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“Yesterday’s doctrines are no longer appropriate  
for today’s realities.” (Drell; Goodby [2007]: p. 1.) 
 
Introduction 
 
1. Overview of the Research Project 
The roots of nuclear strategy go back to the 1950s and over the course of the Cold War 
the primary goals of U.S. nuclear planning did not change much. Military planners and 
targeteers were preparing for the “unthinkable” with war plans that maximize the 
chances of victory for and minimize vulnerability of the U.S. to nuclear attacks, by 
offering strike options that could guarantee these goals without such a high level of 
collateral damage that might risk a President to hesitate to launch an attack. In the 
meanwhile, Presidents and policy makers were trying to solve the fundamental 
challenge of how to deter a first strike by credibly threatening to use nuclear weapons 
but at the same time avoiding a confrontation where their actual use would be 
necessary. In order to ensure the credibility of these threats, every administration tried 
to implement innovations in U.S. nuclear doctrine but despite their best efforts, 
doctrinal changes usually had only limited effects on the actual war plans. As a result of 
the lack of a strong civilian oversight, a striking difference started to emerge between 
the declaratory policy and the operational level. While the political guidance went 
through several fundamental changes, war plans were mostly lagging behind with 
moderate transformations (which had a direct effect on force level requirements, as 
well).  
With the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States lost its main adversary and it was 
logical to assume that both the number and the mission of nuclear weapons would be 
revised and dramatically reduced. In 1990 the U.S. possessed 21,400 nuclear weapons 
which by 2014 have been reduced to 7,700 – with 4,804 warheads in the military 
stockpile. (U.S. Department of State [2014a]) These dramatic reductions in the force 
structure came with major changes in the nuclear guidance, and several shifts and 
innovations in the war plans. But the level of these operational adjustments was far 
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behind the realities of the post-Cold War security environment, and Cold War legacies 
still seem to define certain levels of U.S. nuclear weapons policy.  
In his 2009 Prague address, President Obama stated that it is time to end Cold War 
nuclear thinking and pave the way towards a world without nuclear weapons. (Obama 
[2009]) The notion of “Cold War nuclear thinking” is the central concept of this 
dissertation which is built on the basic premise that Cold War nuclear thinking has 
certain requirements on the different levels of nuclear strategy and maintaining these 
requirements is a “showstopper” for further reductions. 
Since the Prague address, the term “Cold War nuclear thinking” has been widely used in 
academic, as well as in political circles but it has never been defined what it exactly 
means or what the administration meant by it. Therefore, it is not clear what specific 
aspects of the so called Cold War nuclear posture President Obama promised to shift 
away from. In the lack of a clear definition, the term has been mostly used in a negative 
context, or as a sarcastic description of anyone whose thinking is not progressive 
enough.
2
 This, however, is only one side of the coin – it is true that many legacies of the 
Cold War are outdated in the current security environment but there are still some 
characteristics of U.S. nuclear strategy which were developed during the Cold War and 
remain logical today (the doctrine of flexible response for example is one of these 
characteristics).  
In this regard, the main goal of this dissertation is to examine the evolution of Cold War 
nuclear strategy and to objectively identify those guiding principles which were 
characteristics of the bipolar system and designated U.S. nuclear strategy for decades. 
By identifying these principles, the author intends to develop a methodological 
framework which will clearly define what Cold War nuclear thinking means on three 
analytical levels. This framework will help to examine to what extent U.S. nuclear 
                                                 
2
 There are several examples for referring to Cold War thinking in a negative context. Rachel Staley from 
the BASIC Institute, for example, called Cold War thinking “a recipe for disaster.” (Staley [2013]) After 
the 2012 Chicago Summit, Lesley McNiesh, a former associate of the Center for Arms Control and Non-
Proliferation, described the new NATO strategy as outdated which was still inappropriately designed to 
fight the “last (Cold) War.” (McNiesh [2012]) In a 2011 Washington Post article, Walter Pincus claimed 
that Cold War thinking still defined the U.S. force structure which was not adequate to “deter China, or 
al-Qaeda or other non-state terrorist groups,” and he also reminded that “U.S. nuclear warheads have 
not deterred North Korea from trying to build their own, nor do they deter Iran. They may have 
encouraged their programs.” (Pincus [2011]) In another example, Johan Bergenäs and Miles Pomper also 
advocated to end the outdated strategies of the bipolar system in a 2010 Guardian article, titled ‘No more 
cold war thinking.’ (Bergenäs; Pomper [2010]) 
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weapons policy is still driven by Cold War legacies. The three analytical levels of this 
model are:  
 the declaratory policy: it basically refers to a broad set of public statements and 
written documents made by the President, the Secretary of Defense and other 
high-ranking officials on the requirements of deterrence, the strategic doctrine 
and the most important guidelines for nuclear weapons policy;  
 the operational level: this is where the “declaratory policy” should be 
implemented into concrete military strategies and war plans (while the principles 
of the declaratory policy are defined by politicians, the making of operational 
level strategies mostly falls under the control of the military – although civilians 
are having an increased role in the oversight of these strategies);  
 and finally the force structure: it contains the necessary type and number of 
nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles needed to meet the requirements of the 
operational level and to fulfill the role and mission set by the declaratory policy.  
Outlining the characteristics of Cold War nuclear thinking on these three levels will 
help to define the nature of the current U.S. nuclear policy and describe if and how the 
legacies of the Cold War affect the prospects of further reductions in the stockpile. 
In summary, the main research questions of this dissertation are:  
 How has the Obama administration’s visionary Prague agenda affected U.S. 
nuclear weapons policy? 
 What practical changes did it trigger in nuclear strategy? 
 Has the administration really shifted away from Cold War traditions or is there 
still Cold War nuclear thinking on the different levels of nuclear policy? 
 If so, how does it affect the prospects of further nuclear disarmament?  
The first chapter of the dissertation has three main missions. First, it provides a 
historical overview of U.S. nuclear weapons policy, the development of the institutional 
and procedural frameworks of strategic planning, as well as the concrete characteristics 
of nuclear strategy. Describing the evolution of Cold War nuclear planning shows the 
past dynamics of policy guidance and operational planning which gives an important 
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contextual framework. Despite the shifting priorities and the constant innovations on the 
policy level, the chapter also shows that there were several common beliefs and guiding 
principles which led the different administrations. Therefore, the historical overview 
also lays down the ground to identify the specific elements of Cold War nuclear 
thinking.  
Besides the historical overview, the Cold War context also provides a solid basis to 
conceptualize other key terms of the dissertation, like for example nuclear strategy, 
counterforce and counter-value strategies, or strategic stability. Clarifying these 
concepts is a necessary precondition to introduce the main hypotheses of this 
dissertation which suggest that the operational level still preserves many conservative 
elements of the Cold War which have a negative effect on further nuclear reductions. In 
order to prove these hypotheses, the author chose to merge the main findings of the 
historical overview with the relevant aspects of strategic studies and set up a list of 
criteria on Cold War nuclear thinking which will serve as an analytical framework to 
test the Obama administration’s nuclear policy.  
For this purpose, the third mission of this chapter is to provide a literature review of 
three main groups of relevant sources: 1) selected pieces from the discipline of strategic 
studies, 2) the relevant works of policy makers, and 3) seminal works on the operational 
aspects of Cold War nuclear strategy.  
Strategic thinking on the role of nuclear weapons started to evolve during the second 
half of the 1940s. The debate was centered around RAND Corporation’s strategic 
theorists, like for example Bernard Brodie, Albert Wohlstetter, Herman Kahn, William 
W. Kaufmann or Thomas C. Schelling who introduced a unique interdisciplinary 
approach to the field of strategic studies. In the framework of the historical overview, 
the focus is laid on those studies and concepts which had a direct affect on the evolution 
of U.S. nuclear strategy and which made it to actual policy guidance. In addition to 
these theoretical works, the literature review also outlines the most relevant writings of 
policy makers who played a key role in the development of U.S. nuclear doctrine – this 
group includes people like Robert S. McNamara, Henry A. Kissinger, Zbigniew 
Brzezinski or James R. Schlesinger. The third set of sources which is presented in this 
chapter is a synthesis of those groundbreaking academic papers and books which focus 
on the operational aspects of nuclear strategy. William M. Arkin, Bruce G. Blair, 
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William Burr, Fred Kaplan, Janne E. Nolan, Peter Pringle, David A. Rosenberg, and 
Scott D. Sagan laid down the foundations of this kind of research focus and paved to 
way towards further works on the operational level of nuclear weapons employment 
policy. 
The second chapter of the dissertation aims to examine President Obama’s nuclear 
policy based on his pledge to end Cold War nuclear thinking. In order to meet the 
promises of the Prague agenda, the White House initiated a comprehensive review of 
nuclear guidance and pressed for some meaningful changes in U.S. nuclear weapons 
policy. The first milestone of the review was the publication of the administration’s 
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) report in April, 2010. (NPR [2010a]) More than three 
years later, the President announced in his June, 2013 Berlin address that the review had 
officially been finished. (Obama [2013b]) It was marked by the presidential 
employment guidance, a document which set out more specific policy recommendations 
for the military. (U.S. Department of Defense [2013]) Based on these two documents, 
the administration seems to lessen the emphasis on Cold War nuclear thinking in the 
declaratory policy but the operational level is still assumed to preserve several elements 
of Cold War strategic planning. After outlining the campaign strategy and the roots of 
President Obama’s nuclear policy, this chapter takes a quick look at the different steps 
of the review process. It shows the procedural framework of implementation, and how 
the – usually more – general policy guidance gets down to the level of actual war plans. 
The following three sub-chapters (declaratory policy, force structure, operational level) 
focuses on the results of the Obama administration, measured along the concept of Cold 
War nuclear thinking, which is described in the first chapter. (Despite the Cold War 
framework and the focus on the Obama administration, the two decades between the 
end of the Cold War and 2009 are not ignored – each sub-chapter starts with a quick 
overview of the Clinton and Bush administrations’ nuclear policy, outlining how they 
shifted (if at all) away from Cold War thinking and describing their legacy in terms of 
nuclear strategy.) 
The last two sub-chapters focus on the consequences of these dynamics with a special 
attention to the prospects of the nuclear disarmament process. In this regard, the author 
is aware that there are many factors, which influence the implementation of reductions 
but the dissertation does not go into the policy debates of Congress, and the negotiations 
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between the U.S. and Russia. Instead, it focuses on the strategic aspects of nuclear 
disarmament which is the most ignored (at least by the media) but probably the most 
influential determinant of future reductions. This sub-chapter divides the question of 
further reductions into three separate cases: deployed nuclear weapons, non-deployed 
nuclear weapons, and the strategic triad. After going through the most important 
operational policies which define these force requirements, the dissertation outlines a 
list of elements which need to be limited or abandoned by any future administration that 
wishes to implement significant reductions in the U.S. nuclear arsenal.  
 
 
2. Explanation of Choice 
As the United States and Russia still possess almost 94 percent of the world’s nuclear 
weapons capabilities, they remain the dominant players in the field of nuclear arms 
control. (SIPRI [2014]) The policy of these two states has a significant effect on the 
global non-proliferation and disarmament trends and they also have the potential to 
influence the nuclear policy of others – both in a positive and in a negative way. 
The main reason to choose U.S. nuclear strategy out of the two is the political 
commitment of the current administration towards nuclear disarmament in general. 
President Obama’s pledge to global zero and his personal interest in nuclear issues is a 
good starting point to implement meaningful changes in strategic planning and to 
advance further nuclear reductions. After the President’s Prague address, the year 2010 
was a period of success stories: first the Nuclear Posture Review report was published 
on April 6, then two days later President Obama and President Medvedev signed the 
New START Treaty, limiting the deployed strategic nuclear capabilities of the U.S. and 
Russia to 1,550 nuclear warheads and 700 deliveries each. This was followed by the 
first Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in Washington, DC on April 12-13, a process 
initiated by the President to better safeguard all nuclear materials, to reduce the use of 
weapons-grade materials in civilian applications and to advance international 
cooperation in all fields of nuclear security. The next milestone was the May Review 
Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which was concluded by the 
successful adoption of a Final Document, based on the consent of all state parties to the 
Treaty. Although the momentum has considerably slowed down since then, arms 
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control still remains a central focus of the administration’s foreign policy agenda and it 
is still a current issue on the global level as well. 
Besides the potential influence of the U.S. and the relevance of the topic, a third 
important factor in choosing this research area is the relative availability of sources. 
Setting the directions of nuclear strategy, especially in its operational aspects – targeting 
policy and war plans – is the privilege of a few (as Janne E. Nolan called them the 
“guardians of the arsenal”), and in the majority of states (which possess nuclear 
weapons) the public usually do not get any access to primary information on these 
issues. The U.S., however, conducts a rather transparent nuclear policy with sufficient 
literature on the subject since the beginning of the Cold War. Documents and key 
speeches on the declaratory policy are mostly accessible and since the end of the Cold 
War many previous guidance documents have also been declassified which provide a 
unique insight into the world of military planners. But probably the biggest advantage 
for the purposes of this dissertation is the Obama administration’s favorable approach to 
a relatively open nuclear policy which makes it a more transparent government than any 
other before. In 2010, the Obama administration has been the first to disclose an entire 
report on the Nuclear Posture Review
3
 and it also revealed the exact size of the Defense 
Department’s nuclear weapons stockpile (first in 2010 and then again in 2014). Besides, 
it is also the first time that a substantial summary of the presidential employment 
guidance was made available for the public in June, 2013.
4
 
All these factors make the current research design a reasonable choice and a feasible 
task. 
 
 
3. Time Frame 
As the structure suggests, the first chapter focuses on the Cold War years and provides 
an overview of the entire period from the Truman administration to the George H. W. 
                                                 
3
 The entire Nuclear Posture Review document has not been disclosed but the administration prepared a 
detailed report on the NPR which was completely published on April 6, 2010. Previous administrations 
have also come to public with summaries, slides and held briefings on their nuclear postures but the 
Obama administration’s report is by far the most substantial write-up of the NPR which has ever been 
published (altogether 49 pages). (NPR [2010a]) 
4
 In this case, the results of the revised employment strategy were published in the form of a nine-page 
long Pentagon summary report which was submitted to Congress. (U.S. Department of Defense [2013]) 
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Bush administration. But the main focus of the dissertation is the Obama 
administration’s nuclear policy since 2009. Choosing such a current topic always puts 
the burden on the author to be arbitrary and set an exact “end date” to the research. If 
this does not cover an entire administration cycle then it certainly risks some criticism 
over the subjectivity of the choice. In this case, however, restricting the analysis to the 
first four years of the administration would be a mistake. The 2012 reelection campaign 
took a lot of energy and attention away from other issues and the administration could 
not finish the review of its employment guidance and reveal the results. Only half a year 
into his second term could the President announce that the targeting review had been 
finished and a summary of the results was published. On June 19, 2013 President 
Obama delivered his second major speech on nuclear issues, yet again in a European 
capital, this time in Berlin. He reaffirmed his commitment to paving the way towards a 
world without nuclear weapons and envisioned further reductions in the U.S. nuclear 
arsenal. (Obama [2013b]) This was the result of a several years long interagency effort 
to review the role of nuclear weapons aiming to find ways to limit them in number and 
mission as well. Therefore, this date seems to be a suitable end date for the purposes of 
this dissertation, which puts a huge emphasis on the strategic review anyway. 
(Moreover, this date also means a shift in the main “players of the game” as the signing 
of the presidential employment guidance – or as the White House called it, the Nuclear 
Weapons Employment Strategy of the United States – means that the Department of 
Defense (DoD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the U.S. Strategic Command 
(STRATCOM) take over the implementation of the presidential guidance. The 
subsequent guidance documents of these circles, however, will not be available for the 
public and, therefore, cannot be subject to further analysis.) 
Having an exact timeframe definitely helps to focus the dissertation but it is just as 
important to be flexible. Including the major foreign policy speeches from the 2007-
2008 Obama campaign is essential as the campaign strategy provided the basis of the 
Prague agenda and the administration’s entire nuclear policy. The same flexible 
approach is applied at the other end of the time frame, and the author tried to provide an 
outlook to the possible consequences of the implementation of the presidential 
employment guidance, as well as to the future prospects of the Berlin announcement on 
further nuclear reductions. 
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4. Methodology 
This research design relies on the methodology of qualitative analysis. The main reason 
why quantitative methods were excluded lies in the difficulty to transform variables – 
like for example Cold War nuclear thinking – into objectively measurable quantities. 
Qualitative methods, on the other hand, provide the necessary analytical tools to 
examine U.S. nuclear policy since the beginning of the Cold War. 
In order to map Cold War nuclear thinking, the author conducted a focused archival 
research in the U.S. National Security Archive and the George Washington University’s 
online Nuclear Vault, which is a thematic selection of resources from the National 
Security Archive’s Nuclear Documentation Project. These collections provide an 
incredible amount of primary sources on U.S. nuclear policy during the Cold War – 
internal memorandums between key members of the government; notes and minutes 
from top secret meetings; declassified documents and records from the Pentagon and the 
State Department; and most importantly, partly or entirely declassified guidance 
documents on U.S. nuclear strategy. Some of these documents are especially unique: 
Jimmy Carter’s PD-59 Nuclear Targeting Directive (basically his presidential 
employment guidance) which was entirely declassified in September, 2012 and 
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger’s 1974 NUWEP-74 (Nuclear Weapons 
Employment Policy) which guided the 1976 SIOP 5 (Single Integrated Operational 
Plan) war plan – until today this is the only policy directive from the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD) which has been entirely declassified. Based on these 
primary documents and the growing number of secondary sources on the operational 
dimensions of Cold War nuclear policy, it is possible to draw a relatively accurate 
picture on the operational requirements of Cold War nuclear thinking. Some 
groundbreaking works (for example the different volumes of the ‘History of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff’ as well as Bruce Blair’s ‘Strategic Command and Control,’ Fred 
Kaplan’s ‘The Wizards of Armageddon,’ Janne E. Nolan’s ‘Guardians of the Arsenal,’ 
David Rosenberg’s ‘Nuclear War Planning’ and ‘The Origins of Overkill,’ or Scott 
Sagan’s ‘Moving Targets’ and ‘SIOP-62: The Nuclear War Plan Briefing to President 
Kennedy’) provide a good basis for this kind of research focus.  
The examination of the Obama administration’s nuclear policy is based on two 
qualitative methods: document analysis and a systematic interview process. As already 
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mentioned before, the Obama administration conducts a relatively transparent nuclear 
policy and has made two of its primary strategic documents – the report on the Nuclear 
Posture Review and the summary of the presidential employment guidance – available 
for the public. These documents together with the transcripts of the President’s and the 
key cabinet members’ major foreign policy speeches provide a good basis for primary 
source analysis. With this methodology, the main objectives of the administration’s 
nuclear agenda can be clearly identified which helps to judge if the official policy still 
reflects Cold War nuclear thinking. Besides, by comparing the practical results of the 
Obama years with the elements of the announced agenda, one can also define to what 
extent the administration has managed to meet its own goals and implement its own 
policy guidelines. A third benefit of the primary source analysis is the comparative 
framework that can be created in order to see how the 2007-2008 campaign program 
made it to an actual policy agenda. According to Gary Samore, President Obama’s 
former Coordinator for Weapons of Mass Destruction Counter-Terrorism and Arms 
Control, campaign strategies do not necessarily translate into policy but in the case of 
President Obama, “his personal interest and commitment ensured that his campaign 
promises became the basis for his April 2009 Prague speech.” (Samore [2013]: p. 25.) 
Despite major overlaps between the campaign strategy and the Prague agenda, it is still 
worth identifying the differences and explore why certain priorities did not make it to 
official government policies. In this regard, a comparative analysis between the primary 
sources of the 2007-2008 period and the 2009-2010 presidential years can highlight 
some small but still important shifts in focus. 
The last qualitative method applied by this dissertation is a systematic interview process 
which was conducted during a six-month visiting fellowship in Washington, DC. In the 
framework of this process, members of the academia, previous and current government 
officials from the White House, the State Department, the DoD, the National Security 
Council (NSC), the JCS and STRATCOM were questioned about the key concepts of 
this dissertation, the results of the Obama administration, the difficulties that might act 
against the implementation of more significant steps, and most importantly, the “secret 
world” of the current operational level and the possible effects of the new policy 
guidance on the actual war plans.  
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All these qualitative methods add up to a comprehensive methodology which seems to 
be ideal to test and prove the most important premises and statements of this 
dissertation. 
 
 
5. Limits of the Design 
Although it is not usual to draw the attention to the possible weaknesses and limits of a 
dissertation (especially not at the very beginning), but this research design still makes it 
necessary to admit that there are inherent difficulties which come with the analytical 
framework. 
As a result of the limited availability of primary sources, writing anything about the 
operational level of nuclear policies is a tremendous challenge – especially in the case 
of a current administration. The Obama administration’s commitment to relative 
transparency, however, makes it somewhat more feasible. The nine-page long Pentagon 
summary of the presidential employment guidance shows how the DoD interpreted the 
President’s directions and what possible shifts and changes are required in operational 
planning. 
Besides this key document, some factual data is also available on the different elements 
of the operational policy: alert levels, for example, can be estimated based on official 
reports from the Air Force on the general operational readiness of the intercontinental 
ballistic missiles (ICBMs), or the number of deterrent patrols by ballistic missile 
submarines (SSBN) is another piece of information which is available for the public. 
These can help make assumptions on the mission and role of the different legs of the 
nuclear triad, showing to what extent they have changed since the Cold War period. 
These sources, combined with some – sui generis – more subjective interviews have 
provided the backbone of the operational level sub-chapter. Personal interviews were 
conducted on the one hand with people who have access to more information (some of 
them even had the chance to see current or past war plans), and on the other hand with 
academics who have already concluded research projects in this specific area and gained 
a better understanding of these issues. 
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Altogether, the author believes that it would have been ignorance to overlook the limits 
of the design and this short intervention is meant to show that she is aware of the 
biggest challenge of the research, namely how to address the problem of secrecy around 
these issues. But despite all the difficulties, creative ways have been found to overcome 
these challenges, and the applied methods were hopefully appropriate to prove the main 
hypotheses of this dissertation. 
 
 
6. Contribution to the Field 
The Obama administration’s nuclear policy has been a central focus of the arms control 
community since 2009. But despite the fact that the administration set for itself the 
standard of shifting away from the Cold War, the historical framework is mostly 
neglected. Therefore, the first contribution of the current dissertation is the historical 
approach itself, which establishes a clear definition of what Cold War nuclear thinking 
exactly means and analyzes the results of the Obama administration under these tenets. 
The second important dimension that is not emphasized enough in the current debate is 
the strategic aspect of nuclear disarmament. The question of the necessary number of 
nuclear weapons, the possibility of withdrawing non-strategic nuclear weapons from 
Europe, or phasing out one leg of the triad are all in the center of attention and the 
political arguments are presented extensively in academic as well as in daily journals. 
The strategic background of these issues, however, is rarely examined: is it guaranteed 
that the President’s vision is implemented on the operational level, or if the 
administration’s guidelines have any effect on the actual war plans; how does it affect 
force structures if the current alert levels are maintained; or what are the consequences 
of upholding the same number of SSBN deterrent patrols for the next decade? 
In search of answers to these types of questions, this dissertation intends to show the 
linkages between the different levels of nuclear policy and highlight the most important 
obstacles in the way of further nuclear reductions. By going through the characteristics 
of Cold War nuclear thinking, the dissertation outlines what shifts have been 
implemented since 1989 and in cases where Cold War legacies remained, it tries to 
explain the current justification for maintaining these elements. Sometimes the same 
Cold War reasons are used to explain certain strategic considerations but there are cases, 
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when the same elements are maintained for different reasons. Therefore, this analytical 
framework also has the potential to highlight what interests and concerns lay behind the 
current cornerstones of the nuclear posture. In the conclusion, the dissertation tries to 
provide an explanation for the slow transformation of nuclear strategy, and it outlines 
the key strategic problems which need to be addressed in order to implement more 
dramatic reductions in the U.S. force structure. 
On the whole, the real significance of this research is the effort to dig deeper than the 
widely known declaratory policy and the attempt to map how the policy guidelines 
“travel” through the bureaucratic labyrinth of the defense establishment and what 
changes they might trigger in the necessary number of nuclear weapons, prescribed by 
the actual war plans. 
* * * 
 
In the long run, the author wishes to publish this dissertation as a book in order to reach 
out to a wider audience. This will naturally require additional work on the design and 
some further developments in the text. While a future book manuscript would follow the 
logic of the current dissertation, the historic overview is a potential area where the text 
could be improved and extended. Providing more space and effort to the analysis of the 
operational level during the Cold War would guarantee a better understanding of the 
contextual framework of the current research project. Besides, the framework of a book 
might also allow some space to reflect on the policy requirements of further reductions, 
and get into the details of U.S.-Russian arms control negotiations, as well as 
Congressional policies in Washington. 
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I. Cold War Nuclear Thinking and U.S. Nuclear 
Weapons Policy 
 
1. Literature Review: The Evolution of U.S. Nuclear Strategy during 
the Cold War – A Historical Overview 
1.1 The Truman Years (1945-1953) 
During the first years of the nuclear age, the U.S. was the only country to possess 
atomic bombs but despite its nuclear monopoly, until the early 1950s nuclear weapons 
did not occupy a central role in strategic war planning. President Truman saw these 
bombs as weapons of terror, which should only be used as a last resort and he mostly 
remained skeptical about their military utility. (Nolan [1989]: p. 35.) Besides the initial 
skepticism, their limited availability also did not allow nuclear weapons to become 
dominant war fighting tools in the first war plans of the Cold War. 
According to historian David A. Rosenberg, between 1945-1960 U.S. nuclear strategy 
developed on three separate levels: the level of policy guidance; the level of strategic 
plans and concepts; and finally the level of target lists and operational plans. (Rosenberg 
[1983]: pp. 9-10.) On the first level, the President, the National Security Council (NSC), 
the DoD, the State Department and the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission 
(AEC) provided policy guidance on the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. foreign policy 
and military strategy. This policy guidance was then translated by the second level – the 
military planners – into strategic plans and concepts. From 1948 the JCS took the 
leading role in producing strategic plans on nuclear weapons. These plans were the Joint 
Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP since 1952) and the Joint-Mid-Range War Plan, later 
replaced by the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP). These documents outlined force 
requirements and criteria for damage and targeting. On the third level, the JCS guidance 
was transformed into actual target lists and war plans – an area which was almost 
entirely dominated by the Air Force’s Strategic Air Command (SAC).5  
                                                 
5
 The Strategic Air Command was established in March, 1946 as a separate Air Force administrative 
command under the Air Force, and as a specified command under the JCS. Its primary role was to 
execute the nuclear strikes, outlined in the war plans. As SAC was responsible for the implementation, it 
retained the right to prepare its own annual war plans which were sent to the JCS for review and approval. 
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Internal fights between the different branches of government as well as “turf wars” 
among the military services had a significant effect on nuclear strategy. But in addition 
to these fights, Rosenberg also identifies three main external factors which influenced 
the development of U.S. nuclear strategy in a substantial way: technological change, the 
work of strategic theorists, and most importantly, intelligence estimates. (Rosenberg 
[1983]: pp. 10-11.) Technological change constantly expanded the horizons and 
guaranteed newer and more developed weapons systems but it also created new 
challenges to employ or credibly deter the use of nuclear weapons. According to 
Rosenberg’s assessment, the work of strategic theorists6 was important to raise public 
awareness on nuclear issues and influence the policy debate (which he identified as the 
first level of nuclear strategy) but he also claims that their impact on the actual 
operational plans (the third level) remained very limited.
7
 In the meanwhile, the third 
external dynamic (intelligence estimates) were considered the most significant factor 
because they served as the basis of monitoring Soviet force developments and as a 
result, U.S. targeting estimates. 
During the first years of the Truman administration, the President focused on the 
establishment of civilian control over nuclear weapons resources and production, and he 
proposed to put the entire question of atomic energy under international control by the 
United Nations. In the absence of any further interest from the administration or any 
specific policy guidance on the employment of nuclear weapons, the first war plans did 
not even envision the use of atomic bombs. (Kunsman; Lawson [2001]: p. 22.) Strategic 
planning was executed by the Joint War Plan Committees (later replaced by the Joint 
Strategic Plans Group) but “at first, their efforts were limited to the preparation of 
strategic studies of particular areas or of specific military problems.” (Condit [1996]: p. 
153.) These series of studies were called PINCHER. The first war plans prepared under 
the assumption of the use of nuclear weapons were the 1947 short-range BROILER 
                                                 
6
 In this regard, RAND Corporation played an outstanding role as the “Alma Mater” of some of the most 
influential strategic thinkers on U.S. nuclear policy (among them Bernard Brodie, Albert Wohlstetter, 
William Kaufmann, Thomas Schelling and Herman Kahn). It was established in March, 1946 as an Air 
Force RAND (Research and Development) Project to provide analysis on nuclear war and aerial warfare. 
Two years later it was separated and became an independent non-profit organization. Despite its 
independence, RAND has remained somewhere in between the official circles of nuclear policy planning 
and the “outside” world of think tanks. Building on its close connections to the Air Force and introducing 
a positivist revolution in social sciences made RAND Corporation the key Cold War research institute in 
strategic studies and nuclear policy. (Szalai [2009]: pp. 3-4.) 
7
 Janne E. Nolan (author of The Guardians of the Arsenal [1989]) seems to share this view while others 
like Fred Kaplan (The Wizards of Armageddon [1991]) attribute a more influential role to this group. 
DOI: 10.14267/phd.2015009
26 
 
(revised a year later and renamed FROLIC) and the long-range CHARIOTEER plans. 
These plans were later followed by a series of new planning documents: HALFMOON 
in 1948 (later renamed FLEETWOOD), TROJAN and OFFTACKLE in 1949, and 
SHAKEDOWN in 1950. These first war plans were so called capabilities plans (“use 
everything you have”), and they primarily targeted major Soviet cities and some war-
related facilities.
8
 (Pringle; Arkin [1983]: p. 49.) Throughout the late 1940s, nuclear 
weapons were seen only as an extension of conventional strategic bombings and 
skepticism remained about the benefits of their use. They were not considered the 
primary means to make the Soviet Union capitulate in a war or the primary means to 
destroy communism – a skeptical view, concluded by the 1949 Harmon report, which 
claimed that the 133 atomic bombs envisioned in the TROJAN war plan could only 
destroy less than half
9
 of the Soviet industrial capacities. (Nolan [1989]: pp. 43-44, 54-
57.) The Harmon report ultimately led to a dramatic increase in nuclear forces, the 
reevaluation of the urban targeting strategy and the tasking of SAC to also include the 
“retardation of Soviet advances in Western Europe” in its war plans. (Quoted in 
Rosenberg [1983]: p. 16.) 
In 1950, the JCS designated a three-level coding system for the potential targets of a 
nuclear strike, based on their type and relevance to Soviet war-making capacity. These 
targets were listed in the annual Emergency War Plans (EWP). The three target 
categories were: Bravo targets (to deny the Soviets the capability to launch a nuclear 
offensive – mostly airfields), Delta targets (to disrupt the vital elements of Soviet war-
making capacity) and Romeo (to retard Soviet advances into Western Europe). (Pringle; 
Arkin [1983]: p. 56.) These categories remained in effect until the first Single Integrated 
Operational Plan was prepared in 1960.
10
 (Although these categories were renamed 
later, they were maintained in the National Target Base (NTB) all the way through the 
                                                 
8
 BROILER ordered to drop 34 bombs on 24 cities, TROJAN called for 133 bombs on 70 cities, 
OFFTACKLE targeted 104 cities with 220 bombs, withholding 72 nuclear weapons for a re-attack. 
(Pringle; Arkin [1983]: p. 62.)  
9
 More specifically, Rosenberg talks about only 30-40 percent. (Rosenberg [1983]: p. 16.) 
10
 The methodology, however, was completely ignorant of some essential factors of nuclear war fighting. 
In 1950 Yale professor, Bernard Brodie was asked by the Air Force Chief of Staff, Hoyt Vandenberg to 
review the target lists. Brodie wrote two reports in which he criticized the target lists for a number of 
reasons: first, he questioned the utility of targeting Soviet electric power plants, the location of which the 
U.S. did not know completely at that time. Second, he was critical about the “concentration of attacks” 
and proposed to withhold some forces “as a bargaining lever, as a measure of coercion, as a way of 
threatening the Soviets to back down.” Third, he argued against the city bombing strategy (which he 
considered totally ineffective) and stressed the importance of selective targeting. And fourth, he criticized 
military planners for not calculating how much damage can be expected from a nuclear attack – including 
the aftereffects like for example the radioactive fallout. (Kaplan [1991]: pp. 45-47.) 
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Reagan years. In essence, Bravo-Delta-Romeo as a concept carries on until today.) 
(Interview with Franklin C. Miller [2014]) 
Despite Truman’s best efforts, by the early 1950s the control of nuclear weapons slowly 
shifted away from the civilians to the military and by 1952 the JCS managed to get total 
control of the nuclear stockpile and all of its operational aspects.
11
 Although the 
ultimate authority to decide over the use of nuclear weapons remained with the 
President, some declassified sources suggest that by the second half of the 1950s, a kind 
of pre-delegation of control was approved by the President and top commanders 
probably gained some authority to order the use of nuclear weapons under “specific 
emergency conditions.” (National Security Archive EBB No. 45 [2001])  
Under the Truman years, military planners only received very vague policy guidance. 
The 1948 NSC-30 document contained two main points for nuclear planning: first, the 
U.S. must be ready to use “all appropriate means available, including atomic weapons” 
and second, employment should be based on the decision of the President. The same 
year, NSC-20/4 added that the U.S. would refrain from initiating a war, suggesting that 
nuclear strikes would be launched only in response to Soviet aggression.
12
 In the 
meanwhile, the main focus of the war plans has shifted between TROJAN and 
OFFTACKLE from directed attacks against Soviet war-making capacity to the desire to 
destroy these targets. Besides, a completely new objective was also included: the 
retardation of Soviet advances in Western Europe. (Kunsman; Lawson [2001]: pp. 23-
29.) The last policy guidance which the Truman administration approved was the NSC-
68/4 in 1950, mostly written by Paul Nitze, acting director of the Policy Planning Staff 
in the State Department. It presented an alarming picture on Soviet intentions to initiate 
wars, with little or without any warning, and argued for the maintenance of strategic 
superiority and a rapid build-up of nuclear weapons capabilities. (NSC-68/4 [1950]) 
Altogether, Truman tried to keep the U.S. nuclear arsenal under strict civilian control 
and limit the use of these weapons but despite his initial skepticism, the rapid 
                                                 
11
 Parallel to these developments, SAC gained a bigger control over the target lists. After a high level Air 
Staff target panel in January, 1951 the participants agreed that SAC concerns about isolated targets were 
valid hence target lists would “concentrate on industry itself which is located in urban areas” so that even 
if a bomb missed its target, “a bonus will be derived from the use of the bomb” by causing major 
destructions in the civilian population. In addition, the panel decided that future target lists would be 
submitted to SAC for first comment before sending it to the JCS. (Quoted in Rosenberg [1983]: p. 18.) 
12
 Although prevention was excluded by the policy guidance, it did not rule out the option of preemptive 
nuclear strikes, which remained a preferred concept on the operational level. 
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deterioration of the international security environment – the 1948 Communist coup in 
Czechoslovakia, the first Berlin crisis, the Communist victory in China, the Korean War 
and probably most importantly, the first successful Soviet nuclear test in 1949 – 
changed his mind and led to a rapidly growing reliance on these weapons of terror. 
During his eight years, Truman presided over the establishment of what Janne E. Nolan 
called the nuclear “guardianship”13 and paved the way towards a major increase in the 
number and mission of nuclear weapons, realized by the Eisenhower administration. 
 
1.2 The Eisenhower Years (1953-1961) 
The first considerable growth in the U.S. nuclear arsenal started in response to the 
Harmon report and with the endorsement of the NSC-68. But this was just the 
beginning, Truman approved altogether three increases in nuclear production. 
(Rosenberg [1983]: pp. 23-27.) It was continued by the Eisenhower administration and 
by the end of 1961 the U.S. possessed around 22,000 nuclear weapons. The weapons, 
however, did not only advance in number, but in technical capabilities as well. During 
the 1950s, increasingly sophisticated and increasingly powerful weapons designs were 
introduced in the U.S. military stockpile. As a result, in 1952 the U.S. successfully 
tested its first thermonuclear weapon (the “H-bomb”).  
With the rapidly growing number of nuclear weapons, the number of potential targets 
also dramatically increased. By the mid-1950s the U.S. intelligence identified 5,000-
6,000 potential targets, of which SAC provided concrete plans to hit 1,700. As the 
number of targets had become too high to hit all at once, SAC planned an “optimum 
plan” starting with a massive first strike of dropping 700 atomic bombs on the Soviet 
Union. (Pringle; Arkin [1983]: p. 44.) These plans did not really consider withholding 
forces for a second wave after the first nuclear exchange, they put all emphasis on a 
destructive first strike (or the so called “Sunday punch” as Bernard Brodie referred to 
the military jargon about these plans). Parallel to the dramatic increase in the number of 
nuclear weapons and potential targets, the targeting assignments also proliferated. While 
SAC was responsible to prepare the strategic bombing list, Navy commanders in the 
                                                 
13
 In reference to a small group of military specialists who decide over the most specific details of nuclear 
war plans, hence possess the biggest influence over the employment of nuclear weapons. 
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Atlantic and the Pacific as well as the commander of U.S. forces in Europe also 
prepared their own target lists, which resulted in duplications, sometimes triplications in 
targeting. All these lists were supposed to be submitted to the JCS but their resources 
were too limited to process this incredible amount of data. Therefore, a Joint Strategic 
Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) was created in 1960, through which SAC gained control 
over all nuclear targeting and operational planning (including targeting for the Navy and 
the regional commands). Its primary task was to create the first integrated operational 
plan, approved in the end of the Eisenhower administration. (Nolan [1989]: pp. 58-60.) 
 
Figure 1. Nuclear Posture Planning during the Cold War 
 
The Eisenhower period was a clear continuation of the late Truman years in the sense 
that nuclear weapons were generally seen as a “cheap” solution to counterbalance 
Soviet conventional advantages (especially in Europe). Being the first NATO Allied 
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Supreme Commander between 1950 and 1952, Eisenhower was familiar with the JCS 
targeting mechanisms and encouraged planning for the tactical use of nuclear weapons 
in Europe. But unlike Truman, Eisenhower believed that nuclear weapons were 
essential for national defense and they should be weapons of first resort. In this spirit, he 
made sure that nuclear weapons would be available for use – he transferred complete 
atomic bombs to the military for deployment and increased readiness, which led to a 
significant decrease in the civilian control of nuclear weapons.
14
 (Rosenberg [1983]: pp. 
27-28.) 
With regard to the policy guidance on nuclear planning, President Eisenhower approved 
NSC-162/2 as its Basic National Security Policy at the end of his first year. It contained 
three main objectives in terms of nuclear warfare:  
(1) “A strong military posture, with emphasis on the capability of inflicting massive 
retaliatory damage by offensive striking power; 
(2) U.S. and allied forces in readiness to move rapidly initially to counter aggression by 
Soviet bloc forces and to hold vital areas and lines of communication; and  
(3) A mobilization base, and its protection against crippling damage, adequate to insure 
victory in the event of general war.” (NSC-162/2 [1953]: pp. 5-6) 
A more clear articulation of this strategy was presented by Eisenhower’s Secretary of 
State, John Foster Dulles. In his famous January, 1954 speech, Dulles declared that the 
U.S. would “retaliate ‘massively’ against Soviet aggression” even if the aggression was 
solely conventional. (Quoted in Kunsman; Lawson [2001]: p. 34.) Under the 
Eisenhower-Dulles policy, everything was subordinated to victory (although their 
strategy also reaffirmed Truman’s denial of preventive attacks and made a commitment 
to refrain from provoking a war, and to retaliate only in response to Soviet aggression).  
Regarding the Eisenhower administration’s nuclear doctrine, two important “external 
dynamics” made a significant effect on its formulation. First, the improvement of Soviet 
technical capabilities (especially the first Soviet thermonuclear test in 1953 and the 
1957 Sputnik shock); and second, the technical developments in the United States 
                                                 
14
 However, this was only a temporary drop in the civilian control of these weapons – in National Security 
Action Memorandum-160, President Kennedy ordered to install Permissive Action Links (PALs) on 
nuclear weapons to prevent unauthorized use by enemy countries, terrorist groups, rogue U.S. troops, or 
the allies of the U.S. (this latter was the original motivation to install PALs). (Bellovin [2005]) 
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which created the possibility to deploy ballistic missiles on submarines, hence build an 
invulnerable leg in the nuclear delivery systems. 
The most important effect of the Soviet technical advancements was the reevaluation of 
potential war fighting scenarios and the newly arisen questions about the ability of the 
U.S. to launch a disarming first strike on the Soviet Union. The strategists of the RAND 
Corporation and their unique methodology which combined mathematics, science, 
international affairs and national security played a key role in this debate. According to 
Bernard Brodie’s ‘The Absolute Weapon,’ if the United States intends to effectively 
deter aggression, it is essential to retain an ability “to retaliate in kind” and “to explore 
all conceivable situations when the aggressor’s fear of retaliation will be at a minimum 
and to seek to eliminate them.” (Brodie [1946]: p. 77.) Exactly this ability “to retaliate 
in kind” was questioned during the 1950s, when strategists raised serious concerns 
about the vulnerability of the U.S. bomber force. In the 1950s, SAC operational plans 
were based on U.S. strategic bombers flying to overseas military bases and initiating a 
nuclear attack against Soviet targets from there. But another RAND analyst, Albert 
Wohlstetter pointed out that these forward military bases (especially the ones in Europe) 
were highly vulnerable to potential Soviet strikes and this vulnerability might have 
tempted Moscow to launch a surprise attack and eliminate them in order to advance its 
military objectives on the ground. Based on these concerns, a 1954 Ad Hoc Committee 
of the Air Force proposed five areas where the Air Force had to implement changes in 
order to reduce its vulnerability: 1) recognize the existence of the vulnerability; 2) 
specific vulnerability factors should be developed on a zonal basis; 3) harden the bases 
to survive an atomic attack; 4) establish new advanced bases and improve refueling 
capacities; 5) material resources overseas should be reduced to a minimum level.
15
 
(Kaplan [1991]: p. 89-106.) 
The second “external dynamic,” namely the new developments in the U.S. delivery 
capabilities triggered a similarly significant debate – this time – between the Air Force 
and the Navy. The possibility to deploy ballistic missiles on submarines raised the 
potential to possess an invulnerable leg in the delivery systems, and the hope that a 
                                                 
15
 The 1955 Killian Report, ordered by the Science Advisory Committee, mostly contained the same 
conclusions and called for the hardening of SAC bases; the acceleration of research and development on 
the field of IRBMs and ICBMs; and increased intelligence gathering on the Soviet Union. However, it 
also remarked that these new developments will very soon provide both sides with the capability to 
destroy the other and the U.S. might lose its nuclear superiority. (Kunsman; Lawson [2001]: pp. 36-37.) 
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nuclear war might rather be prevented and not fought. Deterring the Soviet Union with 
the threat of a devastating retaliatory strike started to be seen as a more realistic and 
more favorable option in contrast to damage limitation and preemption. While the Navy 
was promoting the former (a “finite deterrence”), the Air Force insisted on retaining a 
massive capability to act preemptively – in case deterrence would fail – and to destroy 
as much as possible of the Soviet nuclear capabilities. (Nolan [1989]: p. 59.) Although, 
the policy guidance of the Eisenhower administration clearly reflected this shift towards 
retaliation, the operational level still suggested a continued planning for preemption. 
During the Eisenhower years, the U.S. list of potential Soviet targets increased from 
3,000 to 20,000 and nuclear war plans included massive strikes against the Soviet 
Union, China and their satellite states. The administration tried to cut with the Truman 
legacy of mostly focusing on Soviet cities and put a greater emphasis on the so called 
“counterforce” targets.16 (Pringle; Arkin [1983]: pp. 107.) From 1954, SAC’s Basic War 
Plan (BWP) was to send 735 bombers to hit the Soviet early warning systems, 
simultaneously from all directions. The main objectives of this massive strike were to 
minimize the time U.S. bombers had to spend in hostile airspace, maximize destruction 
and limit the need for re-attacks. This basically meant a single massive blow against the 
“optimum mix” of military and urban-industrial targets, rather designed for prevention 
than retaliation. (Rosenberg [1983]: p. 35.) 
As a result of Soviet technical advances, President Eisenhower tasked the Science 
Advisory Committee with the set up of a special panel to investigate civil defense 
measures. The so called Gaither Report (also mostly written by Paul Nitze)
17
 was 
presented one month after the first Soviet Sputnik was launch in November, 1957. Its 
main recommendation was to strengthen the strategic capabilities by establishing early 
warning systems to detect the approach of Soviet bombers and ballistic missiles. From 
an operational perspective, it also triggered a higher readiness in the bomber force – 
frequent airborne alert exercises started in 1958 and by 1961 a continuous airborne alert 
status was introduced for 60-70 bombers. (Kunsman; Lawson [2001]: p. 38.) 
                                                 
16
 In 1954 President Eisenhower specifically expressed his preference to focus on military targets and 
asked the JCS: “If we batter Soviet cities to pieces by bombing what solution do we have to take control of 
the situation and handle it so as to achieve the objectives for which we went to war?” (Quoted in 
Rosenberg [1983]: p. 35.) 
17
 Just like the Truman administration’s NSC-68/4 policy guidance document. 
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1.3 The Kennedy-Johnson Years (1961-1969) 
When President Kennedy came into the White House in 1961, he inherited a robust 
nuclear arsenal of about 22,000 nuclear weapons and the first integrated operational 
plan (called SIOP 62), created by the JSTPS and approved by the JCS in December, 
1960. Although war plans in general are among the most highly classified documents, 
the briefing on the new war plan which was given by General Lyman L. Lemnitzer 
(Chairman of the JCS) to President Kennedy has been declassified, and Professor Scott 
Sagan offers a thorough analysis on it. (Sagan [1987])  
The preparation of SIOP 62 was based on detailed policy guidance from the Eisenhower 
administration and it clearly reflected the administration’s massive retaliation doctrine 
(and the retained option of a preemptive strike, as well). SIOP 62 called for launching 
1,685 nuclear weapons on 1,004 delivery systems in a massive strike against targets in 
the Sino-Soviet bloc. During the briefing, General Lemnitzer did not suggest at any 
point that the U.S. was considering a surprise first strike against the Soviet Union, 
instead he focused on preemption (in case of a warning that Moscow was preparing for 
a first strike) and retaliation (in response to Soviet aggression). According to the 
guidance from the Eisenhower administration, strikes were supposed to be delivered on 
a minimum 75 percent probability with extremely high damage expectancy levels.
18
 The 
presented target list was an “optimum mix” of military and urban-industrial targets, 
including critical nuclear counterforce targets (10-25 Soviet ICBMs, 140 bomber bases 
and up to 30 submarine bases).
19
 Although the JCS claimed that this strategy allowed 
the U.S. to prevail in a general nuclear war, they were also cautious to warn the 
President that even under the most successful (preemptive) execution of the war plan, 
they cannot exclude the possibility that some long range Soviet forces would survive 
and retaliate against the U.S.
20
 Despite the unquestionable nuclear superiority of the 
U.S. and the significant imbalances in the alert readiness,
21
 SIOP 62 was still a totally 
                                                 
18
 “Seven priority targets were to be destroyed with 97 percent assurance, 213 targets with 95 percent 
assurance, and 592 with at least 90 percent assurance.” (Sagan [1987]: p. 32.) 
19
 Although civilian population was still held at risk, this was the first war plan that principally aimed at 
military targets – the genesis of the so called “counterforce” strategies. 
20
 Professor Sagan explains the cautious behavior of the JCS by three factors: operational difficulties (e.g. 
the risk of generating strategic warning for Moscow while putting forces on higher readiness level in 
preparation for the SIOP); uncertainty about the warning, authorization and timing of the attacks and 
finally, uncertainty about the precise location and readiness of the entire Russian force. 
21
 The U.S. kept half of its bomber force on 15-minute ground-runway alert, with some B52s on constant 
airborne alert, and two Polaris submarines as well as one-third of the ICBM force were also kept on alert. 
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inflexible, “overwhelming nuclear offensive,” without any plans to withhold U.S. forces 
or exclude satellite states which might not be directly involved in the given conflict. It 
was based on overkill and massive destruction regardless of whether used for 
preemption or retaliation. Although it contained 14 options, all envisioned the use of 
everything the U.S. could mobilize and there was nothing limited or flexible about it. 
While the inherited war plan clearly reflected the Eisenhower administration’s nuclear 
doctrine, the Kennedy-Johnson years brought a major reevaluation of the benefits and 
dangers of massive retaliation. The Kennedy administration had a fundamentally 
different perspective on nuclear war fighting. With the growing Soviet nuclear arsenal 
and their conventional superiority, they had the military means to survive and retaliate 
after a destructive preemptive strike and – according to Pentagon estimates – kill a few 
million Americans. This loss was totally unacceptable for the new President. In the 
framework of massive retaliation, even the smallest incidents risked escalation into a 
general nuclear war. Massive retaliation did not only deter adversaries but with the 
inflexible option of using almost 2,000 nuclear weapons in a single overwhelming 
strike, it certainly had a self-deterrent effect, as well – which questioned the entire 
credibility of the U.S. nuclear doctrine. (Nolan [1989]: p. 68.) President Kennedy’s 
short term in office was marked with a chain of crises: the Bay of Pigs incident, the 
second Berlin crisis, the Cuban missile crisis and the Vietnam War. The doctrine of 
massive retaliation was completely inadequate (and according to Kennedy, also 
inhuman) to address these challenges. In search of more credible solutions, the Kennedy 
administration kept asking for more flexible options in the war plans in order to provide 
more appropriate responses to the emerging crisis situations.  
One of the first explicit articulations of the new “flexible response” doctrine was the 
1961 National Security Memorandum No. 109 which laid out three escalation steps
22
 in 
                                                                                                                                               
The Soviet Union, on the other hand, did not keep any of its ICBMs on high alert (warheads were kept 
separately), there were no bombers on constant runway or airborne alert, and the submarine fleet was 
mostly kept in port during peacetime. (Sagan [1987]: p. 29.) 
22
 The importance of gradual escalation was something that RAND analysts have already been 
advocating. Herman Kahn was one of the early pioneers in the field of escalation theory. Although his 
escalation concept was not directly transferred into policy guidance (it was too complex) but his seminal 
works laid down a solid basis for the doctrine of flexible response and the counterforce strategy of the 
early 1960s. (Kunsman; Lawson [2001]: p. 47.) 
Kahn argued that U.S. nuclear war plans should not rely on a single massive attack, instead a variety of 
options were needed to be able to “control” a nuclear war and exercise “intrawar deterrence.” Control in 
his understanding meant that the adversary could be deterred from further aggression and a nuclear war 
could ultimately be “won.” (Kahn [2007]: p. 175.) During the first years of the 1960s, he worked on the 
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a potential nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union: starting with selective nuclear 
attacks (with the primary purpose of demonstration), then limited tactical employment 
of nuclear weapons (to achieve significant tactical advantage and to extend pressure), 
and finally general nuclear war. (NSAM-109 [1961]) 
The primary architect of this doctrinal revision was Secretary of Defense Robert 
McNamara. Although McNamara believed that the U.S. should maintain its nuclear 
superiority, he differed from his predecessors in terms of its practical application. He 
thought that nuclear retaliation should be secondary to conventional options, thus 
technological advancements in conventional capabilities became a central focus of his 
defense policy. In his understanding, “flexible response was the consideration of all 
non-nuclear options in the event of war, and it aimed to foster an institutional 
avoidance of nuclear options for retaliation.” (Kessler [2010]: p. 40.) He argued that a 
deterrence strategy based on the threat of a massive (nuclear) retaliatory strike against 
the smallest conventional aggression increased crisis instability and it might force an 
adversary to take irrational and desperate steps in order to preempt a massive 
destruction of its forces. (McNamara [1986]: pp. 46-47.)  
In order to refine U.S. nuclear strategy, and pave the way towards the implementation of 
flexible response, McNamara used two methods (both of them quite unpopular in 
military circles): first, the system of (what he called) Planning-Programming-
Budgeting
23
 and second, the involvement of young system analysts in military planning. 
                                                                                                                                               
question of escalation theory and he came up with the concept of the “escalation ladder to war” – a list of 
forty-four escalation “rungs” starting from “ostensible crisis” all the way up to “spasm or insensate war.” 
(Kahn [1965]) 
In order to control a war and avoid Soviet nuclear blackmail, Kahn argued that three “types of deterrence” 
were necessary: the first type was pure deterrence (deterrence of a “direct attack” on the United States), 
the second not-incredible-first-strike capability (“strategic threats to deter an enemy from engaging in 
very provocative acts, other than a direct attack on the United States itself”) and the third a tit-for-tat 
capability (“graduated and controlled deterrence” to deter all other hostile acts). According to Kahn, the 
second and the third types were the most essential elements. While the second type deterrence required 
the capabilities to execute a massive nuclear first strike, the third type deterrence required smaller, more 
limited options to respond to lower level Soviet aggressions. (Kahn [2007]: p. 126.) 
23
 McNamara believed that he could rationalize the U.S. military infrastructure by keeping the budget and 
planning processes under strict civilian control. Therefore he established the system of Draft Presidential 
Memoranda (DPM) in order to “impose detailed justification for each element of the defense budget, 
policy and doctrine.” (Nolan [1989]: p. 62.) 
Regarding the planning processes, McNamara’s chief achievement was putting force requirements and 
intelligence assessments under civilian control. Prior to the McNamara years, the military services 
enjoyed a greater freedom in setting their own force requirements and strategic postures. According to a 
1961 NSC memo, the U.S. services had three separate doctrines at the time: counterforce at the Air Force, 
finite deterrent at the Navy and credible deterrent at the Army. They also used separate intelligence 
estimates which served as a basis of their force requirements. (Nolan [1989]: p. 71.) 
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During the 1960 presidential campaign, many RAND analysts were already secretly 
involved in the planning of the Kennedy campaign strategy. The presidential candidate 
(and McNamara, as well) were very receptive to the ideas of limited war and 
counterforce. Kennedy opposed massive retaliation, and acknowledged the dangers of 
the vulnerability of the U.S. bomber force (revealed by RAND analysts in the 1950s) 
and the perception of a “missile gap” between the Soviet Union and the United States. 
Under McNamara’s Pentagon years, these defense intellectuals (the so called “whiz 
kids”)24 were tasked with providing studies and recommendations on how to shape U.S. 
nuclear strategy in accordance with the realities of the nuclear age. (Kaplan [1991]: pp. 
248-253.) These years were marked as some of the very rare occasions when civilians 
got such a direct access to U.S. strategic planning. 
One major (although short-lived) innovation of the whiz kids was the introduction of the 
“no cities” doctrine (also usually called “city avoidance” or “war fighting” or 
“counterforce” strategy).25 Daniel Ellsberg, Assistant Secretary of State for International 
Affairs argued that major cities should be totally avoided in U.S. nuclear strikes as 
current plans imposing maximum civilian casualties on the Soviet bloc “would fail to 
inhibit punitive retaliation by surviving enemy units, but would instead eliminate the 
possibility that enemy responses could be controlled or terminated to U.S. advantage.” 
(Quoted in Kaplan [1991]: p. 278.) Although the revisions of the SIOP 62 were already 
underway, McNamara signed Ellsberg’s conclusions into official policy guidance to 
lead the JCS in their preparations for the Kennedy administration’s first war plan, the 
SIOP 63. 
One of the main recommendations of the Ellsberg memo was the re-categorization of 
targets. What was previously called “optimum mix” was divided into three “tasks” – 
nuclear targets (ALPHA), other military targets (BRAVO), and urban-industrial targets 
(CHARLIE). Five primary attack options were designated: 1) strategic forces, 2) air-
defense sites away from cities, 3) air-defense sites closer to cities, 4) command-control 
centers, and 5) all-out strike against Soviet cities. These options provided the President 
with greater flexibility to respond under various conditions and with the capability to 
withhold nuclear strikes against certain target categories, or certain states, or certain 
                                                 
24
 Among others, Harold Brown, Alain Enthoven, Patrick Gross, William Kaufmann, Henry Rowen and 
Ivan Selin. 
25
 The reemergence of an idea which was already promoted by Bernard Brodie in the early 1950s.  
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categories in certain states. Despite the greater flexibility, the new SIOP was still far 
from offering real limited attacks, it still envisioned the use of hundreds of nuclear 
weapons and preserved the option of a massive single strike with thousands, based on 
the execution of the SIOP in all categories simultaneously. (Sagan [1987]: pp. 38-39.) 
According to Ellsberg’s guidance, in the initial phase of a nuclear war, only the “least 
destructive, most purely counterforce option would be exercised” and if the war 
escalated, it could be combined with the second, third, and fourth categories, 
withholding the last option of bombing cities as a last resort, in case the war is totally 
out of control.
26
 In William Kaufmann’s summary, the main principles of the new war 
plan were: control, flexibility, discrimination. (Kaplan [1991]: p. 279.) 
McNamara officially announced the new counterforce strategy in his 1962 Ann Arbor 
speech. For McNamara, counterforce meant “approaching nuclear exchanges in terms 
of bargaining.” He borrowed several concepts from RAND theorist, Thomas Schelling 
about limiting and controlling nuclear exchanges and terminating the war by involving 
bargaining in the process (most of these concepts gained even more emphasis under the 
Nixon years). But McNamara differed from Schelling in matching conventional warfare 
with nuclear warfare, risking that traditional conventional contingencies would rush into 
nuclear exchanges. (Freedman [2003]: p. 223.) 
This pure counterforce strategy, however, sent an alarming message to many. Primarily 
focusing on military targets – erroneously – suggested that the U.S. was preparing for a 
first strike against Soviet strategic forces, otherwise it wouldn’t make sense to point 
U.S. missiles and bombers on targets which would probably be emptied if the Soviets 
attacked first.
27
 As a Soviet strategist phrased it, “a strategy which contemplates 
attaining victory through the destruction of the armed forces cannot stem from the idea 
of a “retaliatory” blow; it stems from preventive action and the achievement of 
surprise.” (Quoted in Freedman [2003]: p. 226.) A second problem was that the Soviets 
were catching up in nuclear capabilities
28
 – this provided more counterforce targets for 
                                                 
26
 Interestingly, as a result of the new “no cities” guidance, even Moscow was excluded from the list of 
primary targets. (Pringle; Arkin [1983]: p. 121.) 
27
 Professor Sagan argued that those who equated counterforce strategy with the preparation for a damage 
limiting first strike were wrong. Although he also admitted that this “misperception” was understandable: 
U.S. war plans contained preemptive strike options and damage limiting was the aim in case a nuclear 
war broke out but it did not mean that the U.S. was planning to initiate it. (Sagan [1989]: p. 73.) 
28
 Besides the increased number of their forces, the Soviets also started to harden their launchers. 
According to photoreconnaissance satellites, many ICBMs were placed in concrete underground silos. 
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U.S. military planners and significantly increased the Soviets’ chances to survive a 
preemptive strike. Besides, physical problems and strategic uncertainties also worked 
against this strategy: first, even the most precisely executed counterforce mission risked 
killing millions of civilians and second, there were absolutely no guarantees that after a 
purely counterforce U.S. strike the Soviets would follow the same strategy
29
 and restrain 
themselves from attacking U.S. population centers in a retaliatory strike.
30
 (Panofsky 
[1973]) As a result of all these concerns, during the mid-1960s U.S. nuclear strategy 
was transformed into a “second strike counterforce” or a so called “damage limiting 
strategy.” (Pringle; Arkin [1983]: pp. 122-123.) 
The JCS in general were on board with the idea of no cities counterforce as until they 
were able to locate new military targets, it provided them with a solid justification to ask 
for an increase in U.S. nuclear forces – the more primary targets they found, the more 
nuclear weapons were necessary to hold them at risk. This unlimited growth in the force 
levels, however, was not preferred by McNamara who saw these requests as Air Force 
attempts to acquire a disarming first strike capability. In order to go against these trends, 
he presented President Johnson a new Draft Presidential Memoranda in December, 1963 
which put a greater emphasis on deterrence, instead of war fighting. McNamara claimed 
that in light of the expanding Soviet military capabilities, counterforce
31
 may not 
provide the benefits the administration was hoping for, and the extra resources needed 
to maintain this strategy were simply not warranted. Therefore, he proposed a shift to 
the doctrine of – what he called – “assured destruction” and put a greater emphasis on 
the survivability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, which would guarantee a reliable second 
strike capability. Based on concrete calculations about the Soviet military capabilities, 
he laid out the principles of this new strategy: “An essential test of the adequacy of our 
posture is our ability to destroy, after a well planned and executed Soviet surprise 
attack on our Strategic Nuclear Forces, the Soviet government and military controls, 
                                                 
29
 Although there were no solid guarantees from either side but McNamara tried to communicate his new 
strategy to Moscow as an offer to set a rule to avoid major cities in future nuclear exchanges. He tried to 
convince his Soviet counterparts that U.S. forces were designed to be able to ride out a Soviet attack and 
retaliate, therefore there was no need for the U.S. to preempt. (Freedman [2003]: pp. 225-226.) 
30
 An additional problem with the first strike option was President Kennedy’s opposition to the mere idea 
of executing Eisenhower’s massive strike option as preemption. Only a few weeks into his office, 
Kennedy made a public pledge that the U.S. would not execute preemptive nuclear strikes. This was the 
first and also the last time that a U.S. president officially renounced the first use of nuclear weapons. 
(Nolan [1989]: p. 64.) 
31
 At least not in the form it was originally imagined by the administration – focusing on the primary 
military targets and holding at risk all strategic forces of the Soviet Block have become more difficult and 
less feasible. 
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plus a large percentage of their population and economy (e.g. 30% of their population, 
50% of their industrial capacity, and 150 of their cities). The purpose of such a 
capability is to give us a high degree of confidence that, under all foreseeable 
conditions, we can deter a calculated deliberate Soviet nuclear attack.”32 (DPM-151 
[1963]) 
The new doctrine of assured destruction
33
 meant that McNamara could deny the 
constant demands of the JCS for more weapons. New priorities were guiding the trends 
of the U.S. force structure: survivability and accuracy. Nuclear weapons had to be able 
to survive a Soviet attack and then retaliate accurately against the fully hardened targets 
of the enemy. In this spirit, McNamara approved the development of the new 
Minuteman II ICBM and a research program was started for the creation of the first 
Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRV) – a cheap solution to 
provide counterforce without dramatically increasing the number of launchers. 
The McNamara years altogether presented a great civilian innovation in the declaratory 
policy but the “no cities” doctrine was very soon reversed and shifted to “assured 
destruction” which was blamed by many to be the primary reason for the loss of U.S. 
superiority and the Soviet catch-up in nuclear capabilities (by 1965 the U.S. and Soviet 
nuclear forces were in an approximate balance). (Nolan [1989]: pp. 86-87.) The least 
successful venture, however, was still the operational level which was seriously lagging 
behind the fundamental doctrinal changes from massive retaliation to flexible response. 
Although the revised versions of SIOP 62 rearranged and reprioritized the target 
categories and provided some options to withhold forces but they were still unable to 
offer real limited strike options which could be adequately used under the gradual 
escalation scenarios, advertised by the administration. 
 
                                                 
32
 The calculations used in McNamara’s memorandum were prepared by a computer program design by 
another RAND associate, Alain Enthoven. His methodology was based on calculating the damage caused 
by dropping one-megaton nuclear weapons on Soviet cities. At several different levels, he calculated how 
much additional damage could be caused by dropping another bomb. He used his results to prepare a 
graph with two curves: one showing how many people would be killed and the other showing the 
industrial damage. He found that beyond 400 megatons (which would destroy all major cities) the curves 
started to considerably flatten and the “benefits” of dropping an additional bomb became smaller and 
smaller. The numbers used by McNamara were calculated under this 400 megaton margin. This whole 
concept relied on what economists call “diminishing marginal returns.” (Kaplan [1991]: pp. 317-318.) 
33
 Hudson Institute associate, Donald Brennan attached the term “mutual” to assured destruction as a 
sarcastic reflection on the McNamara doctrine – hence the acronym: MAD.    
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1.4 The Nixon-Ford Years (1969-1977) 
Flexible response remained an official nuclear doctrine for the rest of the Cold War, but 
under this umbrella each administration tried to introduce its own innovations – both in 
terms of technological developments and in policy guidance. The inherited doctrine of 
assured destruction was not entirely popular among members of the incoming Nixon 
administration. According to Henry Kissinger, President Nixon’s National Security 
Advisor, the biggest problem with the doctrine of assured destruction was that the 
United States “deterred Soviet attack by maintaining offensive forces capable of 
achieving a particular level of civilian deaths and industrial damage. The strategy did 
not aim at destroying the other side’s missile or bomber forces…” (Kissinger [1979]: p. 
215.) 
In general, Kissinger was puzzled by the concept of credible military policy. During the 
1950s and 1960s he tried to examine the criteria for credible war fighting under the 
circumstances of the nuclear age. In his 1957 book on ‘Nuclear Weapons and Foreign 
Policy’ he argued that Eisenhower’s doctrine of massive retaliation was flawed because 
it did not transform military power into policy. Kissinger claimed that as both sides 
were restrained by the potential devastation of an all-out nuclear war, the Soviet Union 
could gain many tactical victories without the fear of punishment. Deterring an all-out 
nuclear war was still considered imperative but Kissinger thought that nuclear weapons 
should have a second objective as well. If necessary, the U.S. should be able to fight 
limited nuclear wars, therefore, it was necessary to transform U.S. nuclear forces for 
battlefield employment and include low-yield, mobile nuclear weapons for tactical use. 
(Kissinger [1969]) 
Shortly after his inauguration, in late January, 1969 President Nixon and Kissinger 
received their first briefing on the SIOP. After the meeting both were shocked, mostly 
because they found the attack options offered under the existing war plans totally 
inadequate to handle a crisis in Europe, the Middle East or Asia. Despite the efforts of 
previous administrations to include a wider range of more discriminative options, the 
attacks were still too massive. As a result, Kissinger started to pressure the national 
security bureaucracy to provide him with ideas and ways to use nuclear weapons more 
selectively. (Burr [2005]) As Kissinger noted later, “to have the only option that of 
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killing 80 million people is the height of immorality.” (NSC Minutes of the Verification 
Panel Meeting [1973]: p. 8.) 
The desire of the new administration to put the emphasis on limited nuclear options 
(LNO) created a new opportunity for RAND theorists to influence U.S. nuclear policy 
in a direct and significant manner. One of the earliest advocates of the concept of 
limited war was William Kaufmann. During the second half of the 1950s, Kaufmann 
argued that it was not in the interest of the U.S. or the Soviet Union to follow a policy 
which led to suicide and self-annihilation, therefore, both sides should restrain 
themselves and keep any emerging war limited. However, he believed that such a 
limited war should be fought with conventional weapons and the U.S. should increase 
its capabilities in this area. He claimed that any employment of nuclear weapons would 
no longer be a limited war (mostly because of the huge and indiscriminate destructive 
power of these weapons), and it would also not “be a method of obtaining 
overwhelmingly favorable resolutions of outstanding issues.” (Kaufmann [1972]: p. 
127.) Although he excluded the use of nuclear weapons from his limited war concept, 
his arguments for “rationality, mutual restraints, controlled responses and 
circumscribed limits on the intensity and boundaries of the conflict” laid down a good 
basis to extend limited war to the employment of nuclear weapons as well. (Kaplan 
[1991]: p. 327.) 
Another influential RAND theorist of this concept was Thomas Schelling who 
approached this question from a different angle and based his arguments on game 
theory. According to Schelling, under the circumstances of a nuclear balance, massive 
retaliation was suicide and lacked credibility as the Soviets also gained the necessary 
capabilities to retaliate massively. (Schelling [1980]: p. 253.) But he was also critical of 
a pure counterforce strategy, claiming that it had a destabilizing effect and raised the 
incentives to launch a preemptive strike. In Schelling’s argument, if the United States 
and the Soviet Union at any point decided to engage in a nuclear war it would be 
because of their “reciprocal fear of surprise attack.” In order to avoid this scenario, the 
two superpowers ought to start arms control negotiations to limit the deployment of 
weapons which were vulnerable to attacks and made the adversary’s forces vulnerable 
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to a first strike.
34
 According to this logic, nuclear weapons with a great “counterforce 
power” upset stability and might tempt the other side to launch a preemptive strike. The 
only way to preserve stability is to eliminate (or at least minimize) any incentives to 
strike first (this argument is the basis of the so called “first strike stability” concept). 
The use of nuclear weapons, however, was still considered useful in Schelling’s 
argument: these weapons can “still be capable of carrying out ‘retaliation’ in a punitive 
sense.” (Schelling [1980]: p. 252.) Employing “limited or graduated reprisals” could 
send signals to Moscow, improve the chances of intrawar bargaining and this coercive 
strategy could ultimately convince the Soviets to retreat.  
The RAND ideas of escalation control, limited war and intrawar bargaining by Kahn, 
Kaufmann and Schelling have become the central concepts of the Nixon-Ford 
administrations’ nuclear policy. Between 1972 and 1974 the national security 
establishment was working on plans and ideas to implement selective nuclear targeting 
and provide the President with limited options. In 1974, the DoD was taken over by 
James R. Schlesinger who shared Nixon’s and Kissinger’s view that “the destruction of 
enemy cities ‘should not be the only option and possibly not the primary option’ of the 
United States in the event of war.” He called the doctrine of assured destruction “a 
wrong declaratory policy” which had “moral defects,” “lacked convincingness” and was 
“logically inconsistent.” (Quoted in Kunsman; Lawson [2001]: p. 54.) 
                                                 
34
 Arms control negotiations during the Nixon and Ford administrations approached the question of 
strategic stability from two different angles. On the offensive side, they aimed to preserve parity and 
eliminate the incentives for a first strike by putting an upper limit to the growth of the strategic nuclear 
arsenals. This materialized in the 1972 SALT I Treaty which consisted of two basic documents. The first 
document of the SALT I Treaty was an Interim Agreement on certain measures limiting strategic 
offensive arms, while the second document, the ABM Treaty focused on the limitation of strategic 
defensive systems. This second approach, the defensive angle meant to ease some of the Soviet paranoia 
about U.S. developments in the area of missile defense. During the Cold War, the Soviets have gradually 
realized that missile defense hurts strategic stability and it has to be limited. The concept of a U.S. anti-
ballistic missile (ABM) defense system was not new in the late 1960s, early 1970s. The first proposal to 
establish such a system dates back to 1946 when a board of scientists recommended building one. The 
first ballistic missile defense (BMD) program of the U.S. was the ‘Nike-X’ program, followed by the 
‘Sentinel’ in 1967. During the McNamara years, these programs were aimed at nationwide defenses to 
protect crucial civilian and industrial targets (a capability strongly supported by Nelson Rockefeller). In 
the early 1970s, the Nixon administration changed this focus and BMD systems shifted to the protection 
of ICBM capabilities – as a reflection of this shift, the entire program was renamed to ‘Safeguard.’ The 
Nixon administration argued that protecting the entire civilian population of the U.S. was impossible on 
the one hand and it also triggered an arms race between the two superpowers, threatening that Moscow 
would consider launching a first strike against the retaliatory capabilities of SAC which was not protected 
by a BMD system. This new focus was a more rational approach, as defending Minuteman sites seemed 
to be more feasible and also less demanding (in case of failure, the U.S. would “only” lose an ICBM, not 
an entire city). (Kaplan [1991]: pp. 343-355.) For Nixon and Kissinger, “the American ABM was to be at 
once a bargaining chip and a pedagogic tool in the service of MAD.” (Quoted in Nolan [1989]: p. 99.) 
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In January, 1974 the two-year long review process reached to an end and Nixon signed 
his official presidential guidance on the employment of nuclear weapons (the National 
Security Decision Memorandum-242 (NSDM) document). As Schlesinger made some 
informal remarks on the content of the new guidance, the press suddenly started to call 
this new approach the “Schlesinger doctrine.” (Burr [2005]) NSDM-242 starts with the 
acknowledgement that the new approach is not “a major new departure in U.S. nuclear 
strategy” rather “an elaboration of existing policy.” (NSDM-242 [1974]: p. 1.) The 
fundamental mission of nuclear weapons is threefold: to deter a nuclear attack against 
the United States; to deter conventional and nuclear attacks against its allied forces; and 
to inhibit coercion. Although the U.S. will primarily rely on conventional capabilities to 
deter conventional aggression but the new guidance does not entirely rule out the use of 
nuclear weapons in response to conventional aggression. The guidance addressed two 
main scenarios: limited nuclear wars and general wars. Under the first scenario, the 
main objectives of limited nuclear employment are early war termination and escalation 
control. In this spirit, attack options should be limited in level, scope and duration to 
send a clear signal to Moscow on the nature of the attacks. These options should also 
withhold some vital enemy targets as “hostage to subsequent destruction” and “permit 
control over the timing and pace of attack execution.” (NSDM-242 [1974]: p. 2.) Under 
the second scenario of general war, escalation cannot be controlled and the main 
objective is to “obtain the best possible outcome.” (NSDM-242 [1974]: p. 2.) Regarding 
the attack options, three main planning instructions were provided: first, maintain 
survivable strategic forces in reserve to protect and employ coercion; second, destroy 
the enemy’s political, economic and military resources which are critical for early 
recovery; and third, limit damage to the national political, economic and military 
resources. In addition to all these, a major emphasis was laid on the survivability of 
national command and control systems.  
Based on this policy guidance, three months later Schlesinger’s Office issued its more 
specific instructions for the military planners of the JCS. This document was the 
NUWEP-74 which guided the preparations of the next war plan, the 1976 SIOP 5. The 
OSD guidance identified three strategic concepts to guarantee escalation control: 
escalation boundaries (the “ability to conduct nuclear war at various levels of intensity 
within clearly defined boundaries”), trans-attack stability (withhold forces “for the 
purpose of deterring further enemy escalation”), and avoidance of the enemy’s national 
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command and control (withhold attacks on “the enemy’s highest command structure” as 
well as on “sensors and communications systems needed by the enemy leaders to 
discern the nature of U.S. attacks”). (NUWEP-74 [1974]: p. 2.)  
Four attack options were designated: 
 1) major attack options and 2) selected attack options (both to destroy selected 
economic and military resources, post-war recover capabilities, leadership targets, 
nuclear offensive capabilities and conventional forces), (NUWEP-74 [1974]:  
pp. 4-5.) 
 3) limited nuclear options and 4) regional nuclear options (both to indicate that 
local conflicts are part of the vital interest of the U.S., to establish or increase 
superiority, and to respond to limited nuclear attacks). (NUWEP-74 [1974]: p. 6.) 
On targeting and damage expectancy requirements, the guidance instructed that the 
overall damage expectancy should not normally exceed 90 percent, and “no less than 
one warhead should be applied to each ICBM site, each IRBM and MRBM site, each 
base for heavy, medium, and light bombers and each base for missile-launching 
submarines.” (NUWEP-74 [1974]: A-7) 
Although the document stated that “it is not the intent of this guidance to target civilian 
population per se,” it still required nuclear attacks on war-supporting economic bases, 
industrial facilities, major centers of governments and other targets critical to post-
attack recovery.  
Altogether, NSDM-242 and NUWEP-74 reintroduced the concepts of counterforce and 
war fighting from the early McNamara years by offering a series of limited nuclear 
options (in case deterrence fails). Both documents emphasized the exclusively 
retaliatory function of U.S. nuclear forces, selectivity in strike options (avoiding attacks 
on cities) and the desire for early war termination by intrawar bargaining. As Nixon 
called it, U.S. nuclear policy was based on the principle of “strategic sufficiency.” 
(Nolan [1989]: p. 100.) 
On the operational level, the new guidance rearranged target categories, introduced – as 
a new element – the targeting of Soviet military forces anywhere in the world, and 
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matched high-quality weapons with high priority targets. As a result, SIOP 5 provided 
some smaller options than before, but it was still far from the expectations of the policy 
level – even the smallest strike options included several hundred warheads. Moreover, 
with the inclusion of economic recovery targets, the number of potential targets has 
increased to 25,000 which created a gap between the targets and the available weapons. 
(Nolan [1989]: pp. 109-117.) 
During the Nixon-Ford era, just like in the case of the previous administrations, the pace 
of policy innovations significantly exceeded that of the transformations of the 
operational level and war plans were still dominated by “selective” massive strikes. 
With some technical developments, however, flexible response has become more 
realistic than during the Kennedy-Johnson years. 
 
1.5 The Carter Years (1977-1981) 
Despite being a nuclear officer at the Navy, President Carter was a dedicated advocate 
of nuclear arms control. He had a fundamental hatred to nuclear weapons – in his 1977 
Inaugural Address he took a pledge to move “toward our ultimate goal – the 
elimination of all nuclear weapons from this Earth.” (Carter [1977]) He wanted to cut 
deep in the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arsenals, conclude a treaty which would restrict nuclear 
capabilities to a “small number of single-warhead missiles, with the missiles all uniform 
in size, and deploy them in totally invulnerable place” and he also advocated a 
comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. (Quoted in Nolan [1989]: p. 129.) Since the 
advent of the nuclear age, Carter had been the only President who had experience in 
nuclear planning and who took the effort to examine war plans. He presided over the 
most comprehensive review since the McNamara years. Based on numerous studies on 
how to fight and prevail in a nuclear war, his administration made a significant 
contribution to strategic thinking about a protracted nuclear war. (Nolan [1989] pp. 33; 
129) 
Entering into office, President Carter immediately ordered an overall review of U.S. 
defense policy which was followed by a comprehensive review of nuclear targeting 
policy. The new administration was not too enthusiastic about the Nixon-Ford strategy 
of limited nuclear options. In March, 1977 National Security Advisor Zbigniew 
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Brzezinski sent a memorandum to the President explaining the controversies of the 
inherited nuclear doctrine: first, the policy guidance for the application of LNOs was 
missing; second, it was uncertain how and from where the President would conduct 
such a limited nuclear war; third, the coordination of intelligence and operations was 
unclear; and fourth, the vulnerability of the National Command Authority was not 
addressed adequately.
35
 (Brzezinski [1977])  
The first presidential guidance from the Carter White House was the Presidential 
Directive (PD)/NSC-18 in August, 1977. It characterized U.S.-Soviet relations as both 
competition and cooperation and designated five main goals for U.S. national strategy: 
1) counterbalancing the Soviets with a combination of military forces and political 
efforts; 2) compete politically to pursue human rights and national independence; 3) 
seek cooperation in regional conflicts and reduce potential tensions; 4) advance 
American security interests through verifiable arms control and disarmament 
agreements; and 5) involve the Soviet Union constructively in global activities. (PD-18 
[1977]: p. 2.) 
PD-18 also mandated two additional reviews: a comprehensive review of U.S. targeting 
policy and a study to examine a “secure reserve force” which would guarantee 
“national entity survival” after a massive Soviet strike. The targeting review provided a 
150 pages long document which identified smaller targets for a potential LNO (a 
guidance which Brzezinski missed from the previous documents). The review also 
concluded two main observations on Soviet nuclear policy: first, the hardening of key 
military targets which made them more survivable and resistant to a U.S. nuclear attack; 
and second, a civil defense program to ensure the survival of Soviet leaders.
36
 These 
two developments suggested that “the Soviets seriously plan to face the problems of 
fighting and surviving a nuclear war should it occur, and of winning, in the sense of 
                                                 
35
 According to Brzezinski, the command, control, communications and intelligence systems were 
“among the weaker links.” In fact, nuclear security expert, Bruce Blair argues that until the 1980s 
“Deficiencies in U.S. C3I systems have been so severe for so long that developments in size and technical 
composition of the superpower’s arsenals have been practically irrelevant to the nuclear confrontation.” 
Blair claims that “once deterrence fails, it fails completely” – a targeted Soviet strike against the C3I 
systems could possibly block U.S. retaliation and completely eliminate the chances of a gradual 
escalation with withhold options and intrawar bargaining. (Blair [1985]: pp. 4-5.) 
36
 According to DoD reports, by 1982 the Soviets were planning to place 110,000 government officials in 
hardened targets during a conflict. By 1987, this number has grown to 175,000 party and government 
personnel. (Sagan [1989]: p. 83.) 
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having military forces capable of dominating the post-war world.”37 (Nuclear Targeting 
Policy Review [1978]: p. i.)  
The main concepts of this targeting review were escalation control (a key concept of the 
Nixon-Ford years, as well) and damage limitation. In terms of general war targeting, 
four target categories were designated: 1) impede recovery of the Soviet Union both in 
the short term and in the long term; 2) destroy Soviet national political and military 
leadership and command and control; 3) destroy Soviet nuclear forces, and 4) destroy 
Soviet non-nuclear forces. (Nuclear Targeting Policy Review [1978]: p. iii.) Besides the 
Soviet Union, thousands of additional targets were designated in the Warsaw Pact 
satellites as well as in China, Cuba and Vietnam. 
SIOP 5 went through four revisions, but the above listed target categories were allocated 
to the same four general attack options (first envisioned by NUWEP-74): Major Attack 
Options (MAO), Selected Attack Options (SAO), Limited Attack Options (LAO) and 
Regional Nuclear Options (RNO). The war plans placed these four options under two 
special attack categories: 1) preemptive attacks; 2) or Launch on Warning (LOW) and 
Launch under Attack (LUA) options. (Pringle; Arkin [1983]: pp. 187-188.) 
Based on the findings and recommendations of the targeting review, Brzezinski 
believed that the Soviets were planning to win a nuclear war if it broke out and the U.S. 
had to adjust its own nuclear posture in view of that. Both sides agreed that under 
strategic parity a disarming first strike was not possible but Moscow seemed to 
challenge the doctrine of mutual assured destruction and go for a “winning capability” 
in a prolonged nuclear exchange. Brzezinski argued that the Soviet commitment to such 
a capability was not contradictory to their belief in nuclear deterrence – preparing for 
war fighting was seen as a “different approach” to planning against the eventual failure 
of deterrence. (Brzezinski [1991]) Accordingly, the U.S. also had to put the emphasis on 
a war fighting capability which is enough to “minimize Soviet hopes of military success” 
and “include targeting options against Soviet military forces, command and control, 
and military support that would maximize the threats to the objective targets while 
minimizing collateral damage.” (Nuclear Targeting Policy Review [1978]: p. ii.) 
                                                 
37
 Besides securing key personnel of the Soviet leadership, evacuation plans were also worked out to save 
those Soviet workers whose work was considered essential in a postwar environment. According to Janne 
E. Nolan, all this indicated a Soviet planning to “survive as a society after a nuclear war.” 
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The next presidential guidance, the 1980 PD-59 was based on these findings and 
outlined the principles of a new nuclear doctrine, the so called countervailing strategy.
38
 
The guidance stated that in order to deter an attack on the U.S. and its allies, 
Washington needed to make its adversaries recognize that “no plausible outcome would 
represent a victory” in a nuclear exchange. To meet this purpose, modernizations were 
necessary both in the nuclear forces and in the supporting command, control, 
communications and intelligence (C
3
I) systems. The survivability of the C
3
I systems 
was considered the primary guarantor of a U.S. ability to conduct sequential attacks on 
military targets and their industrial support facilities, while it was also essential to the 
use of withheld nuclear weapons for a belated attack on urban and industrial targets. 
The guidance put the major emphasis on military and control targets which were 
essential for the Soviets to win a nuclear war. In this regard, the four primary target 
categories of the Nuclear Targeting Policy Review remained in force: strategic and 
theater nuclear forces; military C
3
I systems; all other military forces; and industrial 
facilities which provide immediate support to military activities. (PD-59 [1980]) 
Walter Slocombe, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning summarized 
the basis of this new strategy with three requirements: first, U.S. nuclear forces must 
survive a Soviet first strike; second, an overall balance is needed between the U.S. and 
the Soviet Union (it can be realized by adjusting U.S. force planning to Soviet nuclear 
developments and by concluding bilateral arms control treaties); and third, the U.S. 
nuclear doctrine must make it clear to Moscow that the Soviets would not prevail in a 
nuclear exchange. In addition, the countervailing strategy meant to strengthen U.S. 
security guarantees towards its allies (especially towards the NATO allies) by denying 
any Soviet aggression the belief that it could be advantageous to launch an attack at the 
first place. LNOs were considered central tools to exercise escalation control and 
bargain an early war termination. But it is also important to emphasize what the new 
countervailing strategy was not meant to be. It did not claim that the United States could 
win a limited nuclear war, it only focused on denying this possibility from the Soviets 
and convincing them about it. It also did not claim that a nuclear exchange could be 
controlled and kept limited – there were no guarantees that a limited attack on any 
NATO or Warsaw Pact ally would not be followed by a massive level of destructive 
strikes on the two superpowers. (Slocombe [1981]) 
                                                 
38
 It was a strategy which was urged by William Kaufmann and Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown. 
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Altogether, the countervailing strategy was not a major departure from the nuclear 
postures of the previous administrations. The strategists of the Carter administration 
identified this new guidance as an evolutionary development and not as a radical shift in 
U.S. nuclear planning. It was a deterrence strategy which aimed to guarantee that the 
Soviet Union would not want to “test” its new military capabilities and would not see 
benefits in any aggression against the U.S. or its allies.  
When Carter overtook the White House, SIOP contained many limited options – 
although Brzezinski argued that the policy guidance for their implementation was not 
adequate. During the Carter years, the number and categories of SIOP options were 
further increased and as a result of Brzezinski’s innovations, a massive list of 40,000 
potential Soviet targets was designated. (Pringle; Arkin [1983]: pp. 172-174.) 
Under the countervailing strategy, nuclear force acquisition was primarily led by the 
desire for a credible war fighting capability. As a result, Carter presided over a strategic 
build-up with the approval of 200 hard-target-kill MX missiles (each carrying 10 
warheads). His administration renewed the emphasis on military targets and war-
supporting industry (more than half of the 40,000 targets) as opposed to economic 
recovery targets (about 15,000 targets of the 40,000); while command, control and 
communications targets were also upgraded (about 2,000 targets). In the war plans, high 
quality weapons were reassigned to high value military targets, more flexible 
employment was introduced in the strike options and a larger secure reserve force was 
designated. (Nolan [1989]: pp. 126-139 and Pringle; Arkin [1983]: pp. 191-197) 
Carter left behind a somewhat controversial legacy: despite his opposition to nuclear 
weapons, he approved a major build-up in U.S. nuclear forces, raised nuclear war 
fighting into the center of attention, left the ratification of SALT II sail away and paved 
the way in front of the Reagan administration’s rather aggressive policy towards 
Moscow. 
 
1.6 The Reagan Years (1981-1989) 
Over the history of U.S. nuclear strategy, there were three major “windows of 
vulnerability” which had a significant impact on the evolution of political guidance and 
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nuclear war plans. The first window was the “bomber gap” in the 1950s, revealed by 
Wohlstetter’s vulnerability study. The next one was the “missile gap” starting in 1957. 
Although it turned out later that the perception of a “missile gap” was flawed from the 
very beginning and intelligence estimates on the Soviet missile capabilities were 
mistakenly exaggerated, it still had an important effect on the Eisenhower-Kennedy 
years’ nuclear policy. The third major “window of vulnerability” was the “Minuteman 
vulnerability” which was already an issue during the late Carter years (in fact, the 
decision to build MX missiles was exactly because of the perceived vulnerability of the 
Minuteman force) and it remained on the agenda under Reagan as well.  
Starting in 1976, Paul Nitze revived the so called Committee on the Present Danger 
(CPD)
39
 to reveal U.S. weaknesses and put the SALT II Treaty into a grave. By the late 
1970s, the CPD has grown to an incredibly powerful lobby group and Nitze managed to 
launch a grand public debate on the vulnerability of the U.S. ICBM force against a 
Soviet first strike.
40
 They used calculations based on the accuracy of Soviet missiles 
coupled with the Soviets’ “evil intentions” and argued that during the Carter years the 
U.S. was in “imminent danger” of a Soviet attack. (Nolan [1989[: p. 136.) 
Already before taking over the White House, Reagan had long been speaking about the 
dangers of the Soviet Union and he had been known as a committed supporter of a 
higher defense budget. When Reagan entered into office in 1981, he appointed 31 
members of the CPD (he was the 32
nd
) into senior government positions. Among them 
was Nitze, who headed the U.S. delegation in the negotiations with the Soviet Union 
about nuclear reductions in Europe. (Kaplan [1991]: p. 386.) 
The first presidential guidance which the Reagan administration issued on its nuclear 
strategy was the 1981 National Security Decision Directive-13 (NSDD). It maintained 
                                                 
39
 The CPD was originally founded in 1950 to promote the ideas of NSC-68, mostly written by Paul Nitze 
(one of the founders of the committee). They wanted to educate the U.S. public about the dangers of the 
spread of communism. A second influential period of the committee started in 1976, when the group 
aimed to drive the attention on the weaknesses of U.S. strategic capabilities and to promote a massive 
military build-up. The third grand period of the CPD started in 2004 and it mostly focused on the “war on 
terror.” 
40
 The basic idea was that Moscow could destroy the U.S. ICBM force with only a few hundred nuclear 
weapons and it would leave Washington without appropriate hard-target-kill capabilities for a 
counterforce retaliation. Therefore, the U.S. would be forced to use its remaining bomber and SLBM 
arsenal to attack Soviet cities, risking that the Soviets would also target major U.S. population centers. 
Although the entire theory was highly debated in the early 1980s, it still triggered a heavy modernization 
program. 
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that the primary role of nuclear weapons is deterrence against a direct – especially 
nuclear – attack on the U.S. and its allies. But it also stated that if such an attack 
happened, the U.S. must prevail and prepare for responses which would make “Soviet 
assessments of war outcomes, under any contingency, so uncertain and dangerous as to 
remove any incentive for initiating attack.” In other words, the U.S. “must be prepared 
to wage war successfully.” (NSDD-13 [1981]) In terms of rhetoric, this was a 
significant departure from the Carter administration’s doctrine, as it used a much 
tougher language in order to make sure that Moscow will not see any possible gains in 
attacking the U.S. But it still did not mean that the U.S. believed that it could win a 
nuclear war, it was still based on the desire to deny this option from Moscow, which 
was a continuity with the previous countervailing strategy (a 1982 Congressional 
testimony of Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger clearly indicates that U.S. nuclear 
strategy did not depart from the mainstream in this regard). (Weinberger [1982]) A key 
element of Reagan’s prevailing strategy was “holding at risk the full range of enemy 
military capabilities that threaten the Unites States and its Allies.” These imperatives 
were set to guide U.S. force structure trends and war plans, leading to a massive military 
build-up in the nuclear forces and a substantial development in the C
3
I systems. 
(NSDD-13 [1981]) 
NSDD-13 was signed in October, 1981 and only a couple of months later Secretary of 
Defense Caspar Weinberger also issued his own defense guidance, based on the 
presidential directive. It reinforced U.S. intentions to fight and win a protracted nuclear 
war, placing the old “coercive strategy” back to the center of U.S. nuclear planning. The 
guidance was written by Richard Perle and two RAND veterans, Andrew Marshall and 
Fred Iklé – which meant the big come-back of the RAND analysts’ counterforce 
concept. (Kaplan [1991]: p. 387.) 
Based on these guidelines, the Reagan administration modernized all three legs of the 
nuclear triad (the MX ICBMs, the D5 SLBMs, and the B-1 bombers) and introduced 
new nuclear weapons in the European continent. The crown jewel of these 
modernization programs was the President’s 1983 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) 
speech which announced a program to shoot down enemy missiles in outer space
41
 (one 
of the strongest advocates of the initiative was Edward Teller, father of the hydrogen 
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 This is where the name, “Star Wars” comes from. 
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bomb). This policy was a rejection of mutual vulnerability and shifted U.S.-Soviet 
competition to a new field. While, the two superpowers’ rivalry seemed to reach a point 
of technical exhaustion in the traditional areas, competing in the outer space promised 
(at least in theory) that U.S. technology could challenge the Soviet military power.  
Another important factor in the reincarnation of missile defense systems was the new 
“window of vulnerability.” The White House believed that with the massive ICBM 
modernizations and the development of the MX missiles (armed with ten warheads 
each), accepting ICBM vulnerability was not in Washington’s best interest. First, these 
missiles were now too valuable to put them in vulnerable silos (fearing that they would 
invite immediate hits in a Soviet first strike) and second, if the U.S. did not want to lose 
them, it had to apply a launch on warning (LOW) policy (launch all of these missiles 
upon the first sign of a Soviet aggression, risking to destabilize the situation and 
escalate the conflict).
42
 (Nolan [1989]: pp. 150-151.) Based on these concerns, 
improving missile defense systems provided an alternative way to close the “window of 
vulnerability” and improve the survivability of the ICBM forces. In January, 1984 the 
program finally received an official endorsement from the President in the NSDD-119 
and the first budget request was submitted to Congress. 
In the early 1980s, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union were reluctant to negotiate arms 
control agreements and it took several different factors to get them back to the 
negotiating table by the mid-1980s. On the Soviet side, a fundamental political change 
was implemented under the Gorbachev years; while the U.S. was under the pressure of 
allies and the “freeze movement.” As a result of this new turn of events, the second term 
of the Reagan administration as well as the four years of the Bush administration were a 
mix of nuclear modernizations and arms control negotiations. Two major arms control 
agreements were initiated at the 1986 U.S.-Soviet Reykjavik Summit:
43
 the 1987 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF)
44
 which completely eliminated the 
intermediate-range (500-5,500 km) nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic 
                                                 
42
 As Nolan argued, ICBMs had the “worst of all worlds” – inherent vulnerability and maximum lethality 
which made it necessary to keep them on high alert and launch first for the highest efficiency. 
43
 Although the summit paved the way in front of two major arms control agreements, it was still 
considered as a failure by some. The meeting originally had an agenda to abolish all offensive nuclear 
weapons in three phases over the timeframe of ten years. But disagreements over the continued testing of 
the SDI system finally undermined these plans and separate agreements were concluded in the different 
ranges of the offensive nuclear capabilities. (Savranskaya; Blanton [2006]) 
44
 Signed by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev on December 8, 1987. 
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and cruise missiles; and the 1991 First START Treaty
45
 which reduced the number of 
strategic nuclear weapons by 30-40 percent. 
The most interesting aspect of the SDI system was that it had almost zero effect on the 
actual war plans. In fact, it was a major obstacle in the way of further reductions and it 
essentially supported a status quo in U.S. nuclear planning.  
With the modernized capabilities to hit hardened Soviet targets, targeting policy had to 
be adjusted, calling for additional flexibility. This meant preparing for “maximum 
options” in response to strategic attacks from the Soviet Union and for the case of a 
protracted nuclear war. As a result of the increasing mobility of the Soviet forces (e.g. 
mobile ICBMs), re-locatable targets were designated, providing greater significance to 
manned bombers and intelligence gathering. Although these developments served to 
increase the credibility of deterrence, the promptness of the new weapons systems 
suggested an increased capability for preemption (which of course was denied by 
government officials). Reagan, in addition, continued Carter’s efforts to strengthen the 
C
3
I systems of the U.S. and put a great emphasis on the survivability of the National 
Command Authority. (Nolan [1989]: pp. 237-247.) 
These developments were coupled with a “quiet revolution” to implement flexible 
response in the war plans. According to PD-59, this required solving two fundamental 
challenges: develop concrete targeting plans for real limited nuclear options,
46
 and 
establish procedures for civilian oversight to guarantee that the war plans would 
properly reflect the policy guidance of the given administration. This struggle was led 
by Franklin C. Miller, head of the Strategic Forces Policy at the OSD between 1981 and 
1989. Miller’s task was not easy: despite decades of attempts to fundamentally alter war 
plans and implement real flexibility, the military resisted major civilian interference in 
its procedures and the JCS retained their control over the weapons employment policy. 
Since the 1974 NSDM-242, the OSD has provided the JCS with a nuclear weapons 
employment guidance (NUWEP) and based on this document, the JCS prepared the 
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) which was the key document for the preparation 
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 Signed by George H.W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev on July 31, 1991. 
46
 Nuclear options at the beginning of the 1980s were still too large therefore the administration wanted 
small options which could be easily read by Soviet warning systems (although it did not guarantee that 
Moscow would respond accordingly but the aim was to make a clear distinction between a limited strike 
and an all-out nuclear attack). (Interview with Franklin C. Miller [2014]) 
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of the SIOP. During the Cold War, however, NUWEP was mostly seen by the military 
as an advice, not as a directive. Therefore, significant gaps evolved between the policy 
guidance and the actual war plans, and many of the options introduced by the policy 
guidance documents only remained “paper options” in practice. (Nolan [1989]: pp. 248-
251.)  
After Miller concluded a list of areas where the policy guidance was not followed in the 
actual targeting, he was given authority to look over the SIOP. Between 1985 and 1987 
Miller solved a substantial number of these problems, and Secretary Weinberger 
approved them one by one. With revisions of the Reagan years’ last NUWEP underway 
in 1987, an opportunity opened to “institutionalize” his quiet revolution and NUWEP-
87 was written as a compendium of the changes of the last two years. (Interview with 
Miller [2014]) Miller was authorized to establish routine procedures for civilian 
oversight in the implementation of policy guidance – during his investigations, he found 
that as a result of negligence and the lack of interactions, there was a serious breakdown 
in civilian control, damage expectancies were exaggerated, weapons allocations still 
ignored the secondary effects of a nuclear strike, and most importantly, war plans were 
still missing real limited options. While the President might have thought of authorizing 
a limited nuclear attack, in the 1980s it still meant launching 300 nuclear weapons on 
Poland for example. As a result of Miller’s efforts, by the end of the Reagan 
administration, NUWEP-87 guaranteed that civilians had a stronger oversight in nuclear 
targeting; and the necessary time to construct war plans was reduced in order to make 
SIOP less rigid and more responsive to the changing environment. Thus, the 1988 SIOP 
6-E reemphasized flexible targeting and finally contained new and very limited strike 
options. (Nolan [1989]: pp. 253-261.) 
 
1.7 The Bush Years (1989-1993) 
Regarding President George H.W. Bush’s nuclear doctrine, both continuity with the 
Reagan administration’s policy and a strategic redirection apply. NSDD-13 remained 
the official presidential guidance until November, 1997 when President Clinton issued a 
new directive (PDD-16). This meant that the prevailing strategy remained the guiding 
principle of U.S. nuclear policy. Just like the Reagan era, the Bush years were also a 
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mix of nuclear modernizations and arms control negotiations – however, it reflected a 
shifting view compared to the Reagan years that arms control became more imperative 
than nuclear modernizations (several modernization programs were unilaterally 
cancelled by the administration). 
The Bush years concluded the most dramatic nuclear reductions in U.S. history. In two 
rounds, President Bush announced a series of unilateral pledges to limit and reduce U.S. 
nuclear forces. (Both rounds were followed by reciprocal unilateral measures by the 
Kremlin.) These measures were called Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNI). The first 
round was announced in September, 1991 and it pledged to 1) take all strategic bombers 
off alert; 2) stand down from alert and accelerate the reduction of all ICBMs which 
were to be deactivated under the 1991 First START Treaty; 3) terminate the 
development of the mobile ICBMs (Peacekeeper) and the mobile portion of the small 
ICBM program (the small single-warhead ICBM remained the only ICBM 
modernization program); 4) cancel the current program to build a replacement for the 
short-range attack missiles (SRAM) for the strategic bombers; and 5) streamline the 
command and control procedures, allowing the U.S. to more effectively manage 
strategic nuclear forces.
47
 In addition, Bush also proposed to establish the U.S. Strategic 
Command to replace SAC.
48
 (Bush [1991]) The second round of the PNIs was 
announced in the January, 1992 State of the Union Address. In the framework of this 
round, Bush declared that 1) the B-2 procurement was terminated; 2) the production of 
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 In response to the first round of the U.S. PNIs, Mikhail Gorbachev announced similar measures in 
October, 1991. Regarding the ground-launched tactical nuclear weapons, Gorbachev pledged to eliminate 
all nuclear artillery munitions and nuclear warheads for tactical rockets; withdraw nuclear warheads for 
air defense missiles from the troops and concentrate them in central bases (a portion of them to be 
eliminated); and eliminate all nuclear mines. In the sea-launched tactical forces, he announced to remove 
tactical nuclear weapons from surface ships and multiple-purpose submarines; put them in central storage 
as well as the nuclear weapons on land-based naval aircrafts; and eliminate a portion of these forces. He 
also proposed that the U.S. “eliminate fully, on the basis of reciprocity, all tactical nuclear weapons of 
naval forces” and “on the basis of reciprocity, it would be possible to withdraw from all combat units on 
battlefield aviation all nuclear charges and place them in centralized storage sites.” In the ICBM force, 
Gorbachev ordered to remove from alert 503 ICBMs, including 134 MIRVed; end development of small 
mobile ICBMs and do not increase or modernize rail mobile ICBMs (keep them in permanent basing 
areas). Regarding the strategic bombers, he promised to end development of nuclear short-range missiles 
for bombers and end bomber alert. And finally, in the SLBMs, three SSBNs were removed from active 
duty with 48 launchers. In more general terms, Gorbachev also proposed to reduce warheads below the 
START limits, to 5,000 (instead of the 6,000) by the end of the same implementation deadline; besides he 
suggested negotiations of “further radical cuts” after the START entry into force and finally, a creation of 
a single operational command over all strategic nuclear weapons, including defensive. (Gorbachev 
[1991]) 
48
 In 1991, SAC was finally abolished, and in 1992 STRATCOM was established to replace it as a single 
unified command. The idea of a unified command partly came from General Butler, the last commander 
of SAC, and it was also advocated from the Office of the Secretary of Defense by Franklin C. Miller. 
(Interview with Franklin C. Miller [2014]) 
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the Peacekeeper missiles was stopped; 3) the U.S. would not purchase any more 
advanced cruise missiles (ACM); 4) the small ICBM program (previously suspended) 
was cancelled; and 5) the production of new warheads (W88) for the sea-based ballistic 
missiles was stopped.
49
 (Bush [1992]) 
As a result of these presidential initiatives, U.S. nuclear forces were reduced from 
22,200 to 11,500 warheads between 1989 and 1993. (Kristensen; Norris [2013a]) These 
steps clearly indicated that the Cold War was over, and the arms race made a reverse 
turn, shrinking to lower and lower numbers. Furthermore, the PNIs also showed that 
arms reductions do not necessarily have to happen in a treaty framework but unilateral 
steps can also prove beneficial. It also signaled a new era, where the threat of nuclear 
war was no longer the primary national security concern – it was replaced by the fear of 
“loose nukes,” the dissemination of nuclear technology and expertise as well as the 
necessity of safeguarding all nuclear materials inherited by the Soviet successor states. 
On the operational level of U.S. strategic nuclear planning, the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union brought two significant results: first, many targets (especially in the previous 
satellite states) became irrelevant and a comprehensive targeting review seemed 
essential; and second, as the number of deployed forces was shrinking dramatically, the 
role of non-deployed forces started to grow, providing a security reserve for an eventual 
deterioration of U.S.-Russian relations. 
Between 1988 and 1989, Vice Chairman of the JCS, General Robert Herres was tasked 
to conduct an 18-month internal Joint Staff targeting study, which was followed by a 
Strategic Target Review. In November, 1989 after the Berlin Wall was torn down and 
the Eastern European countries regained their independence, Secretary of Defense 
Richard Cheney and Chairman of the JCS, General Colin Powell immediately ordered a 
review which became the most comprehensive review of strategic targeting ever 
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 In response to the second round of the PNIs, Boris Yeltsin announced (also in January, 1992) that 
Moscow would end the production of land-based tactical missiles, nuclear artillery as well as nuclear 
mines; and eliminate one-half of the air defense missile nuclear warheads. In the air-launched tactical 
forces, Russia would cut in half stocks of air-launched tactical nuclear munitions. Regarding the strategic 
bomber forces, Yeltsin pledged to end production of Backfire and Blackjack; and the current air-launched 
cruise missiles (ALCM); besides he was ready to renounce the creation of new ALCM types (on a 
reciprocal basis); and to end exercises with more than 30 bombers. In the SSBN fleet, a further reduction 
of the SSBN combat patrols was announced and Moscow also proposed to end combat patrols on a 
reciprocal basis. In more general measures, Yeltsin added that Russia was ready to meet the 1991 START 
deployed warhead level in 3 years, and he also proposed further strategic reductions, hoping that other 
nuclear powers would join, as well. (Yeltsin [1992]) 
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conducted in U.S. history. This review was led by Franklin C. Miller and it included 
“the full spectrum of policy, intelligence support, targeting guidance, and war plan 
production.” (Kunsman; Lawson [2001]: p. 64.) The review revealed that the SIOP was 
completely out of date and there were many duplications in targeting (sometimes 
against obsolete targets such as post-Soviet facilities which were closed many-many 
years ago; or previous Eastern European targets like Kiev which was still targeted with 
40 nuclear weapons). Damage expectancies still did not calculate with the secondary 
effects of a nuclear blast, and other quantitative criteria were also significantly flawed in 
the system.  
Under the Bush years, many of these problems were addressed and officials eliminated 
thousands of targets from the war plans: after Bush gave the permission to only target 
Russian forces, post-Soviet satellite states were entirely removed,
50
 leadership targets of 
very low value were discarded, many tactical nuclear installations and transportation 
targets outside of Russia were also erased, along with significant portions of the 
industrial and war-supporting infrastructure. As a result of the review, the number of 
targets was reduced from 10,000 to 3,500. (Interview with Franklin C. Miller [2014]) 
Under the newly established unified command (STRATCOM), planning procedures 
were updated, and adaptive targeting was introduced to guarantee rapid and flexible 
retargeting on the global level. (Nolan [1999]: pp. 28-31.) As STRATCOM commander, 
General Butler explained that they were “developing a flexible, adaptive operational 
planning capability that will be much more responsive to the potential for spontaneous 
threats that defy precise preplanning. This will provide senior decision makers with an 
array of options to apply in acute crises requiring a prompt exacting response.” 
(Quoted in Kristensen [2003]: p. 7.) The first SIOP based on these post-Cold War 
innovations was enacted in July, 1993. This was described as a “living SIOP” as the 
time to update this plan was significantly reduced. SIOP revisions traditionally required 
14-18 months, while the new SIOP was “based on continuous analysis of guidance, 
forces and target changes, rather than a fixed plan, all intended to reduce the time 
required for complete overhaul of the SIOP to only six months.” (Kristensen [2003]: p. 
8.) Providing an attack plan for a new enemy became possible in a few months and 
STRATCOM was tasked to provide additional small, flexible and adaptive strike 
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 With the German reunification in October, 1990, Eastern European targeting ended entirely. 
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options for the dynamic post-Cold War environment and the new challenges the U.S. 
had to face.  
 
1.8 The Legacies of the Cold War 
During the forty-five years of the Cold War, nuclear weapons have gradually occupied a 
central position in U.S. national security. Architects of the first war plans were skeptical 
about their military utility and only considered their use as an extension of massive 
conventional bombings. But as the number of atomic bombs started to grow, an entire 
planning apparatus emerged and complex procedures were developed to prepare 
concrete strategies for the application of these weapons. From the mid-1950s nuclear 
forces provided the backbone of national security strategies and war plans placed their 
use in the center of focus. 
This meant the beginning of a still ongoing intellectual challenge to implement 
doctrines which are able to deter a nuclear war; a technological contest to develop new 
warheads and deliveries which make the threats credible; and a bureaucratic struggle 
between the political level and the different military services to control and influence 
the formulation of the weapons employment policies. 
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Table 1. The Evolution of U.S. Nuclear Planning during the Cold War
51
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 The table was prepared by the author, based on the following sources:  
Primary sources: NSAM-109, NSC-20/4, NSC-68, NSC-162/2, NSDD-13, NSDM-242, NUWEP-74, PD-
18, PD-59, SIOP-62 Briefing.  
Secondary sources: Condit, Kenneth W. [1996]: History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Kaplan, Fred [1991]: 
The Wizards of Armageddon; Kessler, Samuel Joseph [2010]: From ‘Massive Retaliation’ to ‘Flexible 
Response’: Robert McNamara at the Pentagon; Kunsman, David M.; Lawson, Douglas B.: [2001]: A 
Primer on U.S. Strategic Nuclear Policy; Nolan, Janne E. [1989]: Guardians of the Arsenal; Poole, 
Walter S. [2011; 2012]: History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Pringle, Peter; Arkin, William [1983]: 
S.I.O.P. – The Secret U.S. Plan for Nuclear Attack; Rosenberg, David A. [1983]: The Origins of Overkill: 
Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy; Sagan, Scott D. [1987]: SIOP-62: The Nuclear War Plan 
Briefing to President Kennedy; Watson, Robert J [1998]: History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 will be stuck here 
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Name and Date Main Strategic and Targeting Characteristics
TOTALITY (1945)
PINCHER (1946)
BROLIER (1947)
CHARIOTEER (1947)
FROLIC (1948)
HALFMOON (1948)
TROJAN (1949)
OFFTACKLE (1949)
SHAKEDOWN (1950)
EWP 1- (1950)
EWP 1-51 (1951)
EWP 1-53 (1953)
50-54 (1954)
BWP 1-55 (1955)
BWP 1-58 (1957)
BWP 1-60 (1960)
SIOP-62 (1961)
SIOP-63 (1962)
SIOP-64 (1964)
SIOP 4 (1966)
SIOP 4A (1967)
SIOP 4C (1968)
SIOP 4E/F (1969)
SIOP 4G/H (1970)
SIOP 4I/J (1971)
SIOP 4K/L (1972)
SIOP 4M/N (1973)
SIOP 4O (1974)
SIOP 4P(1975)
SIOP 5/5A (1976)
SIOP 5B (1977)
SIOP 5C (1978)
SIOP 5D (1979)
SIOP 5E (1980)
SIOP 5F (1981)
SIOP 5G (1982)
SIOP 6 (1983)
SIOP 6A (1984)
SIOP 6B (1985)
SIOP 6C (1986)
SIOP 6D (1987)
SIOP 6E (1988)
SIOP 6F (1989)
SIOP 6G (1990)
SIOP 6H (1991)
SIOP 93 (1992)
- Still many duplications, multiple warheads on the same target + only accounted immediate effects of a nuclear 
strike -> solution: elimination of thousands of targets from the SIOP (former Soviet republics were eliminated 
entirely; reductions in leadership targets, transportation lines + war-supporting industry)
- Adaptive targeting for the global level, flexible retargeting, reduced alert levels
- 1991: SAC was abolished and STRATCOM was established
Flexible 
response, 
no cities 
counterforce, 
assured 
destruction
1961
1962
1964
Flexible 
response, 
counterforce 
with limited 
options
1974
- Rearranging targets: match high-quality weapons with high priority targets, major attack options against 
valuable military targets with high degree of confidence in their destruction
- Target categories: national command authority; overall military-industrial complex + new element: economic 
recovery capabilities + 4 major innovations in targeting: 1) escalation control, 2) concept of withholds, 3) 
industrial recovery capabilities, 4 ) Soviet military forces anywhere in the world -> some high quality weapons 
were allocated to countervalue targets
- BUT innovations had only a limited effect on war fighting: SIOP 5: inclusion of smaller options but still no real 
limited options (smallest ones still included several hundred warheads), target list has grown to over 25,000 
targets (inclusion of economic recovery) -> gap between targets and available weapons -> pressure for more NWs
- Nuclear Targeting Policy Review: four categories: 1) impede recovery of the S.U.; 2) destroy Soviet national 
political and military leadership and command and control; 3) destroy Soviet nuclear forces, and 4) destroy Soviet 
non-nuclear forces + four major attack options against the SU and thousands of targets in satellites, China, Cuba 
and Vietnam
- With the new innovations: over 40,000 designated targets
- Shifts in targeting: less emphasis on economic recovery -> targets focused instead on war-supporting industry + 
command, control and communications targets -> it released NWs for pure counterforce missions - high quality 
weapons reassigned to high priority missions
- It did not cut the number of NWs - same number but reallocation and higher damage-expectancy levels + 
several modernization programs
- 1981: NSDD-13: new focus: prevailing strategy: instead of denying victory to 
the Russian, it aimed a decisive victory for the U.S. -> massive modernizations 
to destroy the Soviet military
- NWs are still the cornerstone of U.S. security policy BUT a new "window of 
vulnerability": vulnerable ICBMs against a Soviet first strike (vulnerability + 
maximum lethality -> pressure to keep them on high alert and launch first)
- U.S.-Soviet rivalry reached a point of technical exhaustion -> shifting the 
competiotion to a new area: space (SDI)
- Continued calls for having selected targeting options
- More focus on the survivability of national command authority 
- Two challenges in targeting: provide real limited options + establishment of clear procedures for civilian 
oversight -> the "quiet revolutuion" of Frank Miller: the establishment of procedurs for a stronger civilian 
oversight
- Problems of targeting: all targets were treated equally, duplications, more weapons allocations than necessary 
(without considering secondary effects of NWs or the ability of regional CINCs to carry out nuclear missions)
- Basic target categories: similar to those of the 1950s
- 1988: SIOP 6E: renewed emphasis on flexible targeting - more responsive to policy guidance - inclusion of new 
strike options, very small options
28,100 
(peak: 
1967: 
31,255)
- At first, decentralization, ad hoc decision making
- 1948: NSC-30: the U.S. must be ready to use nuclear weapons, employment 
should be based on the decision of the President
- 1948: NSC-20/4: main goal: eliminate Bolshevik control inside and outside 
the Soviet Union; the U.S. should not initiate a war, NWs should be used only 
in response to Soviet agression
- 1950: NSC-68: rejection of a no first use policy as the international 
environment is alarming - possible Soviet agression without any warning -> 
greater emphasis on NWs, rapid build-up of capabilities
- Earliest war plans: the use of nuclear weapons was only an extension of conventional strategic bombings - the 
main targets: war-related facilities and major cities (e.g.: BROLIER: 34 bombs on 24 Soviet cities, TROJAN: 
industrial facilities in 70 Soviet cities)
- BUT: skepticism about the benefits of atomic bombings: they are not enough for Soviet capitulation or 
destroying Communism
- OFFTACKLE: first war plan based on a political guidance (NSC-20/4) - destroying Soviet war-making capacities + 
preventing Soviet advances in Western Europe
- 1950: JCS designated 3 target categories: highest priority: Soviet capabilities to deliver atomic bombs; second 
priority: retardation targets; third: energy industries (these categories remained until the first SIOP)
- 1954: ruling out preventive nuclear war (BUT the option of preemptive 
strikes remained)
- Mid-1950s: shifting focus from preemption to retaliation -> 1953: NSC-
162/2: emphasis on massive retaliation
- Threatening with massive nuclear retaliation even if the agression was only 
conventional
- Main but not sole reliance on NWs
 11,500
- Revision of massive retaliation -> 1961: asking for a shift to a "no-cities" 
approach: short-lived strategy, very soon revised
- 1964: new focus: the requirement of an effective, invulnerable and reliable 
nuclear retaliatory force; deterrence over warfighting -> assured detruction - 
the necessary number of NWs can be quantified (400 megatons)
- Flexible/limited counterforce -> shift to survivability and second strike 
capability - the new guiding principles of U.S. deterrence posture
- Revisiting MAD: critic: anti-defense strategy; guarantees the total 
vulnerability of the population
- 1974: NSDM-242: reintroduction of counterforce and nuclear war fighting by 
a series of limited nuclear options (LNO)
- Main principles: selectivity in the strike options, early war termination 
(intrawar bargaining) and avoiding attacks on cities + emphasizing the 
exclusively retaliatory function of US strategic forces
- National Nuclear Strategic Targeting document to guide targeteers
- PNIs: 1991-1992: most significant unilateral reductions
- Increased role for reserve forces to deal with the uncertainties of the 
international environment 
- Reductions + the dissolution of the SU -> many targets became irrelevant in 
the SIOP (e.g. 40 NWs on Kiev) -> 1990: strategic targeting review - most 
comprehensive review ever
- Selective employment of nuclear forces, graduated responses based on the 
new reality of nuclear parity
- Developments in Soviet forces: hardening key targets + major civil defense 
strategy -> planning to survive as a society
- 1980: PD-59: more emphasis on military targets + less on urban/industrial 
targets + priority to Soviet leadership (highly centralized system -> vulnerable 
to chaos) - countervailing strategy: denying the other side the possibility to 
win
- Asking for more LNO; larger secure reserve force; improving the survivability 
of communication lines and command and control structures
 22,200
 25,500
 23,200
 28,100
  1,100
 22,200
- SIOP-62: first integrated operational plan, a combination of preemption and retaliation, overwhelmingly 
counterforce targets: envisioned a first massive strike against thousands of targets then waves of re-attacks to 
increase damage (in the next 24 hours) -> rigid, all-purpose plan; no practical distinction between targets -> 
genesis of counterforce strategies
- SIOP-63: 5 primary attack options from preemption to retaliation, options to withhold attacks and keep reserve 
forces for urban destruction - "second strike counterforce strategy"
- Despite political guidance: even the most limited strike options included hundreds of NWs against Soviet targets
- Nuclear weapons: cheap solution for conventional deficits -> huge increase in capabilities
- Despite policy guidance: the arsenal was rather designed for preventive war, than retaliation; by 1957: more 
than 3,000 military and industrial targets (end of the decade: SAC designated more than 20,000 potential targets)
- Separate targeting plans by the Air Force and the Navy BUT with the development of the Polaris system they 
started to interfere -> 1960: establishing JSTPS to create the first SIOP
- Continuous alert of bombers started in 1961
George             
H. W. Bush
 1989-1993
Prevailing 
strategy, 
strategic 
redirection
1991 22,200
Ronald R. 
Reagan
 1981-1989
Flexible 
response,
prevailing 
strategy 
1981 23,200
James E. 
Carter
 1977-1981
Flexible 
response,
countervailing 
with multiple 
attack options
1980 25,500
 1963-1969  27,500
John F. 
Kennedy
 1961-1963 22,200
----- 2
Richard M. 
Nixon
 1969-1974 27,500  28,500
Gerald R. 
Ford
 1974-1977 28,500
Dwight D. 
Eisenhower
 1953-1961
Massive 
retaliation
1954 1,100
Lyndon B. 
Johnson
Last 
Year
War Plan
Policy guidance
* Kristensen, Hans M.; Norris, Robert S. [2013]: Global nuclear weapons inventories, 1945-2013. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists . Vol. 69. No. 5. September/October 2013. pp. 75-81.
Administration Declaratory Policy Warheads* Operational Level
President Year
Nuclear 
Doctrine 
Date
First 
Year
 1945-1953
Harry S. 
Truman
War-ending 
and 
war-fighting
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2. Conceptualizing the Main Terms of the Dissertation 
2.1 Cold War Nuclear Thinking 
From a strategic point of view, probably the most important sentence of President 
Obama’s 2009 Prague address is the declaration that the United States would “put an 
end to Cold War thinking, we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national 
security strategy, and urge others to do the same.” (Obama [2009])  
The biggest problem with this statement is the lack of a clear definition of what “Cold 
War (nuclear) thinking” exactly means, therefore, it is difficult to judge the Obama 
administration’s accomplishments and objectively decide if the White House has 
fulfilled its promises. Neither President Obama, nor the 2010 NPR report specified what 
the administration meant by Cold War thinking and which particular aspects of it they 
aimed to eliminate in their nuclear strategy. Since 1989, the U.S. force structure has 
been significantly reduced, the PNIs of the George W. H. Bush administration cancelled 
several modernization programs and took bombers off alert status. Thus, many changes 
have happened, but based on President Obama’s Prague address, the administration still 
saw continuities with Cold War nuclear planning which they wanted to eliminate.  
This dissertation aims to outline a working definition of what the author considers Cold 
War nuclear thinking in order to examine what has changed since the Cold War and 
what elements have remained. Cold War nuclear thinking will be identified on three 
levels: the declaratory policy, the force structure and the operational level. Although 
these three levels are closely interlinked, and they mostly reflected the same principles 
during the Cold War, today it is no longer necessary to have the same guidance on all 
three levels.
52
 An administration can shift away from Cold War thinking on one level 
but retain its characteristics on the other two. As Amy Woolf from the Congressional 
Research Service outlined, “Cold War thinking in the rhetoric, versus Cold War 
thinking in the planning, are two very different things.” (Woolf In: Halperin; Kimball; 
Kristensen; Woolf [2012]) The George W. Bush administration for example put a huge 
emphasis on abandoning Cold War thinking in the declaratory policy (in essence, its 
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 It would be ideal to end Cold War nuclear thinking on all levels simultaneously but unfortunately this is 
not what we see in practice. Significant changes in the official rhetoric do not necessarily trigger 
meaningful changes on the operational level. 
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rhetoric was more post-Cold War than the 2010 NPR) but several aspects of the force 
structure and the operational level were still stuck in Cold War legacies.
53
 
Looking at the history of Cold War nuclear strategy, it was more an evolution of 
thought than steady thinking. As President after President repeated, there were “no 
major departures” in nuclear doctrine, each administration built on the legacies of its 
predecessors. However, it did not mean that there were no changes in the nuclear 
strategy. As a result of technological developments in U.S. and Soviet capabilities, 
several new ideas and shifts in focus were implemented by the different administrations. 
The first big shift was the transformation of the Eisenhower administration’s massive 
retaliation doctrine to McNamara’s flexible response. Although McNamara’s concept 
remained an official strategy until the end of the Cold War, several additional 
adjustments came under the umbrella of flexible response. Each administration tried to 
introduce its own innovation: first, the no cities doctrine and assured destruction under 
Kennedy and Johnson; then counterforce with limited options under Nixon and Ford; 
followed by Carter’s countervailing strategy; modified to prevailing under Reagan. 
Despite the above mentioned differences, there were several common beliefs which led 
U.S. Presidents and military planners in the making of their own nuclear doctrines. 
According to Morton Halperin (who was involved in the formulation of U.S. nuclear 
strategy under Presidents Johnson and Nixon), during the 45 years of the Cold War, 
there were two basic premises which guided the development of U.S. nuclear strategy: 
first, “the notion that there is a serious possibility of a surprise Russian attack and that 
we need to design our force to deter the Russians from deliberately deciding to launch 
an attack on the United States,” and second, “the notion that we had a conventional 
deficit, and therefore we needed to use, or threaten to use nuclear weapons first in 
various scenarios involving conventional attacks and biological and chemical 
weapons.”54 (Halperin In: Halperin; Kimball; Kristensen; Woolf [2012]) In addition to 
these two beliefs, Daryl Kimball from the Arms Control Association adds another 
element, “a kind of cultural concept of what Cold War thinking is. And part of it is the 
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 While the 2001 NPR of the Bush administration claimed that Russia was no longer an enemy and the 
“Russia threat” would not define U.S. force levels anymore, its arsenal of 1,700-2,200 deployed strategic 
nuclear weapons still suggested a Moscow-centric thinking – even after the events of 9/11 it was difficult 
to imagine the use of this amount of weapons against anybody else but Russia. (NPR [2001]) 
54
 According to Ambassador Linton Brooks, former administrator of the Department of Energy’s (DoE) 
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), both of these premises were believed to be true, none 
of them is true today, and the first one was actually never true. (Interview with Linton F. Brooks [2014]) 
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concept that we might be willing to engage in an actual nuclear war, and wage a 
nuclear war. Deterring a nuclear attack is one thing, waging a nuclear war is another 
thing.” (Kimball In: Halperin; Kimball; Kristensen; Woolf [2012]) 
In terms of nuclear strategy, the Cold War can be divided into three main periods: 1) the 
initial years of the Truman-Eisenhower administrations; 2) the “classical” Cold War 
years from Kennedy to Reagan; and 3) the transition to a new era under the Bush years. 
In the first period (1945-1961), Truman and Eisenhower laid down the structure of 
nuclear planning, and the most important operational procedures were enacted which 
led to the first SIOP by 1961. Compared to the early Truman years, nuclear weapons 
gained an increasingly significant role in the national security strategies, their number 
dramatically grew from zero to about 22,000 and as a result of this increase, the early 
city-targeting strategy of the late 1940s was abandoned and the focus shifted towards 
the so called counterforce targets.  
During the “classical” period (1961-1989) of Cold War nuclear strategies, the Kennedy 
administration and especially Robert McNamara played a crucial role. Their flexible 
response doctrine had become a guiding principle for the entire period. Although 
McNamara’s 1964 assured destruction policy was suspended by the Nixon 
administration, in a way MAD remained “alive” on the operational level and in the 
force structure – throughout the entire period, the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal 
reflected a massive overkill capacity, and regardless of the policy level’s main focus, 
war plans contained several massive attack options, which were enough to destroy most 
of the Soviet Union and its satellite states.  
Focusing on the three analytical levels of the dissertation, Cold War nuclear thinking in 
the declaratory policy had a specific worldview on the role and mission of the U.S. and 
the Soviet Union. This worldview had four different layers: first, the enemy image was 
defined in the framework of the bipolar system – Washington knew exactly who the 
enemy was, and what kind of challenges it represented. The Soviet block was identified 
as the peer opponent
55
 and it was seriously believed that Moscow was constantly 
preparing for a surprise attack on the U.S. and its allies. The second and third layers 
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 In this regard, the role of China has changed over time – until the Nixon administration’s appeasement 
with China, Beijing was handled in the same group as the Soviet Union and its satellite states. But by the 
early 1980s, it was taken out of the war plans until the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996. (Interview with Bruce 
G. Blair [2014]) 
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identified the role of the U.S. as the global leader of the free world, the ultimate goal of 
which was to ensure the victory of the good cause. And finally, the relationship between 
the U.S. and NATO: the U.S. had to demonstrate its willingness to use nuclear weapons 
if its allies are attacked. Therefore, the U.S. provided a positive security assurance in 
the framework of NATO which served as the basis of tactical nuclear weapons
56
 
deployments in Europe from 1954. In addition, starting with the Eisenhower 
administration, U.S. Presidents specifically encouraged their military planners to 
prepare for the tactical use of nuclear weapons in the European theater. 
Cold War nuclear thinking also meant the doctrine of flexible response which was a 
unifying policy of these three decades (1961-1989). In essence, it meant that in a crisis 
situation the U.S. had multiple options to address a threat appropriately, starting from 
the use of conventional weapons, through selective nuclear attacks to a general nuclear 
war. Besides this doctrine, Cold War nuclear thinking included the denial of a 
preventive war. Preventive war thinking was a preferred concept by the Air Force 
during the early years of the Cold War but it had become a marginal discourse by the 
mid-1950s.
57
 (Burr [2007]) According to Nolan, from the mid-1950s, “preventive war 
was ruled out as a matter of policy” by the U.S. government. (Nolan [1989]: p. 58.) 
Although preventive action in the sense of a decapitating first strike was ruled out, none 
of the official guidance documents specifically excluded the option of preemptive 
strikes – in fact it remained on the level of operational planning. During the 1961 SIOP 
62 briefing, General Lemnitzer for example talked about two main options: retaliation 
and preemption. Another example is President Carter’s war plan where preemption was 
one of the two special attack categories in the different versions of SIOP 5.
58
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 The term “tactical nuclear weapon” is used as a synonym for non-strategic or sub-strategic nuclear 
weapon. 
57
 The preventive war concept had a short reemergence in the discourse during the early 1960s when 
China got close to conduct its first nuclear weapon test. President Kennedy and then Johnson discussed 
the option of a preventive strike against the Chinese nuclear installations but they concluded that it was 
not worth attacking as “even ‘successful’ action may not necessarily prevent the ChiComs from 
detonating a nuclear device in the next few years” and the risks of an immediate Chinese attack against 
Taiwan or an escalating conflict to include the Soviet Union were too high. (Policy Planning Council 
[1964]: Paragraph 7/a) 
58
 The reliance on preemptive options has probably changed by the end of Reagan’s first term. In a 1985 
Congressional hearing, the commander of SAC testified that “there are no preemption options” in the 
SIOP, suggesting that the U.S. was no longer planning for a preemptive strike against the Soviet Union. 
(Quoted in Sagan [1989]: p. 75.) Although professor Sagan noted that it did not mean that SAC 
abandoned the option of LOW, it only meant that “SIOP options are no longer, as they were in the late 
1960s, specifically designed to maximize preemptive effectiveness.” (Sagan [1989]: p. 75.) In fact, if one 
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Closely related to the option of preemption was the rejection of a no-first-use 
declaration. With the exception of a very short period under the Kennedy 
administration, none of the Presidents declared that the U.S. would refrain from the first 
use of nuclear weapons. The main reason to rule out a no-first-use declaration was tied 
to the territorial defense of the NATO allies. In order to credibly reassure its allies (and 
also to deter Moscow), the U.S. needed the option of the first use of nuclear weapons in 
case a Soviet aggression in Europe couldn’t be stopped by conventional means. Cold 
War nuclear thinking also excluded the option of a universal negative security 
assurance (NSA) to non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). As satellite states, especially 
in the European theater were considered essential to break the Soviet power and 
exercise pressure on Moscow, target lists contained thousands of potential targets in 
NNWSs, outside the territory of the Soviet Union. The U.S. has first articulated a 
negative security assurance
59
 during the Carter administration in June, 1978 but it 
contained a so called “Warsaw Pact exclusion clause” which (under specific conditions) 
retained the option of attacking NNWSs allied or associated with nuclear weapon states 
– thus, it did not change much in the actual targeting policy of the U.S.  
And finally, a more general characteristic of the declaratory policy was the prominent 
day-to-day role of nuclear weapons in the military strategies. By the early 1950s, 
nuclear weapons occupied a central role in strategic war planning. Starting from the 
Kennedy administration and the development of the first SSBNs (which came to 
represent an invulnerable leg in the nuclear triad), the primary role of nuclear weapons 
has shifted away from fighting an all-out nuclear war to credibly deterring any 
aggression against the U.S. and its allies by multiple options. This deterrence posture, 
however, was never restricted to nuclear contingencies. As Reagan’s 1981 NSDD-13 
guidance stated, the fundamental role of nuclear weapons was to deter a primarily (but 
not exclusively) nuclear attack on the U.S. and its allies – thus, nuclear weapons had a 
role in deterring conventional as well as chemical and biological attacks; and nuclear 
retaliation remained an option against any of these contingencies.  
                                                                                                                                               
maintains the option of LOW or LUA (which carries on until today in U.S. nuclear strategy), then it also 
has the capabilities for a preventive or preemptive strike. 
59
 “The United States will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapons States Party to the 
NPT or any comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, 
except in the case of an attack on the United States, its territories or armed forces, or its allies, by such a 
State allied to a nuclear-weapon State or associated with a nuclear-weapon State in carrying out or 
sustaining the attack.” (Quoted in Bunn [1997]: p. 6.) 
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Cold War nuclear thinking in the force structure meant a massive overkill capacity: 
extremely high number of nuclear weapons and deliveries with all three legs of the 
nuclear triad. Interestingly, at the end of 1961, U.S. nuclear forces were at the level of 
22,200 warheads and by the time President Reagan left office in 1989, force levels 
shrank to about the same amount. Under these three decades, nuclear weapons reached a 
historic peak of 31,200 nuclear weapons in 1967, and the rapid growth of the late 1950s 
and early 1960s was followed by a much slower decrease in the 1970s and 1980s. 
(Kristensen; Norris [2013a]) In addition to the high numbers in the nuclear weapons 
capabilities, delivery systems often carried multiple warheads – i.e. ballistic missiles 
equipped with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). Regarding 
the triad, there were many shifts in the significance of the different legs but all three 
gained their special role during the Cold War: with the development of C
3
I systems 
submarines gained their role as the invulnerable leg of the triad (they provide 
survivability);
60
 ICBMs provide prompt response and bombers provide flexibility (as 
they can be recalled after launch and they can be quickly dispersed from their forward 
deployed bases). (Mies [1999]) 
A great diversity of nuclear weapons was also considered necessary. Parallel to the 
rapid growth of the strategic nuclear arsenals, several arguments were raised during the 
early 1950s for the development of low-yield, short-range weapons. Proponents of this 
arsenal claimed that tactical nuclear weapons were necessary to support ground 
combats, or as Oppenheimer said, bring the “battle back to the battlefield.” The Air 
Force was very soon divided into strategic and tactical wings – strategic to attack “vital 
targets in the enemy’s heartland” and tactical for the support of theater missions (in this 
regard, tactical nuclear weapons played a key role in the reassurance of allies). 
(Freedman [1986]: p. 746.) During the Nixon-Ford years, these low-yield weapons 
gained an additional justification: providing credibility to the concepts of intrawar 
bargaining and escalation control in the framework of limited attack options. In the 
meanwhile, the maintenance of a massive arsenal with high yield weapons was also 
necessary as hardened Soviet targets with a high military value still required a huge 
destructive power. New nuclear weapon types were extensively tested (from 1945 to 
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 Without reliable communication lines, war plans could not rely on submarines as the risk of losing 
connection with the National Command Authority meant that submarines might not be able to execute 
their mission, or alternatively they had to come to surface which would seriously hurt their 
invulnerability. 
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1992 the U.S. conducted altogether 1,032 nuclear tests) and there was no systematic 
hedging policy. During the Cold War, the U.S. tried to deploy the majority of its 
nuclear weapons inventories. Reserve nuclear forces were small as a result of an active 
infrastructure and the continuous development and production of new nuclear weapons, 
which guaranteed the rapid exchange of the entire stockpile in every few years. The 
United States only started to create a permanent reserve or hedge force in the early 
1990s, when nuclear testing was abandoned. 
Stationing nuclear weapons in the territory of allied states was also characteristic of this 
era. Forward deployment of nuclear weapons served four main purposes: deterring 
enemies, reassuring allies, signaling, and burden sharing. (Seay [2011]) Analysts of the 
Natural Resources Defense Council claim that “during the Cold War, 18 sovereign 
nations and nine former or current American territories or possessions hosted U.S. 
nuclear weapons.” Declassified Pentagon history documents revealed that altogether 38 
types of nuclear weapons systems were stationed abroad and the first overseas 
deployment of complete nuclear bombs started in 1954. During the peak years in the 
early 1970s, more than 7,000 U.S. nuclear weapons were deployed in Europe and 
another 2,000 on land in the Pacific. (Norris; Arkin; Burr [1999]) 
The “classical” period of Cold War nuclear strategies had ten main characteristics on 
the operational level. Because of the fear of a Soviet first strike which was a basic 
premise of Cold War thinking, U.S. forces had to be ready for a prompt launch. This 
meant that a portion of the nuclear forces was kept on high alert level all the time, ready 
to be launched shortly after the President made a decision. Continuous airborne alert of 
bombers started in 1961 and it was soon complemented with ICBMs and SSBNs on 
alert, as well. In connection with the prompt launch capability, the second characteristic 
was the reliance on the options of preemption, launch on warning (LOW) and launch 
under attack (LUA). A very simplistic differentiation between these three policies is 
based on the timing of the attack: preemption means that nuclear weapons would be 
launched as soon as hostile actions are taken by the enemy;
61
 LOW means that nuclear 
weapons would be launched on tactical warning that an enemy attack is underway; and 
LUA means that nuclear weapons would be launched after the first enemy weapons hit 
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 A preventive nuclear strike, in contrast, would mean that the U.S. launched an attack to avoid a 
potential threat, which was not imminent and not justified by concrete actions on the enemy’s side.  
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their targets.
62
 (Sauer [2005]: p. 12.) All three attack options were operational policies 
during the Cold War. Just to mention one example: the Carter administration’s SIOP 5 
war plan contained preemption as a special attack option, and the other alternative was 
LOW or LUA. This has somewhat changed by the mid-1980s, as President Carter’s 
1980 PD-59 stated that “while it will remain our policy not to rely on launching nuclear 
weapons on warning that an attack has begun, appropriate pre-planning, especially for 
ICBMs that are vulnerable to a preemptive attack, will be undertaken to provide the 
President the option of so launching.” (PD-59 [1980]: p. 3.) This meant that LOW was 
no longer endorsed but the capability was nevertheless maintained in the form of “pre-
planned options” against a potential attack on the vulnerable ICBMs.  
The third element of operational level Cold War nuclear thinking is the so called pre-
delegation of control of nuclear weapons. The first presidential guidance document on 
the use of nuclear weapons was issued by the Truman administration in 1948. The NSC-
30 guidance contained two major obligations, one of which stated that the President had 
the ultimate authority to make the decision on the use of nuclear weapons. This 
principle was reinforced by each following administration, however, some “loopholes” 
were also implemented in the system. In 1957, the Eisenhower administration was the 
first to introduce a kind of pre-delegation of control in its national security strategy. As 
a result of weak C
3
I systems, it was feared that a well prepared attack against the 
National Command Authority might incapacitate the President and/or cut 
communication between the civilian authorities and the military forces. Therefore, top 
commanders were given a “pre-positioned national command authority […] to 
authorize a SIOP retaliatory strike and to select the SIOP option to execute.” (Blair 
[1993]: p. 50.) Declassified sources suggest that this authorization was only applicable 
under specific emergency conditions of major attack scenarios: “1) when attacks by sea 
or by air on U.S. territory and possessions provided no time for consultation with the 
President on defensive measures, or 2) when “enemy attacks” prevented a Presidential 
decision and it was necessary to protect U.S. forces abroad, including those in 
international waters, or to launch SAC to retaliate to nuclear attack on the continental 
United States.” (National Security Archive [1998]) Under these scenarios, the pre-
delegation was primarily applicable for air defense and missile defense weapons and it 
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 Another closely related term is the option of ride-out, which would require waiting until the first wave 
of enemy attacks arrive and then launch a retaliation.  
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was mostly significant during the 1950s and 1960s. (Interview with Franklin C. Miller) 
According to Bruce Blair, the practice of pre-delegation was strictly limited to top level 
commanders, “well above the bottom level” of SSBN, ICBM or bomber commanders, 
and much closer to the level of unified and specified commanders (CINCs). Blair also 
claims that this practice probably remained until the Reagan administration, however, it 
was not always based on a formal (i.e. written) approval from the President – under 
certain administrations it was only based on an “unwritten understanding.” (Blair 
[1993]: pp. 46-50.) The 1980s definitely meant the end of this practice as those air 
defense weapons which were pre-delegated during the 1950s were deliberately retired. 
(Interview with Franklin C. Miller [2014]) 
The fourth characteristic of Cold War operational planning was counterforce targeting. 
In the late 1940s, war plans were mostly targeting Soviet cities. But this policy has very 
quickly shifted towards an increased focus on military targets. By the 1960s, SIOP 
contained overwhelmingly counterforce targets, although counter-value elements (like 
economic recovery infrastructure) were never entirely excluded and under most attack 
options, serious civilian losses were expected. In terms of targeting policy, another 
characteristic is the very conservative targeting criteria: redundancy in the system, and 
extremely high levels of damage expectancy.  
The fifth element was related to strike options. Regardless of the focus of the acting 
administration (whether it wanted flexible options, limited options or multiple attack 
options), massive attack options remained predominant throughout the entire Cold War 
and only a very few real limited options were included. The sixth area was the SIOP 
itself. Cold War target plans (which meant a lot of plans and sub-plans) were 
preplanned and not flexible at all. These plans were unable to guarantee for example 
the Nixon administration’s preferred concept of limited nuclear attacks applicable in 
unforeseen regional conflicts. Targeting was layered and stacked, and it took a long 
time to adjust these rigid plans to new contingencies. Besides, nuclear war was seen in 
part as a protracted, global conflict. Despite the inclusion of limited and regional attack 
options, each administration had plans for a prolonged nuclear exchange, based on 
massive attack options against the entire range of enemy countries and their allies. 
Although planning for a protracted global nuclear war was true for the entire Cold War 
period, the rationale behind it changed during the Carter administration. By the second 
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half of the 1970s, the U.S. no longer believed that it could win a nuclear war
63
 but the 
Soviets were thought to believe that they could win a protracted global war. Therefore, 
the U.S. had to make clear that it would deny the Soviets any possible chance of victory. 
(Interviews with Linton F. Brooks [2014] and Franklin C. Miller [2014]) This is why 
the 1981 NSDD-13 used a tougher language – “should nuclear attack nonetheless 
occur, the United States and its Allies must prevail” (NSDD-13 [1981]: p. 1.) – than 
Carter’s countervailing strategy but it did not mean that the U.S. believed that there 
would be winners of such a war. It only meant, as Secretary of Defense Caspar 
Weinberger said in 1982, that “we must be able – and must be seen to be able – to 
retaliate against any potential aggressor in such a manner that the costs we will exact 
will substantially exceed any gains he might hope to achieve through aggression.” 
(Weinberger [1982]) 
The eighth element of operational level Cold War nuclear thinking was the lack of clear 
procedures for civilian oversight. A pioneer in this field was Franklin C. Miller but he 
only started his “quiet revolution” in 1985, and his recommendations were enacted 
gradually in the coming years. Before 1985, civilians had very limited influence on the 
actual war plans. 
The ninth characteristic of the operational level was the lack of calculations on the 
secondary effects of a nuclear blast in operational plans (especially fire damage which 
is thought to be more destructive than the blast itself). Throughout the entire Cold War, 
the U.S. seriously underestimated the potential damages caused by the use of nuclear 
weapons and built considerably more nuclear weapons with considerably bigger 
destructive power than it was deemed necessary by the war plans.
64
 According to 
Professor Lynn Eden, despite the fact that the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki caused serious fire damage, Cold War war plans completely ignored the 
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 After leaving the Pentagon in 1981, President Carter’s Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown wrote that 
“The destruction of more than 100 million people in each of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the 
European nations could take place during the first half-hour of a nuclear war […] such a war would be a 
catastrophe not only indescribable but unimaginable […] it would be unlike anything that has taken place 
on this planet since human life began.” (Quoted in Halloran [2008]) As he later phrased it, “No, we did 
not think we could win a nuclear war.” (Brown [2012]) In addition, President Reagan declared himself in 
April, 1982 that “A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” (Quoted in Halloran [2008]) 
64
 Although war plans did not calculate with the secondary effects of a nuclear blast, there were efforts to 
develop models which could include these effects in strategic planning. In 1986, the U.S. and the United 
Kingdom initiated a bilateral dialogue – British experts developed a model which could include the 
secondary effects but it was strongly dependent on weather conditions which made it difficult to quantify 
without a significant level of uncertainty. In the end, as a result of the difficulties in quantification, this 
model was not incorporated in U.S. war plans. (Interview with Franklin C. Miller [2014]) 
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damages from atomic firestorms. Until the 1990s, there were absolutely no attempts to 
incorporate fire damage in war planning which led to an unnecessary overkill capacity 
in the number and destructive power of U.S. nuclear forces. Concepts like limited 
nuclear options and escalation control were based on significantly misleading and 
flawed calculations and “if nuclear weapons had been used, the physical, social, and 
political effects would have been far more devastating than anticipated.” (Eden [2004]: 
p. 2.) 
The last element is partly related to the issue of the secondary effects of a nuclear blast. 
The humanitarian aspects of using nuclear weapons, in general, had only a very low 
profile in operational planning. Starting from the Kennedy administration, the focus of 
the White House has shifted from the threat of an all-out nuclear war to smaller and 
more credible strike options which were more appropriate to deter a Soviet aggression 
against the U.S. and its allies. Instead of the Eisenhower administration’s massive 
retaliation doctrine, Presidents were asking for capabilities and options for limited 
nuclear strikes (which were more appropriate to reduce civilian losses as well). But 
despite the intentions of the policy level, doctrinal changes were inadequate to avoid the 
targeting of major cities in the war plans and to avoid the targeting of civilians per se. In 
fact, after the early 1950s some SAC officials talked about mass civilian casualties as a 
bonus effect to hitting major urban-industrial targets. 
Under the Bush years (1989-1993) or the third period of Cold War nuclear strategies, 
many legacies of the Cold War persisted but significant transformations were also 
implemented. In the 1991-1992 PNIs, President Bush announced huge reductions in the 
number of nuclear warheads and deliveries, in addition, alert levels and target lists were 
also considerably cut and a structural change established STRATCOM to replace SAC. 
Altogether, when this dissertation makes a reference to Cold War nuclear thinking, it 
primarily refers to what the author called the “classical” period of Cold War nuclear 
strategy from Kennedy to Reagan. The 1961-1989 period has many overlaps with the 
Eisenhower and the Bush administrations but some of its characteristics were not yet 
present under Eisenhower and some were already limited or abandoned by Bush, 
therefore, they do not entirely fit the model. Besides, it is also important to stress that 
Cold War nuclear thinking is not a bad thing by all means. Some elements of it are 
inherent results of the logic of deterrence and do not necessarily need to be abandoned 
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in the current security environment. In the framework of the chapter on the Obama 
administration’s nuclear policy, the dissertation will go through all these elements to 
outline what is still there from the Cold War legacies, and also to explain why they are 
still there. Although it might be fair to say that the above listed elements equal Cold 
War thinking but the rationale behind the specific characteristics might have changed 
and it might not be the same as it was a few decades ago. Just to mention one example: 
the primary role of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe used to be deterring the Soviet 
Union form any aggression in Europe (and if necessary, fight a war against the Warsaw 
Pact countries); while today it is more about reassuring NATO allies. This will add an 
additional layer to the analysis and draw a more sophisticated picture on the relationship 
between Cold War thinking and the Obama administration’s nuclear policy. 
 
Table 2. Cold War Nuclear Thinking (1961-1989) 
Cold War Nuclear Thinking 
Declaratory 
Policy 
 worldview:  
1) enemy image: bipolar system, the Soviet block is the 
enemy which constantly prepares for a surprise attack on the 
U.S. 
2) the role of the U.S. as the global leader of the free world 
3) the ultimate goal is to ensure the victory of the good cause  
4) NATO: providing positive security assurances for the allies 
 main doctrine: flexible response 
 denial of a preventive war – but maintaining the option of 
preemptive strikes 
 rejection of no-first-use declarations 
 rejection of a universal negative security assurance to NNWSs 
(from Carter: introduction of very limited NSAs) 
 prominent day-to-day role of nuclear weapons against a great 
variety of contingencies 
Force 
Structure 
 high number of nuclear weapons and deliveries + multiple 
warheads on the delivery systems (MIRVs) 
 nuclear triad 
 great diversity of nuclear weapons 
 nuclear weapons testing 
 no systematic hedging policy 
 forward deployment of nuclear weapons 
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Operational 
Level 
 high alert levels 
 preemption, LOW and LUA 
 pre-delegation of control 
 (mostly) counterforce targeting + very conservative targeting 
criteria 
 massive attack options + a very few real limited attack option  
 target plans are preplanned and not flexible 
 duration of war: protracted, global war 
 lack of clear procedures for civilian oversight 
 lack of calculations on the secondary effects of a nuclear blast in 
operational plans, serious underestimation of the potential 
damages caused by the use of nuclear weapons 
 low profile of humanitarian aspects in operational planning 
 
2.2 Nuclear Strategy 
According to Lawrence Freedman, “the origins of nuclear strategy go back to well 
before the formal arrival of the nuclear age on August 6, 1945.” (Freedman [1986]: p. 
736.) Freedman claims that during the 1920s and 1930s, theorists of strategic 
bombardments have already laid down precepts which did not entirely lose relevance in 
the aftermath of the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Despite the 
arguments of “air power enthusiasts,” massive bombardments were not enough to bring 
victories in such large-scale confrontations as the two world wars. But the development 
of nuclear weapons significantly changed this situation. Their incredible destructive 
power guaranteed that one aircraft could deliver the same results as hundreds before, 
which provided tremendous potential and an unquestionable primacy for SAC in the 
first years of the Cold War. 
Regarding the early history of nuclear strategies, other theorists rather emphasize the 
revolutionary effects of the development of nuclear weapons. Especially because of its 
potential for mass destruction, the invention of nuclear weapons rewrote everything that 
had been accepted as conventional wisdom and it meant a major departure from the 
traditions of the so called Clausewitzian strategy. Having no precedents for a nuclear 
exchange also brought a sense of uncertainty in the making of strategy and from several 
perspectives, it created a tabula rasa in strategic thinking. (Szalai [2009]: p. 11.) 
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As a result of the nuclear revolution, strategic theorists had to ask again the most 
fundamental questions: what does it mean to win a nuclear war (if it was possible at all); 
how to use these weapons of terror in the service of political goals; how to survive a 
nuclear attack; or how to credibly deter one… As Liddell Hart phrased it, “old concepts 
and old definitions of strategy have become not only obsolete but nonsensical with the 
development of nuclear weapons. To aim at winning a war, to take victory as your 
object, is no more than a state of lunacy.” (Quoted in Baylis; Garnett [1991]: p. 1.) Or 
as Herman Kahn put it, “Our [long-standing] intuitions are no longer as reliable a 
guide as they used to be. Many currently useful ideas seemed bizarre or ridiculous when 
they were first considered.” (Quoted in Ghamar-Tabrizi [2000]: p. 170.) 
Although today we can apply the term “strategy” with respect to almost every human 
activities, its traditional understanding used to refer primarily to military affairs. 
Nuclear strategy in general is a specified military strategy which “involves the 
development of doctrines and strategies for the production and use or non-use of 
nuclear weapons.”65 (Vicente; Cabaço [2011]) In more simplistic terms, just like any 
other strategy, this is the art of matching means to certain ends – in this case: nuclear 
weapons to policy goals. Although it applies the same logic, nuclear strategy is still 
fundamentally different from other military strategies. Most of these differences derive 
from the huge destructive power of nuclear weapons. As a result of this immense 
destructive power, the main goal of nuclear strategies has quickly shifted away from the 
use of these weapons to deterring their employment by the enemy. In other words, Hans 
Morgenthau argues that a fundamental difference between the nuclear and the pre-
nuclear periods is the use of force. In the pre-nuclear age, traditional forces were 
considered “an instrument for breaking the will of the opponent either through 
successful defense or attack; its primary function lies in the effectiveness of its physical 
application.” In the meanwhile, nuclear weapons have “a psychological function pure 
and simple. The prospective opponents are kept constantly aware of the inevitability of 
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 While strategy connects military power with political goals, doctrines define the possible application of 
military tools. They lay down the potential response options in advance, summarize the principles of 
responses and signal to the adversaries what might be the consequence of their actions under different 
contingencies. Walter Slocombe suggests two additional roles for a nuclear doctrine: it “guides our 
procurement strategy for the acquisition of strategic nuclear forces and the corresponding command, 
control, communications and intelligence systems which support our ability to employ them. [And it] 
shapes our operational planning for the use of our forces in war, if necessary.” (Slocombe [1981]: pp. 
18-19.) 
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their own destruction should they resort to nuclear force, and this awareness prevents 
them from resorting to it.”66 (Morgenthau [1964]: p. 24.)  
The shift in strategies from war fighting to deterrence was not so immediate and not so 
clear in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The first nuclear strategies emphasized the 
tactical values of nuclear weapons in supporting military missions. Planning their 
application was based on the traditions of strategic bombardments which Lawrence 
Freedman identified as an important inheritance from the pre-nuclear age.  
As the U.S. lost its nuclear monopoly and the number of nuclear weapons started to 
grow dramatically, the policy goals have changed and nuclear weapons have become 
the means to a new “end” – deterring war between the two military blocks of the Cold 
War. Despite several confrontations and crises between Washington and Moscow, 
nuclear deterrence proved to be resilient and as Wohlstetter called it, the “delicate 
balance of terror” prevented the use of nuclear weapons. (Wohlstetter [1958])  
Besides the different perspectives on the use of force, another fundamental difference 
between nuclear and conventional military strategies is the role of civilians in the 
making of strategies. While military strategies traditionally fell under the authority of 
the armed forces, nuclear strategies were paradoxically an exception to this rule. As the 
invention of nuclear weapons questioned many orthodox beliefs in military strategies, a 
kind of “intellectual vacuum” emerged, providing strategic theorists with an unusual 
opportunity to challenge the military and to draw up their own innovations for the 
formulation of nuclear strategies. (Szalai [2009]: p. 10-12.) Although the military tried 
to resist any civilian interference in its conduct of nuclear strategy, some 
administrations (especially the Kennedy and the Nixon administrations) proved to be 
more open to the ideas of the so called defense intellectuals and several civilian 
                                                 
66
 Despite the fundamental differences between conventional and nuclear military strategies, throughout 
the entire Cold War, there has been a constant attempt to “conventionalize” nuclear politics and use pre-
nuclear concepts to rationalize the potential use of nuclear weapons. McNamara’s no cities counterforce 
strategy or Schlesinger’s countervailing doctrine are good examples for this attempt. The problem with 
these attempts is their ignorance of the changed circumstances of war fighting. (Jervis [1984]: pp. 56-59.) 
Even if the U.S. only attacked Soviet military targets, there were no guarantees that Moscow would 
follow the same logic. Or how could the U.S. guarantee that a limited nuclear attack would not be 
misinterpreted and escalation would not lead to an all-out nuclear war. As Jervis argued, “traditionally, 
gaining an advantage over the other side’s forces made it impossible for the adversary to attack one’s 
civilian assets.” (Jervis [1984]: p. 58.) This again, has changed under the nuclear revolution – even one 
surviving Soviet ICBM could cause devastating civilian losses, if directed against a densely populated 
U.S. metropolitan. 
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proposals made it to official nuclear strategies. Nuclear weapons, in addition, are 
inherently “presidential weapons,” more than any other type of weapons – the use of 
these weapons is an exclusively presidential authority (with the exception of a very few 
cases in the Cold War, when the practice of pre-delegation was introduced). 
Altogether, when this dissertation uses the term “nuclear strategy,” it applies a holistic 
approach to the concept. First, it includes all aspects of developing official nuclear 
doctrines on the policy level, the implementation of these doctrines by the military, and 
the actual designation of the nuclear war plans. And second, it also includes every 
doctrine or concept which has been designed to guide the use or non-use of nuclear 
weapons, regardless of the origin of the idea (be it from the military, policy makers or 
the academia) and regardless of the extent to which it could actually influence the 
official guidance of nuclear policy. 
 
2.3 Counterforce vs. Counter-value Strategies 
According to the Encyclopedia of the U.S. Military, counterforce means “The 
employment of strategic air and missile forces in an effort to destroy, or render 
impotent, selected military capabilities of an enemy force under any of the 
circumstances by which hostilities may be initiated.” (The definition was quoted from 
the JCS in Arkin; Handler; Morrissey; Walsh [1990]: p. 184.) “Typical counter-force 
targets include: bomber bases, ballistic missile submarine bases, intercontinental 
ballistic missile (ICBM) silos, antiballistic and air defense installations, command and 
control centers, and weapons of mass destruction storage facilities.” (Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs 
[2011]: p. 240.) 
In contrast, counter-value means “Strategies or attacks against an opponent’s civilian 
population and general economic centers that constitute the social fabric of the nation.” 
(Arkin; Handler; Morrissey; Walsh [1990]: p. 185.) Opponents of counter-value 
strategies generally claim that counter-value equals “city busting” and targeting main 
population centers, which is only half of the truth. Applying a counter-value strategy 
does not necessarily mean the deliberate targeting of civilian populations, it can just as 
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well mean the targeting of softer economic centers which play a role as war-supporting 
industry or render meaningful in the after war recovery.
67
 
An important consequence of this differentiation relates to the force levels. As cities and 
general economic centers are mostly considered soft targets which are large and fixed, 
they do not require very sophisticated weapon systems and smaller arsenals are enough 
to hold them at risk. (Glaser [1992]: p. 74.) In contrast, these smaller arsenals are not 
enough to meet the criteria of counterforce missions which require high-confidence 
attacks against hardened military targets. War plans usually designate extremely high 
damage expectancy levels to these attacks therefore many targets have to be covered 
with multiple warheads. Counterforce strategies, thus, absorb considerably more nuclear 
forces than counter-value strategies which can be maintained with as few as a couple of 
hundreds of nuclear warheads.  
Although in theory the differentiation between counterforce and counter-value seems to 
be clear, the practice so far has suggested otherwise. Throughout the history of the Cold 
War, U.S. targeting policy applied a mix of counterforce and counter-value strategies, 
with a shifting focus between the different target categories.  
In the late 1940s, the focus of U.S. targeting policy was mostly on softer targets, which 
are closer to the definition of counter-value. As a result of the limited availability of 
nuclear weapons (and the lack of Soviet nuclear forces until 1949), the first nuclear war 
plans primarily targeted Soviet cities (BROILER (1947): 34 bombs on 24 cities; 
TROJAN (1949): 133 bombs on 70 cities; OFFTACKLE (1949): 220 bombs on 104 
cities). (Pringle; Arkin [1983]: p. 62.) In 1950, the JCS finally designated a three-level 
target system, which remained in force until the first SIOP. This system meant the first 
shift to a more counterforce-centered strategy – the three categories were aimed at 
Soviet capabilities to launch a nuclear offensive; Soviet war-making capacities and 
targets to retard Soviet advances in Western Europe. The so called Emergency War 
Plans of the late Truman years and the Basic War Plans of the Eisenhower 
administration contained an “optimum mix” of the above mentioned categories. These 
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 This latter approach is reflected in the counter-value definition of the 2011 Nuclear Matters Handbook. 
Accordingly, “counter-value targeting directs the destruction or neutralization of selected enemy military 
and military-related targets such as industries, resources, and or/institutions that contribute to the ability 
of the enemy to wage war.” (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and 
Biological Defense Programs [2011]: p. 240.) 
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plans, however, were mostly built on one massive strike, the so called “Sunday punch” 
– hitting everything simultaneously and withholding nothing. The first SIOP reflected a 
very similar logic, dropping 1,685 weapons on the military-urban targets of the Sino-
Soviet bloc in a massive retaliatory or preemptive strike. (Sagan [1987]: p. 29.) 
After receiving their first SIOP briefing, Kennedy and McNamara decided to cut with 
the policy of massive retaliation and introduced the doctrine of flexible response. Under 
the tenure of flexible response, the defense intellectuals of RAND Corporation managed 
to promote the introduction of the counterforce – or the so called “no cities” – strategy 
as the new official U.S. doctrine. This was the first real attempt to avoid major civilian 
casualties in U.S. nuclear strategy but despite the best intentions of the administration, 
even this strategy left a small window open for counter-value targeting. The 1962 SIOP 
63 designated five primary attack options: 1) strategic forces; 2) air-defense sites away 
from cities; 3) defense sites closer to cities; 4) command-control centers and 5) an all-
out strike against Soviet cities. (Sagan [1987]: pp. 38-39.) In theory, the first four 
options would all meet the military’s official counterforce definition, but in practice 
options three and four would probably damage civilian populations, as well. Option 
three (defense sites closer to cities) is a counterforce target in purpose but as a result of 
its proximity to cities, it would most likely cause severe civilian losses as collateral 
damage. The fourth primary attack option (command-control centers) is an interesting 
example for the blurred lines between counterforce and counter-value targeting. 
Planning to hit leadership and command and control targets perfectly fits in the 
framework of counterforce targeting, as it meets the criteria to “render impotent 
selected military capabilities.” However, most of the leadership targets in the Sino-
Soviet bloc were located in the heart of densely populated cities, therefore, hitting these 
targets would inevitably result in a mass destruction in the civilian population which is a 
more likely consequence of the counter-value strategies. Altogether, only the first two 
categories were real counterforce attack options and the remaining three categories 
risked killing masses of Sino-Soviet civilian populations, either on purpose (option five) 
or as collateral damage (options three and four).  
In the end, McNamara’s official counterforce doctrine was very short-lived and it was 
soon replaced by the strategy of assured destruction which put a bigger emphasis on 
deterrence, instead of war fighting. The targeting policy of the new doctrine continued 
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to focus primarily on counterforce objectives but counter-value elements were never 
excluded either. McNamara’s “400 megaton” strategy was based on a retaliatory strike 
that would destroy specified percentages of the Soviet civilian population as well.  
Under Presidents Nixon and Ford, the doctrine of limited nuclear options aimed to 
provide real credibility to war fighting, thus it meant a big revival for the RAND 
Corporation’s counterforce strategy. Based on the presidential guidance, the 1974 
NUWEP-74 designated four attack options: 1) major attack options; 2) selected attack 
options; 3) limited nuclear options; and 4) regional nuclear options. The first two aimed 
to destroy selected economic and military resources, post-war recovery capabilities, 
leadership targets and nuclear as well as conventional capabilities – basically the 
classical target categories with a major focus on counterforce. The second two options 
were meant to tailor nuclear strikes to more limited, regional conflicts where vital U.S. 
interests were involved. Despite the dominance of the counterforce strategy, a major 
innovation of the Schlesinger doctrine was the inclusion of economic recovery targets, 
which was much closer to the group of counter-value elements. Adding this new 
category meant that many softer targets were matched with nuclear weapons of a huge 
destructive power, and a gap emerged between the increased number of potential targets 
and the number of available weapons. 
The Carter years slightly deviated from these traditions and reorganized the mix of 
counterforce and counter-value elements. Carter’s targeting policy put a huge emphasis 
on holding at risk the Soviets’ ability to prevail in a nuclear war. Therefore, command 
and control targets gained primary importance and general war-supporting industrial 
facilities were prioritized against economic recovery targets. As a result of this shift, 
counterforce targeting became more dominant than before. Many nuclear weapons, 
previously tied down to hit economic recovery facilities were now reassigned to “pure 
counterforce” missions. As regards targeting principles, the Reagan administration was 
a clear continuation of the Carter years. Reagan’s prevailing strategy meant that the U.S. 
held at risk “the full range of enemy military capabilities that threaten the U.S. and its 
Allies” – an explicit reinforcement of the primacy of counterforce targeting. (NSDD-13 
[1981])  
Despite the strategic redirection under the Bush administration, NSDD-13 remained in 
force, which meant that the same guidance was applicable for the making of nuclear war 
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plans. The system, however, was rationalized according to the new circumstances and 
the PNIs implemented several major changes in U.S. nuclear forces. However, as the 
significant reductions in the force levels were followed by major cuts in the target lists, 
the remaining nuclear arsenal was still able to cover mostly the same target categories in 
a considerably smaller geographical scope, which shrank from the former Soviet Union 
to the Russian Federation. 
Despite the fact that the number of nuclear weapons has been cut down to half since the 
end of the George H. W. Bush administration, the primacy of counterforce targeting has 
remained the guiding principle for U.S. operational policies and it is still characteristic 
of the most recent war plans of the Obama administration. 
Scott Sagan argues that in general there were three main reasons why the U.S. decided 
to follow a counterforce strategy during the Cold War. In the 1960s, it “was designed to 
limit damage to the United States in the event of a nuclear war, and U.S. war plans 
included specific preemptive options.” (Sagan [1989]: p. 73.) The second reason was to 
enhance the credibility of extended deterrence towards the NATO allies. And finally, 
the strongest and newest reason was the Carter and Reagan administrations’ strategy to 
deny Soviet war aims. While many critics of counterforce claimed that this strategy 
reflected the adoption of a major first strike option, official declarations from the 
Reagan administration suggested that the military’s favored preemptive strike options 
from the 1960s had been abandoned by the second half of the 1980s and U.S. strategy 
had become purely defensive. Another critic of counterforce strategies claimed that 
counterforce raised crisis instability as its main emphasis on nuclear forces and 
leadership targets increased incentives for Moscow to act preemptively. In addition, 
both Thomas Schelling and James Schlesinger argued that counterforce matched such a 
robust destructive power to military targets that in a crisis situation it would have been 
impossible to differentiate between a limited retaliatory strike and an all-out nuclear 
war, thus escalation could not be controlled. (Kaplan [1991]: p. 365.) But in response to 
these fears, Sagan argued that creating a second-strike posture (with a force structure 
that enables differentiation between first-strike and second-strike capabilities), 
complemented with operational arms control measures would actually allow the U.S. to 
maintain both a robust deterrence posture and crisis stability. (Sagan [1989]: pp. 59-90.) 
The importance of arms control measures was also shared by Schelling, who argued that 
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counterforce strategy created mutual fears from a preemptive first strike but arms 
control negotiations provided a way out of this dilemma. (Schelling [1980]: pp. 251-
254.) 
Although Sagan saw a solution for the potential dangers of counterforce, others seem to 
be more pessimistic in this regard. Professor John D. Steinbruner for example argues 
that this strategy “has the most doubtful legitimacy, the most questionable effectiveness, 
the fewest domestic advocates, and the greatest Soviet resistance.” He goes further and 
claims that counterforce works against deterrence as a result of its focus on retaliation. 
(Steinbruner [1988]: pp. 4-5.) 
Altogether, since the early 1950s, U.S. targeting policy has been primarily counterforce. 
In practice, however, it never existed in a pure sense – despite the fact that in U.S. war 
plans counterforce targets absorbed the majority of forces, counter-value elements have 
always been present. On the operational level, it is very difficult to differentiate 
counterforce targeting from counter-value, as the lines between these two strategies are 
frequently blurred. Therefore, the traditional characterization of U.S. nuclear policy as 
counterforce is mostly correct but in a way it is also simplistic and overlooks the fact 
that counter-value elements have always been parts of U.S. nuclear war plans. In 
essence, the ultimate logic of U.S. targeting policy has always been to hold those targets 
at risk, which the enemy values the most. 
 
2.4 Strategic Stability 
Unlike the terms “counterforce” and “counter-value” which were elaborated and clearly 
defined by the military, the concept of “strategic stability” is a theoretical abstraction 
and there is no universal definition for what it exactly means. This is the main reason 
why there are so many different understandings and different definitions of strategic 
stability, used widely in the academic discussions as well as in the official rhetoric of 
nuclear weapon states. 
The roots of strategic stability go back to the early years of the Cold War and, based on 
a historical approach, Michael S. Gerson argues that strategic stability emphasized “how 
changes in military technology and strategy encouraged a new way of thinking about 
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the causes of war and the requirements of peace and security.” (Gerson [2013]: p. 2.) 
During the 1950s and 1960s the concept of strategic stability was gradually developed 
in the course of a lively debate between the government, the different branches of the 
military, the defense intellectuals and the rest of the academia. Although the word 
“stability” only appeared in the official debate during the late 1960s, its foundations 
were already laid down in the strategic concepts of the 1950s.  
The two earliest pioneers of strategic studies were Bernard Brodie with his 1946 book, 
‘The Absolute Weapon’ and William Borden with his ‘There Will Be No Time.’ While 
Brodie argued that a war in the nuclear age can be avoided by having an ability to 
“retaliate in kind” (thus deter the opponents from launching a first strike), Borden 
claimed that nuclear weapons would spread very quickly and a nuclear war seemed 
almost inevitable. Therefore, in Borden’s argument, the ultimate role of nuclear 
weapons was to provide a disarming first strike capability. Borden believed that the key 
to victory was not attacking cities or industrial facilities but targeting the enemy’s 
retaliatory capabilities in a surprise first attack (one of the earliest articulations of the 
first strike counterforce strategy). Brodie, in contrast, argued that under the 
circumstances of assured retaliatory capabilities, no victory was worth launching a 
surprise first attack. These two seminal works outlined what turned out to be the two 
central challenges of strategic stability as early as the late 1940s: the vulnerability of 
strategic forces to a surprise first strike versus the assured ability to survive a first strike 
and “retaliate in kind.” (Gerson [2013]: pp. 2-3.) 
By the early 1950s, the U.S. had lost its nuclear monopoly and both superpowers were 
rapidly increasing their nuclear capabilities. As a result of these developments, the 
mutual fears of a first strike dominated the strategic discourse. One of the first 
articulations of these fears was the 1950 NSC-68 which claimed that initiating a surprise 
first strike could provide tremendous strategic advantages and the Soviet Union was 
moving towards that direction. (NSC-68 [1950]) These conclusions were also reinforced 
by a 1950 JCS study and fed into the paranoia of the highest political levels. 
Wohlstetter’s vulnerability study and the horrific scenarios of losing the majority of 
U.S. bombers on the ground in the event of a Soviet surprise attack only added to these 
fears. As a result of the notion of vulnerability, Wohlstetter came to the conclusion that 
deterrence was not automatic and the key to maintain the “delicate balance of terror” 
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was not parity in numbers but a capability to survive a first attack and have enough 
forces for a retaliatory strike. (Wohlstetter [1958]: pp. 10-16.)  
A second consequence of vulnerability was the necessity to make U.S. forces more 
survivable. A physical solution for this problem was the development of early warning 
systems, the hardening and dispersal of bomber bases, and the development of an 
alternative force, the intercontinental ballistic missiles (all these recommendations were 
included in the 1955 Killian Report). In the meanwhile, a strategic solution was 
reducing SAC’s reaction time by keeping the bombers on a continuous alert status and 
relying on a preemptive doctrine which would launch the aircrafts in response to the 
first signs of a surprise attack by the enemy (a very influential doctrine throughout the 
1950s and 1960s). In addition to these physical and strategic measures, the 1957 Gaither 
Report raised another possibility, “a continuing attempt to arrive at a dependable 
agreement on the limitation of armaments.” (Quoted in Gerson [2013]: p. 21.) 
According to the Gaither Committee’s conclusions, the United States and the Soviet 
Union should cooperate to address their mutual fears of a surprise first strike – this 
reflected an important evolutionary step in strategic thinking: stability was not a one-
sided phenomenon, the U.S. was not able to maintain it by unilateral measures, mutual 
efforts were needed to preserve the balance. The last important development for the 
explicit formulation of strategic stability was the Navy’s finite deterrence concept. 
According to their argument, invulnerability was the most important precondition of 
stability: acquiring survivable forces can diminish the constant pressure to strike first 
and would significantly calm down tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. 
These strategic considerations of the 1940s and 1950s made a major contribution to the 
concept of strategic stability. Vulnerability and fears of a surprise first attack, ultimately 
leading to arguments for more survivable forces and a dialogue between the two 
superpowers were all essential theoretical foundations. As the nuclear arsenals had 
significantly grown by the end of the decade and weapons systems became more 
sophisticated, more accurate and more survivable, Washington seemed to overstep the 
first “window of vulnerability” – i.e. the bomber gap. This was the time when Thomas 
Schelling appeared on the horizon with his RAND article on ‘Surprise Attack and 
Disarmament.’ (Schelling [1959]) Schelling’s theory on stability was strongly 
influenced by Wohlstetter’s final paragraph in the ‘Delicate Balance of Terror’ which 
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argued that if both the U.S. and the Soviet Union had the capability to destroy each 
other’s retaliatory forces, it would result a highly unstable situation, while a protected 
retaliatory capability would actually stabilize their relationship and reduce the 
incentives to launch an attack. Schelling elaborated on this idea and claimed that “the 
main incentive to initiate a total war with a surprise attack is the fear of being a poor 
second for not going first.” (Schelling [1959]: pp. 413-414.) In addition, he argued that 
“There is a difference between a balance of terror in which either side can obliterate 
the other, and one in which both sides can do it no matter who strikes first. It is not the 
“balance” – the sheer equality or symmetry in the situation – that constitutes mutual 
deterrence, it is the stability of the balance. The balance is stable only when neither 
side, in striking first, can destroy the other’s ability to strike back.” Schelling [1959]: 
pp. 414.) Altogether, Schelling claimed that stability
68
 did not only mean that the U.S. 
had survivable capabilities for retaliation but the Soviet Union also had to possess such 
capabilities with a confidence in its own retaliatory forces. Based on this logic, 
Schelling designated “good” nuclear weapons, which can cause damages to the civilian 
population but are unable to hurt the enemy’s strategic forces; and “bad” nuclear 
weapons which can provide a strategic advantage if launched first, thus upset the 
balance and create incentives for a first strike. In Schelling’s stability concept, the 
mutual vulnerability of forces should be eliminated by arms control measures which 
limit the so called counterforce arsenals and reproduce mutual vulnerability on the level 
of the populations. This actually strengthened stability and lessened the dangers of a 
nuclear exchange by introducing serious moral constraints to initiate a war. This 
argument about the stabilizing effect of arms control measures was accepted on the 
highest political levels and it formulated the basic foundation of the SALT and START 
negotiations of the 1970s and 1980s. 
Based on Schelling’s stability concept, defense intellectuals identify several types of 
strategic stability: crisis stability, first strike stability, and arms race stability. In general 
terms, “Crisis stability is the degree to which strategic force characteristics might, in a 
crisis situation, reduce incentives to initiate the use of nuclear weapons. Arms race 
stability involves the effect of planned deployments on the scope and pace of the arms 
race.” (U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment [1985]: p. 119.) And first 
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 According to Schelling himself, back in the 1960s, they did not really use the term strategic stability, 
instead they called it stability of deterrence. (Colby; Gerson [2013]: p. vii.) 
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strike stability is “a condition that exists when neither superpower perceives the other 
as motivated by the posture of strategic forces to launch the first nuclear strike in a 
crisis.” (Kent; Thaler [1989]: p. iii.) While first strike stability is based primarily on the 
force structures, the other two concepts are much broader. Both crisis stability and arms 
race stability depend on additional factors like psychological stress, the accuracy of 
intelligence information, assessments of the intent of the enemy, miscalculations and 
misperceptions. Therefore, first strike stability is part of both concepts. (Kent; Thaler 
[1989]: p. 2.) 
Despite the end of the Cold War, strategic stability has not lost its importance. While 
early discussions during the Cold War mostly focused on what we call today crisis 
stability and first strike stability, the Obama administration seems to put more emphasis 
on a form of arms race stability. U.S. force planning considers all factors which might 
endanger stability but the primary driver of medium- and long-term force postures is to 
avoid setting off arms buildups in Russia and China, while it also maintains sufficient 
levels to deter and defeat these forces. The big question is how the administration can 
balance these seemingly contradictory interests. (Interview with Hans M. Kristensen 
[2014])  
Another challenge for the current U.S. administration comes from the U.S. and Russian 
governments’ different interpretations of strategic stability. While the U.S. seems to 
apply a narrow approach to strategic stability, the Russian Federation uses a much 
broader understanding which has already interfered with several dimensions of the 
ongoing arms control negotiations.  
In the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review report, the Obama administration used the concept 
of strategic stability as a central issue in U.S. nuclear policy vis-à-vis Russia and China. 
The term strategic stability appeared altogether 29 times, in reference to issues mostly 
related to nuclear weapons capabilities. In the U.S.-Russian bilateral relationship, 
strategic stability was associated with a continued dialogue between the two states to 
further reduce U.S.-Russian nuclear arsenals, to limit the role of nuclear weapons in the 
national security strategies, and to enhance transparency and confidence-building 
measures. (NPR [2010a]) 
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Russia, on the other hand, seems to use the term strategic stability in a broader context, 
claiming that the question of ballistic missile defense, conventional prompt global 
strike, and the militarization of outer space all affect the strategic stability between 
Moscow and Washington. U.S. modernization efforts in these areas are seen as attempts 
to undermine the survivability of the Russian nuclear arsenal and steps to gain strategic 
advantage over Russia. Therefore, Moscow has been repeatedly arguing that any future 
arms control agreement should address all factors which affect strategic stability. 
(Denisov [2011]) 
Besides the scope of strategic stability, another striking difference between the current 
U.S. and Russian strategic cultures is their interpretation of the role of strategic parity. 
Strategic stability from a U.S. perspective is not necessarily dependent on strategic 
parity. As a result of its tremendous technological leverage, the U.S. could easily 
maintain strategic stability vis-à-vis Russia even if it had fewer deployed strategic 
nuclear weapons than its counterpart. Moscow, on the other hand, seems to make 
strategic stability dependent on the notion of strategic parity. (Lavrov [2011]) This 
different interpretation is another factor which will affect the next rounds of arms 
control negotiations between Washington and Moscow. 
 
2. Hypotheses 
The history of U.S. nuclear strategy was a constant search for credible nuclear doctrines 
which could deter the Soviet Union from engaging in any kind of aggression that could 
lead to a nuclear exchange between the United States and its Allies on the one side, and 
the Soviet Union with its satellite states on the other. Although the official policy 
declarations of the U.S. have gone through a long evolution, each administration 
emphasized the importance of flexible, limited and selective attack options which would 
give the President the necessary maneuvering capability in a crisis situation to choose 
the best possible solution. At the core of the U.S. approach was the preparation for the 
worst case scenarios and the assurance of survivability under any circumstances. 
Preparing for these worst case scenarios meant constant revisions on the political as 
well as on the operational levels of nuclear strategy. 
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The historical overview has already shown the shifting focuses of policy and planning 
during the Cold War period, the primary focus now is to show how these dynamics 
work under the Obama administration. With the visionary Prague speech, the President 
designated a very ambitious policy agenda but the implementation is still far from 
complete. In the declaratory policy, the emphasis on nuclear weapons has been clearly 
lessened, a new limited negative security assurance has been announced and the 
administration promised to reduce reliance on such Cold War relics as the launch under 
attack policy for example. These declarations suggest that a meaningful shift has been 
implemented on the policy level but it still needs to be seen what changes it will trigger 
on the operational level and how it will affect the prospects of further reductions with 
Russia. Moscow has never based its strategic assumptions on the declarations of U.S. 
Presidents, it has always carefully examined what changes those declarations produced 
in the actual war fighting capabilities of the U.S., and the Kremlin formulated its own 
nuclear policy according to those capabilities. As Walter Slocombe noted in 1981, 
“What the Soviets judge we could do, not what we say we would do, has the strongest 
impact on deterrence.” (Slocombe [1981]: p. 18.)  
Therefore, the most important questions to be answered relate to the operational aspects 
of the current nuclear strategy. Unfortunately, in this area the Obama administration 
seems to lag behind its promises: the issue of reducing alert levels has been abandoned 
after the 2007-2008 campaign period and it did not even make it into the official policy 
agenda. Despite the declarations that the role of launch under attack is reduced, the 
capability itself is still maintained; targeting policy still relies on a prompt counterforce 
strategy; and damage expectancy levels are still much higher than necessary. As a result 
of the maintenance of many of these conservative elements on the operational level, the 
prospects of further deep force reductions are not too promising. Altogether, the Obama 
administration seems to fit well in the paradox Cold War tradition of a considerable 
divide between the declaratory policy and the operational level. 
All these assumptions and conclusions lead to three main hypotheses: 
H1: In the declaratory policy, the Obama administration has lessened the 
reliance on Cold War nuclear thinking. 
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H2: But on the operational level, it still retains key elements of Cold War 
nuclear thinking. 
H3: Retaining key elements of Cold War nuclear thinking on the operational 
level has a negative effect on the prospects of further reductions. 
Regarding the first hypothesis, having established what the author means under Cold 
War nuclear thinking on the different levels of nuclear strategy, the first task will be a 
primary source analysis to examine what aspects of the Obama administration’s 
declaratory policy constitute a shift from Cold War traditions. As defined in the 
introduction, declaratory policy in this case includes speeches from the campaign and 
the presidential periods, as well as primary policy documents like for example the 
official campaign strategy from 2008, the nuclear agenda on the White House webpage, 
or the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review report. The term “lessened reliance” refers to 
concrete changes on the policy level, based on the examination of what has disappeared 
from the Cold War elements and what is still there. 
In the case of the second and the third hypotheses, there is a causal connection between 
the two statements – the third hypothesis depends on the second one and it can only be 
proved if the second hypothesis is true. In order to defend these statements, the 
operational policies of the current administration will be compared with the analytical 
framework on Cold War policies. Presuming that the nature of strategic planning will 
show major overlaps between the two periods, a final task will be to show the 
consequences of this continuity. The third hypothesis intends to link the different levels 
of nuclear policy and show how planning affects force structure requirements. 
In this regard, the dissertation uses a broad interpretation of the term “reductions.” First, 
it includes reductions in the overall number of nuclear warheads or delivery vehicles. 
And second, it also includes reductions in the type of nuclear weapons – reducing the 
number of the currently deployed seven warhead types or moving from a triad to a dyad 
in the deliveries would all constitute a reduction. Reducing the overall number and the 
diversity of weapons does not necessarily come together – one can reduce the number of 
warheads but still retain all seven types, and similarly, the number of deliveries can be 
reduced without phasing out one leg of the triad. However, in the case of the Obama 
administration, if the number of warhead types is reduced, the overall number of 
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weapons would also be reduced, as the administration took a pledge not to develop new 
nuclear warheads. (NPR [2010a]: p. 39.)  
Regarding the term “negative effect,” it also has two dimensions. From a quantitative 
point of view, in several aspects, the requirements of the operational level can be 
reflected in concrete numbers – after all, this is how strategic planners outline the force 
requirements which are needed to execute the war plans. During the process of plan 
production, specific targets are identified, calculations are made on the sortie probability 
of arrival, the desired ground zero aimpoints are chosen, weapons are allocated to 
individual sorties, and calculations are made on the probability of damage. In the end, 
all these factors add up to a requirement for a certain number and type of nuclear 
weapons. (Kristensen [2010]: p. 6.) These data, however, are not available for the public 
(which makes it almost impossible to reproduce these calculations and apply a 
quantitative approach to show the exact force requirements of certain operational 
elements). Therefore, the emphasis will be on the qualitative aspect of the relationship 
between the operational level and the force structure. A good example for that is the 
case of the launch under attack policy. The decision of the Obama administration that it 
intends to maintain the capability to launch under attack means that the military still has 
to provide a prompt launch capability, which in practice means an ICBM force on a 
high alert status. 
As it was mentioned before, the prospects of nuclear disarmament depend on many 
issues, starting from the Russian will to cooperate, to the political intentions of 
Congress, but having favorable conditions in these two fields would still not mean that 
reductions can be implemented. Without changing the primary operational drivers of 
weapons requirements, the current force structure will mostly remain intact. 
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II. Nuclear Strategy under the Obama Administration 
 
1. The Roots of President Obama's Nuclear Strategy – From College 
Paper to Official Campaign Strategy 
President Obama’s commitment to global zero goes back to the early 1980s. As a 
college student in March, 1983 he published a piece in Columbia University’s Sundial 
journal. In his ‘Breaking the War Mentality’ article, he argued that American militarism 
and the Reagan administration’s hard rhetoric had already frozen the arms control talks 
in Geneva, and it might lead to a “dangerous rift” between the U.S. and its Western 
allies which would play “directly into the Russians’ hands.” He criticized “academic 
discussions of first versus second strike capabilities” which in his opinion only “suit the 
military-industrial interests, as they continue adding to their billion dollar erector sets.” 
He welcomed Mark Bigelow’s commitment to a “Test Ban Treaty as a powerful first 
step towards a nuclear free world,” praised student movements for their efforts to 
establish a “decent world” and closed his thoughts with “an invitation to work towards 
a peace that is genuine, lasting and non-nuclear.” (Obama [1983]) 
These ideas were in the forefront of his agenda under his short term as a U.S. senator 
between 2005 and 2008. During these years, preventing the spread of nuclear weapons 
was a top priority for Obama. He worked with Senator Richard Lugar to conclude a law 
to secure nuclear weapons and materials around the world, and he worked with Senator 
Chuck Hagel to pass a law to prevent nuclear terrorism and to promote global nuclear 
disarmament as well as nuclear non-proliferation. (Obama [2007])  
In addition to his own deep belief in nuclear disarmament and in global zero, two 
writings had a significant influence on his campaign strategy and later presidential 
agenda: the 2007 and 2008 Wall Street Journal (WSJ) op-eds by the so called “four 
horsemen” and the 2009 Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic 
Posture of the United States. 
In January, 2007 former Secretaries of State George P. Shultz and Henry A. Kissinger, 
former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry and former Chairman of the Senate 
Armed Services Committee Sam Nunn published their first op-ed in the Wall Street 
Journal, under the title “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons.” In their article, the four 
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horsemen argued that “mutual Soviet-American deterrence” became “obsolete” with the 
end of the Cold War and relying on nuclear weapons “is becoming increasingly 
hazardous and decreasingly effective.” With the rising threat of nuclear terrorism, North 
Korea’s developing nuclear program and Iran’s refusal to halt its uranium enrichment 
activities, “the world is now on the precipice of a new and dangerous nuclear era.” In 
order to create the conditions of a safer international security environment, the four 
horsemen proposed a series of steps, most of which were later incorporated in the 
Obama administration’s nuclear strategy, as well. These steps were the following: 
change nuclear postures, reduce the size of forces, eliminate short-range nuclear 
weapons, ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), secure nuclear 
weapons and weapons-usable materials, get control of the uranium enrichment process, 
halt the production of weapons-usable fissile materials, phase out highly enriched 
uranium (HEU) from civilian nuclear facilities and resolve regional confrontations. 
(Shultz; Perry; Kissinger; Nunn [2007])  
In their next WSJ op-ed – “Toward a Nuclear-Free World” – the four horsemen warned 
that the “spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear know-how and nuclear material has 
brought us to a nuclear tipping point” and concrete near-term steps are needed to 
address these dangers: extend key provisions of the 1991 START Treaty, increase 
warning and decision times for the launch of nuclear weapons systems, discard 
operational plans for massive attacks, develop cooperative multilateral ballistic-missile 
defense and early warning systems, set high standards for the security of nuclear 
weapons and materials, start a dialogue on the consolidation of forward deployed 
nuclear weapons, strengthen monitoring under the NPT, and bring the CTBT into effect. 
In parallel, the U.S.-Russia dialogue should be extended to a multilateral level, the risks 
of the nuclear fuel cycle should be addressed and further substantial reductions should 
be implemented in the nuclear forces of the U.S. and Russia. (Shultz; Perry; Kissinger; 
Nunn [2008])  
In 2011, the four horsemen issued a new WSJ article on “Deterrence in the Age of 
Nuclear Proliferation.” The authors explained why deterrence based on nuclear 
weapons is inadequate in the current security environment and what steps need to be 
taken to move “from mutual assured destruction toward a new and more stable form of 
deterrence with decreasing nuclear risks and an increasing measure of assured security 
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for all nations.” (Shultz; Perry; Kissinger; Nunn [2011]) These articles all together, 
reinvigorated the academic as well as the political debate about the vision of a world 
free of nuclear weapons and they had an important effect on the incoming Obama 
administration’s campaign strategy and subsequent nuclear doctrine. 
Parallel to the efforts of the four horsemen, another influential write-up was a bipartisan 
commission report on U.S. nuclear posture. In 2008, Congress established a commission 
to review the strategic posture of the United States and to make recommendations for 
the future. Congress designated a 12-person bipartisan group for the task – the 
Chairman of the commission was William J. Perry and the Vice-Chairman James R. 
Schlesinger.
69
 The group published its final report in May, 2009 with almost a 100 
findings and recommendations. (Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of 
the United States [2009]) The main focus areas were: 
 The security environment: since the end of the Cold War, it has generally 
changed for the better. 
 The U.S. nuclear posture: “the principle functions of the U.S. nuclear posture 
are to create the conditions in which nuclear weapons are never used;” assure 
allies; discourage competition; and encourage strategic cooperation. Sizing U.S. 
forces is still overwhelmingly dependent on Russia; new challenges have 
emerged to strategic stability (e.g.: imbalance in non-strategic nuclear weapons); 
nuclear posture should be able to address a broad set of U.S. objectives; and 
maintaining the triad is necessary for the immediate future. 
 Missile defense: plays a useful role in supporting the deterrence posture; 
effective defenses are valuable against regional contingencies and limited long-
range threats; but these developments should not trigger counter-actions by 
Russia and China. 
 Declaratory policy: the primary goal is to signal U.S. intent to allies and 
enemies; calculated ambiguity is still important but it must be clear enough to 
deter potential adversaries; the use of nuclear weapons is only considered for the 
protection of the U.S. and its allies and only under “extreme circumstances.” 
 The nuclear weapons stockpile: a safe, secure, and reliable arsenal is needed; the 
Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP)
70
 and the Life Extension Programs 
                                                 
69
 Besides Perry and Schlesinger, the remaining ten members of the commission were: Harry Cartland, 
John Foster, John Glenn, Morton Halperin, Lee Hamilton, Fred Iklé, Keith Payne, Bruce Tarter, Ellen 
Williams and James Woolsey. 
70
 As most U.S. nuclear weapons were produced between 30-40 years ago and no new nuclear weapons 
have been produced since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. had to invest in the nuclear security 
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(LEP)
71
 have been successful in refurbishing and modernizing the U.S. nuclear 
arsenal; clarify what makes a weapon “new” and what does not; modernization 
should proceed without a political difficulty; as a matter of policy, the U.S. does 
not produce fissile materials and does not conduct nuclear explosive tests; and 
the U.S. does not seek new weapons with new military characteristics but 
advanced safety, security and reliability should be pursued. 
 The nuclear weapons complex: the physical infrastructure needs transformation; 
the NNSA needs funding for its modernization plans; the intellectual 
infrastructure also needs to be reinvigorated; interagency cooperation between 
the nuclear weapons laboratories and the different departments has to be 
strengthened; the autonomy of the NNSA needs to be enhanced. 
 Arms control: follow a modest step-by-step approach with Russia; secure a 
successor treaty to START I; broaden the scope of negotiations and include non-
strategic nuclear weapons; include China and U.S. allies in the process. 
 Non-proliferation: the U.S. should reenergize the non-proliferation regime with a 
strong leadership; broaden the agenda to strengthen the international treaty 
system; and play a leadership role in the 2010 NPT Review Conference. 
 The CTBT: no agreement in the commission about the ratification of the CTBT; 
but support to a comprehensive net assessment of the benefits, costs and risks of 
the treaty to update the political arguments. 
 Prevention and protection: the overall strategy has to be supplemented with steps 
to prevent further proliferation and nuclear terrorism; support to the Proliferation 
Security Initiative (PSI)
72
 and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism 
                                                                                                                                               
enterprise and establish a management program which is able to maintain the “safety, security and 
effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent. […] Within the Nuclear Security Enterprise, the central mission 
which includes maintaining the active stockpile, Life Extension Programs (LEPs) and Weapons 
Dismantlement, is referred to as the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program.” (NNSA [2014b]) 
It was initiated in the mid-1990s and according to the NNSA’s official website, the “Stockpile 
Stewardship Program is a robust program of scientific inquiry used to sustain and assess the nuclear 
weapons stockpile without the use of underground nuclear tests. The experiments carried out within the 
program are used in combination with complex computational models and NNSA’s Advanced Simulation 
and Computing (ASC) Program to assess the safety, security and effectiveness of the stockpile. An 
extraordinary set of science, technology and engineering (ST&E) facilities have been established in 
support of the stockpile stewardship program.” (NNSA [2014c])  
71
 “The term “life extension program (LEP)” means a program to repair/replace components of nuclear 
weapons to ensure the ability to meet military requirements.  By extending the "life," or time that a 
weapon can safely and reliably remain in the stockpile without having to be replaced or removed, 
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is able to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent 
without producing new weapons or conducting new underground nuclear tests.” (NNSA [2014a]) 
72
 The Proliferation Security Initiative was launched on May 31, 2003 and it is a “global effort that aims 
to stop trafficking of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials to 
and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern.” (U.S. Department of State [2003]) 
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(GICNT);
73
 reduce the risks of nuclear smuggling; and reduce vulnerability to 
electromagnetic pulse weapons. 
 Visions of the future: commission members had disagreements about the vision 
of global zero; but they were hopeful about near-term progress in reducing 
nuclear dangers. In order to advance this goal, pragmatic steps are outlined, 
“grounded in the strategic tradition of the United States in balancing deterrence 
and other means, including principally arms control and nonproliferation, to 
reduce nuclear dangers.” Reaffirm the preservation of nuclear non-use which 
strongly supports U.S. interests. 
The major findings and recommendations of this commission study were channeled in 
the Obama administration’s 2009-2010 Nuclear Posture Review process and the two 
documents reflect several overlaps regarding the fundamental role and mission of 
nuclear weapons. 
During the 2007-2008 campaign, presidential candidate Barack Obama repeatedly 
affirmed his commitment to the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and he 
precisely outlined the main elements of his future nuclear strategy. The details of this 
strategy (the related campaign speeches, fact sheets, policy papers) were worked out by 
a group of outside experts, who were tasked to turn the visions of the WSJ op-eds into a 
concrete policy agenda. The group was led by Ivo Daalder and Brooke Anderson. 
Besides Daalder and Anderson, the group included former officials, think tank experts 
and academics, such as Graham Allison, Robert Gallucci, Matthew Bunn, Jeffrey 
Lewis, Jan Lodal, John Holum, Robert Einhorn, Daniel Poneman, Michael Nacht, Laura 
Holgate, Jon Wolfsthal, and experts who were not officially associated with the 
campaign but gave their advice from the outside: Ashton Carter, Rose Gottemoeller, 
Michael McFaul and Gary Samore. (Samore [2013]) 
Senator Obama announced his candidacy for President in February, 2007 and after 
winning the primaries, he became the official candidate of the Democratic Party in 
August, 2008. His first major foreign policy speech took place at DePaul University in 
Chicago, in October, 2007. In his speech, Obama announced that he would continue his 
                                                 
73
 The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism was announced on July 16, 2006 by President 
George W. Bush and President Vladimir Putin. It is “an international partnership of 85 nations and four 
official observers who are committed to working individually and collectively to implement a set of 
shared nuclear security principles. The mission of the GICNT is to strengthen global capacity to prevent, 
detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism by conducting multilateral activities that strengthen the plans, 
policies, procedures, and interoperability of partner nations.” (U.S. Department of State [2006]) 
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efforts to secure nuclear weapons and materials from terrorist threats. He pledged to 
change the U.S. nuclear deterrent posture (which was still focused on deterring the 
former Soviet Union) and to set it right according to the new threats of a multipolar 
environment with more nuclear-armed states; and he stated that as President he would 
seek “a world in which there are no nuclear weapons.” At the same time, he also 
reassured conservative circles that this would not be a unilateral path, and “as long as 
nuclear weapons exist, we'll retain a strong nuclear deterrent.” (Obama [2007]) 
Regarding the concrete program areas of his nuclear agenda, Obama pledged to take 
ballistic missiles off hair trigger alert; dramatically reduce stockpiles of nuclear 
weapons and materials; pursue a global ban on the production of fissile materials; 
expand the U.S.-Russian ban on intermediate-range missiles to global; and strengthen 
the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.  
The next major campaign declaration on nuclear weapons was the January, 2008 official 
“Statement by Senator Obama Calling for a World Without Nuclear Weapons.” Obama 
welcomed the renewed efforts of the four horsemen to the establishment of a world free 
of nuclear weapons. He repeated most of the elements of the 2007 DePaul University 
speech but he also included a new commitment: the pledge to stop the development of 
new nuclear weapons. (Obama [2008c]) In his July, 2008 remarks on Iraq and 
Afghanistan, Obama devoted again several paragraphs to the repetition of the main 
focus areas of his nuclear strategy but this time he did not add any new elements to the 
already announced program. (Obama [2008b]) 
All these speeches culminated in a detailed policy paper, “Obama’s New Plan to 
Confront 21st Century Threats,” announced on July 16, 2008. (Obama [2008a]) This 
strategy organized the previously announced elements of Obama’s nuclear agenda into a 
structured format and added several – more specific – components to the official 
campaign strategy. In the document, four main areas were identified: 1) reduce the 
danger of nuclear terrorism, 2) prevent the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities, 3) 
strengthen the non-proliferation regime, and 4) organize the U.S. government for 
success. Under these areas, many new elements appeared: phase out HEU from the 
civilian sector; strengthen policing and interdiction efforts by institutionalizing the PSI; 
build state capacity to prevent theft, diversion, or spread of nuclear materials; convene a 
summit on preventing nuclear terrorism; strengthen the International Atomic Energy 
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Agency (IAEA); prevent nuclear fuel from becoming nuclear bombs; appoint a White 
House coordinator for nuclear security; and strengthen nuclear risk reduction work at 
the Defense, State, and Energy Departments. In the meanwhile, it meant a slight 
difference that the expansion of the U.S.-Russian ban on intermediate-range missiles to 
the global level was not specifically mentioned. 
After Senator Obama won the elections on November 4, 2008, this comprehensive 
strategy became the backbone of the administration’s official nuclear agenda. During 
the first few months of the new government, the exact same set of principles were 
uploaded to the White House webpage but as the text of the April, 2009 Prague address 
was finalized some of the elements suddenly disappeared and the agenda was updated. 
 
Table 3. Senator Obama’s Campaign Strategy 
Senator Obama’s Campaign Strategy (2008) 
Elements of the Nuclear Agenda Announcement 
Reduce the Danger of Nuclear Terrorism: 
secure nuclear weapons  
materials in four years 
DePaul University (2007) 
January, 2008 Statement 
Remarks on Iraq and Afghanistan (2008) 
Obama’s New Plan to Confront… (2008) 
phase out HEU from the civil sector Obama’s New Plan to Confront… (2008) 
strengthen policing and interdiction efforts 
(institutionalize the PSI) 
Obama’s New Plan to Confront… (2008) 
build state capacity to prevent theft,  
diversion, or spread of nuclear materials 
Obama’s New Plan to Confront… (2008) 
convene a summit on  
preventing nuclear terrorism 
Obama’s New Plan to Confront… (2008) 
Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons Capabilities: 
eliminate Iran’s and North Korea’s  
nuclear weapons programs through  
tough, direct diplomacy 
DePaul University (2007) 
Remarks on Iraq and Afghanistan (2008) 
Obama’s New Plan to Confront… (2008) 
strengthen the IAEA Obama’s New Plan to Confront… (2008) 
control fissile materials by a global ban  
on the production of fissile materials 
DePaul University (2007) 
Remarks on Iraq and Afghanistan (2008) 
Obama’s New Plan to Confront… (2008) 
prevent nuclear fuel from  
becoming nuclear bombs 
Obama’s New Plan to Confront… (2008) 
Strengthen the Nonproliferation Regime: 
set the goal of a nuclear-free world 
DePaul University (2007)  
January, 2008 Statement 
Remarks on Iraq and Afghanistan (2008) 
Obama’s New Plan to Confront… (2008) 
DOI: 10.14267/phd.2015009
96 
 
change U.S. nuclear deterrent posture,  
reduce the role of nuclear weapons 
DePaul University (2007) 
Obama’s New Plan to Confront… (2008) 
retain a strong nuclear deterrent by  
a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear arsenal 
DePaul University (2007) 
January, 2008 Statement 
Remarks on Iraq and Afghanistan (2008) 
Obama’s New Plan to Confront… (2008) 
stop the development of new nuclear weapons 
January, 2008 Statement 
Obama’s New Plan to Confront… (2008) 
seek real, verifiable reductions in nuclear 
stockpiles (deployed, non-deployed; strategic, 
non-strategic; high level dialogue with the P5) 
DePaul University (2007) 
January, 2008 Statement 
Remarks on Iraq and Afghanistan (2008) 
Obama’s New Plan to Confront… (2008) 
work with Russia to increase  
warning and decision time:  
take ballistic missiles off hair trigger alert 
DePaul University (2007) 
January, 2008 Statement 
Remarks on Iraq and Afghanistan (2008) 
Obama’s New Plan to Confront… (2008) 
secure CTBT ratification Obama’s New Plan to Confront… (2008) 
strengthen the global nuclear  
non-proliferation regime,  
achieve successful NPT RevCon in 2010 
DePaul University (2007) 
January, 2008 Statement 
Remarks on Iraq and Afghanistan (2008) 
Obama’s New Plan to Confront… (2008) 
Organize the U.S. Government for success: 
appoint a White House  
coordinator for nuclear security 
Obama’s New Plan to Confront… (2008) 
strengthen nuclear risk reduction work at 
Defense, State, and Energy Departments 
Obama’s New Plan to Confront… (2008) 
Additional measures which were not specifically included  
in the 2008 official campaign strategy: 
expand the U.S.-Russian ban on  
intermediate-range missiles to global 
DePaul University (2007) 
January, 2008 Statement 
Remarks on Iraq and Afghanistan (2008) 
 
2. The Review of U.S. Nuclear Guidance 
The Obama administration’s Nuclear Posture Review was mandated by Congress in 
§1070 of the FY 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). Section 1070, 
titled “Revised Nuclear Posture Review” declared that “In order to clarify U.S. nuclear 
deterrence policy and strategy for the near term, the secretary of defense shall conduct 
a comprehensive review of the nuclear posture of the United States for the next 5 to 10 
years.” According to the authorization, the review should include the role of nuclear 
forces; policy requirements and objectives to maintain a safe, reliable, and credible 
deterrence posture; the relationship of the deterrence policy, the targeting strategy, and 
arms control objectives; the role of missile defense and conventional forces in 
determining the role and size of the nuclear arsenal; the size and composition of the 
delivery capabilities; the nuclear weapons complex; and finally the active and inactive 
nuclear weapons stockpile necessary to meet the requirements of the national and 
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military strategy. The Secretary of Defense was designated to submit to Congress a 
report on the Nuclear Posture Review and it should “be used as a basis for establishing 
future U.S. arms control objectives and negotiating positions.” (NDAA for FY 2008 
[2007]: p. 327.)  
In general, after the NPR is finished the review of nuclear guidance goes through a 
similar process as during the Cold War: the President, the Secretary of Defense and the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff issue their own guidance documents and STRATCOM modifies 
the war plans according to the given guidance. Although SAC was replaced by 
STRATCOM in 1992 and SIOP was renamed to OPLAN in 2003, “the process for 
developing nuclear targeting and employment guidance […] has remained virtually 
unchanged since 1991” – claims a 2012 Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
report on nuclear weapons targeting. (GAO [2012]: p. 5.) The process in general 
consists of four main steps by the President and the NSC, the DoD, the JCS and 
STRATCOM. “The President and the National Security Council define the fundamental 
role of nuclear weapons, deterrence strategy, and basic employment strategy. The 
Secretary of Defense amplifies presidential guidance for DoD describing how the 
strategy should be carried out. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff refines and 
implements guidance by adding detail required for military planners. U.S. Strategic 
Command produces the Nuclear Force Employment Plan detailing options for the 
employment of nuclear weapons.” (GAO [2012]: p. 5., Figure 1.)  
The strategic documents issued along these steps are traditionally classified, although 
the Obama administration published an unprecedentedly long report of its 2010 NPR 
and DoD also submitted a nine pages long public summary for Congress on the 
presidential guidance document.
74
 As mentioned before, the Nuclear Posture Review is 
                                                 
74
 Despite the administration’s commitment to transparency, the core documents of nuclear strategy are 
still highly classified. At a Congressional hearing before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces of the 
Committee on Armed Services in the House of Representatives on November 2, 2011, Dr. James N. 
Miller, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy at the U.S. Department of Defense 
testified that within the executive branch only “a very small group of personnel […] have access to the 
nuclear employment guidance issued by the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command.” Within the DoD, “fewer than twenty 
copies of the President’s guidance are distributed in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, 
and U.S. Strategic Command. Fewer than 200 copies of the most recent amplifying guidance issued by 
the Secretary of Defense were produced, and distribution was limited primarily to Office of the Secretary 
of Defense, the Joint Staff, U.S. Strategic Command, and other Combatant Commanders. The Chairman’s 
guidance is distributed more widely within DOD (fewer than 200 copies), as the document assigns 
responsibilities to several defense agencies and the intelligence community. Commander, U.S. Strategic 
Command must issue guidance to his planners and forces in the field, so distribution is somewhat wider 
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a general overview of the role and mission of nuclear weapons, and it “establishes U.S. 
nuclear policy, strategy, capabilities and force posture for the next five to ten years.” 
(U.S. Department of Defense [2010a]) Although the NPR touches upon a wide range of 
issues from declaratory policy and force structure to operational planning, the next four 
steps are the key phases of the strategic planning process: the presidential, the OSD, the 
JCS and the STRATCOM guidance documents. (Interviews with James E. Cartwright 
[2014], Franklin C. Miller [2014] and Amy F. Woolf [2014])  
In the framework of the NPR follow-on process, parallel steps take place. On the one 
hand, the DoD begins to implement the specific decisions of the NPR, and designates 
concrete implementation timelines to these objectives (in this case, these measures 
include, for example, the downloading of ICBMs or the retirement of the Tomahawk 
nuclear-equipped sea-launched cruise missiles (TLAM-N). (Interviews with Hans M. 
Kristensen [2013c], Bradley H. Roberts [2014] and James N. Miller [2014]) 
Parallel to these steps, a Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Study (NPR IS) is 
prepared. It usually takes 90 days to complete the NPR IS but this time it took almost 
two years (to announce the results)
75
 – as Madelyn R. Creedon, Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Global Strategic Affairs called it, “the so much longer than 90-days 
review.” (Interview with Madelyn R. Creedon [2014]) In the summer of 2011 the DoD 
was tasked to prepare this broader study intended to examine strategy and targeting 
requirements to update White House nuclear employment guidance, including 
assessments on the ideal number of nuclear weapons and what kind of force reductions 
are possible. Based on this study, the Obama administration issued its nuclear weapons 
employment strategy (Presidential Policy Directive – PPD-24) in June, 2013. 
The presidential employment guidance (or as it is officially called, the ‘Nuclear 
Employment Strategy of the United States’) describes the administration’s priorities on 
what the DoD’s new nuclear weapons employment policy (NUWEP) should look like. 
                                                                                                                                               
because of that need.” Regarding the legislative branch, Dr. Miller said that there is a long debate about 
their access to these sensitive materials and there are a few instances when access is provided to members 
of Congress and senior staff but these cases are “quite limited” and they are “under restrictive terms.” 
(Congressional Hearing [2011]) 
75
 The NPR IS was reported to be finished by the summer of 2012 but certain elements of the study were 
leaked and some press releases falsely suggested that the administration considered the option of 
unilateral cuts to as low as 300 deployed strategic nuclear warheads. As the presidential campaign turned 
into its final months, the administration decided that it was not the right time to announce the results of 
the review, and the document was put on the shelf for a while. (Blechman [2012]) 
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In general, this directive identifies potential adversaries, target categories, and scenarios 
for which preplanned nuclear options should be developed. (GAO [2012]: p. 5.) 
After the President signs his guidance document, the OSD prepares the so called 
Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF). NUWEP is an appendix to the GEF 
which “provides general and country-specific planning scenarios and objectives” as 
well as “policy guidance for target selection and for the development of different types 
of attack options.” (GAO [2012]: p. 6.) In this case, attack options include Emergency 
Response Options (ERO), Selective Attack Options (SAO), Basic Attack Options 
(BAO), and Directed/Adaptive Planning Capability options. (Carpenter [2010]) 
According to issue experts Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, these attack 
options “range in size from employment of hundreds of nuclear warheads in a single 
strike against a broad section of an adversary’s targets to the use of a few warheads 
against a few targets in a limited strike.” (Kristensen; Norris [2011]) In addition, the 
OSD guidance also describes the necessary readiness level of forces and the required 
portions of operationally deployed and responsive forces. Based on the PPD-24, the 
OSD is presumed to have prepared its new employment guidance (NUWEP-13) 
sometime in 2013. 
The next step in the “bureaucratic labyrinth” is the Nuclear Supplement to the Joint 
Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP-N), prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This 
document contains detailed “targeting constraints and restraints,”76 it designates 
damage criteria, and “identifies the force generation timelines.” (GAO [2012]: p. 6.) 
This is a significantly longer document than the OSD guidance (in 2001 experts from 
the academia estimated that the current guidance was approximately 250 pages long). In 
general, it “directs and initiates the deliberate joint operations planning process for 
development of operational plans by assigning planning tasks and nuclear strike forces 
to the combatant commanders tasked with nuclear operations.” (McKinzie; Cochran; 
Norris; Arkin [2001]: p. 9. and Kristensen; Norris [2011]) 
The JCS then send the JSCP-N to STRATCOM where these guidance documents are 
transformed into actual war plans. The first step at STRATCOM is the so called 
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 “A ‘constraint’ is an operational limitation placed on a command by a higher commander that dictates 
an action, whereas a ‘restraint’ is an operational limitation that prohibits an action.” (GAO [2012]: p. 
6.) 
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Command Guidance (CG) which guides the modifications of the nuclear war plans by 
the Joint Functional Component Command for Global Strike (JFCC-GS – previously 
known as JSTPS). The Component Command is responsible for designing, maintaining 
and executing the war plans. In 2003, SIOP was renamed Operations Plan (OPLAN) to 
better reflect that this is not a single plan but a family of plans and it does not only 
contain nuclear components. (Kristensen; Norris [2011]) The current Operations Plan is 
the “USSTRATCOM OPLAN 8010-12 Strategic Deterrence and Force Employment” 
which was adopted in July, 2012.
77
 This is the first war plan update since the 2010 NPR 
but as the presidential guidance and the subsequent NUWEP were only issued in 2013, 
this probably does not contain changes which were triggered by the review process. 
(Kristensen [2013c]) 
Despite the fact that the different stages follow each other in a subsequent order, the 
process is not as linear as the above described phases suggest. Although a lot depends 
on the personalities and on the extent to which the civilians are determined to engage in 
the process of developing employment guidance and targeting, Franklin C. Miller 
argues that there has been a significant development since the early 1980s and by now a 
partnership has evolved between the OSD, the JCS and STRATCOM. (Interview with 
Franklin C. Miller [2014]) The different phases overlap, there is cooperation within the 
Department of Defense in the development of the guidance documents, and both 
civilians and people in uniform have the authority to provide feedback on the war plans. 
In the case of the OSD, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy reviews the updated 
war plans and makes sure that the President’s and Secretary of Defense’s guidance was 
implemented on the operational level. The Secretary of Defense and the President are 
typically briefed on the revised plans, and provide additional direction as appropriate. 
After the review process is finished, and the OPLAN is updated, the Secretary of 
Defense approves the new strategic war plan. (Interviews with James E. Cartwright 
[2014] and James N. Miller [2014]) 
Altogether, as a result of the Obama administration’s review process, a broad set of 
directives and guidance documents are rewritten. The success of the review, however, 
mostly depends on the President’s ability to make sure that his principles are interpreted 
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 Based on the new presidential guidance and the 2013 NUWEP, a new/updated nuclear war plan will 
probably enter into effect in 2014. Former officials from the administration and the DoD estimated that 
based on a new presidential guidance, a major update to the war plans generally takes 12-18 months. 
(Interviews with Jon B. Wolfsthal [2014] and Franklin C. Miller [2014]) 
DOI: 10.14267/phd.2015009
101 
 
correctly and implemented by the following guidance documents. This is not an easy 
task as the review will definitely trigger some debates between the different 
departments, agencies and individuals who might not share the President’s vision on the 
role and mission of nuclear weapons. Therefore, a successful review definitely requires 
strong leadership and strict oversight by the civilians, especially as the process 
sometimes allows a big maneuvering capability at each step of the review. (Kristensen; 
Norris [2011]) As STRATCOM Commander Admiral James Ellis said in 2004, “[The] 
president’s direction to me was less than two pages; the Joint Staff’s explanation of 
what the president really meant to say was twenty-six pages.” (Quoted in Kristensen; 
Norris [2011]) Each guidance document is reinterpreted by the following level and by 
the time it gets down to the war plans, the main content might be lost (until the 1980s 
this happened several times). This significant amount of interpretation in the system 
does not necessarily help – as Admiral Gerald E. Miller, former deputy director of the 
JSTPS summarized it, “It is in the implementation that the true strategy evolves, 
regardless of what is generated in the political and policy-meeting rooms of any 
Administration.” (Miller [1982]) 
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Figure 2. Nuclear Posture Planning under Obama 
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3. Declaratory Policy 
3.1 The Prague Address  
After President Obama took office in January, 2009, the campaign strategy was 
uploaded to the White House webpage as the official nuclear agenda of the 
administration. But as the text of the April Prague address was finalized, this strategy 
was revised and some elements disappeared. 
The Prague address was drafted by President Obama’s speechwriter Benjamin Rhodes, 
based on advice from the State Department, the DoD, the DoE and the JCS. In addition, 
the President was also deeply engaged in the process and put his own touches on the 
text
78
 which guaranteed that most of the campaign elements made it to the official 
presidential agenda. (Samore [2013]) Regarding the President’s advisors, their primary 
role was to make the speech realistic, and shape it in a way that its promises could be 
implemented without upsetting the closest allies of Washington – the ones with nuclear 
weapons (especially France), and the ones without nuclear weapons (especially in Asia). 
(Interview with Gary Samore [2014])  
The President delivered his Prague address on April 5, 2009. (Obama [2009]) The 
speech laid out a detailed nuclear agenda for the next four years which was reflected in 
the updated White House webpage as well. It designated three main goals, and several 
concrete steps: 
1)  Work towards a world without nuclear weapons (but as long as nuclear weapons 
exist, maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal): 
 reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy, and 
urge others to do the same;  
 reduce the nuclear warheads and stockpiles, negotiate a New START 
Treaty with Moscow, which will set the stage for further cuts with all 
nuclear weapon states; 
 ratify the CTBT in order to achieve a global ban on nuclear weapons 
testing; 
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 In some cases it meant that the text included a more progressive language, than bureaucrats originally 
imagined. Setting global zero as the ultimate goal was one of the issues which the president personally 
wanted. (Interview with Robert J. Einhorn [2014]) 
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 seek a treaty which will verifiably end the production of weapons usable 
fissile materials (FMCT). 
2)  Strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: 
 countries with nuclear weapons will work towards disarmament, 
countries without nuclear weapons will not pursue nuclear weapons; 
 strengthen international inspections and take stronger measures to 
address non-compliance; 
 establish a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation, which would 
include an international fuel bank; 
 pressure North Korea to abide by international norms and rules; 
 pursue a peaceful, diplomatic solution with Iran. 
3)  Secure nuclear weapons and materials from terrorists: 
 initiate a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear 
materials in the next four years (i.e. the Nuclear Security Summit series); 
 strengthen export control, break up black markets; 
 turn the PSI and the GICNT into durable international institutions. 
Several elements of the Prague agenda were implemented during the Spring of 2010: 
the U.S. announced its new Nuclear Posture Review on April 6, 2010; then it signed the 
New START Treaty with Moscow on April 8; the first Nuclear Security Summit was 
organized on April 12-13 in Washington, DC; and the 2010 Review Conference of the 
NPT was concluded with a final document. These successes proved that a considerable 
part of the Prague agenda was realistic. Progress, however, significantly slowed 
afterwards, and there are several fields where no results have been achieved: the FMCT 
negotiations are still frozen at the Conference on Disarmament (CD), a vote on the 
CTBT ratification has still not been scheduled, and Russia seems to be reluctant to 
negotiate any further disarmament agreements before the New START Treaty expires.  
Compared to the campaign strategy, there was one striking difference regarding the 
Prague address: increasing warning and decision time for the President to launch 
nuclear weapons (i.e. de-alerting) was completely eliminated from the policy priorities. 
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Besides several technical difficulties, there was strong institutional resistance against it 
(both U.S. and Russian military circles refused the idea of reducing the readiness of 
their nuclear forces), and de-alerting was also claimed to weaken the credibility of U.S. 
security guarantees and affect negatively the relationship of Washington and its allies. 
(Samore [2013] and Interview with Linton F. Brooks [2014]) 
 
3.2 The Nuclear Posture Review 
According to the DoD’s explanation, “The Nuclear Posture Review is a legislatively-
mandated review that establishes U.S. nuclear policy, strategy, capabilities and force 
posture for the next five to ten years.” (U.S. Department of Defense [2010a]) The first 
NPR was completed in 1994 by President Clinton and the second NPR was submitted to 
Congress by the Bush administration in December, 2001. The Obama administration’s 
2010 document is the third NPR. 
 
3.2.1 The Clinton Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review 
All three reviews have been different, regarding the purposes of the review and the 
process itself. The 1994 NPR was the “brain-child” of Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin 
who wanted to adapt U.S. nuclear policy to the realities of the post-Cold War 
environment. Under Les Aspin and Assistant Secretary of Defense, Ashton Carter, the 
DoD initiated a rather internal bottom-up review process on October 29, 1993. (Sauer 
[2005]: pp. 102-103.) It was the first review of U.S. nuclear weapons policy since the 
end of the Cold War and the first comprehensive review in 15 years, which addressed 
policy, doctrine, force structure, command and control, operations, supporting 
infrastructure, safety, security and arms control at the same time. The 10-month process 
was co-chaired by the OSD and the JCS. Although the DoD took the leading role, the 
working groups included members from the OSD, the JCS, the different services and 
the unified commands as well. (FAS [1995]) There were six working groups: 1) the role 
of nuclear weapons in U.S. security strategy; 2) U.S. nuclear force structure; 3) U.S. 
nuclear force operations; 4) nuclear safety and security; 5) the relationship between U.S. 
nuclear posture and counterproliferation policy; and 6) the relationship between US 
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nuclear posture and threat reduction policy with the former Soviet Union. The review 
was finally approved by President Clinton on September 18, 1994. (Kristensen [2005b]) 
The document was not released to the public, however, the DoD prepared a brief press 
release (U.S. Department of Defense [1994a]) with slides (NPR [1994]) on the most 
important conclusions of the review; and the transcripts of the briefings to the Congress 
(Congressional Hearing [1994]) and to the media (U.S. Department of Defense [1994b]) 
became also available. 
Regarding the main findings of the 1994 NPR, the DoD prepared the following figure: 
 
Figure 3. Nuclear Posture Review (1994) (NPR [1994]: p. 4.) 
 
Based on these elements, the main conclusion of the 1994 NPR was: “lead but hedge.” 
With the end of the Cold War, the Clinton administration concluded that the role of 
nuclear weapons was smaller than any time during the nuclear age, which allowed a 
smaller nuclear force and dramatic reductions from the Cold War levels. But with the 
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dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the bipolar system, the future became 
significantly uncertain – the denuclearization process and the reductions in the new 
independent states were still underway and the U.S. had to hedge against these 
uncertainties. In addition, the U.S. pledged to continue its commitments and security 
guarantees towards its allies, and to maintain high standards for nuclear safety and 
security, command and control, use control and civilian control. 
 
3.2.2 The Bush Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review 
The Bush administration’s NPR was mandated by Congress in 2000. The DoD was 
tasked “to lay out the direction for American nuclear forces over the next five to ten 
years.” (NPR [2002b]: p. 1.) But the Bush administration’s review went beyond its 
mandate, and looked at a bigger picture as the President had already tasked the DoD to 
adjust the U.S. military to the 21
st
 century security environment and prepare the 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Having a QDR process underway put its stamp on 
the 2001 NPR as well. The Bush administration’s NPR examined nuclear weapons in a 
broader context, integrating them into a continuum of different force options to address 
the new threats of the 21
st
 century. The review was co-chaired by senior officials from 
the DoD and the DoE, and the White House was also engaged in the process. (NPR 
[2002a]: p. 3.) The NPR was submitted to Congress on December 31, 2001, along with 
the release of a very brief report on the NPR. (NPR [2001]) The press was briefed on 
January 9, 2002 (U.S. Department of Defense [2002]) which included the release of 
some slides on the main findings of the NPR. (NPR [2002a]) In addition to these 
sources, the Los Angeles Times and the New York Times revealed that they acquired 
the full text in March, 2002 and substantial excerpts of the NPR were published on the 
Internet. (NPR [2002b]) 
These sources suggested that the Bush administration put a huge emphasis on shifting 
away from the Cold War context. The new NPR recognized that the 21
st
 century 
represented a change compared to the Cold War in four main aspects: 1) multiple 
potential opponents, multiple sources of conflict, and unprecedented challenges needed 
to be addressed; 2) the U.S. had a new relationship with Russia; 3) the spectrum of 
contingencies has significantly grown; and 4) the opponents will probably not threaten 
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the survival of the U.S. – the stakes are varying and unequal. (NPR [2002a]: p. 4.) In 
response to these changes, the Bush NPR suggested a strategy with four legs:  
 
Table 4. Nuclear Posture Review (2001) (NPR [2002a]: p. 7.) 
Assure Allies and Friends Deter Aggressors 
 Credible non-nuclear and nuclear 
response options support U.S. 
commitments 
 Nuclear and non-nuclear options 
provide tailored deterrent 
 Defenses protect security partners and 
power projection forces 
 Defenses discourage attack by 
frustrating adversary’s attack plans 
 Second-to-none nuclear capability 
assures allies and public 
 Infrastructure improves U.S. 
capabilities to counter emerging threats 
Dissuade Competitors Defeat Enemies 
 Diverse portfolio of capabilities denies 
payoff from competition 
 Strike systems can neutralize range of 
enemy targets 
 Non-nuclear strike favors U.S.  Defenses provide protection if 
deterrence fails 
 Infrastructure promises U.S. 
competitive edge 
 
 
In addition to the strategy of “assure, dissuade, deter, defeat,” the administration also 
envisioned a synergy of nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities, as well as a synergy of 
offense and defense. In terms of nuclear planning, a new capabilities-based approach 
was chosen (instead of the previous threat-based approaches) to provide greater 
flexibility for a range of contingencies. The NPR also introduced the concept of the 
“new triad” – the traditional triad of ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers was transformed to 
only one leg of the new triad and the remaining two became defenses and a responsive 
infrastructure. (NPR [2002a]: p. 9.) 
Besides the introduction of these new concepts, the 2001 NPR was different from the 
Clinton administration’s NPR regarding the role of arms control agreements. In general, 
the 2001 NPR stated that unilateral reductions were seen as a way of preserving 
flexibility and transparency, thus disarmament does not necessarily have to happen in 
treaty framework. (NPR [2002a]: p. 4.) In this spirit, the document also downplayed 
certain arms control agreements for the objective of maximum flexibility. While the 
Clinton presidency considered the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty important, the Bush 
administration renounced it in order to eliminate any limitations on its ballistic missile 
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defense plans. Similarly, the CTBT was also downplayed by the Bush administration. In 
1996, President Clinton was the first to sign the treaty and put huge efforts in its 
ratification (which failed in a 1999 Senate vote). The Bush administration, on the other 
hand, reaffirmed the 1992 testing moratorium but declared that it would not seek the 
ratification of the CTBT. In fact, it ordered to reduce the required time for the 
preparations to resume nuclear weapons testing (from the current 2-3 years to one year). 
(NPR [2002b]: p. 11.; p. 17.) 
Despite these differences, there were many continuities between the two NPRs. First, 
both documents recognized the changing security environment, the proliferation of 
threats, the improving relations with Russia, but at the same time the uncertainties about 
the future of relations also required a hedge force (as the Clinton administration called 
it) or a responsive force (as the Bush administration called it). The second continuity is 
the list of potential targets for a nuclear attack – besides Russia, the 2001 NPR named 
six other countries: North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya and China, which is perceived 
as a continuity of the previous administration’s targeting strategy. Third, the force 
reductions proposed by the Bush team (reduce the deployed strategic nuclear stockpile 
to 3,800 warheads by 2007 and to 1,700-2,200 by 2012) are also in line with Clinton’s 
proposals in the 1997 Helsinki Protocol.
79
 Fourth, both documents endorsed adaptive 
planning in response to unforeseen contingencies. Fifth, both administrations supported 
the maintenance of all three legs of the strategic triad (in the case of the Bush 
administration, additional legs were introduced to the concept). And finally, the desire 
to develop advanced capabilities against hardened and deeply buried bunkers is another 
issue which was already endorsed in the 1990s. (Ferguson [2002]) 
Altogether, several elements of the Bush administration’s nuclear posture were truly 
post-Cold War concepts, designed to address the new threats of the 21
st
 century. But the 
administration failed to explain its posture to the public, to the closest U.S. allies and to 
Congress as well, and it did not follow through its proposals, which resulted several 
negative perceptions on the 2001 NPR. According to a 2006 SAIC report on the 
‘Foreign Perspectives on U.S. Nuclear Policy and Posture,’ U.S. nuclear posture was 
widely perceived to place “heightened emphasis on nuclear weapons as part of overall 
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 The Helsinki Joint Statement on the START follow-on process was signed by President Clinton and 
President Yeltsin, and it stated that after the entry into force of the START II agreement, Washington and 
Moscow will immediately start negotiations on a New START agreement. It envisioned reductions to 
2,000-2,500 deployed strategic nuclear warheads for each side. 
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U.S. defense posture, shifting from a posture of nuclear deterrence to one of nuclear 
war-fighting if not nuclear preemption,” making the divisive line between conventional 
and nuclear weapons blurred, and making the use of nuclear weapons more likely. 
Missile defense developments seriously worried Russia and China, whose 
modernization programs were primarily “influenced by their perceptions of U.S. 
strategic intent, plans, and commitments.” U.S. extended deterrence was still considered 
essential to the security of Japan, Turkey, the new NATO members, and Australia; but 
other non-nuclear allies (especially the so called “old NATO” members) saw U.S. 
extended nuclear deterrence as “less critical in today’s post-Cold War world” and they 
described “U.S. development of new, tailored, low-yield nuclear weapons as 
unnecessary, potentially dangerous, politically divisive, and adversely impacting non-
proliferation.” (Dunn; Giles; Larsen; Skypek [2006]: pp. 2-3.) 
Parallel to these negative voices from the allies and the adversaries of the U.S., there 
were problems on the home front as well. After excerpts of the document were leaked, 
and the main architect of the 2001 NPR, Keith Payne left office, leadership was lacking, 
the administration could not defend its policy agenda, and it also lost the support of 
Congress on the issue. (Interview with John R. Harvey [2014])  
 
3.2.3 The Obama Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review 
Because of the above mentioned problems around the Bush administration’s NPR, 
Congress mandated a new comprehensive review in 2007. §1070 of the FY 2008 
National Defense Authorization Act tasked the next administration to deliver a “Revised 
Nuclear Posture Review” with a very broad scope, which covered all aspects of U.S. 
nuclear weapons policy:  
1) “The role of nuclear forces in United States military strategy, planning, and 
programming.  
2) The policy requirements and objectives for the United States to maintain a 
safe, reliable, and credible nuclear deterrence posture. 
3) The relationship among United States nuclear deterrence policy, targeting 
strategy, and arms control objectives. 
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4) The role that missile defense capabilities and conventional strike forces play 
in determining the role and size of nuclear forces. 
5) The levels and composition of the nuclear delivery systems that will be 
required for implementing the United States national and military strategy, 
including any plans for replacing or modifying existing systems. 
6) The nuclear weapons complex that will be required for implementing the 
United States national and military strategy, including any plans to 
modernize or modify the complex. 
7) The active and inactive nuclear weapons stockpile that will be required for 
implementing the United States national and military strategy, including any 
plans for replacing or modifying warheads.” (NDAA for FY 2008 [2007]) 
Drafting the Obama administration’s NPR started in April, 2009 and the report was 
submitted to Congress in April, 2010. The 2010 NPR process was special for three 
reasons: 1) it was more of an inter-agency process than any time before; 2) the review of 
the presidential guidance did not take place in the framework of the Nuclear Posture 
Review process – the 2010 NPR was adopted under the previous administration’s 
nuclear guidance; and 3) an unprecedentedly detailed report was published on the major 
findings of the review. 
During the 1994 and 2001 NPR processes, there was interagency input but not to the 
level of this review – this one was the most inter-agency process of the three reviews. 
(Interviews with Bradley H. Roberts [2014], Robert J. Einhorn [2014] and James N. 
Miller [2014]) The OSD and the JCS were leading the process jointly but the State 
Department, the DoE, the NNSA, STRATCOM, the White House and the intelligence 
community were also strongly engaged. In addition, the broad scope of the review also 
made it necessary to involve the Departments of Homeland Security and Treasury, and 
there were extensive consultations with Congress and the allies of the U.S. as well. The 
drafting process took shape in three rough organizing constructs/informal phases which 
were overlapping and each lasted for about one-thirds of the timeframe between April, 
2009 and April, 2010. The first phase was divided into seven rings or seven working 
groups which addressed all the areas included in the Congressional mandate. It was a 
fully interagency work – there was significant participation from other agencies and the 
working groups were co-chaired by a DoD and a non-DoD official. In the so called 
second phase, the results of the first round were reviewed and discussed. The 
DOI: 10.14267/phd.2015009
112 
 
interagency role evolved, and other departments became engaged at a more senior level 
– on the level of deputies and principals meetings, the State Department, for example, 
was represented by officials like Robert Einhorn (special advisor on non-proliferation 
and arms control) and Ellen Tauscher (Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and 
International Security) who gave an important input. And finally, phase three was the 
leadership deliberation and decision phase – the NSC reviewed the results of the first 
two phases and decided on the main conclusions of the review. President Obama 
engaged both through National Security Council meetings, and by separate meetings 
with his staff and others. Regarding the entire process, the media was incorrect to report 
on inter-agency battles – there were different points of views between the agencies, and 
divisions between competing priorities but the final NPR document enjoyed the full 
support of the leadership of all departments. (Interviews with Bradley H. Roberts [2014] 
and James N. Miller [2014]) In this regard, the process fulfilled the vision of Congress, 
which included in the mandate that “The Secretary shall conduct the review in 
consultation with the Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of State.” (NDAA for FY 
2008 [2007]) 
The second unique character of the 2009-2010 NPR was the unusual order of reviews – 
this time the presidential guidance was not revised as part of the NPR process. President 
Obama’s NPR was delivered without even starting the targeting review, and the Bush 
administration’s presidential guidance (the NSPD-14 from 2002) remained effective 
until 2013. As the First START Treaty expired on December 5, 2009, it was imperative 
to put the U.S.-Russian arms control process back on track and guarantee legally 
binding verification mechanisms. Because of the pressure to focus on the New START 
Treaty negotiations and ratification, the NPR process was delivered under the Bush 
guidance – the Obama administration simply did not want a targeting review underway 
(or incomplete), while the New START Treaty was negotiated. (Interviews with Jon B. 
Wolfsthal [2014] and James N. Miller [2014]) 
And finally, the 2010 review process was also special because – as mentioned before – 
the 2010 NPR report was the most substantial write-up which has ever been released on 
a NPR. On April 6, 2010, the DoD published a 49 pages long summary of the results of 
the review (NPR [2010a]), along with background briefing slides for the media (NPR 
[2010b] and NPR [2010c]), a fact sheet (U.S. Department of Defense [2010b]) and the 
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release of the exact size of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile as of September, 2009. 
(U.S. Department of Defense [2010c]) 
Altogether, the 2010 review process had three main goals: 1) to deliver a nuclear 
posture for the next five to ten years; 2) (as the Congressional mandate phrased it) to put 
down the “basis for establishing future United States arms control objectives and 
negotiating positions” (NDAA for FY 2008 [2007]), including negotiating thresholds to 
the New START Treaty (this is one of the most important reasons why the State 
Department and especially Rose Gottemoeller was so engaged in the drafting process); 
and 3) to change the global perspective on the U.S. by accepting self-constraints on the 
use of nuclear weapons. 
The final text of the document was organized around five concrete objectives: 1) 
prevent nuclear proliferation; 2) reduce the role of nuclear weapons; 3) maintain 
effective strategic deterrence and stability at lower nuclear force levels; 4) strengthen 
regional deterrence and reassurance of U.S. allies and partners; and 5) sustain a safe, 
secure and effective nuclear arsenal as long as nuclear weapons remain. (NPR [2010b]) 
Based on the NPR report (NPR [2010a]) and the DoD fact sheet (U.S. Department of 
Defense [2010b]), the specific results of the NPR in these five key areas are: 
1) Prevent nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism: 
 strengthen the global non-proliferation regime by strengthening IAEA 
safeguards and by enforcing compliance; 
 increase DoE non-proliferation programs by 25 percent; 
 reaffirm U.S. commitment to fulfill NPT obligations, including Article VI; 
 secure all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide in four years – enhance 
capabilities to detect and interdict smuggled nuclear materials; 
 renew commitment to hold accountable those states, terrorist groups and other 
non-state actors which support terrorists in obtaining or using WMD (be it by 
facilitating, financing, providing expertise or safe heaven). 
2) Reduce the role of nuclear weapons: 
 strengthen the U.S. negative security assurance: “the United States will not use 
or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states that are 
party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and in compliance with 
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their nuclear nonproliferation obligations” (NPR [2010a]: p. 15.) – these states 
face the prospect of a devastating conventional military response if they use 
WMD against the U.S. or its allies and partners (however, if the biological threat 
grows, the U.S. reserves the right to adjust this assurance); 
 for nuclear weapon states and non-compliant states: the U.S. would only 
consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital 
interests of the U.S. or its allies and partners; 
 as long as nuclear weapons exist: the fundamental role of nuclear weapons is to 
deter nuclear attack on the U.S. or its allies and partners; 
 the role of conventional capabilities will be strengthened to reduce the role of 
nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks, with the purpose of making 
the sole purpose of nuclear weapons to deter nuclear attack on the U.S. or its 
allies and partners. 
3) Maintain effective strategic deterrence and stability at lower nuclear force levels: 
 renew arms control and work with Russia to reduce nuclear forces, while 
maintaining strategic stability – conclude a New START Treaty with the limits 
of 1,550 accountable strategic warheads and 700 deployed strategic delivery 
vehicles (altogether 800 deployed and non-deployed strategic launchers); 
 the nuclear triad of ICBMs, SLBMs and nuclear-capable heavy bombers will be 
maintained under the New START; 
 all ICBMs will be “de-MIRV”-ed to a single warhead each; 
 the New START Treaty does not constrain U.S. missile defense or long-range 
conventional strike capabilities; 
 the U.S. will make an investment in the U.S. command and control system to 
maximize presidential decision time in a nuclear crisis; 
 the U.S. will pursue post-New START arms control with Russia which will also 
include non-strategic and non-deployed nuclear weapons; 
 the U.S. will promote a more stable and more transparent strategic relationship 
with Russia and China. 
4) Strengthen regional deterrence (against 21
st
 century threats) and reassurance of U.S. 
allies and partners: 
 apply a comprehensive approach to broaden regional security architectures, with 
the inclusion of missile defenses, improved conventional forces and improved 
counter-WMD capabilities; 
 as long as regional nuclear threats remain, deterrence will require a nuclear 
component; 
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 the U.S. will retain the capability to forward deploy U.S. nuclear weapons on 
tactical fighter bombers and heavy bombers, and the full scope life extension 
program of the B61 bomb will proceed; 
 the nuclear tipped, sea-launched cruise missiles (TLAM-N) will be retired as 
they are redundant in the overall mix of capabilities; 
 continue consultations with the allies and partners to ensure the credibility and 
effectiveness of the U.S. extended deterrent. 
5) Sustain a safe, secure and effective nuclear arsenal as long as nuclear weapons 
remain: 
 the U.S. will modernize the nuclear weapons infrastructure, sustain the science, 
technology, and engineering base, invest in human capital, and ensure senior 
leadership focus on the nuclear mission – this investment will guarantee the 
stockpile, facilitate further reductions, enhance the ability to stem nuclear 
proliferation and nuclear terrorism; 
 this will also extend the life of warheads as an alternative to new nuclear 
weapons which the U.S. rejects – the U.S. will not develop new nuclear 
warheads, LEPs will use only nuclear components based on previously tested 
designs, and will not support new military missions or provide for new military 
capabilities; 
 the U.S. will not conduct nuclear testing and will seek the ratification and entry 
into force of the CTBT; 
 the options for ensuring the safety, security and reliability of nuclear warheads 
will be studied on a case-by-case basis, consistent with the Stockpile 
Management Plan and the full range of LEP approaches will be considered: 
refurbishment of existing warheads, reuse of nuclear components from different 
warheads and replacement of nuclear components; 
 in any decision to proceed to engineering development for warhead LEPs, the 
administration will give strong preference to options for refurbishment or reuse, 
while replacement of nuclear components would be undertaken only if critical 
Stockpile Management Program goals could not otherwise be met, and if 
authorized by the President and approved by Congress. 
Altogether, the 2010 NPR meant a significant departure from previous nuclear postures 
in five main areas: 1) the framework, 2) the role of nuclear weapons, 3) the rhetoric 
towards Russia and China, 4) the rhetoric towards other adversaries, and 5) the relations 
with the allies. 
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Regarding the framework, this review applied a comprehensive approach, and took an 
integrated look at deterrence. The 2010 NPR named two primary threats to U.S. national 
security: nuclear terrorism as the “most immediate and extreme danger” and nuclear 
proliferation. (NPR [2010a]: p. 3.) These challenges made it necessary to broaden the 
scope of the NPR (which traditionally focused on arms control), and the 2010 document 
became the first to include nuclear security as well.  
The second area where the Obama posture presents a major shift is the role of nuclear 
weapons. The tone of the document is significantly different from previous NPRs. This 
was the first time that the goal of global zero was explicitly included in a NPR. The 
administration, however, did not mean to alienate conservative circles and it tried to 
guarantee a bipartisan support behind the new nuclear posture. In order to keep a bridge 
between the left and right wings of Congress, the administration brilliantly brought 
together the long-term goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons and the near-term goal of 
maintaining a safe, secure and effective nuclear arsenal. (Interview with John R. Harvey 
[2014]) The latter commitment laid down the ground for major modernization programs 
and the administration pledged to put the necessary financial support behind it – in a 
November, 2010 announcement, President Obama promised “to invest more than $85 
billion over the next decade to modernize the U.S. nuclear weapons complex that 
supports our deterrent.” (Obama [2010]) This “grand bargain” served as the basis of the 
New START Treaty ratification as well.  
Besides the long-term goal of global zero, another important statement of the NPR was 
that “The fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons, which will continue as long as 
nuclear weapons exist, is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and 
partners.” (NPR [2010a]: p. 15.) This represents a more limited role for nuclear 
weapons than in the previous administrations. The 2001 NPR stated that “Nuclear 
weapons play a critical role in the defense capabilities of the United States, its allies 
and friends. They provide credible military options to deter a wide range of threats, 
including WMD and large-scale conventional military force. These nuclear capabilities 
possess unique properties that give the United States options to hold at risk classes of 
targets [that are] important to achieve strategic and political objectives.” (NPR 
[2002b]: p. 3.) While in the 2001 document nuclear weapons had a “critical role” in 
deterring chemical, biological and large-scale conventional attacks, the 2010 NPR limits 
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this role to fundamentally deter nuclear attacks, which is a significant shift from a wide 
range of scenarios to “a narrow range of contingencies in which U.S. nuclear weapons 
may still play a role in deterring a conventional or CBW attack against the United 
States or its allies and partners.” (NPR [2010a]: p. 16.)  
“Fundamental role,” however, does not mean “sole purpose” – in fact, the document 
itself admits that “The United States is therefore not prepared at the present time to 
adopt a universal policy that the ‘sole purpose’ of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter 
nuclear attack on the United States and our allies and partners, but will work to 
establish conditions under which such a policy could be safely adopted.” (NPR [2010a]: 
p. 16.) This pledge to work towards a “sole purpose” posture also means a desire to shift 
towards a no-first-use declaration – if the sole purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter a 
nuclear attack, then it essentially means that nuclear weapons will not be used in a first 
strike. Although the U.S. was not ready for this “sole purpose” declaration,80 the 
Nuclear Posture Review clearly circumscribed that “narrow range of contingencies” 
when nuclear weapons had a role other than deterring a nuclear attack, and it stated that 
the use of nuclear weapons will only happen in “extreme circumstances to defend the 
vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners.” (NPR [2010a]: p. 16.)  
The third area, where the 2010 NPR is different from the previous documents is the 
rhetoric towards Russia and China. In this regard, the first innovation of the 2010 
posture is that China was put in the same category as Russia. In 2001, the Bush NPR 
recognized “the changed relationship with Russia” and stated that the “United States 
seeks a more cooperative relationship with Russia and a move away from the balance-
of-terror policy framework.” (NPR [2002b]: p. 5.) Beijing, at the same time, was 
handled in a different framework, as a state of concern and a potential conflict 
contingency – “Due to the combination of China's still developing strategic objectives 
and its ongoing modernization of its nuclear and non nuclear forces, China is a country 
that could be involved in an immediate or potential contingency.” (NPR [2002b]: p. 5.)  
In contrast, the 2010 NPR mentions both Russia and China in the context of a more 
stable strategic relationship: “Russia and the United States are no longer adversaries, 
                                                 
80
 There were mainly two reasons why the U.S. did not announce a “sole purpose” posture: first, to 
maintain a strong reassurance towards its allies, and second to maintain a strong deterrent against states of 
concern like Iran, Syria or North Korea. (Interview with Robert J. Einhorn [2014]) 
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and prospects for military confrontation have declined dramatically. The two have 
increased their cooperation in areas of shared interest, including preventing nuclear 
terrorism and nuclear proliferation.” (NPR [2010a]: p. iv.) “The United States and 
China are increasingly interdependent and their shared responsibilities for addressing 
global security threats, such as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation and 
terrorism, are growing. The United States welcomes a strong, prosperous, and 
successful China that plays a greater global role in supporting international rules, 
norms, and institutions.” (NPR [2010a]: p. 5.)  
Instead of mutual deterrence, the new organizing concept with these two states is 
strategic stability – “By promoting strategic stability with Russia and China and 
improving transparency and mutual confidence, we can help create the conditions for 
moving toward a world without nuclear weapons and build a stronger basis for 
addressing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism.” (NPR [2010a]: p. vi.) In this 
regard, the 2010 NPR implies that strengthening strategic stability with these two states, 
and implementing transparency and confidence building measures will lead to a broader 
cooperation on arms control and nuclear security issues.  
The next difference between the 2010 posture and previous NPRs is the rhetoric 
towards other adversaries (be it non-nuclear weapon states like Syria or Iran, or states in 
possession of nuclear weapons like North Korea). In this regard, the Obama NPR 
declared a more limited negative security assurance than any other administration 
before. The first articulation of a negative security assurance dates back to June, 1978. 
As quoted before, the Carter administration declared that “The United States will not use 
nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapons States Party to the NPT or any 
comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive 
devices, except in the case of an attack on the United States, its territories or armed 
forces, or its allies, by such a State allied to a nuclear-weapon State or associated with 
a nuclear-weapon State in carrying out or sustaining the attack.” (Quoted in Bunn 
[1997]: p. 6.) This basically excluded from the assurance any non-nuclear weapon state 
which was allied or associated with a nuclear weapon state (i.e. the Soviet Union) – this 
was the so called “Warsaw Pact exclusion clause.”  
Although the policy of a declared negative security assurance has been present in U.S. 
nuclear policy since Carter, the conditions of this assurance have significantly changed 
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over time. After Ukraine joined the NPT in 1994, and transferred all of its (post-Soviet) 
nuclear warheads back to Russia for elimination, the U.S. rephrased its assurance, and 
pledged to “reaffirm, in the case of Ukraine, their commitment not to use nuclear 
weapons against any non-nuclear weapon state party to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, except in the case of an attack on themselves, their 
territories or dependent territories, their armed forces, or their allies, by such a state in 
association or alliance with a nuclear weapon state.” (Budapest Memorandums [1994]) 
This eliminated the reference to a “comparable internationally binding commitment not 
to acquire nuclear explosive devices,” thus the NPT membership remained the ultimate 
guarantor of the U.S. negative security assurance (with some exceptions).  
In April, 1995, the Clinton administration went a bit further, and in the NPT Review 
and Extension Conference declared that “The United States reaffirms that it will not use 
nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons except in the case of an invasion or any other attack 
on the United States, its territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies, or on a 
State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a 
non-nuclear-weapon State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon state.” 
(Quoted in Kristensen [2003]: p. 22.) This added two new dimensions to the negative 
security assurances: first, the case of invasion, which was not included previously; and 
second, the term “any other attack” which meant to reflect the growing concerns about a 
chemical or biological attack on the U.S. and its allies. (Kristensen [2003]: p. 22.)  
In comparison with these declarations, the 2010 assurance significantly limited the cases 
when the U.S. considered the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon 
states. The Obama NPR stated that “the United States will not use or threaten to use 
nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states that are party to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation 
obligations.” (NPR [2010a]: p. 15.)  
Thus, the assurance became dependent on a single factor, NPT membership and 
compliance with the non-proliferation obligations. If these criteria are met, non-nuclear 
weapon states are no longer threatened with U.S. nuclear weapons, even if they attacked 
the U.S. with biological, chemical or conventional weapons. This is an important 
rhetorical innovation in two regards: first, the number of contingencies and threatened 
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states has been reduced (e.g. states like Libya or Iraq which were specifically named in 
the 2001 NPR now fell out of the group); and second, the NPR provided a positive path 
to those states which – in a U.S. perspective – are labeled as “non-compliant” (i.e. Iran, 
Syria and North Korea). If these states abandon their activities and come in compliance 
with the NPT, the negative security assurance will be extended to them as well. 
Including an incentive in the NPR, and approaching these proliferation challenges from 
a positive angle (not just threatening them with nuclear weapons, but also offering a 
way out) is again an important rhetorical departure from previous NPRs. 
Despite the positive message of the new negative security assurance, two questions 
come up immediately: first, how does the U.S. plan to assess compliance – is it decided 
by an objective international standard (or organization like the IAEA), or Washington 
will judge this question on its own, based on a case-by-case assessment? And second, is 
it really a significant departure in operational terms, or was it just a better rhetorical 
formulation of the same operational policy?  
Regarding the first question, senior officials of the Obama administration implied that 
the U.S. intends to maintain the right to decide if a state is in compliance with its non-
proliferation obligations. In April, 2010 Gary Samore explained at the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace that “in compliance with their nuclear 
nonproliferation obligations is intended to be a broad clause and we’ll interpret that – 
when the time comes, we’ll interpret that in accordance with what we judge to be a 
meaningful standard. […] On the question of who determines, that’s a U.S. national 
determination. I mean, obviously, we’ll be influenced by the actions of other parties. If 
the IAEA Board of Governors decides that a country is not in compliance with their 
safeguards obligation, that it would be difficult or – not impossible, but difficult – for 
the U.S. government to ignore that.” (Samore [2010]) 
On the second question, it seems that the NPR was just in a way catching up with 
reality. As a result of the implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention (BTWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) the possible 
circumstances have been significantly narrowed in which enemies could jeopardize the 
vital interests of the U.S. and its allies by non-nuclear means. Regarding the potential 
targets of a U.S. nuclear strike, the new negative security assurance probably did not 
change anything in operational terms. The proliferation challenges of Libya and Iraq 
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have been resolved during the Bush administration therefore these countries have 
already fallen off the list before the 2010 NPR. In the meanwhile, Iran, Syria and North 
Korea (which are considered as non-compliant by Washington) are still not protected 
under the new assurance, as well as nuclear weapon states like Russia or China. 
Although the new negative security assurance was mostly a rhetorical proof that the role 
of nuclear weapons has been reduced in U.S. defense policy, it was also meant to send a 
reassurance message to the allies of the U.S. in the Middle East and in East Asia that 
U.S. nuclear deterrence still applies against their most important adversaries. As Gary 
Samore phrased it, the negative security assurance “was deliberately crafted to exclude 
countries like North Korea and Iran which threaten our allies – or countries that 
depend on us – with a range of potential nuclear, biological, chemical and conventional 
threats.” (Samore [2010]) 
The last major difference between the Obama posture and previous documents is linked 
to the relations of the U.S. and its allies. The 2006 SAIC study found that close U.S. 
allies and friends would like to see the U.S. “smarter in dealing with other countries’ 
perspectives on nuclear issues and to listen more to other countries’ views.” (Dunn; 
Giles; Larsen; Skypek [2006]: pp. 3.) In this regard, it was an important change of 
previous practices that during the drafting of the 2010 NPR, the U.S. consulted with its 
allies several times. The retirement of the Tomahawk (TLAM-N) cruise missiles (which 
played an important role in U.S. extended nuclear deterrence against North Korea) was 
for example discussed with South Korea and Japan in advance. (Interview with James 
N. Miller [2014])  
The 2010 NPR, in addition, stated that any further reductions would be pursued in 
consideration of the assurances towards the allies of the U.S.: “any future nuclear 
reductions must continue to strengthen deterrence of potential regional adversaries, 
strategic stability vis-à-vis Russia and China, and assurance of our allies and partners. 
This will require an updated assessment of deterrence requirements; further 
improvements in U.S., allied, and partner non-nuclear capabilities; focused reductions 
in strategic and nonstrategic weapons; and close consultations with allies and 
partners.”  (NPR [2010a]: p. xi.) 
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The question of disarmament is specifically important in the case of NATO allies which 
still host around 200 U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on their territory. Given this linkage, 
the context of President Obama’s Prague address, the UN Security Council’s nuclear 
summit in September, 2009, the negotiations on the New START Treaty, the first 
Nuclear Security Summit, as well as the ongoing review of NATO’s strategic concept, 
the 2010 NPR enjoyed a greater attention in Europe than the previous NPR processes. 
Based on five different country case studies (France, Estonia, Poland, Germany and 
Norway), Professor Harald Müller argues that the document allowed each NATO 
member state to read into the NPR what they wanted, depending on their security 
interests and preferences: nuclear weapon states welcomed continuities in the validity of 
nuclear deterrence, and the importance of a safe, secure, and reliable arsenal; Eastern 
European countries were pleased by the reaffirmed nuclear assurances; and 
disarmament advocates were content with the inclusion of global zero as the ultimate 
goal. Although the issue of tactical nuclear deployment in Europe appeared to be the 
most important question to NATO members, the NPR avoided to take a clear position 
on it, and linked any changes to a consensual decision of all NATO members. (Müller 
[2011]) “The United States will consult with our allies regarding the future basing of 
nuclear weapons in Europe, and is committed to making consensus decisions through 
NATO processes. […] No changes to U.S. extended deterrence capabilities will be made 
without continued close consultation with allies and partners.” (NPR [2010a]: p. 28.)  
Although the 2010 NPR directly explains its innovations in nuclear posture, Scott Sagan 
and Jane Vaynman identify three “lingering ambiguities” which the NPR report failed 
to clarify. The first issue is the role of allies in supporting the U.S. for a greater reliance 
on conventional deterrence. The NPR recognizes the improved conventional capabilities 
of allies which are important assets in defending against regional conventional threats 
but the NPR does not specify what role the allies play in strengthening regional 
conventional capabilities, or in the ability of the U.S. to “project those capabilities.” 
(Sagan; Vaynman [2011]: p. 24.) The second issue is the question of prevention and 
preemption. In this regard Sagan and Vaynman argue that the option to use nuclear 
weapons in prevention or preemption is ruled out in the case of non-nuclear weapon 
states which are parties to the NPT and are in compliance with their non-proliferation 
obligations, but there is no discussion about the case of states which do not fall under 
this negative security assurance. While the Bush administration declared several times 
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that all options (including the preventive use of nuclear weapons) are on the table in the 
Iran nuclear debate, the Obama administration’s nuclear posture did not clarify its 
position in the NPR. The third ambiguity according to Sagan and Vaynman relates to 
the policy towards biological weapons. After the negative security assurance, the 2010 
NPR included a clause that “Given the catastrophic potential of biological weapons and 
the rapid pace of bio-technology development, the United States reserves the right to 
make any adjustment in the assurance that may be warranted by the evolution and 
proliferation of the biological weapons threat and U.S. capacities to counter that 
threat.” (NPR [2010a]: p. 16.) According to this reservation, nuclear weapons do not 
have a role against biological weapons in the case of those states which are protected by 
the negative security assurance, but it might change in the future – thus, the U.S. 
maintained a way out of the current commitment. 
Altogether, the 2010 NPR represents a significant departure from previous nuclear 
postures in its rhetoric – it explicitly included the goal of global zero in the text of the 
nuclear posture, added nuclear security to the scope of the review, declared a more 
comprehensive negative security assurance than any previous administration, 
significantly reduced the role of nuclear weapons for a very narrow range of 
contingencies against a fewer number of states, placed strategic stability in the center of 
U.S.-Russian and U.S.-Chinese relations, refrained from developing new nuclear 
weapons and from supporting new nuclear missions, committed to ratify the CTBT, and 
involved the allies in the drafting process to a greater extent. But despite these results, 
some ambiguities remained about the role of allies in strengthening reliance on regional 
conventional capabilities, the role of prevention and preemption under the new posture, 
and the policy towards biological weapons. In addition, critics of the 2010 NPR still 
question why the U.S. did not declare a “sole purpose” posture; why the negative 
security assurance did not provide a universal guarantee to all non-nuclear weapon 
states and why it left a loophole to reevaluate the assurance in case the threat of 
biological weapons became imminent; why a no-first-use declaration was not included; 
and if the new posture had any real world effects in operational terms. In this regard, the 
most important reasons (for not implementing a more dramatic posture) seem to be the 
reassurance of allies, and the Obama administration’s desire to build a bipartisan 
support behind the document. Transferring the decision on the future of tactical nuclear 
weapons in Europe to NATO, including global zero in the posture but committing to 
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modernizations, admitting that the U.S. had more nuclear weapons than needed but 
excluding unilateral reductions, or pledging to reduce the strategic nuclear arsenal but 
maintaining the triad all reflect these cautious considerations. Therefore, the assessment 
of Daryl G. Kimball and Greg Thielmann seems to be accurate that the 2010 NPR is 
“transitional, not transformational” – continuity and significant shifts both describe the 
Obama posture. (Kimball; Thielmann [2010])  
After the NPR was released, the DoD worked out a number of concrete steps and an 
implementation timeline to those specific commitments which could be realized in the 
foreseeable future – these implementation steps included for example the retirement of 
the Tomahawk cruise missiles or the downloading of the ICBMs to a single warhead 
configuration. (Interviews with Bradley H. Roberts [2014] and James N. Miller [2014]) 
In addition to these concrete steps, a Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Study 
was prepared, which usually takes 90 days to complete. In this case, however, it took 
almost two years to finish the NPR IS, which formed the basis of President Obama’s 
new employment guidance, announced in the summer of 2013. 
 
3.3 Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership 
While the NPR follow-on process was happening, the U.S. was facing unprecedented 
fiscal difficulties and in response to these circumstances, as well as to the changing 
geopolitical environment, the DoD was tasked to conduct an overall review of U.S. 
defense policy. The review was run by the DoD, in cooperation with the JCS, the 
Secretaries of the Military Departments, and the Combatant Commanders. 
The result of the review was an assessment called ‘Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: 
Priorities for 21st Century Defense’ which was released on January 5, 2012. This 
document “reflects the President’s strategic direction to the Department” and it was 
developed to transition the U.S. defense enterprise “from an emphasis on today’s wars 
to preparing for future challenges, protects the broad range of U.S. national security 
interests, advances the Department’s efforts to rebalance and reform, and supports the 
national security imperative of deficit reduction through a lower level of defense 
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spending.” (Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership [2012]: p. 1.) Thus, it intends to guide 
U.S. decisions on the size and shape of future military forces. 
Regarding nuclear threats and capabilities, the document contained four main 
paragraphs:  
“The proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons technology has the 
potential to magnify the threats posed by regional state actors, giving them more 
freedom of action to challenge U.S. interests. Terrorist access to even simple nuclear 
devices poses the prospect of devastating consequences for the United States. 
Accordingly, the Department of Defense will continue to enhance its capabilities, acting 
with an array of domestic and foreign partners, to conduct effective operations to 
counter the proliferation of WMD.” (Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership [2012]: p. 3.) 
“Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction: U.S. forces conduct a range of activities aimed 
at preventing the proliferation and use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. 
These activities include implementing the Cooperative Threat Reduction (Nunn-Lugar) 
Program, and planning and operations to locate, monitor, track, interdict and secure 
WMD and WMD-related components and the means and facilities to make them. They 
also include an active whole-of-government effort to frustrate the ambitions of nations 
bent on developing WMD, to include preventing Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons 
capability. In partnership with other elements of the U.S. Government, DoD will 
continue to invest in capabilities to detect, protect against, and respond to WMD use, 
should preventive measures fail.” (Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership [2012]: p. 3.) 
“Maintain a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Deterrent: As long as nuclear weapons 
remain in existence, the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective 
arsenal. We will field nuclear forces that can under any circumstances confront an 
adversary with the prospect of unacceptable damage, both to deter potential 
adversaries and to assure U.S. allies and other security partners that they can count on 
America’s security commitments. It is possible that our deterrence goals can be 
achieved with a smaller nuclear force, which would reduce the number of nuclear 
weapons in our inventory as well as their role in U.S. national security strategy.” 
(Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership [2012]: p. 5.) 
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“The aforementioned missions will largely determine the shape of the future Joint 
Force. The overall capacity of U.S. forces, however, will be based on requirements that 
the following subset of missions demand: counter terrorism and irregular warfare; 
deter and defeat aggression; maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent; 
and defend the homeland and support civil authorities.” (Sustaining U.S. Global 
Leadership [2012]: p. 6.) 
Despite the economic difficulties, the new DoD strategy did not constitute a major 
departure from the 2010 NPR. According to the document, the U.S. still considered the 
threats of WMD proliferation and terrorism the most important security challenges, and 
committed to work both on a national and on an international level to counter these 
threats. An important aspect of these counter measures is the enhanced security of 
WMD stockpiles which will require an investment in the capabilities to detect, protect 
and respond to the use of these weapons. In addition to the security concerns, the U.S. 
reinforced its commitment to maintain a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent 
which will serve as a basis to future force requirements as well. However, in this regard, 
the document already paved the way in front of future reductions as it projected that 
U.S. deterrence goals might be met with a smaller nuclear arsenal where the role of 
nuclear weapons is also smaller. 
 
3.4 The Berlin Address 
After the successful reelection campaign, President Obama delivered his second major 
speech on nuclear issues at the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin, on June 19, 2013. He 
repeated again that with the fall of the Soviet Union, the global threat of annihilation 
disappeared but as long as nuclear weapons exist nobody is safe, and the threat of 
nuclear terrorism is still a danger to U.S. national security. Thus, he reaffirmed his 
commitment to work towards a world without nuclear weapons. 
In this regard, President Obama listed a number of areas where his administration has 
already reached significant results: first, the efforts to strengthen the nuclear non-
proliferation regime; second, the reduced role of nuclear weapons; and third, the 
reduced number of nuclear weapons – thanks to the New START Treaty which obliged 
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the U.S. and Russia to reduce their deployed strategic nuclear forces to the lowest levels 
since the 1950s. 
However, he also declared that there was more to be done, and he laid out three main 
issues which his second presidency aimed to focus on:  
The first question was the further reduction of deployed strategic nuclear forces: “After 
a comprehensive review, I’ve determined that we can ensure the security of America 
and our allies, and maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent, while reducing 
our deployed strategic nuclear weapons by up to one-third. And I intend to seek 
negotiated cuts with Russia to move beyond Cold War nuclear postures.” (Obama 
[2013b]) In this regard, the announced reduction is the result of the NPR IS which 
examined strategy and targeting requirements to update the presidential employment 
guidance of the Obama administration (PPD-24). Based on this review, the 
administration concluded that the U.S. could go down to as low as 1,000-1,100 
deployed strategic nuclear weapons. The Berlin announcement, however, did not 
specify how the administration planned to implement these reductions – it only implied 
that it will happen in the framework of “negotiated cuts” with Moscow. 
The second major issue area in the Berlin speech was the reduction of tactical nuclear 
weapons with Russia and the strengthening of the NPT regime: “At the same time, we’ll 
work with our NATO allies to seek bold reductions in U.S. and Russian tactical 
weapons in Europe. And we can forge a new international framework for peaceful 
nuclear power, and reject the nuclear weaponization that North Korea and Iran may be 
seeking.” (Obama [2013b]) The intention to broaden the scope of negotiations with 
Russia and include tactical nuclear weapons (and non-deployed nuclear weapons) have 
been on the agenda since the beginning of the Obama administration but in order to 
break the deadlock, the U.S. needs to get Russia on board, which so far did not show 
much interest in the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons.  
And finally, the President announced that the U.S. will host the next round of the 
Nuclear Security Summit series, and called for the ratification of the CTBT and the 
conclusion of the FMCT: “America will host a summit in 2016 to continue our efforts to 
secure nuclear materials around the world, and we will work to build support in the 
United States to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and call on all 
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nations to begin negotiations on a treaty that ends the production of fissile materials for 
nuclear weapons. These are steps we can take to create a world of peace with justice.” 
(Obama [2013b]) Probably the only surprise of the Berlin address was the 
announcement to organize a new (and most likely last) Nuclear Security Summit in 
2016 which will be brought back to the U.S. Besides that, the CTBT ratification and the 
desire to conclude a FMCT were already on the Prague agenda and it was rather 
symbolic that the President reinforced his commitment to these issues, sending a sign to 
Congress and the international community as well that his promises are not forgotten. 
But just like in the case of the Prague address, the President did not specify a concrete 
timeframe to achieve these goals. 
Altogether, besides the promise to cut deeper in the strategic nuclear forces, the 
symbolism of the Berlin address was its most important dimension – speaking in Berlin 
and putting the question of nuclear disarmament in the larger framework of “peace with 
justice” was an unusual approach from a U.S. President. But there was not much more 
to the speech besides this symbolism – as Joe Cirincione from the Ploughshares Fund 
phrased it, “Everything the president said today had been expected for some time. […] It 
was important for him to say it, and to say it in Berlin, and to signal to his own 
bureaucracy that this agenda is still one of his top priorities.” (Quoted in Grossman 
[2013]) 
As an immediate follow-up to the Berlin address, the administration released a fact 
sheet on the White House webpage which implied that the President has indeed issued 
its new guidance which will serve as the basis of further nuclear reductions. (The White 
House [2013]) 
 
3.5 Evaluation 
Going through the elements of Cold War nuclear thinking, the Obama administration 
has indeed changed several aspects of it in its declaratory policy. The first characteristic 
was related to the worldview – how does the U.S. define its enemies and its own role; 
what is the ultimate goal of U.S. nuclear weapons policy; and how does the U.S. 
reassure its allies. 
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In this regard, the security environment has significantly changed since the Cold War. 
Instead of the relatively predictable bipolar system, the U.S. is now facing multiple 
potential opponents, and instead of a global conflict, regional challenges have become 
more likely to occur. Besides the growing number of potential opponents, the spectrum 
of contingencies has also increased, the stakes have become varying and unequal, and 
the mere survival of the U.S. will probably not be challenged.  
Regarding the image of Russia, since the Clinton years, each administration recognized 
that the U.S. had a new relationship with Russia, and as the Obama NPR phrased it, 
“Russia and the United States are no longer adversaries, and prospects for military 
confrontation have declined dramatically.” (NPR [2010a]: p. iv.) Therefore, the U.S. is 
no longer afraid of a surprise attack from Moscow, however “Russia remains America’s 
only peer in the area of nuclear weapons capabilities” which makes it necessary for the 
United States to “continue to address the more familiar challenge of ensuring strategic 
stability.” (NPR [2010a]: p. iv.)  
Compared to the Cold War, China has become a more important factor in U.S. strategic 
planning – after the 1996 Taiwan crisis, it was put back on the target lists, and as a 
result of its developing military capabilities the U.S. continues to plan for this challenge 
as well. The 2010 NPR, however, recognized the improved relations and it handled 
China in the same group with Russia, where mutual interests made it possible for 
Washington and Beijing to work together for strategic stability.  
In addition to these – more traditional – threats, the proliferation challenges of North 
Korea and Iran were specifically mentioned by the 2010 NPR as potential sources of 
regional instability. And finally, another new element of the “enemy image” was the 
threat of nuclear terrorism. President Obama identified this threat as “today’s most 
immediate and extreme danger.”  
The changing dynamics in U.S.-Russian and U.S.-Chinese relations, as well as the new 
threats of nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation rearranged the hierarchy of U.S. 
nuclear concerns and objectives. Therefore, the Obama administration envisioned a role 
for the U.S. in “discouraging additional countries from acquiring nuclear weapons 
capabilities and stopping terrorist groups from acquiring nuclear bombs or the 
materials to build them.” In addition to these priorities, the U.S. pledged to “maintain 
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stable strategic relationships with Russia and China and counter threats posed by any 
emerging nuclear-armed states” in order to protect the U.S. and its allies and partners. 
(NPR [2010a]: p. v.) 
Regarding the relationship of the U.S. and its allies, it has been an important declaration 
in the 1994 NPR that despite the end of the Cold War, Washington intends to maintain 
its extended nuclear deterrence towards its allies which was reinforced by the Bush and 
Obama postures as well. The forward deployment of tactical nuclear weapons still 
continues, which means that U.S. nuclear forces still play a role in guaranteeing the 
security of allies, and if necessary, these weapons can be used in order to protect the 
allies and partners of the U.S. 
The second character of Cold War nuclear thinking was the doctrine of flexible 
response. As already mentioned, the term “flexible response” refers to a posture which 
means that in a crisis situation the U.S. has multiple options to address a threat 
appropriately, starting from the use of conventional weapons, through selective nuclear 
attacks to a general nuclear war. In this sense, flexible response is still appropriate to 
describe current U.S. nuclear posture, although the focus has somewhat shifted since the 
Cold War. Until the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the majority of potential challenges 
required nuclear responses, and war plans addressed a wide spectrum of contingencies 
with nuclear options. In contrast, the Obama administration tries to minimize those 
cases when nuclear weapons can be used, and a greater emphasis is put on the 
development of non-nuclear capabilities, in order to widen the spectrum of options on 
the level of conventional weapons and to narrow the spectrum on the level of nuclear 
forces. 
The third parameter of Cold War nuclear thinking was prevention and preemption. As 
mentioned before, the Bush administration’s rhetoric did not rule out any of these 
options when for example it was addressing the challenge of the Iran nuclear debate. 
The Obama administration, on the other hand, has been more cautious in its rhetoric. 
The 2010 NPR ruled out these options in the case of states which are parties to the NPT 
and are in compliance with their non-proliferation obligations, but it is not clear what 
the case is with that small number of states which are not covered by the negative 
security assurance. However, as long as a portion of the U.S. nuclear forces is kept on 
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high alert, and as long as the U.S. maintains a capability to launch under attack, it 
obviously has a capability to execute preventive or preemptive strikes as well. 
The next issue is the question of negative security assurances. In this regard, the Obama 
administration’s posture is a continuity of previous strategies, as it also refused to 
declare a universal negative security assurance to all non-nuclear weapon states. But 
compared to the exceptions of the previous administrations, the 2010 NPR significantly 
reduced the number of states which are excluded from the assurance. The only decisive 
factor remained the NPT membership and the compliance with the non-proliferation 
obligations, which in 2010 was probably directed at only two non-nuclear weapon states 
(i.e. Iran and Syria). Therefore, this framing is by all means the closest policy so far to a 
universal negative security assurance. 
The last two areas are closely related to each other: the general role of nuclear weapons, 
and the question of no-first-use declarations. During the Cold War, nuclear weapons 
were overemphasized and nuclear deterrence had a role against chemical, biological and 
conventional contingencies as well. The 2010 NPR, on the other hand, minimized the 
scenarios under which nuclear weapons can be applied – in the case of states which are 
protected by the negative security assurance nuclear weapons no longer play a role 
against chemical, biological or conventional weapons. The Obama posture, in addition, 
contains two important declarations: “The fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons 
[…] is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and partners.” (NPR 
[2010a]: p. 15.) And the U.S. will only use nuclear weapons in “extreme circumstances 
to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners.” (NPR 
[2010a]: p. 16.) These statements are significant changes compared to the Cold War 
rhetoric, and the commitment to move towards a “sole purpose” posture is, in a way, a 
commitment to move towards a no-first-use policy as well. An implicit no-first-use 
policy is already in place in the case of states which are covered by the negative security 
assurance – this can be complete if all non-nuclear weapon states come in compliance 
with their non-proliferation obligations. 
Altogether, the first hypothesis of this dissertation which claims that “in the declaratory 
policy, the Obama administration has lessened the reliance on Cold War nuclear 
thinking” seems to stand on a solid basis. In response to the dramatic changes of the 
security environment, the Obama administration used a more cooperative tone towards 
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its traditional adversaries (i.e. Russia and China); put a bigger emphasis on non-nuclear 
options; and reduced the role of nuclear weapons in several different ways: first, by 
fundamentally limiting their role to deterring a nuclear attack against the U.S. and its 
allies and partners; second, by declaring an almost universal negative security assurance 
to non-nuclear weapon states; third, by limiting the scenarios when preventive or 
preemptive nuclear strikes were possible; and fourth, by committing to move towards a 
“sole purpose” posture which would also mean an implicit no-first-use declaration.  
Table 5. Declaratory Policy: Cold War vs. Obama 
Cold War Nuclear Thinking Change Obama Posture 
 enemy image: bipolar system, 
the Soviet block is the enemy 
which constantly prepares for a 
surprise attack on the U.S. 
YES 
 multiple opponents and 
contingencies, the chances of a 
military confrontation with 
Russia has dramatically declined 
 the role of the U.S. as the global 
leader of the free world 
 the ultimate goal is to ensure the 
victory of the good cause 
YES 
 the role and the ultimate goal of 
the U.S. is to prevent nuclear 
proliferation and nuclear 
terrorism, and to maintain 
strategic stability with Russia 
and China 
 NATO: providing positive 
security assurances for the allies 
NO 
 the U.S. still provides positive 
security assurances for its allies 
 main doctrine: flexible response NO 
 flexible response is still 
applicable (although there is a 
bigger emphasis on conventional 
options) 
 denial of a preventive war – but 
maintaining the option of 
preemptive strikes 
≈ 
 the capability is still maintained 
but the potential scenarios have 
been significantly reduced 
 rejection of no-first-use 
declarations ≈ 
 shifts towards a “sole purpose” 
posture which would mean an 
implicit no-first-use declaration 
 rejection of a universal negative 
security assurance to NNWSs 
(from Carter: introduction of 
very limited NSAs) 
≈ 
 a more comprehensive negative 
security assurance than any time 
before – almost universal, only a 
very few exceptions remained 
 prominent day-to-day role of 
nuclear weapons against a great 
variety of contingencies 
YES 
 the role of nuclear weapons has 
been significantly reduced, their 
fundamental role is to deter a 
nuclear attack against the U.S. 
and its allies and partners + their 
use is only possible in extreme 
circumstances  
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4. Force Structure 
4.1 Nuclear Warheads and the Nuclear Triad 
Based on the official numbers which the administration released in 2010 and in 2014, 
the military stockpile of the U.S. nuclear arsenal (or the so called “active stockpile” 
which consists of the operational warheads) has been reduced from 21,392 warheads to 
4,804 between 1990 and 2013. (U.S. Department of State [2014a]) 
 
Figure 4. U.S. Military Stockpile (1990-2013) 
 
 
These numbers show that the most dramatic reductions were implemented under the 
Republican administrations – the George W. H. Bush administration (1989-1993) cut 
the arsenal in half from about 22,000 nuclear weapons to 11,000 nuclear weapons, while 
the George W. Bush administration (2001-2009) reduced it from around 10,000 to 
5,000. The Clinton and the Obama administrations, on the other hand, could only realize 
moderate reductions in the nuclear weapons stockpile of the U.S.
81
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 As Democratic governments generally face critics for being weak on defense, it turns out to be really 
difficult to implement serious reductions proposed by these administrations (especially in cases when 
Congress has a Republican majority). Republican presidents, on the other hand, have been really 
successful in realizing dramatic force reductions – in which case, having a Democratic majority in 
Congress further facilitates the implementation of these measures.  
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4.1.1 Force Levels under the Bush Years (1989-1993) 
In terms of force structure reductions, the first milestone in the post-Cold War period 
was the START I Treaty in 1991. (START I [1991a]) The Treaty was signed by 
President George W. H. Bush and President Mikhail Gorbachev in July, 1991. But five 
months later the Soviet Union was dissolved, leaving nuclear weapons in the territory of 
Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine as well. Therefore, the Treaty was extended to 
all four states, plus the United States in the 1992 Lisbon Protocol. (START I [1991b]) 
The START I Treaty entered into force on December 5, 1994 for 15 years, with a seven 
years implementation deadline – thus, the reductions had to be realized by December 5, 
2001, and the Treaty expired on December 5, 2009. 
The most important provisions of the Treaty regarding the number of launchers and the 
number of warheads: 
 “(a) 1600, for deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed SLBMs 
and their associated launchers, and deployed heavy bombers, including 154 for 
deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers;  
 (b) 6000, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and 
deployed heavy bombers, including:   
o (i) 4900, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and deployed 
SLBMs; 
o (ii) 1100, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs on mobile 
launchers of ICBMs;  
o (iii) 1540, for warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs.” (START I 
[1991a]: pp. 1-2.) 
 These provisions need to be implemented in three phases: 
o First phase (no later than 36 months after the entry into force): 2,100 for 
deployed launchers, and 9,150 for deployed warheads (of which 8,050 
attributed to deployed ICBMs and SLBMs); 
o Second phase (no later than 60 months after the entry into force): 1,900 
for deployed launchers, and 7,950 for deployed warheads (of which 
6,750 attributed to deployed ICBMs and SLBMs); 
o Third phase (no later than 84 month after the entry into force): full 
implementation. 
 In addition, special counting rules were also set by the Treaty: 
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o heavy bombers are counted as carrying one warhead if they are equipped 
only with bombs or short-range attack missiles (SRAMs); 
o in the case of heavy bombers carrying long-range air-launched cruise 
missiles (ALCMs): 
 U.S. heavy bombers can carry no more than 20 ALCMs each, and 
the first 150 of these bombers will be counted as carrying only 10 
ALCMs; 
 Soviet heavy bombers can carry no more than 16 ALCMs each, 
and the first 180 of these bombers will be counted as carrying 
only 8 ALCMs; 
o no more than 1,250 warheads can be downloaded and not counted on 
existing ICBMs and SLBMs. 
While the START I Treaty was negotiated, President George H. W. Bush and Soviet 
President Mikhail Gorbachev issued a Joint Statement at a summit meeting in 
Washington in June, 1990. This Joint Statement outlined the basic goals of the next 
START Treaty which was aimed at the further reduction and limitation of strategic 
offensive forces, with a special focus on heavy ICBMs and SLBMs, as well as on 
MIRVed ICBMs, SLBMs and ALCMs. (Joint Statement [1990]) This was followed by 
separate statements from President George H. W. Bush and Russian President Boris 
Yeltsin, and a Joint Understanding in June, 1992, which became the basis of the final 
agreement. The START II Treaty was signed on January 3, 1993 by George H. W. Bush 
and Boris Yeltsin. (START II [1993])  
This Treaty did not replace, rather complemented the START I Treaty. It obliged the 
parties to continue the reduction of the strategic offensive forces – in the first phase 
(originally in the timeframe of seven years of the entry into force of START I) to reduce 
the deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 3,800-4,250 (with no more than 2,160 
warheads on SLBMs, no more than 650 on heavy ICBMs, and no more than 1,200 
warheads on MIRVed ICBMs); while in the second phase (originally by January 1, 
2003) to reduce the deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 3,000-3,500 (with no more 
than 1,700-1,750 warheads on SLBMs, and a total elimination of heavy ICBMs and 
MIRVed ICBMs). The Treaty, however, never entered into force, and on June 14, 2002 
Moscow announced its withdrawal from the START II as the U.S. still did not ratify the 
agreement and the Bush administration withdrew from the ABM Treaty. 
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4.1.2 Force Levels under the Clinton Years (1993-2001) 
By the time the START I Treaty entered into force in 1994, the U.S. has already 
dramatically reduced its nuclear forces (mostly in the framework of the PNI’s of the 
early 1990s). According to the Clinton administration’s NPR, between 1988 and 1994 
the total active stockpile of the U.S. has been reduced by 59 percent, the strategic 
warheads were reduced by 47 percent, the non-strategic nuclear force warheads were 
reduced by 90 percent, and no nuclear weapons were left in the custody of U.S. ground 
forces. In addition to these reductions, several programs were terminated (the small 
ICBM, the Peacekeeper Rail Garrison, the Lance Follow-on, the New Artillery Fired 
Atomic Projectile, the Tactical Air to Surface Missile and the Short-Range Attack 
Missile II), other programs were truncated (the Peacekeeper, the B-2, the B-1 Nuclear 
Role, the Advanced Cruise Missile and the W-88), and many systems were retired 
without replacement (the Artillery Fired Atomic Projectile, the FB-111, the Minuteman 
II, the Lance, the Short-Range Attack Missile-A, the Nuclear Depth Bomb and the C-3 
SSBN). (NPR [1994]: p. 10.) 
During the Clinton years, U.S. strategic nuclear force requirements were determined by 
three main factors: the projected military requirements for the next ten years, the 
assumed implementation of the START I and START II Treaties, and the concerns over 
the former Soviet capabilities. Regarding the role of the triad, the 1994 NPR stated that 
the main attribute of submarines is survivability, which provides stability. Bombers, on 
the other hand, are only survivable if they are on alert status; but bombers also have a 
role as a “hedge against catastrophic failure of SSBN leg,” and as a dual capable carrier 
(DCA), which can also help in conventional contingencies. In the meanwhile, ICBMs 
provide a significant upload hedge capability, and the ability to strike selectively. (NPR 
[1994]: p. 16.) Under the START I and START II Treaties, the Clinton administration 
envisioned a strategic nuclear force with no more than 20 B-2 bombers for the nuclear 
role, a reduced B-52 bomber force (from 94 to 66), a reduced Trident submarine fleet 
(from 18 to 14), equipped with D5 missiles, and a single warhead Minuteman III ICBM 
force of 500/450. Besides, it maintained flexibility to “reduce further or reconstitute.” 
(NPR [1994]: p. 36.) 
In addition to the START I and START II Treaties, the Clinton administration explored 
the options to achieve faster and deeper reductions in the strategic nuclear forces and 
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concluded that there were three ways to achieve this goal: 1) by accelerating the 
implementation of the START I and START II Treaties, or 2) by negotiating a new 
agreement for faster and deeper reductions, or 3) by implementing unilateral reductions, 
based on the sufficiency of U.S. forces below the START II levels. 
Regarding the non-deployed arsenal of the U.S., the Clinton administration was the first 
to codify a permanent hedge force against the uncertainties of the security environment 
(mostly against the uncertainties of the relations with Russia and the newly independent 
post-Soviet states). The Clinton NPR stated that the U.S. “must preserve options for 
uploading/reconstituting US nuclear forces should political relations with Russia 
change for the worse [or should] START I and START II not be fully implemented.” 
(NPR [1994]: p. 19.) 
In the case of the non-strategic nuclear forces, the Clinton administration pledged to 
maintain the forward-deployed European non-strategic nuclear forces at the current 
levels (which was less than 10 percent of the Cold War levels), but at the same time it 
also declared serious reductions in the non-strategic forces, by the elimination of 
nuclear weapons capability from U.S. Navy surface ships (this meant the elimination of 
DCA capability from aircraft carriers, and the elimination of nuclear cruise missile 
capability from surface combatants). At the same time, the administration pledged to 
retain the nuclear cruise missile capability on submarines and the land-based dual-
capable nuclear aircraft capability. (NPR [1994]: p. 36.) 
Another priority of the Clinton administration was to deliver a complete ban on nuclear 
weapons testing. After altogether 1,032 nuclear weapons tests between 1945 and 1992, 
President Bush signed a testing moratorium on October 2, 1992, which was preceded by 
a Soviet moratorium in 1991, and followed by a British and a French moratorium in 
1992 and 1996 respectively. Since the election campaign, the Clinton administration 
aimed to codify a comprehensive nuclear-test ban agreement and it strongly supported 
the negotiations at the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament. After the treaty was 
handed over to and approved by the General Assembly of the UN in September, 1996, 
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the Clinton administration was the first to sign the treaty. The Senate ratification, 
however, failed in 1999 and the treaty is still not in force.
82
 
The issue of nuclear weapons testing had a direct effect on the production side, and the 
infrastructure as well. As a nuclear weapons testing moratorium was introduced by the 
Bush administration in 1992, and the Clinton administration was devoted to codify this 
ban by the entry into force of the CTBT, alternative ways were needed to assess the 
aging nuclear arsenal and to guarantee its continued reliability. For these reasons, in 
1995 the administration announced the Stockpile Stewardship Program with four main 
objectives: 
1) “Support a focused, multifaceted program to increase the understanding of the 
enduring stockpile; 
2) Predict, detect, and evaluate potential problems of the aging stockpile; 
3) Refurbish and re-manufacture nuclear weapons and components, as required; 
and 
4) Maintain the science and engineering institutions needed to support the nation’s 
nuclear deterrent, now and in the future.” (U.S. Department of Energy [2013]) 
In the framework of the SSP, the first modified warhead introduced in the stockpile 
after the moratorium on testing was announced was the B61-11 earth penetrating bomb. 
The B61-11 was publicly announced by the Clinton administration in 1995 to replace 
the retiring B53 warhead because of safety concerns. (Kristensen [2005c]) 
 
4.1.3 Force Levels under the Bush Years (2001-2009) 
When President Bush took office in January, 2001, the U.S. had around 10,000 nuclear 
weapons in its military stockpile. During his eight years as President, the number of 
U.S. nuclear weapons was cut in half which was the most significant force reduction 
since the early 1990s. 
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 Article XIV of the CTBT declares that the Treaty will enter into force 180 days after the deposit of the 
instruments of ratification by all states which are listed in Annex 2 – these 44 states were members of the 
CD (as of June, 1996), worked on the preparations and the negotiations of the Treaty, and were included 
in the IAEA’s April 1996 edition of ‘Nuclear Power Reactors in the World.’ As of August, 2014, eight of 
these states have still not ratified the Treaty (China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Egypt, 
India, Israel, Iran, Pakistan, and the United States).  
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In the administration’s 2001 NPR, the U.S. declared that its force structure requirements 
would be guided by the already mentioned “assure, deter, dissuade, defeat” strategy and 
the primary driver of force levels would be the so called “capabilities-based” approach, 
instead of the traditional threat-based approach. The capabilities-based approach of the 
Bush administration meant that the nuclear forces of the U.S. would be adjusted to 
multiple contingencies and to the new threats of the changing security environment. 
According to this, the required capabilities are not country-specific, they are maintained 
for unexpected potential threat contingencies, and as reductions occur, it reflects that the 
risks are reduced. This includes active defense and non-nuclear capabilities – defenses 
reduce dependency on offensive strike forces to enforce deterrence, while non-nuclear 
strike forces reduce dependency on nuclear forces to provide offensive deterrent. In 
addition to the strengthening of these capabilities, the Bush NPR declared that 
effectiveness depends upon command and control, intelligence and adaptive planning. 
(NPR [2002a]: p. 8.) 
Under the capabilities-based approach, an operationally deployed force was maintained 
for immediate and unexpected contingencies, and a responsive force for potential 
contingencies. This responsive force meant the capability to adapt to the changes of the 
security environment, both in a positive and in a negative way. The responsive force 
does not only cover reserve nuclear forces, but it also includes a responsive 
infrastructure, in order to have the capability to increase the deployed forces if 
necessary, and also to have the capability to dismantle these forces if this is what the 
security environment requires (thus, the Bush administration’s responsive force concept 
was broader than the Clinton administration’s hedge force). (Interview with John R. 
Harvey [2014])  
Regarding the sizing of these forces, the Bush administration pledged to “deploy the 
lowest number of nuclear weapons consistent with the security requirements of the U.S., 
its allies and friends” and to achieve these reductions without the requirement of “Cold 
War-style treaties.” (NPR [2002a]: p. 8.) In this regard, the administration envisioned 
1,700-2,200 operationally deployed strategic warheads by 2012, which – according to 
the NPR – was not meant to address an immediate contingency with Russia. These 
reductions were planned in two phases: in the first phase (until 2007) to 3,800 warheads, 
and in the second phase (until 2012) to 1,700-2,200. In order to realize these cuts, the 
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administration outlined the following steps: retire the Peacekeeper (MX) ICBMs, 
starting from 2002,
83
 remove four Trident submarines from strategic service,
84
 the B-1 
bombers will not have a nuclear role in the future, and warheads will be downloaded on 
ICBMs and SLBMs.
85
 (NPR [2002a]: p. 14.) In addition to these steps, the 2005 
Strategic Capabilities Assessment and the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review 
announced additional changes to the U.S. strategic nuclear forces – these included the 
elimination of 50 Minuteman III missiles (reducing the entire ICBM force from 500 to 
450) and hundreds of advanced air-launched cruise missiles. (U.S. Department of 
Defense [2006]) 
Regarding the non-deployed arsenal, the NPR declared that a separate force structure 
and downloaded warheads would be preserved for the responsive force, in case the 
security environment dramatically deteriorated. In the meanwhile, the role of the 
nuclear triad was reinforced and a new triad was envisioned with the traditional three 
legs, complemented with the development of defenses and a responsive infrastructure. 
The current systems were declared to remain, and life extension programs were initiated 
for all of them.  
Although the 2001 NPR did not contain specific changes to the non-strategic nuclear 
arsenal of the U.S., unclassified sources suggest that parallel to these steps, the number 
of forward deployed tactical nuclear weapons in Europe was cut in half (leaving behind 
the currently deployed 180-200 tactical nuclear weapons). Between 2001 and 2005, the 
U.S. pulled out tactical nuclear weapons from Greece and Ramstein AFB in Germany, 
while in 2006 it entirely withdrew its tactical nuclear forces from the United Kingdom. 
(Woolf [2014a]: p. 17.) 
As the 2001 NPR stated, the Bush administration planned to cut with the tradition of 
Cold War-style arms control treaties, and it was ready to take these steps unilaterally – 
                                                 
83
 This initiative came out of the START II Treaty, and the implementation was finished by September, 
2005. (Woolf [2014c]: p. 5.) 
84
 The reduction of the ballistic missile submarine force from 18 to 14 boats was already envisioned by 
the Clinton administration’s Nuclear Posture Review. The four Trident submarines were removed from 
the nuclear fleet by 2007, and the conversion of the first boat to carry conventional cruise missiles and 
other conventional weapons was completed between 2004 and 2007. (Woolf [2014c]: pp. 17-18.) 
85
 The first phase of downloading warheads from all Trident II missiles was completed by 2005 to an 
average of six warheads, instead of the maximum eight. (Kristensen; Norris [2007]: p. 80.) Under the 
START I agreement, the downloading of all 150 Minuteman III ICBMs at Warren AFB to a single 
warhead configuration was completed by 2001, and the process was continued to download the remaining 
Minuteman III ICBMs. (Kristensen; Norris [2006]: p. 69.) 
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as President Bush said himself in November, 2001: “We don't need arms control 
negotiations to reduce our weaponry in a significant way.” (Quoted in Arms Control 
Association [2013]) Russian President Vladimir Putin also agreed that the deployed 
strategic nuclear arsenals could be lowered, especially as the Russian forces were 
expected to decline anyways, because of financial and technical reasons. Moscow, 
however, insisted to codify these reductions in order to maintain a level of parity and 
predictability between the two sides. As a result of this pressure from Russia and the 
U.S. Congress as well, President Bush agreed to put these reductions in a legally 
binding framework. (Arms Control Association [2006])  
The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty or the so called Moscow Treaty was signed 
by President Bush and President Putin on May 24, 2002 and entered into force on June 
1, 2003, after the U.S. and Russian lawmakers approved the ratification of the 
agreement. The main provisions of the treaty obliged Washington and Moscow to 
reduce and limit the aggregate number of their strategic nuclear warheads to 1,700-
2,200 each. The agreement, however, reflected the U.S. desires for flexibility, and 
allowed each party to decide on the composition of these forces, and on the fate of the 
decommissioned warheads, which was also not regulated by the SORT Treaty – thus, 
previously deployed warheads could still be retained in the active stockpile, as a hedge 
against uncertainties. In addition, the SORT agreement did not contain any specific 
verification mechanisms besides the regular (at least twice a year) meetings of the 
Bilateral Implementation Commission. (SORT [2002]) (But as the parties agreed that 
the START I remained in force, those verification and compliance practices were still 
maintained.) The SORT agreement remained in force until December 31, 2012 as 
agreed in the original document. 
Regarding other arms control agreements, it was already mentioned that for the sake of 
flexibility, the Bush administration announced its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty on 
December 31, 2001, and the NPR also declared that the U.S. would not seek ratification 
of the CTBT but it would maintain the “continued adherence to testing moratorium.” 
(NPR [2002a]: p. 11.) 
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4.1.4 Force Levels under the Obama Years (2009-present) 
Based on the released stockpile numbers, when President Obama took office in January, 
2009 the U.S. had 5,113 nuclear weapons in its military stockpile which has been 
reduced to 4,804 by 2013. (U.S. Department of State [2014a]) Compared to the 
powerful rhetoric of the administration, this is a relatively moderate reduction in the 
force levels. 
According to issue experts Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, the deployed 
nuclear arsenal of the U.S. was the following in 2009: 
 
Table 6. U.S. Nuclear Forces (2009) 
Type/Designation Number 
Year 
Deployed 
Warheads  
x Yields 
Deployed/Spare 
ICBMs 
LGM-30G Minuteman III     
Mk-12 0 1970 1-3 W62 x 170 kt 
(MIRV) 
0 
Mk-12A 250 1979 1-3 W78 x 335 kt 
(MIRV) 
350/20 
Mk-21/SERV 200 2006
1
 1 W87 x 300 kt 200/10 
Total 450   550/30 
 
SLBMs
2
 
 UGM-133A Trident II D5 288    
Mk-4  1992 4-6 W76 x 100 kt 
(MIRV) 
718/40 
Mk-4A  2008 4-6 W76-1 x 100 kt 
(MIRV) 
50/10 
Mk-5  1990 4-6 W88 x 455 kt 
(MIRV) 
384/20 
Total 288   1,152/70 
 
Bombers 
B-52H Stratofortress 93/44
3
 1961 ALCM/W80-1 x  
5-150 kt 
350/25 
B-2A Spirit 20/16 1994 B61-7/-11, B83-1 150/25 
Total 113/60   500/50
4
 
 
Nonstrategic forces 
Tomahawk SLCM 325 1984 1 W80-0 x 5-150 kt 100 
B61-3/-4 bombs n/a 1979 0,3-170 kt 400
5
 
Total 325   500 
 
GRAND TOTAL                                                                                            2,702/1506 
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1. The W87 was first deployed on the MX/Peacekeeper in 1986. 
2. Two additional subs with 48 missiles are normally in overhaul and not available for deployment. 
Their 288warheads are considered part of the responsive force of reserve warheads. Delivery of the 
W76-1/Mk-4A began in late October 2008, and we estimate that the warhead is currently being 
deployed. 
3. The first figure is the aircraft inventory, including those used for training, testing, and backup; the 
second is the primary mission aircraft inventory, the number of operational aircraft assigned for 
nuclear and/or conventional missions. 
4. The large pool of bombs and cruise missiles allows for multiple loading possibilities depending on the 
mission. We estimate that the force level of 350 ALCMs of all categories by 2012 has already been 
achieved in preparation for reaching the SORT level in 2010, two years early. 
5. Approximately 200 of these are deployed at six bases in European NATO countries. Nuclear 
Tomahawk SLCMs also support NATO and Northeast Asian extended deterrence. 
6. The U.S. government does not count spares as operational warheads. We have included them in the 
reserve, which we estimate contains approximately 2,500 warheads. Another 4,200 warheads are 
awaiting dismantlement. 
 
Source of table: Kristensen; Norris [2009a] 
 
In terms of force structure requirements, the administration’s 2010 Nuclear Posture 
Review declared that “Since the end of the Cold War, the United States and Russia have 
reduced operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons by about 75 percent, but 
both still retain many more nuclear weapons than they need for deterrence. The 
Administration is committed to working with Russia to preserve stability at significantly 
reduced force levels.” (NPR [2010a]: p. ix.) In order to meet this objective, three main 
steps were outlined. The first step was the conclusion of the New START Treaty with 
Moscow, under which the U.S. pledged to maintain the nuclear triad, and also 
committed to continue the “de-MIRV”-ing of the ICBMs to a one warhead 
configuration each, in order to enhance crisis stability.  
The second step was to maximize presidential decision time. In this regard, the NPR 
concluded that the current alert posture of the U.S. strategic forces should be maintained 
but efforts should continue to further reduce the chances of accidental or unauthorized 
launches, as well as launches based on misperceptions, while the time available to the 
President to decide on the use of nuclear weapons should be maximized. For this 
purpose, the three key recommendations of the NPR: 1) continue the practice of “open-
ocean targeting” of all ICBMs and SLBMs, 2) further strengthen the U.S. command and 
control system, and 3) explore new modes of ICBM basing so that their survivability 
would be enhanced and reduce any incentives for prompt launch.  
The third step on the way of reduced force levels is reinforcing strategic stability. As 
both Russia and China are in the process of modernizing their nuclear forces, 
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maintaining strategic stability is going to be an important challenge in the future. 
Therefore, the U.S. pledged to “pursue high-level, bilateral dialogues on strategic 
stability with both Russia and China which are aimed at fostering more stable, resilient, 
and transparent strategic relationships.” (NPR [2010a]: p. x.)  
Regarding further reductions, the NPR also stated that the President initiated a review of 
post-New START arms control objectives, in order to consider future nuclear 
reductions. The level of these reductions will primarily depend on three factors. The 
first factor to consider is the strengthening of the deterrence of potential regional 
adversaries, the strategic stability vis-à-vis Russia and China, and the continued 
assurance of the allies of the U.S. The second factor is the implementation of the 
Stockpile Stewardship Program and the investments in the nuclear weapons 
infrastructure which will allow the U.S. to reduce the number of the non-deployed 
warheads in the hedge force. The last influencing factor of future force reductions is the 
level of Russian nuclear forces. As it has been in the past, Russia will remain a 
significant factor in future U.S. force reductions. Although strict numerical parity is no 
longer imperative, the NPR still argued that large disparities would raise concerns in the 
U.S. and among allies as well, therefore the U.S. will try to pursue further reductions 
together with Russia. These further reductions should expand the scope of traditional 
arms control agreements and include non-strategic and non-deployed forces as well; and 
consultation with allies is imperative because of the continued U.S. commitments 
towards their reassurance. 
Under the umbrella of strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring allies, the NPR 
contained some additional commitments. The conventional capabilities and the regional 
missile defense systems will be further strengthened in the future, and the U.S. will 
retain the capability to forward-deploy its nuclear forces on tactical fighter- and heavy 
bombers. The full scope of the B61 Life Extension Program will proceed and the 
nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles (TLAM-N) of the Navy will be retired (in 
2009 the U.S. still deployed around 100 non-strategic nuclear weapons on these 
systems). 
As already mentioned, the NPR also committed the U.S. to maintain the strategic triad 
under the New START Treaty. In the framework of the START reductions, the U.S. 
would maintain a smaller triad which was seen as the best way to “maintain strategic 
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stability at reasonable cost, while hedging against potential technical problems or 
vulnerabilities.” (NPR [2010a]: p. 21.) The NPR also explained why all three legs were 
deemed necessary: SSBNs and SLBMs are the most survivable leg of the triad and there 
is no current or mid-term threat to the survivability of these systems. Single-warhead 
ICBMs contribute to stability as they are not vulnerable to air defenses (like the 
SLBMs) and finally, the bombers are essential as they can be visibly deployed as a 
signal in a crisis situation which would strengthen deterrence and reassure allies. 
After the NPR was announced, the next result of the Obama administration was the 
New START Treaty. As the START I agreement expired on December 5, 2009, there 
was a huge pressure on the Obama administration to conclude the Treaty as soon as 
possible. At the G-20 meeting in London on April 1, 2009, President Obama and 
President Medvedev expressed their support to reduce the level of strategic offensive 
forces below the SORT agreement, and declared their commitment to conclude a new 
treaty before the START I expires. Negotiations, however, were slowed mostly because 
of disagreements around the U.S. planned missile defense system in Europe
86
 and the 
parties missed the December deadline.
87
 An agreement was finally reached on March 
26, 2010 and the Treaty was signed by President Obama and President Medvedev on 
April 8, 2010.
88
 (START III [2010a]) 
                                                 
86
 In September, 2009, President Obama announced that the U.S. will seek a “Phased Adaptive 
Approach” in the European missile defense system, to be deployed between 2011 and 2018 in three 
phases (originally the U.S. planned to build four phases but the last phase was officially withdrawn in 
March, 2013 to ease some of the Russian concerns about the system’s capabilities against long-range 
ballistic missiles). The proposal is based on the Aegis missile defense system, and it will include sea-
based elements on the Mediterranean Sea, and ashore deployments in Romania (Phase 2), and in Poland 
(Phase 3). The system, in addition, will include AN/TPY-2 radar deployment in Turkey, and a basic 
command and control capability at the NATO Headquarters Allied Air Command in Ramstein, Germany. 
At the 2010 Lisbon Summit, the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) was approved by NATO 
as its official ballistic missile defense system, and the 2012 Chicago Summit announced an “interim 
BMD capability.” Russia, in general, is worried about the capabilities of the ashore interceptors (SM-3 
Block IA and IIA), which they claim could mean a threat to their ICBM capabilities in the third (and 
potential future phases). 
87
 On December 4, 2009, Washington and Moscow issued a joint statement that “Recognizing our mutual 
determination to support strategic stability between the United States of America and the Russian 
Federation, we express our commitment, as a matter of principle, to continue to work together in the 
spirit of the START Treaty following its expiration, as well as our firm intention to ensure that a new 
treaty on strategic arms enter into force at the earliest possible date.” (The White House [2009]) 
88
 Moscow’s concerns about the European missile defense system, however, have not been adequately 
addressed, and it declared in a unilateral statement on April 7, 2010 that the New START agreement 
“may be effective and viable only in conditions where there is no qualitative or quantitative build-up in 
the missile defense system capabilities of the United States of America.” (Russian Federation [2010]) 
In response to this statement, the U.S. also released two unilateral statements which assured Russia that 
the U.S. missile defense plans in Europe are not intended to upset the strategic balance between the U.S. 
and Russia. 
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In its first two years, the administration was really effective and successful in the 
implementation of its nuclear agenda therefore the White House expected a quick 
ratification process of no more than three months, and after the ratification of the New 
START agreement, they hoped to use the momentum and submit the CTBT 
immediately for a vote. But the difficulties of ratifying the New START agreement 
already projected that future initiatives will be extremely hard to implement (including 
the ratification of the CTBT).
89
 President Obama’s rhetoric was too progressive for 
some conservative lawmakers who feared that the New START agreement would be 
only the first step in a series of more dramatic reductions therefore they developed a 
reflexive opposition against any arms control measures which was put forward by the 
administration. (Interviews with Steven Pifer [2013] and Robert J. Einhorn [2014]) In 
order to address these fears, the administration was forced into a “grand bargain” and 
President Obama made a commitment to invest in the nuclear weapons infrastructure – 
                                                 
89
 Ratifying the CTBT was an important element of the Obama campaign in 2008, and it was high on the 
agenda in the Prague address, and the 2010 NPR as well. As the NPR stated, “Ratification of the CTBT is 
central to leading other nuclear weapons states toward a world of diminished reliance on nuclear 
weapons, reduced nuclear competition, and eventual nuclear disarmament. U.S. ratification could also 
encourage ratification by other states, including China, and provide incentives for the remaining states to 
work toward entry into force of the treaty.” (NPR [2010a]: p. 13.) In this regard, the administration took 
some promising steps in the first two years by putting in place the technical background for the debate. 
Two non-partisan research groups were asked to provide an updated assessment on the technical issues 
related to the CTBT: the National Academy of Sciences updated its 2002 study on the CTBT and the 
JASONs also came out with a new report in 2009. The updated NAS study was released in March, 2012 
and it concluded that the U.S. “has the technical capabilities to maintain a safe, secure, and reliable 
stockpile of nuclear weapons into the foreseeable future without nuclear-explosion testing” and “is now 
better able to maintain a safe and effective nuclear stockpile and to monitor clandestine nuclear-
explosion testing than at any time in the past.” (NAS [2012]: p. 4; 12.) While, the JASONs found that the 
“lifetimes of today’s nuclear warheads could be extended for decades, with no anticipated loss in 
confidence” and there is “no evidence that accumulation of changes incurred from aging and LEPs have 
increased risk to certification of today’s deployed nuclear warheads.” (JASON [2009]: p. 2.) 
Although the technical background of the CTBT seems to be stronger than ever, the ratification is still a 
captive of political turf wars. The administration expected a quick ratification process for the New 
START Treaty, and hoped to submit the CTBT for a Senate vote immediately afterwards. But the 
unforeseen difficulties of the START ratification sent a warning sign to the CTBT process as well, and 
the momentum of the first two years was lost. After President Clinton’s failure to ratify the CTBT, the 
Obama White House did not want to repeat the mistake to submit the treaty without the necessary number 
of supporters. This projected a long and painful process of lobbying in the Senate. In 2011, Under 
Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Ellen O. Tauscher spoke at the Arms 
Control Association’s annual meeting and outlined a strategy which was based on three arguments: “One, 
the United States no longer needs to conduct nuclear explosive tests, plain and simple. Two, a CTBT that 
has entered into force will obligate other states not to test and provide a disincentive for states to conduct 
such tests. And three, we now have a greater ability to catch those who cheat.” (Tauscher [2011])  
Although the CTBT is the “most verifiable treaty,” the chances of ratification seem to be less by each 
year. “Democrats would ratify but can’t, while Republicans could but wouldn’t” – the Democrats are 
running out of time, and it will probably take the next moderate Republican President to ratify the treaty. 
However, regardless of which party wins the next elections, there is a strong norm against testing and the 
moratorium seems to firm. (Interview with Robert J. Einhorn [2014])  
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in November, 2010, the administration announced an unprecedented $85 billion 
package “to modernize the U.S. nuclear weapons complex that supports our deterrent.” 
(Obama [2010]) 
After a long process of Congressional Hearings, on December 22, 2010 the U.S. Senate 
finally approved the ratification of the New START agreement by a vote of 71 to 26 in 
favor. This success was partly due to President Obama’s commitment to 
modernizations, and partly to Senator Lugar’s efforts in the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, who was instrumental in bringing the necessary number of Republican 
votes to the table, in order to reach the two thirds majority. After the successful Senate 
vote in the U.S., the Russian Duma also gave its endorsement to the Treaty which 
entered into force on February 5, 2011. 
Since the entry into force of the START I agreement in 1994, this was the first 
verifiable arms control agreement to take effect between Washington and Moscow. The 
New START agreement was concluded for a duration of ten years, with the option to 
extend the agreement for an additional five years. The implementation deadline is seven 
years, which means that the two sides have to reduce their forces to the levels of the 
agreement by February 5, 2018. 
The main provisions of the New START agreement oblige Washington and Moscow to 
reduce their deployed strategic nuclear forces to 1,550 “treaty accountable” warheads 
and 700 ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers. This reduction means approximately 30 
percent less than the 2,200 upper limit of the 2002 SORT agreement, and 74 percent 
less than the START I limit of 6,000. The combined limit for deployed and non-
deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers is 800.  
The term “treaty accountable” in this case means the actual number of re-entry vehicles 
emplaced on ICBMs and SLBMs, while one warhead is counted for each deployed 
heavy bomber (even if there are more warheads assigned to it). As the NPR explains, 
“Under the New START, dual-capable bombers will count as both one strategic delivery 
vehicle, and as one warhead. This counting rule was adopted in recognition of the facts 
that heavy bombers do not pose a first-strike threat to either side, and that on a day-to-
day basis few or no bombers are loaded with nuclear weapons.” (NPR [2010a]: p. 21.)  
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As a result of this counting rule, the absolute number of deployed warheads can exceed 
the 1,550 limit, which will bring it exactly to the ranges of the 2002 SORT Treaty 
(1,700-2,200). This is why critics of the New START agreement argue that the numbers 
are not low enough, and in fact the treaty only codified the projected numbers of the 
Bush administration. The main reason for these moderate reductions is that the START 
negotiations were conducted under the Bush administration’s presidential guidance 
document (the NSPD-14 from 2002), which determined that the numbers would reflect 
the previous administration’s force structure.90 Although the New START limits are 
extremely moderate, it is also important to emphasize that the U.S. was ready to go 
deeper but Russia was not willing to agree to it (as the number of launchers was already 
set).
91
 Joe Cirincione, president of the Ploughshares Fund argued that “Even under the 
Bush 2002 guidance, which [affected] our forces until yesterday [June, 2013], the [Joint 
Chiefs of Staff] were ready to go down to 1,300 operationally deployed strategic 
weapons.” (Quoted in Grossman [2013])  
In terms of verification mechanisms and transparency measures, the New START 
Treaty combines elements of the 1991 START I agreement with some new practices. 
These measures include national technical means (for example satellites), on-site 
inspections and exhibitions, data exchanges and notifications related to strategic 
offensive arms and facilities covered by the Treaty. For the sake of increased 
transparency, the treaty also allows an annual exchange of telemetry on an agreed 
number of ICBM and SLBM launchers. Verification mechanisms also differentiate 
between Type One and Type Two inspections: Type One focuses on sites with deployed 
and non-deployed strategic systems; while Type Two focuses on sites with only non-
deployed strategic systems. According to the webpage of the Department of State, as of 
July 10, 2014 the U.S. and Russia conducted altogether 123 inspections and 6,802 
notifications were exchanged since the entry into force of the Treaty. (START III 
[2010b]) 
                                                 
90
 As already mentioned before, it was a strategic (and unprecedented) decision by the administration that 
the targeting review, or the so called review of the presidential guidance was postponed until the New 
START negotiations were finished, so that no review would be underway while the U.S. was negotiating 
with Russia. Therefore, the Bush guidance remained in force until mid-2013 and the negotiating 
thresholds were laid out by the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review.  
91
 Russia is already below the U.S. regarding the number of launchers, and this number is expected to 
shrink further in the coming decades. Therefore, Moscow tries to keep strategic parity with the U.S. by 
higher warhead loadings on the deployed launchers – this is why lower warhead limits were not in their 
interest if the number of launchers was already settled at a relatively high limit (if they agreed to these 
terms, the U.S. would have a much bigger upload capability on its strategic deliveries).   
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The Treaty, in general, provides a lot more flexibility to the parties than the START I 
agreement. It gives total flexibility on the composition of forces and it also emphasizes 
that it does not constrain U.S. programs or plans for missile defense or conventional 
systems. It does ban the conversion of ICBM and SLBM launchers to launchers of 
missile defense interceptors but as Amy Woolf from the Congressional Research 
Service argues, “the United States never intended to pursue such conversions when 
deploying missile defense interceptors.” (Woolf [2014b]: p. ii.) Regarding conventional 
weapons, the U.S. can also deploy conventional warheads on ballistic missiles, but these 
systems will count under the limits of the treaty. 
In April, 2014, three years after the treaty’s entry into force, the DoD finally released its 
plan on the implementation of the New START agreement. (U.S. Department of 
Defense [2014]) 
 
Table 7. Nuclear Force Structure under the New START Treaty 
Existing Types of 
ICBMs, SLBMs, and 
heavy bombers 
2014 Deployed 
and Non-
Deployed ICBM 
launchers, SLBM 
launchers, and 
heavy bombers 
2018 
Deployed 
ICBMs, 
SLBMs, and 
heavy 
bombers 
2018 Deployed 
and Non-Deployed 
ICBM launchers, 
SLBM launchers, 
and heavy 
bombers 
Minuteman III ICBMs 454
1
 400 454 
Trident II SLBMs 336 240 280 
B-2A/B-52H Bombers 96
2
 60 66 
Total 886 700 800 
1. Does not include 53 non-operational ICBM launchers (52 Minuteman III and one Peacekeeper) 
currently being eliminated. 
2. Does not include 13 non-operational B-52H bombers scheduled to be converted or eliminated. 
 
Source of table: U.S. Department of Defense [2014] 
 
The DoD plan reveals that in order to meet the New START limits by 2018, the U.S. 
will place 50 currently deployed ICBM launchers into a non-deployed status, by 
removing the ICBMs from the silos. Four SSBN launch tubes will be converted on each 
of the 14 SSBNs, removing 56 launch tubes from accountability. As a result of this 
reduction, a maximum of 12 SSBNs will remain with 20 loaded missiles at any given 
time (with two SSBNs staying in overhaul), providing 240 deployed SLBMs and SLBM 
launchers. Regarding the bomber force, the U.S. will retain 19 B-2As and 41 B-52Hs as 
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nuclear capable heavy bombers, and 30 B-52H bombers will be converted to a 
conventional role only (thus, removing them from accountability). The DoD will 
manage the 1,550 accountable warheads on the deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy 
bombers based on these numbers. (U.S. Department of Defense [2014]) 
A discrepancy in this regard is that the administration pledged to retain those 50 silos 
which will be emptied under the New START Treaty. While the 50 silos at Malmstrom 
Air Force Base (AFB) and the 50 at F.E Warren AFB – which were emptied by the 
Bush administration’s reductions – will be destroyed by 2016, the Obama 
administration decided to keep the empty silos to provide a reloading capacity for the 
Minuteman III ICBMs. This goes against previous practices (i.e. destroy empty 
launchers), and it might also weaken the flexibility of the U.S. as the 50 empty silos 
would “eat up” half of the 100 non-deployed launchers, allowed under the New START 
Treaty. (Kristensen [2014d]) 
Based on the official stockpile numbers released by the administration, between 2009 
and 2014 the Obama administration has reduced its nuclear forces by only 309 nuclear 
warheads (a reduction from 5,113 to 4,804 warheads). (U.S. Department of State 
[2014a]) This reduction is most likely the result of four factors: 1) retiring the TLAM-N 
systems from the service of the Navy, 2) retiring some tactical nuclear weapons, 3) 
retiring some strategic nuclear weapons, and 4) reducing the number of legacy 
warheads.  
In 2009, the U.S. still had a hundred warheads deployed on TLAM-N launchers, which 
was retired by the 2010 NPR in order to reduce the redundancy in the stockpile. The 
retirement was probably completed by early 2013, as unlike every previous document, 
the new Secretary of the Navy Instruction of February 15 no longer contained a sub-
section describing the role of the TLAM-N systems. (Secretary of the Navy [2013]) 
This reduction meant that the Navy completed a 25-year process to get out of the 
business of non-strategic nuclear weapons.
92
 This is an important milestone in putting 
                                                 
92
 The retirement of these systems started in 1989, when the Navy unilaterally decided to retire its 
submarine-launched rocket (SUBROC), ship-launched rocket (ASROC) and ship-launched surface-to-air 
Terrier missiles. The Reagan administration planned to replace these systems but all of these replacement 
programs were cancelled. After these retirements, the Navy still had the B61 and B57 bombs on aircraft 
carriers and land-based anti-submarine aircrafts, and the TLAM-N system. The PNIs of the Bush 
administration unilaterally cancelled the replacement programs for the naval B61 and B57, and declared 
to offload and withdraw all non-strategic nuclear weapons. This process was continued by the Clinton 
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an end to the Cold War force structure. In 1987, the U.S. Navy possessed around 3,700 
non-strategic nuclear weapons, on almost 240 nuclear-capable ships and attack 
submarines. The retirement of the TLAM-N system means that there are no more such 
weapons left, which also indicates the decreasing military and political value of non-
strategic nuclear weapons in the reassurance of allies. Moreover, these steps also 
triggered some reciprocal measures in Russia, where a third of the non-strategic naval 
nuclear weapons have been eliminated since 1991. (Kristensen [2013b]) 
Regarding the three other sources of reduction, some B61 tactical nuclear weapons were 
retired, as well as some B61-7 strategic nuclear weapons. In addition, some W76 legacy 
warheads were also taken out of the stockpile, which were only maintained to hedge 
warheads which were undergoing life extension. (Interview with Hans M. Kristensen 
[2014]) 
Parallel to these reductions, another source of change in the U.S. force structure comes 
from the implementation of the New START Treaty – although it probably did not (and 
will not) reduce the overall number of the active stockpile (the weapons to be taken out 
of deployed status will most likely remain in the non-deployed hedge force). In this 
regard, the first main result of the implementation is the reconfiguration of the ICBMs. 
The process of “de-MIRV”-ing the ICBMs was already started during the Clinton 
administration and President Obama pledged to finish the job under the New START 
Treaty (however, official statements suggested that a “re-MIRV”-ing capability will be 
retained as a hedge against the uncertainties of the security environment). 
(Congressional Hearing [2011]) As a result of this “de-MIRV”-ing process, on June 18, 
2014, the Great Falls Tribune reported that the nation’s last Minuteman III ICBM was 
reconfigured at Malmstrom AFB to carry only a single warhead. (Rowell [2014]) The 
Minuteman III ICBMs were originally designed to carry up to three independently 
targetable re-entry vehicles, able to hit three separate targets. The reconfiguration of the 
Minuteman III ICBMs was also a historic milestone in shifting away from Cold War 
force structures as MIRV-ed ICBMs had been in the U.S. arsenal since the first 
                                                                                                                                               
administration, which denuclearized the entire surface fleet, leaving only the TLAM-N system on the 
navy’s attack submarines. (Although the missiles were stored on land and did not make it back to sea.) 
During the Bush administration, the Navy already wanted to retire the TLAM-N but NSC and OSD 
officials insisted that these systems still play a role in the reassurance of allies, therefore the TLAM-N 
survived the 2001 NPR. The Obama administration, on the other hand, was determined enough to retire 
the system. (Kristensen [2013b]) 
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Minuteman III came on alert in 1970. When the Obama administration took office in 
2009, the U.S. still had a few ICBMs, carrying multiple
93
 W78 warheads, which by 
mid-2014 has been reduced to zero. As the NPR stated, this step “will enhance the 
stability of the nuclear balance by reducing the incentives for either side to strike first.” 
(NPR [2010a]: p. 23.)  
Although the ICBMs have been successfully “de-MIRV”-ed by 2014, SLBMs are still 
carrying three, four, or five warheads, depending on their mission. According to the 
latest data exchange (July 1, 2014) under the New START Treaty (U.S. Department of 
State [2014b]), the U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals are the following:  
Table 8. New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms 
Category of Data 
United States of 
America 
Russian 
Federation 
Deployed ICBMs, Deployed SLBMs, 
and Deployed Heavy Bombers 
778 498 
Warheads on Deployed ICBMs, on 
Deployed SLBMs, and Nuclear 
Warheads Counted for Deployed Heavy 
Bombers 
1,585 1,512 
Deployed and Non-deployed Launchers 
of ICBMs, Deployed and Non-deployed 
Launchers of SLBMs, and Deployed 
and Non-deployed Heavy Bombers 
  
952 905 
Source of table: U.S. Department of State [2014b]  
 
Based on these numbers, Moscow has already met the New START limits, both in 
terms of deployed deliveries and in terms of deployed warheads. The U.S., on the other 
hand, is still above all limits. According to the 2014 Nuclear Notebook on U.S. nuclear 
forces, the current arsenal consists of 2,120 operational warheads (1,150 on SLBMs; 
470 on ICBMs; 300 strategic warheads are located at bomber bases; and around 200 
non-strategic nuclear weapons are deployed in Europe). It leaves around 2,530 
warheads in storage as a so-called hedge force, and another 2,700 nuclear warheads are 
awaiting dismantlement. (Kristensen; Norris [2014b]: p. 85.) In this regard, the revealed 
stockpile numbers of the Obama administration contain concrete data on weapon 
                                                 
93
 If the capability to carry multiple warheads was still there in the case of a few ICBMs, then the 
assumption is that the maximum number of three warheads was probably deployed on those ICBMs. 
(Interview with Hans M. Kristensen [2014]) 
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dismantlements since 1994.
94
 These numbers show that between 1994 and 2013, 
altogether 9,952 nuclear warheads had been dismantled – while during the first half of 
the 1990s more than 1,000 nuclear warheads were dismantled each year, the Obama 
administration dismantles between 350 and 240 nuclear weapons each year. (U.S. 
Department of State [2014a]) 
Based on these data, the 2014 Nuclear Notebook contains the following U.S. force 
structure: 
 
Table 9. U.S. Nuclear Forces (2014) 
Type/Designation Number 
Year 
Deployed 
Warheads  
x Yields 
Deployed 
ICBMs 
LGM-30G Minuteman III     
Mk-12A 200 1979 1-3 W78 x 335 kt 
(MIRV) 
220 
Mk-21/SERV 250 2006
1
 1 W87 x 300 kt 250 
Total 450   470 
 
SLBMs 
 UGM-133A Trident II D5 288
2
    
Mk-4  1992 4 W76 x 100 kt 
(MIRV) 
268 
Mk-4A  2008 4 W76-1 x 100 kt 
(MIRV) 
500 
Mk-5  1990 4 W88 x 455 kt 
(MIRV) 
384 
Total 288   1,152 
 
Bombers 
B-52H Stratofortress 93/44
3
 1961 ALCM/W80-1 x  
5-150kt 
200 
B-2A Spirit 20/16 1994 B61-7/-11, B83-1 100 
Total 113/60   300
4
 
 
Nonstrategic forces 
B61-3/-4 bombs n/a 1979 0,3-170 kt 200
5
 
Total    200 
 
Total deployed                                                                                                       2,1206 
Reserve                                                                                                                     2,530 
Total stockpile                                                                                                         4,650 
 
Awaiting dismantlement                                                                                        2,700 
TOTAL INVENTORY                                                                                           7,400 
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 By definition a warhead is dismantled if it is reduced to its component parts. (U.S. Department of State 
[2014a]) 
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1. The W87 was first deployed on the MX/Peacekeeper in 1986. 
2. Two additional submarines with 48 missile tubes (total) are normally in overhaul and not available 
for deployment. Their 48 missiles, with 288 warheads, are considered part of the responsive force of 
reserve warheads. Sometimes more than two submarines are in overhaul. 
3. The first figure is the aircraft inventory, including those used for training, testing, and backup; the 
second is the primary mission aircraft inventory – the number of operational aircraft assigned for 
nuclear or conventional missions. 
4. The pool of bombs and cruise missiles allows for multiple loading possibilities depending on the 
mission. The Air Force has 528 ALCMs, of which 200 are deployed at Minot AFB. Although B-52Hs 
can also carry B61-7 and B83-1, gravity bombs are only planned for delivery by the B-2s. 
5. These are deployed in Europe. Another 300 bombs are in storage in the United States, for a total 
inventory of 500 nonstrategic bombs. 
6. The U.S. government does not count spares as operational warheads. We have included them in the 
reserve. 
Source of table: Kristensen; Norris [2014b] 
 
Between January, 2009 and January, 2014, the number of deployed ICBMs did not 
change, it remained on the level of 450 Minuteman III ICBMs, but as a result of the 
“de-MIRV”-ing process, the number of assigned warheads has been cut from 550 to 470 
(by mid-2014 it was further reduced to 450, as the “de-MIRV”-ing was completed). 
Regarding the SLBMs, there was no change either in the number of missiles or in the 
number of warheads. The strategic bombers also remained on the levels of 2009, and the 
number of the assigned warheads has probably also remained at around the same 
levels.
95
  
In addition, the TLAM-N system was retired, leaving the 200 B61 bombs in Europe as 
the only deployed non-strategic nuclear capability of the U.S. Although the U.S. and 
NATO do not officially disclose the number and location of non-strategic nuclear 
weapons, it is widely believed that the current inventory of B61-3, B61-4 and B61-10 
gravity bombs is about 500. Of this 500, 180-200 B61-3 and B61-4 warheads are 
deployed at six bases in five European countries: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, and Turkey. The remaining 300 B61 tactical bombs are stored in the 
continental U.S. for potential overseas deployment to support extended deterrence. 
(Besides the B61 bombs, around 260 W80-0 ALCM warheads (for the TLAM-N 
systems) were also part of the non-strategic nuclear arsenal of the U.S. but these 
weapons have been retired by the 2010 NPR.) (Kristensen [2012]: pp. 11-14.) 
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 The authors of the Nuclear Notebook received information that their 2009 estimates for deployed 
bomber weapons were too high, and the 2014 numbers seem to be closer to reality, which basically 
implies that no major changes were implemented between 2009 and 2014. (Interview with Hans M. 
Kristensen [2014]) 
DOI: 10.14267/phd.2015009
155 
 
In terms of future reductions, President Obama announced in his 2013 Berlin address 
that the administration finished the review of nuclear guidance, and according to the 
“Obama guidance,” the U.S. can safely cut the number of deployed strategic nuclear 
weapons by up-to a third. Accordingly, the administration pledged to seek negotiated 
cuts with Russia to further reduce the deployed strategic nuclear forces to 1,100-1,000 
(but the framework and form of these reductions is still not clarified). (Obama [2013b]) 
 
4.2 Nuclear Modernizations  
As most U.S. nuclear weapons systems were developed during the Cold War, they are 
coming close to the end of their service life. The U.S. is currently in the process of 
modernizing all of its strategic delivery systems and it is refurbishing its nuclear 
warheads so that they could continue their mission for at least 20-30 years into the 
future. This robust modernization program has essentially three legs: modernizing the 
strategic delivery systems, refurbishing nuclear warheads, and modernizing the nuclear 
weapons infrastructure. 
The first leg of the modernization program is directed at the delivery systems. 
According to the 2014 Nuclear Notebook, at the moment, the U.S. Air Force operates 
450 silo-based Minuteman III ICBMs, evenly split between the F.E. Warren AFB in 
Wyoming, the Minot AFB in North Dakota, and the Malmstrom AFB in Montana. Each 
wing is divided into three squadrons, with 50 missiles and five launch-control centers. 
Under the New START Treaty, the ICBM force will be reduced to 400 missiles, retiring 
one squadron at one of the three bases. These missiles traditionally carry either the 335-
kiloton W78 or the 300-kiloton W87 warheads. (Kristensen; Norris [2014b]: pp. 89-90.) 
As a result of the downloading process, since mid-2014 each ICBM carries a single 
warhead. The modernization program of the ICBM force will be completed in 2015 and 
it aims to extend the service life of the Minuteman III ICBMs to 2030 (the LEP of the 
ICBMs is already underway and it is estimated to cost $7 billion). The “new” missiles 
will have expanded target options, enhanced accuracy and survivability. In addition, 
options are weighed to sustain or replace the Minuteman III missiles after 2030 (the 
costs of developing the new missiles and rebuilding the warheads could reach $10 
billion over the next decade). (Collina [2014]) 
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The Navy currently operates 14 Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines (in general, 12 
subs are operational, while the 13
th
 and the 14
th
 are in overhaul at any given time). 
Although the Navy does not disclose the exact mission of these submarines, based on 
the Navy’s public list of SSBN homeports, it is believed to assign eight boats to the 
Pacific and six to the Atlantic. The submarines are based at Bangor, Washington (eight 
subs), and Kings Bay, Georgia (six subs). (U.S. Department of the Navy [2014] and 
Kristensen; Norris [2014b]: p. 90.) The service life of an Ohio-class submarine is 42 
years – two twenty year cycles and a two-year mid-life nuclear refueling. (Collina 
[2014])  
All of these SSBNs carry Trident II D5 SLBMs, although the data exchanges under the 
New START agreement suggest that normally only 10 or 11 boats are fully equipped 
with missiles, ready to fulfill their mission. At the moment, SSBNs carry 1,152 
warheads – each SLBM is usually equipped with three, four or five warheads (instead of 
the maximum eight). These warheads include the 100-kiloton W76-0, the 100-kiloton 
W76-1 (which is the refurbished version of the W76-0 with an added safety device), and 
the 455-kiloton W88. The number of deterrent patrols has been decreasing – while 
submarines executed 64 patrols in 1999, today each submarine conducts 2.5 patrols in 
average per year. Eight or nine of the operational submarines are at sea at any given 
time – four or five (two-three at the Pacific and one-two at the Atlantic) are at “hard 
alert” within the range of their targets, while the other three or four are in transit to or 
from their patrols, on a so called “modified alert.” (Kristensen; Norris [2014b]: pp. 90-
91.) Currently there are 24 missile tubes on each submarine, which will be reduced to 
20 launch tubes and altogether 240 SLBMs under the New START agreement. In the 
framework of the SSBN modernization program, twelve new replacement boats (called 
SSBNX) are planned, instead of the current fleet of 14 boats. The construction of the 
first new boat is scheduled to start in 2021, and it will be operational by 2031 (in the 
meanwhile, the “old” submarines are scheduled to retire between 2027 and 2040 at a 
rate of one boat per year). Beginning in 2017, the new submarines will be equipped with 
the life extended D5LE missiles, which have an upgraded guidance system for more 
flexibility and accuracy. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the lead boat 
would cost $13.3 billion, and each subsequent boat $7 billion, for a total cost of $85 
billion. In addition to this amount, research, development and evaluation of the SSBNX 
will cost another $10-15 billion, adding up to $100 billion total for the project. The 
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entire lifecycle cost of the next generation SSBNXs is estimated at $347 billion. 
(Collina [2014])  
The Air Force currently operates 20 B-2 and 93 B-52H bombers at three bases: the B-2 
Spirit bombers at Whiteman AFB in Missouri, and the B-52H bombers at Minot AFB, 
North Dakota, and at Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. Of this fleet, 20 B-2s and 78 B-52Hs 
are nuclear capable and approximately 60 bombers (16 B-2s and 44 B-52Hs) are 
assigned for nuclear missions. (Woolf [2014c] and Kristensen; Norris [2014b]: p. 91.) 
Under the New START agreement, the DoD will retain 19 B-2s and 41 B-52Hs as 
nuclear capable, and convert 30 B-52Hs to a conventional role only. (U.S. Department 
of Defense [2014]) The B-2s can carry up to 16 nuclear bombs (B61-7, B61-11 and 
B83-1), while the B-52Hs carry air-launched cruise missiles and no longer assigned to 
gravity bombs. According to estimates, approximately 1,000 nuclear weapons are 
assigned to the bombers (528 ALCMs, plus the gravity bombs), but most of these 
weapons are in central storage at Kirkland AFB, New Mexico; at Nellis AFB, Nevada; 
at Minot AFB, North Dakota; and at Whiteman AFB, Missouri. Since the bombers were 
taken off alert status, these weapons are no longer loaded on bombers under normal 
circumstances, but they can be deployed very quickly. (Kristensen; Norris [2014b]: p. 
91.) In the framework of the modernization programs, the B2s are scheduled to receive 
the new B61-12 precision guided nuclear bombs in the 2020s, and from the mid-2020s 
the replacement of the B-52s will start with a new long-range bomber (as the service life 
of the B-2s is expected to last until 2058, their replacement will only start decades later, 
but there will be upgrades to their survivability and mission effectiveness). According to 
the 2012 Aircraft Procurement Plan, 80-100 new bombers are planned, of which some 
will be nuclear-capable. The procurement of each unit is estimated to cost $550 million, 
with a total cost of $40-60 billion for the next generation bombers (including research 
and development). (U.S. Department of Defense [2011]: pp. 21-22.) The new long-
range bombers will also be equipped with the new B61-12 bombs and the new ALCM 
missiles, called Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO) missiles. At the moment, the LRSO 
warhead is delayed by 1-3 years to FY2025-2027, and the LRSO missile is delayed by 
three years. If the Pentagon decides to move forward with the LRSO program, the new 
cruise missiles are expected to enter into service around 2025, and it could cost $10-20 
billion in total. These missiles will probably be equipped with the life-extended W80-1 
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or the life-extended retired W-84 warheads. (Collina [2014] and Kristensen; Norris 
[2014b]: pp. 91-92.) 
The second leg of the modernization programs is the refurbishment of the nuclear 
weapons stockpile. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is 
responsible for the Life Extension Program (LEP) of the nuclear warheads and bombs. 
In this regard, the NNSA revealed its long-term “3+2” modernization program in the 
Fiscal Year 2014 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, submitted to Congress 
in June, 2013. (FY 2014 SSMP [2013]) According to the SSMP, the “3+2” is a long-
term strategic vision “to transition the composition of the stockpile to a total of five 
unique systems:  
 Three ballistic missile‐type warheads, each deployable on both Air Force and 
Navy delivery systems, employing three interoperable nuclear explosive 
packages with adaptable non‐nuclear components.  
 Two types of air‐delivered nuclear weapons, both deployable in a cruise missile 
and a bomb weapon system, employing interoperable nuclear explosive 
packages with adaptable non‐nuclear components.” (FY 2014 SSMP [2013]: p. 
1-2) 
In cooperation with the DoD, the LEP schedules will be aligned with the DoD delivery 
platform upgrades. As a consequence of the interoperable warheads (IW), the program 
objectives include a long term vision to reduce the total number of systems, as well as 
the amount of warheads in the technical hedge; to stay within the NNSA’s planned 
production capabilities and capacities; and finally to balance the workload in the nuclear 
security enterprise. (FY 2014 SSMP [2013]: p. 2-16) 
The current U.S. nuclear arsenal includes two types of ICBM warheads (the W78 and 
the W87), two types of SLBM warheads (the W88 and the W76), while there are three 
types of warheads for long-range bombers and fighter jets (the B61-3/4/7/10 bombs, the 
W80-1 ALCM warheads and the B83 bombs). In the framework of the “3+2” program, 
the current seven types would be reduced to five – three interoperable ballistic missile-
types and two air-delivered. In terms of implementation, this would mean that:  
 the first interoperable warhead (IW-1) will be the life extended W78/W88-1 
warhead (available for ICBMs and SLBMs), 
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 the second interoperable warhead (IW-2) will be the life extended W87/W88-1 
warhead (available for ICBMs and SLBMs),  
 the third interoperable warhead (IW-3) will be the life extended W76-1 warhead 
(available for ICBMs and SLBMs), 
 a cruise missile warhead (probably the life extended W80-1 or the W84) will be 
assigned to the ALCM missiles (and the future LRSOs), 
 and the new B61-12 precision-guided standoff bomb will be assigned to the B2s. 
 
Figure 5. The “3+2” Nuclear Modernization Program 
 
Source of figure: FY 2014 SSMP [2013]: p. 1-3. (modified by the author) 
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The NNSA claimed that the “3+2” would provide multiple advantages: 1) fewer 
warhead types, which would permit reductions in the hedge; 2) modified warheads with 
increased safety, use control, and performance margin; and 3) fewer warheads, which 
will be cheaper to maintain and deploy. (Kristensen [2014c]) But despite these 
promises, Congress had been skeptical about the proposal since the very beginning. As 
the Senate Appropriations Committee wrote it last year, the “3+2” vision “may be 
unnecessarily complex and expensive, increase uncertainty about certification [and] fail 
to address aging issues in a timely manner.” (Quoted in Arms Control Association 
[2014]) In addition, it is not guaranteed that interoperable warheads will provide a 
necessary level of confidence, as they are further from the tested designs; and it is also 
questionable that the IWs will not go against President Obama’s pledge to stop the 
development of new nuclear weapons. Besides, as lawmakers said, the “3+2” is 
complex and expensive (it is expected to cost $60 billion), which projects potential 
delays and cost overruns. (Kristensen [2014c]) As a result of these skeptical voices, key 
components of the “3+2” were delayed by the FY 2015 SSMP. While the NNSA 
expressed its additional support to the project, strict budget realities forced the agency to 
implement adjustments, and it decided to delay the production of the first interoperable 
warhead by five years to FY 2030. (FY 2015 SSMP [2014]: pp. iii-iv.) Altogether, 
despite the continued support of the NNSA, it still remains questionable if the “3+2” 
can survive in the current budget environment. 
Although the future of the overall “3+2” strategy might be in question, the key life 
extension programs seem to be on track. In January, 2014, the President requested full 
funding for the W76-1 and the B61-12 LEPs, which was essentially matched by the 
FY15 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of the House. The W76-1 LEP will 
be finished by 2019, while the initial production of the B61-12 and the W88 Alt 370 are 
scheduled for early 2020. (Harvey [2014]) 
The most controversial program of these life extensions is the B61-12. In the framework 
of the LEP of the B61 gravity bomb, the old versions of the bomb (B61-3/4/7/10/11)
96
 
will be replaced by the 12
th
 modification, which will be a low-yield, precision-guided 
nuclear weapon. The B61-12 will receive a guided tail kit to increase its accuracy, and it 
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 The currently deployed five versions of the B61 include the B61-3, -4, and -10 tactical bombs; the B61-
7 strategic bomb; and the B61-11 strategic earth-penetrating bomb. The Mod 3 and 4 versions are the 
tactical nuclear weapons, which are still deployed in Europe. (Kristensen; Norris [2014a]: p. 79, 82.) 
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will be able to strike targets more accurately, with a smaller yield, and with a reduced 
radioactive fallout from the attack. This modification would enable the current 50-
kiloton warhead from the B61-4 to hold at risk the same targets which are currently 
targeted by the higher yield B61-7. In the framework of the LEP program, the 
administration plans to retire three of the currently deployed versions of the B61, and 
convert the B61-4 into the B61-12, which would be able to serve on both strategic and 
tactical aircrafts. The Obama administration approved the development of the B61-12, 
which entered the engineering phase in 2013, and the first production unit is expected 
by 2020. (Kristensen; Norris [2014a]) 
Regarding the overall program, two fundamental issues are debated by members of 
Congress and the expert community as well: first, the record high price of the weapon, 
which makes the new B61-12 bombs more expensive than if they were made of solid 
gold – the NNSA’s estimated cost for the B61 LEP has doubled between 2010 and 2012 
from the initial $4 billion to $8 billion. A DoD Cost Assessment & Program Evaluation 
study projected $10.4 billion, in addition to which the guided tail kit assembly will cost 
$1.4 billion. As plans are about building 500 B61-12s, this will be the most expensive 
bomb project ever. (Kristensen [2014b]: p. 10.) The second concerning issue relates to 
the enhanced capabilities of the new modification, which raise concerns that the B61 
LEP might go against President Obama’s promises, and provide the Air Force with an 
essentially new weapon, which supports new missions. The increased accuracy and the 
standoff capability, deployed on the future F-35A fighters will definitely improve 
NATO’s nuclear posture (although the enhanced capabilities of the new B61-12 will not 
be so “visible” on the current F-16A/B and Tornado fighters, as the B61-12 tail kit will 
be locked on these systems).
97
 (Kristensen; Norris [2014a]) 
The third leg of the nuclear modernization programs is the nuclear weapons 
infrastructure – the NNSA continues “to work to deliver an infrastructure that supports 
our uranium, plutonium, non-nuclear, and high-explosive manufacturing capabilities.” 
(FY 2015 SSMP [2014]: p. 1-4.) In this regard, the NNSA has three flagship projects: 
the construction of a Uranium Processing Facility (UPF), a plutonium production 
facility, and a National Ignition Facility.  
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 The FY 2015 budget request of the Air Force indicates that the integration of the B61-12 on NATO F-
16 and Tornado aircrafts will start in 2015, and it will be completed in 2017 and 2018. In Europe, the Air 
Force also plans to equip all F-35s with nuclear capability by 2024. (Kristensen [2014a]) 
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The Uranium Processing Facility is in the preliminary design phase at Oak Ridge, 
Tennessee, and it would “provide capabilities for highly enriched uranium that are now 
performed in aging facilities to be replaced by FY 2025.” The construction of the UPF 
was proposed to support the “3+2” strategy and to satisfy military requirements. (FY 
2015 SSMP [2014]: p. 1-4.) When the construction of the UPF was mandated in 2011, 
the NNSA estimated that its overall cost would be between $4.2 billion to $6.5 billion. 
(Roth; Kristensen; Young [2011]) However, as a result of budget restrictions, for FY 
2014 the UPF received less funding ($309 million) than originally projected, and the 
entire concept is being rethought now. As the NNSA stated, the “FY 2015 SSMP is 
based on a lower spending profile for the Uranium Processing Facility that allows the 
project to continue but focuses on an initial phase to move crucial functions out of an 
aged building by FY 2025.” (FY 2015 SSMP [2014]: p. 1-4.)  
Regarding plutonium production, since the end of the Cold War U.S. plutonium pit 
production has been significantly reduced and the U.S. has made at most 11 pits per 
year. But in order to maintain existing weapons, the DoD stated that it needs the DoE to 
produce 50-80 pits per year by 2030.
98
 Therefore, the Obama administration proposed 
the construction of a Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility 
(CMRR-NF) at Los Alamos National Laboratory. In 2011, the NNSA estimated that the 
total costs of building the CMRR-NF would be between $3.7 billion and $5.8 billion. 
(Roth; Kristensen; Young [2011]) Although the project was mandated by Congress in 
the FY 2013 cycle, no funds were provided for its construction, and it was deferred for 
at least five years. The main argument for its delay was that the building of the UPF and 
the CMRR-NF, parallel to the B-61 LEP would be unaffordable, and there are available 
options on the table, which could perform the tasks of the CMRR-NF. (Medalia [2014]: 
p. ii., p. 31.) In its FY2015 request, the administration basically killed the CMRR-NF 
project but unlike in FY2014, it also delayed funding for the alternate plutonium 
strategy by an additional five years. This means that the originally projected interim 
capacity of 30 pits per year by 2021 was also delayed by five years, as well as the 50-80 
pits per year final capacity – which is now scheduled for FY2031. (Harvey [2014]) 
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 In this regard, the FY 2015 SSMP declared that the “NNSA is planning for a pit production capability 
of 30 pits per year by FY 2026 to better align with the planned life extension program activity and 
delivery system schedule, and will support the modular acquisition of additional capability to support 
production beyond the 30-pit-per-year level.” (FY 2015 SSMP [2014]: p. iv.) 
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The National Ignition Facility (NIF) is the third flagship project of the NNSA, which is 
crucial in the future maintenance of the nuclear weapons stockpile. NIF is located at the 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. The construction of 
the facility started in 1997, and it was certified by the DoE in March, 2009. Regarding 
its role in the maintenance of the nuclear weapons stockpile, the Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory (LLNL) claimed that “NIF experiments are an essential component 
of the nation’s stockpile assessment and certification strategy because NIF provides the 
only process for scientists to gain access to and examine thermonuclear burn. These 
experiments will also help the nation maintain the skills of nuclear weapon scientists, 
which is crucial in order to assess the age-related changes that could compromise 
weapon reliability.” (LLNL [2014]) 
 
4.3 Budget Debates and the Future of the Stockpile 
In the 2010 NPR, the administration pledged to maintain all three legs of triad, to 
maintain the capability to forward deploy tactical nuclear weapons, and to maintain a 
safe, secure, and reliable nuclear arsenal by an unprecedented $85 billion modernization 
package. The problem is that almost all of these systems are coming close to the end of 
their service life, and they need to be modernized in the next two decades. These 
programs will significantly increase the cost of nuclear forces in a budget environment 
where most defense programs are being cut.  
In order to see more clearly, the FY 2013 National Defense Authorization Act mandated 
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to estimate the cost of these nuclear 
modernization programs for the next ten years. According to CBO estimates, over the 
next decade the maintenance and the modernization of the U.S. nuclear enterprise will 
cost $355 billion, which is a significant increase compared to the Obama 
administration’s 2011 projection of $213 billion. (CBO [2013b]: p. 2.) Besides, experts 
of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies expect this amount to reach $1 
trillion over the next 30 years. (Wolfsthal; Lewis; Quint [2014]: p. 4.)  
The scale of these nuclear modernizations exceeds by far the Bush administration’s 
plans, and based on the budget allocations, it seems that nuclear modernizations enjoy a 
priority over conventional modernizations, which proves the administration’s 
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commitment to maintain a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear arsenal but at the same time 
it is also an interesting contradiction with several aspects of the Obama administration’s 
arms control agenda. 
Regarding the overall $355 billion dollar amount for 2014-2023, $136 billion is 
expected for strategic and tactical nuclear delivery systems; $105 billion for the nuclear 
weapons enterprise, and SSBN nuclear reactors; $56 billion for command, control, 
communications, and early-warning systems; and $59 for additional costs (which was 
estimated for the next decade based on historical cost growth). According to these 
numbers, the combined cost of delivery systems and nuclear weapons is $241 billion 
which will cover the maintenance of the currently deployed systems ($152 billion), as 
well as the replacement and development of the next generation of nuclear forces ($89 
billion). (CBO [2013b]: p. 2.) 
Looking at the annual cost of the nuclear enterprise, for FY 2014, the DoD and the DoE 
requested $23.1 billion for the nuclear delivery systems and the nuclear weapons – 
according to the CBO, $9.7 billion of this amount was requested for DoD’s strategic and 
tactical nuclear delivery systems; $8.3 for the DoE’s nuclear weapons activities, the 
supporting laboratories, and the nuclear reactors for ballistic missile submarines; while 
an additional $5.1 billion was requested for the command, control, communications, and 
early-warning systems. In addition to this $23.1 billion dollar, another $20.8 billion was 
projected for “other nuclear-related activities,” which include the budget for threat 
reduction and arms control, as well as costs for missile defense and other defenses. 
(CBO [2013b]: p. 2.) 
Regarding the different legs of the modernization programs, the most expensive 
package will be the maintenance and modernization of the delivery systems under the 
aegis of the DoD. A June, 2014 GAO study examined the DoD’s 2013 projections for 
the next ten years, divided into two five-year cycles. Although the report found that the 
DoD significantly underestimated the cost of nuclear delivery systems (as it did not 
include the cost of Air Force efforts to modernize the ICBM missiles, and the 
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development of new bombers), the DoD’s table still provides a detailed outline of the 
potential costs of the delivery systems.
99
 (GAO [2014]: p. 16.) 
 
Table 10. DoD’s 5-Year and 10-Year Nuclear Delivery System Sustainment and 
Modernization Estimates as of July 2013 (Dollars in billions) 
Delivery system FY 2014-2018 FY 2019-2023 Total 
Heavy bombers 
 B-2 and B-52 $12.9 $14.8 $27.7 
 New bomber 8.8 Not provided 8.8 
 
Cruise missiles 
 Air-launched cruise missile 0.3 0.4 0.7 
 Air-launched cruise missile 
replacement 1.0 1.7 2.7 
 
Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) 
 Minuteman III 7.3 6.8 14.1 
 Minuteman III replacement Not provided Not provided Not provided 
 
Dual-capable aircraft
a
 
 Dual-capable aircraft 1.6 1.1 2.7 
 
Fleet ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN) 
 Ohio-class submarine 7.0 7.4 14.4 
 Ohio-replacement submarineb 8.4 19.4 27.8 
 Submarine-launched ballistic 
missile (SLBM) (Trident II) 12.8 13.8 26.6 
 
Total $60.1 $65.4 $125.5
c
 
a. Dual-capable aircraft are fighter aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Currently the Air 
Force maintains F-15 and F-16 fighter aircraft capable of delivering specific versions of the B61 
nuclear bomb. 
b. Includes $0.8 billion through fiscal year 2018, and $1.2 billion total funding, from the National 
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) for nuclear reactor design. 
c. DOD published in the July 2013 joint report a 10-year estimate for strategic delivery systems of 
$116.7 billion. However, DOD did not include $8.8 billion for research and development for a new 
bomber as part of the 10-year estimate published in the report, even though it had included this 
amount as part of the $60.1 billion estimate through fiscal year 2018. 
 
Source of table: GAO [2014]: p. 16. 
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 The DoD estimates concluded that the total cost of sustaining and modernizing the nuclear delivery 
systems will be $125.5 billion. If the missing amounts for modernizing the ICBM missiles, and 
developing new bombers are included, the total cost gets very close to the estimates of the CBO report, 
which put this amount to $136 billion. 
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The second and third legs of the modernizations are the refurbishment of the nuclear 
warheads, and the development of the supporting facilities and infrastructure, under the 
DoE. In the CBO report, these costs were estimated as follows: (CBO [2013b]: p. 5.) 
 
Table 11. Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces (Dollars in billions) 
Nuclear weapons laboratories  
and supporting activities 
2014 2014-2023 
Stockpile services $0.9 $12 
Facilities and infrastructure $2.5 $30 
Other stewardship and support activities
a
 $3.1 $35 
Subtotal $6.5 $77 
a. Activities include scientific research and high-performance computing for improving understanding 
of nuclear explosions, security forces, and transportation of nuclear materials and weapons. This 
category also includes $400 million in 2014 and $4 billion over the 2014–2023 period for the Office 
of the Administrator at the National Nuclear Security Administration. 
 
Source of table: CBO [2013b]: p. 5. 
 
In addition to this $77 billion, the DoE was also projected to spend $28 billion on 
sustainment and modernization activities, unique to specific warheads: $25 billion for 
strategic warheads and nuclear reactors, as well as $3 billion for tactical warheads – this 
is how the already mentioned $105 billion adds up for overall DoE costs to maintain 
and modernize the nuclear weapons enterprise and SSBN nuclear reactors over the next 
decade. (CBO [2013b]: p. 5.) 
The biggest challenge of these modernization programs will be the strict budget 
environment. Since the Obama administration entered office, budget deficits have 
reached a record height and the federal debt held by the public has become equivalent to 
74 percent of the GDP, which is higher than any time before (except for a short period 
around the Second World War). In order to address these problems, serious restrictions 
and cuts were implemented, and the enormous defense spendings are high priority 
targets for these budget cuts. 
In this regard, the first milestone was President Obama’s April 2011 message to the 
DoD, in which he ordered to cut the defense budget by $400 billion over the next twelve 
years. (Brannen; Weisgerber [2011]) The announcement enjoyed wide support in both 
political parties and this “coercive-consent” on the necessity of deficit-reduction became 
the basis of the 2011 Budget Control Act (BCA) as well. On August 2, 2011 President 
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Obama signed the BCA into law which increased the debt limit by $400 billion 
immediately, provisioned immediate spending cuts and projected concrete savings of 
$917 billion over the next ten years. Besides these immediate cuts, the BCA ordered a 
$1.2-1.5 trillion deficit reduction plan which should be projected either by a new bill (to 
be passed by December 23, 2011), or by automatic spending cuts (sequestration). (BCA 
[2011]) White House officials estimated that the BCA would mean at least $350 billion 
in defense cuts over the next ten years. Although explicit defense programs were not 
mentioned in the bill, both the Pentagon and the NNSA were included in the text, 
suggesting that these restrictions would definitely hit the budget of the nuclear industry 
as well. 
In the framework of the $917 billion projected BCA cuts, $21 billion had to be realized 
already in FY 2012. To lay out a new bill for the $1.2-1.5 trillion reduction, the BCA 
established a 12-member Budget Super Committee of 6 Republican and 6 Democrat 
lawmakers. The committee had to specifically define these cuts and prepare a deficit 
reduction plan by November 23, 2011. The BCA declared that the committee should 
reach an agreement over at least $1.2 trillion and Congress must approve the plan by the 
end of December, otherwise automatic budget reductions will be enacted. These 
restrictions were supposed to implement the $1.2 trillion cut in a predetermined way, 
slicing $500 billion directly from the defense budget, starting from FY 2013.  
Although both the Pentagon and the White House wanted to avoid these automatisms, 
the committee could not come to an agreement in the given timeframe. As a result of the 
failure of the Budget Super Committee, the sequestration took effect on March 1, 2013 
with a mandatory budget cut of $1.2 trillion over the next ten years. For the DoD, this 
meant that between March 1 and September 30, 2013, the defense budget had to be cut 
by roughly $43 billion. For the entire 10-year period, the sequestration means around a 
$500 billion reduction in defense spending, which comes in addition to the more than 
$450 billion reduction, originally planned by the Pentagon for the next decade. (Reif 
[2011]) 
On the whole, these mandatory cuts have already forced the administration to 
reschedule some of its modernization programs, and as the already started life extension 
programs proceed, cost overruns will definitely have a negative effect on the next round 
of modernizations, some of which might fall victim to these strict budget realities. So 
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far, the B61 LEP seems to survive the sequestration, it has been funded by Congress, 
but the “3+2” and the CMRR-NF have already been delayed, and the construction of the 
UPF also runs on a smaller funding than anticipated. 
 
4.4 Evaluation 
Looking at the concept of Cold War nuclear thinking, the first characteristic was the 
high number of nuclear weapons, with multiple warheads on the delivery systems. In 
this regard, there have been significant changes since the Cold War – both Bush 
administrations halved the U.S. nuclear forces (the George W. H. Bush administration 
from 22,000 to 11,000 and then the George W. Bush administration from 10,000 to 
5,000). In the meanwhile, the Clinton and the Obama administrations implemented only 
moderate changes – between 2009 and 2014, the Obama administration reduced its 
stockpile by only 309 nuclear warheads. Therefore, the overall force levels have been 
significantly reduced since the Cold War times, but it was not primarily realized by the 
Obama administration; and despite the reductions of the Republican administrations, the 
remaining military stockpile of 4,804 nuclear warheads is still high compared to the 
nuclear capabilities of other states. Today, the U.S. and Russia still possess 89 percent 
of the globally deployed nuclear forces, and 94 percent of the total nuclear weapons 
inventories of the world. (SIPRI [2014])  
Regarding the number of warheads on the delivery systems, the reliance on MIRV-ed 
ICBMs and SLBMs has also been reduced since the Cold War. President Obama 
continued the efforts of the Clinton and the Bush administrations to download the 
ICBM and SLBM forces. By mid-2014, all ICBMs have been “de-MIRV”-ed to a single 
warhead configuration, and the SLBMs have also been downloaded to carry three, four 
or five nuclear warheads, instead of the maximum eight. However, despite these shifts, 
MIRVs will continue to have an important strategic role in the future stockpile of the 
U.S. – under the New START Treaty and the projected next generation SSBN force as 
well, SLBMs will remain loaded with multiple warheads; and a “re-MIRV”-ing 
capability is also maintained for the ICBMs. 
Regarding the delivery systems, the administration pledged to maintain all three legs of 
the nuclear triad under the New START Treaty. In terms of numbers, by 2018 the 
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deployed ICBMs will be cut from 450 to 400, the number of SLBMs will be cut from 
336 to 240, and the number of bombers will be cut from 96 to 60. Looking at the post-
2018 period, the service life of the Minuteman III ICBMs is being extended until 2030, 
and the Air Force is in the process of examining the options to replace these missiles 
after 2030. In the case of the submarine fleet, the Navy committed to retire the current 
fourteen submarines between 2027 and 2040, and replace them with twelve new 
SSBNX replacement subs, starting from 2031. Regarding the bombers, the replacement 
of the current B-52s will start in the mid-2020s, while the B-2s will only go through 
upgrades to their survivability and mission effectiveness, as their service life is expected 
to last until 2058. Altogether, the Obama administration maintained the commitment to 
the nuclear triad, and the transformation from a triad to a dyad seems to be unlikely as 
long as the life extended Minuteman IIIs remain in the stockpile.  
The next parameter of Cold War Nuclear Thinking is the great diversity of nuclear 
weapons. Since 1945 the U.S. has developed and deployed altogether 66,500 nuclear 
bombs and warheads of 100 types and modifications (the air force has adopted 52 types, 
the navy 35, the army 26, and the marines 15 – some designs were adopted by two or 
even three services) with yields from 100 tons to 25 megatons. The peak year was 1967, 
when the U.S. reached 32,000 warheads of 33 types and modifications. (Kristensen; 
Norris [2009b]) In comparison to these numbers, the diversity has been significantly 
reduced but the current stockpile of seven types of warheads still includes multiple 
options for each delivery systems – two types of ICBM warheads (the W78 and the 
W87), two types of SLBM warheads (the W88 and the W76), and three types for long-
range bombers and fighter jets (the B61-3/4/7/10 bombs, the W80-1 ALCM warheads 
and the B83 bombs). The Obama administration intends to maintain this diversity under 
the “3+2” strategy as well. Despite the reduction from seven types to five types, three 
interoperable warheads are planned for ICBMs and SLBMs, and two types for long-
range bombers and fighter jets (the LRSO cruise missile warheads and the B61-12 
precision-guided standoff bombs). 
In terms of maintaining and developing the nuclear stockpile, nuclear weapons testing 
was a central element of the Cold War strategy. This practice, however, was abandoned 
by the Bush administration in 1992, and a new approach was initiated by President 
Clinton in 1995 to assess the aging nuclear arsenal. The Stockpile Stewardship Program 
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aims to maintain the safety, security and effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent without 
the necessity of continued reliance on nuclear weapons testing. The SSP proved to be 
successful so far, and a 2009 study from the JASON independent scientific advisory 
group concluded that “in the absence of underground nuclear testing,” the “lifetimes of 
today’s nuclear warheads could be extended for decades, with no anticipated loss in 
confidence, by using approaches similar to those employed in LEPs to date.” (JASON 
[2009]: p. 2.) As a result of these technical developments, both the George W. Bush 
administration and the Obama administration pledged to maintain the testing 
moratorium and the reliance on the Stockpile Stewardship Program. 
Partly as a result of abandoning nuclear weapons testing, the Clinton administration 
announced the concept of a constant reserve force in its 1994 NPR to hedge against the 
technical failures of a warhead type, and also to address the dramatic changes of the 
security environment. The Bush administration broadened the concept and introduced 
the so called responsive force which included a constant reserve force, as well as a 
responsive infrastructure. The Obama administration reinforced the importance of the 
development of the nuclear weapons infrastructure, and seems to maintain the reliance 
on a constant reserve force, although it envisioned a nuclear modernization program 
which would allow cutting the hedge in half.  
Regarding the forward deployment of nuclear weapons, the end of the Cold War 
brought some significant changes. According to issue experts, “Between 1945 and 1977, 
the United States based thousands of nuclear weapons abroad. The weapons’ hosts did 
not always know they were there.” (Norris; Arkin; Burr [1999]) Since then, the locations 
of nine places have been declassified by the DoD (these include Alaska, Cuba, Guam, 
Hawaii, Johnston Island, Midway, Puerto Rico, Britain, and West Germany), while 
another eighteen locations were blacked out. In certain cases, the withdrawal of these 
weapons was already completed in the 1960s (e.g. Alaska and Okinawa in 1967), and 
by the early 1990s only seven European NATO members remained with these weapons 
on their territory (Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, and the 
United Kingdom). (Norris; Arkin; Burr [1999]) Both the Clinton and the Bush 
administrations reinforced the importance of forward deployment in the territory of 
European allies, although the Bush administration significantly reduced the number of 
forward deployed weapons, and it completely withdrew the tactical nuclear weapons of 
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the U.S. from Greece and the United Kingdom. In the 2010 NPR, the Obama 
administration declared that “a small number of U.S. nuclear weapons remain” in 
Europe. “Although the risk of nuclear attack against NATO members is at an historic 
low, the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons […] contribute to Alliance cohesion and 
provide reassurance to allies and partners who feel exposed to regional threats.” (NPR 
[2010a]: p. xii.) Despite the maintained capability, it means a significant difference that 
during the Cold War, the forward deployment of tactical nuclear weapons was about 
deterring the Eastern Block and preparing for a theater nuclear exchange in Europe, 
while today it is more about reassuring allies.  
Altogether, force planning under the Obama administration is different from the Bush 
posture as it prefers bilateral cuts instead of unilateral reductions; it favors addressing 
arms control issues in a treaty framework; and it seeks the ratification of the CTBT. In 
this regard, the most genuine effect of the 2010 NPR is the transformation of the force 
structure. The Navy completely got out of the business of tactical nuclear weapons, and 
ICBMs were “de-MIRV”-ed. These changes, however, did not go together with 
dramatic reductions. As the Bush guidance remained in force until mid-2013, what the 
Obama administration envisioned for its force structure under the New START Treaty 
was basically a moderate
100
 implementation of the Bush numbers. The next round of 
reductions, which was projected under the new Obama guidance (PPD-24), was 
announced in June, 2013 in Berlin, but looking at the current status of U.S.-Russian 
relations and the (lack of) willingness of Congress to approve any further cuts in the 
stockpile, the feasibility of these reductions is highly questionable.  
In general terms, the primary drivers of the Obama administration’s force structure are: 
1) strengthening the deterrence of potential regional adversaries, maintaining strategic 
stability vis-à-vis Russia and China, and continued assurance of the allies; 2) the 
implementation of the Stockpile Stewardship Program, and the investments in the 
nuclear weapons infrastructure; 3) and finally, the level of Russian nuclear forces. 
Although Washington has made it clear that strategic stability from a U.S. perspective is 
no longer dependent on strategic parity,
101
 U.S. force planning still seems to reflect a 
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 The New START Treaty limits of 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear weapons were moderate even for 
the Bush guidance (the NSPD-14 from 2002), as the JCS were reported to consider reductions to 1,300 
already under the 2002 presidential guidance. (Grossman [2013]) 
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 As the 2010 NPR stated, “the need for strict numerical parity between the two countries is no longer 
as compelling as it was during the Cold War.” (NPR [2010a]: p. xi.) 
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continued reliance on parallel reductions with Moscow, and the level of Russian nuclear 
forces still seems to determine U.S. forces as well. 
In addition to these factors, budget realities will play an increased role in the future of 
the stockpile – just to mention one example, the projected reductions in the hedge 
totally depend on the implementation of the “3+2” strategy (thus, in certain cases there 
is a causal connection between the nuclear modernization programs and the future of 
reductions). 
 
Table 12. Force Structure: Cold War vs. Obama 
Cold War Nuclear Thinking Change Obama Posture 
 high number of nuclear weapons 
and deliveries + multiple 
warheads on the delivery 
systems (MIRVs) 
≈ 
 significant reductions since the 
Cold War (moderate reductions 
under Obama) but still high 
number of warheads and 
deliveries + MIRVs are still 
maintained (although ICBMs 
have been “de-MIRV”-ed) 
 nuclear triad NO 
 continued commitment to the 
nuclear triad (under the New 
START Treaty) 
 great diversity of nuclear 
weapons ≈ 
 reduced diversity of nuclear 
weapons but still multiple types 
for all three legs of the triad 
(even under the “3+2” strategy), 
which includes strategic and 
tactical capabilities as well  
 nuclear weapons testing YES 
 since 1992: testing moratorium, 
and using the stockpile 
stewardship program instead 
 no systematic hedging policy YES  since 1994: a constant reserve 
(hedge) force 
 forward deployment of nuclear 
weapons ≈ 
 continued commitment to 
forward deployment in Europe 
(but nuclear weapons were 
withdrawn from other countries) 
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5. Operational Level 
5.1 Operational Level under the Clinton and Bush Administrations 
The revisions of nuclear war planning against the Soviet Block already started in the 
late 1980s. In September, 1992 General Butler, head of SAC claimed that “As early as 
October 1989 [before the Soviet Union had broken up] we abandoned global war with 
the Soviet Union as the principle planning and programming paradigm for the U.S. 
armed forces.” (Quoted in Kristensen [2003]: p. 6.) The end of the Cold War gave a big 
push to these transformations, and the George W. H. Bush administration implemented 
several significant changes in U.S. nuclear policy, both in terms of numbers and in 
terms of planning. Parallel to the most dramatic force reductions in U.S. history, all 
strategic bombers were taken off day-to-day alert; ICBMs and SLBMs were detargeted 
to mitigate the risks coming from the unlikely event of an unauthorized or accidental 
launch; more SSBNs were conducted to patrol on “modified alert,” instead of “alert;”102 
naval non-strategic nuclear weapons were no longer routinely deployed at sea; and 
airborne command and control operations were reduced. (NPR [1994]: p. 10.) In 
addition, the DoD and the JCS initiated the most comprehensive targeting review 
process ever, which eliminated thousands of obsolete targets in the Warsaw Pact 
countries and the post-Soviet region. In terms of target categories, tactical nuclear 
installations and transportation lines out of Russia were eliminated from the target lists; 
and less emphasis was put on leadership targets, and on industrial and war-supporting 
infrastructure. 
Despite the significant changes in the number of targets, the Clinton administration 
inherited almost the same conservative targeting criteria, which was used during the 
Cold War. It allowed loose interpretation of the different target categories – the role of 
war-supporting industry was, for example, deemphasized but it still remained a priority 
                                                 
102
 In general, the two most important differences between a (hard) “alert” and a” modified alert” status 
are: “U.S. submarines on modified alert have not reached their assigned launch stations and their 
weapons systems are technically unprepared for launch.” (Shultz; Andreasen; Drell; Goodby [2008]: p. 
79.) This means that submarines on modified alert are in transit between their home port and their on-
station alert areas, and the crew needs to perform specific procedures – such as installing code devices, or 
so called electronic “inverters” on the launch tubes – in order to reach launch readiness. After leaving 
home port, installing these devices takes about eighteen hours. (Feiveson [1999]: p. 116.) Besides, 
submarines on modified alert only periodically listen for messages which are transmitted from the shore. 
Submarines on (hard) alert, in contrast, are always on their assigned launch stations; in case of a launch 
order, they are ready to launch their missiles within fifteen minutes; and they constantly listen for low-
frequency radio signs from the shore. (Shultz; Andreasen; Drell; Goodby [2008]: p. 79.) 
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category. The primary focus on the adversary’s (especially Russia’s) nuclear forces also 
remained, as both the Bush and the Clinton administrations felt that holding at risk the 
other side’s nuclear forces had a strong deterrent value, while threatening major cities 
was not credible, and targeting civilians would also be immoral. (Nolan [1999]: p. 44-
49.)  
Besides these “traditional” targets, it was a new development that in a Congressional 
testimony in June, 1990 Defense Secretary Dick Cheney claimed, for the first time, that 
maintaining U.S. nuclear weapons was partly due to WMD proliferators. Targeting 
these proliferators was a relatively new concept in the SIOP, and it projected a future 
shift in attention to more limited but also more widespread targeting against the so 
called “rogue states,” like for example Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea or Syria. 
(Kristensen [2003]: p. 6.) Although the Bush administration tried to codify these 
changes in a presidential guidance document, but they ran out of time and the Reagan 
administration’s 1981 NSDD-13 document remained in force until the second half of 
the 1990s. Despite the prolonged reliance on the old guidance, institutional and 
procedural changes on the operational level made it possible that the new focus on 
regional scenarios was already channeled in the target plans and capabilities by the time 
the Clinton administration issued its own presidential guidance document. 
From a procedural perspective, the end of the Cold War and the new challenges of the 
international system gave a big push to the transformation of U.S. war planning 
capabilities. Since the late 1980s, SAC was running a continuous effort to become more 
responsive to the changes of the security environment – the SIOP was restructured, 
more flexible targeting capabilities were invented to rapidly reevaluate targeting 
criteria, and to reduce the necessary time to adjust war plans. (Nolan [1999]: p. 28.) 
In 1991, General Butler was appointed head of SAC (replaced by STRATCOM in 1992) 
and he initiated several efforts to revise planning assumptions and procedures. One of 
these initiatives was the establishment of a Strategic Planning Study Group (SPSG) in 
December, 1992 to develop a new global planning process, the Strategic War Planning 
System (SWPS). In the framework of these efforts, “adaptive targeting” was introduced 
to provide the military planners with rapid and flexible retargeting capabilities, which 
were more appropriate to address the unforeseen contingencies of the post-Cold War 
security environment. These changes required “continuous analysis of guidance, forces, 
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and target changes,” and they apparently led to a dramatic decrease in the time required 
to update and develop the next SIOP. (Quoted in Nolan [1999]: p. 31.) The new SIOP, 
or as they called it, the “living SIOP” was a real-time war plan, which was able to 
transform the incoming commands into specific attack options in a very short amount of 
time. These changes in retargeting made it possible that new regional threats could be 
rapidly added to the existing preplanned scenarios – according to William Arkin, a 
“wholesale revision of an attack plan for a new enemy will be possible in a matter of 
months.” (Arkin [1994]) The new regional contingencies, or the so called rogue states 
were mostly covered by the strategic reserve forces through limited and selected attack 
options. These attack options were developed based on information from the newly 
established Intelligence Center, which was tasked to provide threat assessments for 
STRATCOM on the global WMD proliferation trends. (Kristensen [2003]: p. 10.) 
When the Clinton administration came into office in January, 1993, the JCS and 
STRATCOM continued their efforts to extend the scope of planning from the previous 
Soviet Block to a global scale; and to include more limited and flexible options against 
regional scenarios, involving WMD. As General Butler summarized in 1993, “Adaptive 
planning challenges the headquarters to formulate plans very quickly in response to 
spontaneous threats which are more likely to emerge in a new international 
environment unconstrained by the Super Power stand-off. We can accomplish this task 
by using generic targets, rather than identifying specific scenarios and specific enemies, 
and then crafting a variety of response options to address these threats. To ensure their 
completeness, these options consider the employment of both nuclear and conventional 
weapons. Thus, by its very nature, adaptive planning offers unique solutions, tailored to 
generic regional dangers involving weapons of mass destruction.” (Quoted in 
Kristensen; Handler [1996]: p. 390.) In April, 1993 the Joint Chiefs explicitly stated that 
U.S. nuclear strategy was expanded to counter all WMD. The Doctrine for Joint Nuclear 
Operations (Joint Pub 3-12) claimed that “the fundamental purpose of US nuclear 
forces is to deter the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), particularly nuclear 
weapons, and to serve as a hedge against the emergence of an overwhelming 
conventional threat.” (JCS [1993]: p. I-1.) 
As the fall of the Soviet Union did not only change the strategic calculations of the U.S. 
but it also erased the most important source of threat for Washington’s European allies, 
DOI: 10.14267/phd.2015009
176 
 
the focus on WMD proliferation, and the term “adaptive planning” were adopted by 
NATO as well. 
On the operational level, the shifting priorities towards countering regional WMD 
scenarios led to the introduction of the Strategic Installation List of Vulnerability 
Effects and Results, or the so called “SILVER Books.” These books were regional 
target plans, developed by STRATCOM to aid civilian leadership and theater CINCs in 
planning against WMD proliferators. Each regional command was to receive its own 
Silver Book, which contained “the planning associated with a series of ‘silver bullet’ 
missions aimed at counterproliferation.” (Quoted in Kristensen [2003]: p. 17.) The 
designated targets in these books included nuclear, chemical, biological and C3 
installations. As the nuclear (weapons) capabilities of these rogue states were very 
limited (in the early 1990s none of them possessed nuclear weapons, and only a few had 
an active nuclear weapons program), the primary focus was on fixed chemical and 
biological installations and buried targets.
103
 The first Silver Book was developed for 
the European Command by late 1994 (and a prototype was developed for the Pacific 
Command). STRATCOM hoped that these books would provide them with a stronger 
role in counterproliferation efforts, but the regional commands did not approve 
STRATCOM’s take-over. In a 1995 Counterproliferation Mission and Function Study, 
the JCS concluded that CINCs would remain responsible for regional target planning 
and execution, but STRATCOM would assist them. This meant that the Silver Book 
project was officially ended but some of its elements remained to guarantee a better 
cooperation between STRATCOM and the CINCs. (Kristensen [2003]: p. 17-18.) 
The increased focus on these theater missions, put pressure on the force structure as 
well. The first important consequence was the requirement to develop low-yield 
precision-guided weapons for possible use in regional contingencies. The other 
concerning issue was the necessary number of weapons to cover both the traditional 
target categories and the new theater missions. As the Clinton administration was 
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 Although the Silver Book project was abandoned in 1995, planning for the theater use of nuclear 
weapons remained a priority. In February, 1996 the JCS issued a doctrine for non-strategic nuclear 
employment in regional scenarios, the Doctrine for Joint Theater Nuclear Operations (Joint Pub 3-12.1). 
In the document, the following targets were included as potential targets for a nuclear attack: WMD and 
their delivery systems, as well as associated command and control, production, and logistical support 
units; ground combat units and their associated command and control and support units; air defense 
facilities and support installations; naval installations, combat vessels, and associated support facilities 
and command and control capabilities; non-state actors (facilities and operation centers) that possess 
WMD; and underground facilities. (JCS [1996]: pp. III-6-7.)  
DOI: 10.14267/phd.2015009
177 
 
devoted to implement and continue the arms control efforts of the Bush administration, 
preparations were taken to further reduce U.S. nuclear forces, which started to upset 
STRATCOM. Under the lowered numbers, STRATCOM was worried that the United 
States might no longer be able to hold at risk the traditional targets in Russia, as well as 
the new targets in a number of rogue states. Thus, deeper cuts became dependent on 
revising the presidential employment guidance, and on abandoning certain targets in 
Russia. (Kristensen [2003]: p. 20-21.) 
As a result of the pressure from STRATCOM, the Clinton administration issued a new 
presidential guidance document, the PDD-60 in November, 1997. According to Robert 
G. Bell, senior Director for Defense Policy at the NSC, the new guidance “recognizes 
that we’re at the end of the Cold War and that nuclear weapons now play a smaller role 
in our nuclear strategy than at any point during the nuclear era.”  He also stated that 
“the PDD removes from presidential guidance all previous references to being able to 
wage a nuclear war successfully or to prevail in a nuclear war… The emphasis in this 
PDD is therefore on deterring nuclear wars or the use of nuclear weapons at any level, 
not fighting [with] them.” (Quoted in Kunsman; Lawson [2001]: p. 67.) By abandoning 
the planning for a protracted nuclear war with Russia, several target categories could be 
removed from the war plans – these included a major part of Russian conventional 
forces and war-making industry. Although these changes meant an important departure 
from the Reagan administration’s guidance, to some extent, PDD-60 only caught up 
with reality and codified what STRATCOM was already doing for years. 
Besides putting an end to planning for President Reagan’s prevailing strategy, the new 
guidance implemented another significant change in the potential target categories. 
During the 1994 NPR process, STRATCOM and the JCS already tried to put China 
back in the SIOP but they failed to implement it.
104
 (Kristensen [2004]: p. 23.) In the 
partially declassified 1994 Sun City Extended Study, STRATCOM identified two 
potential adversarial scenarios between the U.S. and China: 1) a crisis (on the Korean 
Peninsula), involving the U.S., North Korea and China; and 2) a direct confrontation 
between the continental U.S. (CONUS) and China. Under the first scenario, 
STRATCOM proposed a “not a full scale attack against China” with DPF (Deliberate 
Planning Force), NSNF (Non-Strategic Nuclear Force), or conventional air-
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 As already mentioned before, China was taken out of the SIOP in 1982, as a result of the Nixon 
administration’s appeasement with Beijing in the 1970s.  
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launched/sea-launched cruise missiles. In the meanwhile, the second scenario implied 
“a need for a major-attack response plan” which was probably meant to justify the 
arguments for putting China back in the SIOP. (USSTRATCOM [1994]: p. 39.) After 
the 1996 Taiwan crisis, PDD-60 finally broadened targeting against China, and 
according to the unclassified minutes of a Strategic Nuclear Action Group conference, 
China was put back in the SIOP, and a Chinese Integrated Strategic Operations Plan 
(CHISOP) was created by 2000. (Kristensen [2004]: p. 23.)  
When President George W. Bush took office in January, 2001, the main goal was to 
reevaluate U.S. nuclear strategy in a way that would reduce reliance on offensive 
nuclear forces, in exchange for an increased reliance on defensive capabilities and 
conventional forces. The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the U.S., however, put their stamp on 
the review process, and rogue states with WMD capabilities featured prominently in the 
2001 Nuclear Posture Review. Accordingly, the role of nuclear weapons was expanded 
to deter not only the use (and development) of nuclear but other types of weapons of 
mass destruction as well. The NPR, in addition, called for the massive modernization of 
U.S. nuclear forces, delivery vehicles, command and control systems, satellites, and the 
nuclear weapons infrastructure, in order to be able to address these more limited 
regional contingencies. As the NPR stated, “The current nuclear planning system, 
including target identification, weapons systems assignment, and the nuclear command 
and control systems requirements, is optimized to support large, deliberately planned 
nuclear strikes. In the future, as the nation moves beyond the concept of a large, Single 
Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) and moves toward more flexibility, adaptive 
planning will play a much larger role.” (NPR [2002b]: p. 9.) 
In relation to the expanded role of nuclear weapons, the 2001 NPR put the WMD 
proliferator states on the list of most likely crisis scenarios, according to which the U.S. 
should formulate its nuclear war plans, and according to which the U.S. should size its 
nuclear arsenal (in addition to Russia and China, the 2001 NPR specifically named five 
potential adversaries against which the U.S. anticipated the use of nuclear weapons: 
Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea and Syria). The new focus on WMD proliferators meant 
that an increased role was attached to low-yield and earth-penetrating nuclear weapons, 
which were designed to destroy underground facilities and forces. In the public version 
of the 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Bush 
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administration stated that it “reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force – 
including through resort to all of our options – to the use of WMD against the United 
States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies.” (National Strategy to Combat 
Weapons of Mass Destruction [2002]: p. 3.) According to the Washington Times, the 
classified version of the strategy (the September, 2002 NSPD-17) specifies the meaning 
of “all of our options” and uses the term “potentially nuclear weapons” instead. This 
meant that military planners were given a more specific instruction to prepare nuclear 
attack options against these regional scenarios. (Kralev [2003]) 
After the 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Bush 
administration approved a number of guidance documents which were meant to codify 
the increased attention on WMD proliferators, and adjust U.S. nuclear weapons policy 
to these new threats. (Kristensen [2005a]: p. 16.) The unclassified version of NSPD-17 
was followed by the National Policy on Ballistic Missile Defense in December, 2002; 
the Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Plan in March, 2003; the National Military 
Strategy of the United States in March, 2004; the DoD’s Nuclear Weapons Employment 
Policy in April, 2004; the Fiscal Year 2004-2012 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan in 
May, 2004; the Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization in May, 2004; a new 
nuclear supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan for FY 2005 in December, 
2004; and finally, the Joint Chiefs’ March, 2005 Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations. 
(JCS [2005]) According to issue expert Hans M. Kristensen, the Bush nuclear doctrine 
is different from Clinton’s 1995 Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations in three aspects: 
the threshold for nuclear use, the relevance of international law with regards to 
targeting, and the role of conventional forces and missile defense. (Kristensen [2005a])  
Regarding the issue of nuclear use, the new doctrine included some indications that the 
bar had been lowered for the employment of nuclear weapons. With the developments 
in adaptive planning, the transformation of the war plans had become much faster, 
providing the U.S. with the capability to rapidly respond with nuclear weapons 
anywhere in the world. The new doctrine differentiated three main planning scenarios: 
Deliberate Planning, Crisis Action Planning, and Adaptive Planning. While Deliberate 
Planning “is a highly structured process that engages commanders and staffs of the 
entire joint planning and execution community,” Crisis Action Planning is the “time-
sensitive development of joint operation plans and orders in response to an imminent 
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crisis […] it is distinct from adaptive planning in that emerging targets are likely to 
have no preexisting plans that could be adapted. Success in engaging these types of 
targets depends heavily upon the speed with which they are identified, targeted, and 
attacked.” (JCS [2005]: p. II-6.) And finally, adaptive planning was identified as a 
subset of crisis action planning, which is based on changing an existing deliberate plan 
according to national security needs. The first indicator of a lowered bar is the increased 
need for rapid response, which implied that the new threats of the 21
st
 century (which 
are most likely regional threats, unable to threaten the existence of the U.S.) actually 
qualify for the same responses as the potential Cold War scenarios, and the U.S. needs 
to plan against them with nuclear weapons. The fact that the new doctrine replaced the 
word “war” with “conflict” seems to justify these fears about the potential use of 
nuclear weapons in lower-intensity crises. (Kristensen [2005a]: p. 15.) 
In this regard, the second indicator of the increased likelihood of nuclear weapons 
employment was the strengthened reliance on preemption. Unlike the previous JCS 
document, the Bush doctrine specifically identified several potential scenarios for the 
preemptive use of nuclear weapons, and embraced this policy into official U.S. nuclear 
doctrine.
105
 
The last indicator was that the 2005 document included an additional chapter on the 
theater uses of nuclear weapons where it did not separate strategic and non-strategic 
nuclear weapons. In previous guidance documents, theater missions were traditionally 
considered an arena for non-strategic nuclear weapons, applied in limited form to 
control the conflict and prevent escalation. The new doctrine, in contrast, assigned both 
strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons to these missions, blurring the line between 
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 The scenarios for the preemptive use of nuclear weapons were the following:  
a) “An adversary using or intending to use WMD against US, multinational, or alliance forces or 
civilian populations. 
b) Imminent attack from adversary biological weapons that only effects from nuclear weapons can 
safely destroy. 
c) Attacks on adversary installations including WMD, deep, hardened bunkers containing chemical 
or biological weapons or the C2 infrastructure required for the adversary to execute a WMD 
attack against the United States or its friends and allies. 
d) To counter potentially overwhelming adversary conventional forces, including mobile and area 
targets (troop concentration). 
e) For rapid and favorable war termination on US terms. 
f) To ensure success of US and multinational operations. 
g) To demonstrate US intent and capability to use nuclear weapons to deter adversary use of 
WMD. 
h) To respond to adversary-supplied WMD use by surrogates against US and multinational forces 
or civilian populations.” (JCS [2005]: p. III-2.) 
DOI: 10.14267/phd.2015009
181 
 
these capabilities and bringing down strategic nuclear weapons to the level of lower 
intensity regional crises. (Kristensen [2005a]: p. 17.) 
On the issue of nuclear targeting and international law, the new doctrine also raised 
some important concerns. Although the target selection factors
106
 included proximity to 
populated areas, and potential for collateral damage, the expansion of targeting to 
regional scenarios and non-nuclear facilities definitely increased the pool of the so 
called “counter-value” targets in the war plans, which STRATCOM itself designated as 
a violation of the Law of Armed Conflict. (Kristensen [2005a]: p. 19.) Besides, the 
lowered bar for the employment of nuclear weapons, and the various scenarios for their 
preemptive use also seemed to go against these norms. In addition, the 1996 advisory 
opinion of the International Court of Justice on the ‘Legality of the Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons’ stated unanimously that “There is in neither customary nor 
conventional international law any specific authorization of the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons” (ICJ [1996]) – a norm, which seemed to be repeatedly ignored by the Bush 
administration’s rhetoric when it tried to deter rogue states with the explicit threat of the 
(preemptive) use of nuclear weapons. 
The third major difference between the Clinton and the Bush administration’s 
operational doctrine was the role of conventional weapons and missile defense. The 
integration of conventional weapons and missile defense was a completely new element 
in strategic planning. Although the idea itself had the potential to reduce reliance on 
nuclear weapons but the new doctrine still implied that these capabilities rather 
complemented and not substituted nuclear forces. Besides, it also became apparent that 
conventional capabilities had to develop a lot in order to take over the role of nuclear 
weapons, and merging these two capabilities had its own dangers due to the different 
line of command in conventional and nuclear strikes, and due to the potential 
misperceptions of the adversaries on employing conventional warheads on strategic 
delivery systems. 
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 The Bush doctrine listed the following target selection factors: “time sensitivity; hardness (ability to 
withstand conventional strikes); size of target; surrounding geology and depth (for underground targets); 
required level of damage; defenses; mobility; proximity to populated areas; and finally potential for 
collateral damage.” (JCS [2005]: p. II-7-8.) Based on these factors, the following target categories were 
designated: “WMD, associated delivery systems, C2, production, and logistic support units; ground 
combat units, associated C2, and support units; air defense facilities and support installations; naval 
installations, combat vessels, associated support facilities, and C2 capabilities; nonstate actors (their 
facilities and operation centers that possess WMD); nuclear storage, nonnuclear storage, and hardened 
ICBM launch facilities; and political and military C2.” (JCS [2005]: p. II-8.) 
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Parallel to the development of the new operational doctrine for nuclear weapons, the 
Bush administration implemented several innovations to better reflect the increased 
attention on regional aggressors and their terrorist clients, as well as to better adjust the 
war plans to these changes in the threat environment. In March, 2003, STRATCOM 
Commander Admiral James Ellis sent a message to the JCS that the term “SIOP” no 
longer properly described the post-Cold War war plans – these plans had been 
transformed from a single integrated plan into a family of plans, covering a much larger 
range of scenarios. Ellis suggested turning SIOP into an Operations Plan (OPLAN) to 
stand along with the other war plans. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Richard 
Myers agreed with these arguments, STRATCOM was authorized in February, 2003 to 
change the name of SIOP to OPLAN to better reflect that in essence it covered a family 
of plans. (Kristensen [2007]: p. 378.) 
Only three years after 9/11, the Bush administration implemented its next big 
innovation, a new operational strategy – the Global Strike mission. The first milestone 
in this regard was January, 2003 when President Bush signed Change-2 to the Unified 
Command Plan, assigning four additional missions to STARTCCOM: 1) missile 
defense planning; 2) global strike planning; 3) information operations; and 4) global 
C
4
ISR (Command, Control, Computers, Communication, Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance). (Kristensen [2005a]: p. 16.) According to the Unified Command Plan, 
the global strike mission was tasked “to deliver rapid, extended-range, precision kinetic 
(nuclear and conventional), and nonkinetic (elements of space and information 
operations) effects in support of theater and national objectives.” (Unified Command 
Plan [2002]: p. 13.)  
Although Global Strike was the result of a long post-Cold War process of developing 
nuclear weapons and planning capabilities, implementing rapid retargeting,
107
 and 
increasing the attention on WMD threats, it was still a new mission in the sense that it 
incorporated a wider range of capabilities (including Special Operations Forces, cyber 
                                                 
107
 In this regard, the Bush administration continued the efforts of the Clinton and Bush 41 
administrations. The modernization of the Strategic War Planning System was completed by 2003, and as 
a result of continued improvements in adaptive planning, the necessary time for a complete overhaul of 
the war plans was reduced from eighteen to six months, developing a major plan was possible in four 
months, and developing limited options for a smaller contingency became possible in 24 hours. Similar 
procedures were introduced in the framework of NATO as well – the NATO Nuclear Planning System 
(NNPS) automated the nuclear planning process in NATO, and facilitated the rapid development of Major 
Contingency Options, as well as Selective Contingency Options. (Kristensen [2004]) 
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attacks, advanced conventional weapons, and nuclear weapons), and it was mostly 
intended for preemptive and preventive strikes against regional adversaries. The 
employment component of Global Strike was Concept Plan (CONPLAN) 8022, 
developed to give the President prompt strike options against immediate threats. 
CONPLAN 8022 was completed by November, 2003, and became a fully operational 
contingency plan by August, 2004. This meant that selected nuclear forces were 
assigned to the countries of concern, identified by the OSD’s 2004 NUWEP. For the 
execution of the mission, STRATCOM established a new functional component 
command (Joint Functional Component Command – JFCC), which was later divided 
into a Global Strike and Integration (JFCC-GSI), and a Space component. (Kristensen 
[2007]: pp. 376-377.) 
According to the administration, the stronger integration of nuclear and non-nuclear 
capabilities in the framework of Global Strike provided the President with a greater 
variety of (better) capabilities, which increased the credibility of deterrence. But the 
integration of the forces in a preemptive nuclear posture raised some concerns in arms 
control advocates, and in the adversaries of the U.S. as well. Blurring the line between 
conventional and nuclear capabilities implies that nuclear weapons are just one more 
tool in the box, and their employment is more likely in a great variety of regional 
scenarios, which were not even covered by nuclear weapons before.  
Besides, despite the administration’s arguments, the increased credibility of deterrence 
will probably still have zero effect on the intentions of terrorist organizations, while it 
might actually worsen highly asymmetric crisis scenarios where small adversaries might 
take desperate measures under the perception of a potential preemptive strike from the 
U.S. Looking at the more balanced U.S.-Russian and U.S.-Chinese dimensions, the 
concept of Global Strike seemed to backfire in these cases as well – in response to the 
extended offensive posture of the U.S., both Moscow and Beijing expressed serious 
concerns about the implications of this new mission to crisis stability, and they used 
Global Strike as a justification to their own modernization programs. (Kristensen 
[2007]: pp. 383-384.) 
Hans M. Kristensen from the Federation of American Scientists argued that although 
CONPLAN 8022 was formally separated from OPLAN 8044 (which was the larger 
“basic” war plan of the Bush administration), JFCC-GSI was still responsible for the 
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planning and execution of a significant portion of OPLAN 8044, which made it difficult 
to differentiate the two (targets were designated from the same database, and strikes 
were supposed to be launched from the same deliveries) therefore CONPLAN 8022 
almost appeared to be a sub-plan of OPLAN, which was primarily designed for prompt 
attacks, including preemption and prevention. (Kristensen [2007]: pp. 379-380.) During 
the Fall of 2004 – after a really short lifetime – CONPLAN 8022 was finally withdrawn. 
Over the course of the next few years, it was formally canceled, but the mission 
capabilities were believed to “migrate” to other plans. (Kristensen [2008]) 
Altogether, the Bush administration continued the Clinton administration’s efforts to 
develop more flexible and adaptive planning capabilities, and to shift the focus of war 
plans – strike planning against Russia was reduced as it was no longer an immediate 
contingency, while strike planning against China and WMD proliferators was 
significantly increased. In terms of rhetoric, the Bush administration’s declaratory 
policy was a truly post-Cold War doctrine, which included several major innovations 
(for example the new triad concept, the responsive force, or the capabilities-based 
approach in the force structure). But looking at the actual employment policy, the role 
of nuclear weapons was significantly expanded to cover regional WMD scenarios, the 
preemptive use of nuclear weapons was explicitly elevated into official nuclear doctrine, 
the threshold to use nuclear weapons seems to be lowered, and the dividing lines 
between strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons, as well as between conventional 
and nuclear weapons have been blurred, implying an increased likelihood of nuclear 
weapons employment, and raising some serious concerns about crisis stability vis-à-vis 
both Russia and China, and rogue states. 
 
5.2 Operational Level under the Obama Administration 
5.2.1 War Plans under Obama 
Although the Bush administration changed the name of the strategic war plan from 
SIOP to OPLAN in 2003, OPLAN 8044 was still a transitional war plan to future plans. 
The first real non-SIOP war plan is thought to be OPLAN 8010, which was adopted in 
February, 2008. It was overwhelmingly nuclear but it also included conventional strike 
options, and it clearly had the fingerprints of the Bush administration’s presidential 
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guidance from 2001 (NSDP-10) and 2002 (NSDP-14). OPLAN 8010 was first revised 
in December, 2008 (OPLAN 8010-08), and in February, 2009 the newly elected Obama 
administration inherited OPLAN 8010-08 Change 1, which was the 17
th
 major update of 
the war plan since the end of the Cold War. (Kristensen [2010]: pp. 2-5.) 
OPLAN 8010 is a “base plan” with annexes, one of which was OPLAN 8010-08, the 
nuclear combat employment portion. In general, the annexes include strike plans for the 
entire range of STRATCOM missions, including nuclear forces, conventional strikes, 
non-kinetic operations (cyber belongs to this category), missile defense, intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance, and counter-WMD. (Kristensen [2013c])  
The next (and latest) revision of the strategic war plan was concluded by July, 2012. 
OPLAN 8010-12 was the first update since the Obama administration’s 2010 NPR. 
Although the review of the presidential employment guidance or the so called targeting 
review was already underway, the new guidance was not yet issued therefore OPLAN 
8010-12 was probably still based on the Bush guidance. Nevertheless, a change in the 
numbers is believed to imply a more significant shift in the plans, as owing to the new 
flexible and adaptive capabilities, minor revision and changes are made to the war plans 
on a day-to-day basis. (Interview with James E. Cartwright [2014]) In this case, the 
most important developments between February, 2009 and July, 2012 include the 
adoption of the Obama administration’s NPR in April, 2010; the Cyber Command’s 
reach to full operational capability in October, 2010; the New START entry into force 
in February, 2011; Change 2 of the JCS’s Nuclear Supplement to the Joint Strategic 
Capabilities Plan (CJCSI 3110.04B) in June, 2011; the retirement of the Tomahawk 
land-attack cruise missiles between 2011 and 2012; the undergoing NPR IS between 
2011 and 2012; President Obama’s announcement that the U.S. had “narrowed the 
range of contingencies under which we would ever use or threaten to use nuclear 
weapons” in March, 2012 (Obama [2012]); and the downloading of the remaining 
MIRVed ICBMs. From this list, the most likely triggers for the major revision of the 
war plan are: 1) the update of the JSCP-N, which provides nuclear planning guidance 
for the combatant commanders, and it probably eliminated strike scenarios for the 
retired TLAM-N system; and 2) the decline of the Russian ICBM force by 80 missiles 
(mostly silo-based SS-18s and SS-19s), which based on the current war plan 
requirements (e.g. cross-targeting and damage expectancy) allowed the reduction of 
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U.S. nuclear warheads by at least 160. (Kristensen [2013c]) (According to Morton 
Halperin, ICBMs are probably still among the targets which are targeted with two 
warheads, from two different delivery platforms.) (Interview with Morton H. Halperin 
[2014]) 
Besides the new numbers, the new names of the war plan also indicate that the plan is in 
evolution:  
 December 1, 2008: OPLAN 8010-08 Revision: Global Deterrence and Strike 
 February 1, 2009: OPLAN 8010-08 Change 1: Strategic Deterrence and Global 
Strike 
 July 30, 2012: OPLAN 8010-12: Strategic Deterrence and Force Employment 
In general, STRATCOM identifies “strategic deterrence” as its “first line of operation 
[…] that includes nuclear force operations. That’s the old SAC, translated to 
STRATCOM back in the ’90s, translated to today.” (Quoted in Kristensen [2010]: p. 7.) 
Global strike, on the other hand, is an “old” new concept. When it was assigned to 
STRATCOM in 2003, it mostly meant a prompt strike plan (in certain scenarios even 
preemptive) to provide capabilities against theater contingencies which were not 
covered by OPLAN 8044. The separate Global Strike war plan, CONPLAN 8022 was a 
mix of conventional and nuclear options, with overlapping responsibilities to the 
strategic war plan. After CONPLAN 8022 was canceled, Global Strike became a 
synonym for the offensive leg of the “New Triad” with nuclear, conventional, and non-
kinetic capabilities, while its previous missions migrated into the other plans. Mixing 
strategic deterrence and Global Strike probably meant to provide a link between 
strategic missions of a global scope and the more limited regional contingencies. 
(Kristensen [2010]) The most recent name change from ‘Strategic Deterrence and 
Global Strike’ to ‘Strategic Deterrence and Force Employment’ meant to reflect a more 
accurate description of the plan, and it probably also meant to eliminate some confusion 
around today’s Global Strike mission and its relation to programs like Conventional 
Prompt Global Strike.  
Compared to the Bush administration’s targeting policy, OPLAN 8010 meant a slight 
shift in the list of adversaries. The Bush administration’s 2001 NPR declared that 
besides Russia and China, “North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya are among the 
countries that could be involved in immediate, potential, or unexpected contingencies.” 
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(NPR [2002b]: p. 5.) Since 2001, Iraq and Libya got off the list as they both agreed to 
dismantle their WMD capabilities under international monitoring, and adhered to the 
relevant arms control agreements. Although the current list of adversaries is secret, the 
Obama administration’s war plan is believed to be directed against six potential 
adversaries: Russia, China, North Korea, Iran and Syria probably remained on the list, 
and in addition to these states, a new element is the “9/11-type scenario” – “a 
catastrophic WMD attack by a terrorist organization in collaboration with a regional 
state.” (Kristensen [2010]: p. 3.) From this list, Iran, Syria and the last element do not 
have nuclear weapons capabilities, and both Iran and Syria are signatories to the NPT 
(although they are still not protected by the negative security assurance of the 2010 
NPR, as their treaty compliance is questioned by the U.S.).
108
 Regarding Russia and 
China, Bruce G. Blair estimates that currently there are around 1,000 targets in Russia 
which are covered with nuclear weapons, and around 500 in China. (Interview with 
Bruce G. Blair [2014]) But thinking in terms of trends, parallel to the reductions in the 
U.S.-Russian nuclear arsenals, there is a steady decline in the number of Russian 
targets, while the constant developments in the military capabilities of China required 
an increase in the number of Chinese targets. (Interview with James E. Cartwright 
[2014]) 
Each of these potential adversaries are covered with a range of strike options which 
might significantly differ in size and objective. Based on a 2010 briefing from Major 
General Floyd Carpenter, Commander of STRATCOM’s JFCC-GS, the four major 
attack options of OPLAN 8010 are: Emergency Response Option (ERO), Selective 
Attack Option (SAO), Basic Attack Option (BAO), and Directed/Adaptive Planning 
Capability (DPO/APO) options. (Carpenter [2010]: p. 10.) These attack options range in 
size from the employment of hundreds of nuclear weapons in preplanned options
109
 to 
the employment of only a few warheads in adaptive options, against a carefully selected 
number of targets. The modification of the preplanned options might take several 
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 In this regard, Syria is likely to fall off the list very soon. Damascus was believed to harbor nuclear 
weapons intentions but with the 2007 Israeli airstrike on Al-Kibar (which was suspected by the U.S. and 
Israel to be the location of an undeclared plutonium production reactor), and with the ongoing civil war, it 
is highly unlikely that Syria would still have an active nuclear weapons program. Besides, with the 
conclusion of the chemical weapons dismantlement it will probably no longer mean a serious WMD 
challenge, and it can be taken off the list. 
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 Although the current war plans no longer explicitly contain massive attack options, the idea of using 
hundreds of nuclear warheads, based on preplanned attack options is still very similar to the Cold War 
MAO concept. 
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months, while changes in the adaptive options might be realized in a few hours. 
Besides, these plans do not have the same readiness level – Level 4 options are fully 
executable, while lower level options have to be worked up for execution. (Kristensen 
[2010]: p. 5.) In the current security environment, limited attack options are expected to 
be more active than major attack options, for the execution of which forces have to be 
generated, and reserve forces need to be uploaded on the launch platforms. 
As already mentioned, OPLAN 8010 covers the entire spectrum of STRATCOM’s 
missions, which includes conventional capabilities as well. These conventional strike 
options are based on systems like for example the conventional version of the 
Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles (which are deployed on the four converted 
Ohio-class submarines, attack submarines and surface ships), precision guided 
munitions and bunker busters.  
To a certain extent, the target categories in the six potential adversaries are roughly the 
same categories, which were designated during the Cold War. Based on the 1974 
NUWEP guidance, the 1976 SIOP-5 targeted 1) economic and industrial facilities 
critical for war initiation and post-war recovery, 2) political leadership and command 
and control targets, 3) nuclear offensive capabilities and storage locations, and 4) 
conventional forces. (NUWEP [1974]: pp. 4-5.) In the meanwhile, the 2001 NPR 
(which was reflected in the Bush administration’s NSDP-10 and NSDP-14 presidential 
employment guidance documents, and in the OPLAN 8044 and OPLAN 8010 war plans 
as well) declared that “The types of targets to be held at risk for deterrence purposes 
include leadership and military capabilities, particularly WMD, military command 
facilities and other centers of control and infrastructure that support military forces.” 
(NPR [2002b]: p. 6.)  
 
Table 13. Nuclear Target Categories 
Nuclear Target Categories 
SIOP-5 (1976) OPLAN 8010 (2009) 
Nuclear forces and storage locations Military forces 
Conventional forces WMD infrastructure 
Leadership and Command and Control Military and national leadership 
Economic and industrial facilities War-supporting infrastructure 
 
Source of table: Kristensen [2010] 
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Looking at these categories, there are two major differences: the first one is the 
increased focus on WMD capabilities; and in close relation to the first element, the 
second one is the extension of potential targets in general. Shifting away from the Cold 
War concept of deterring a nuclear attack on the U.S. and its allies to deterring all types 
of WMD attacks on the U.S. and its allies and partners means a broadening in two 
aspects. First, WMD is broader than nuclear, which means more potential targets to be 
held at risk; and second, the inclusion of partners is a broader concept than just the U.S. 
and its closest allies. In addition to these changes, a third important broadening comes 
from the inclusion of terrorist organizations and other non-state actors. 
Altogether, OPLAN 8010-12 is significantly different from the SIOP is terms of the 
security environment and the challenges that need to be addressed by the plan; the 
number of warheads have been significantly reduced; while the planning capabilities 
have been dramatically improved which provides a better capability to cover a wider 
range of target categories with fewer nuclear weapons. But despite these changes, the 
Obama administration’s nuclear war plan still seems to maintain planning for Cold War-
style nuclear war fighting scenarios, focusing on traditional damage limiting 
counterforce targeting with a nuclear triad on high alert, preplanned attack options 
involving the employment of hundreds of nuclear weapons against a somewhat 
extended range of target categories (despite the significantly different rhetoric, the 
Obama administration’s 2010 NPR, and the new negative security assurance did not 
exclude from the target lists any of the previously targeted adversaries). Therefore, if 
the administration is serious about ending Cold War nuclear thinking and reducing the 
role and number of nuclear weapons, many of these relics have to be limited or 
abandoned in the framework of the next revisions of the strategic war plan. 
 
5.2.2 Presidential Employment Guidance (2013) 
In 2011, after the New START negotiations were concluded and the Nuclear Posture 
Review was announced, the President directed the DoD to conduct a follow-on analysis 
to the 2010 NPR, in consultation with other departments and agencies. This review 
examined U.S. nuclear deterrence requirements to align planning to the present and 
anticipated future security environment. The review was an interagency process, led by 
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the DoD, but the OSD, the JCS, STRATCOM, the Department of State, the DoE, the 
intelligence community, and the NSC were also involved. This team presented a range 
of options to the President, with potential implications of each strategy option. Based on 
the findings of this review, and the advice of the DoD and the participating departments 
and agencies, the President updated nuclear employment guidance to better align with 
today’s security environment (Presidential Policy Directive: PPD-24 – announced in 
June, 2013 in the Berlin address). (U.S. Department of Defense [2013]: pp. 1-2.) 
This was the third revision since the end of the Cold War, and the first one since the 
conclusion of the Bush administration’s review in 2002. As already mentioned, the new 
guidance is a classified document, but the White House uploaded a fact sheet on its 
webpage (The White House [2013]), and the DoD published a nine pages long summary 
of the guidance, which was submitted to Congress. (U.S. Department of Defense 
[2013]) The DoD summary emphasized, that although the new guidance is a White 
House document, it enjoyed the support of the Commander of STRATCOM, the JCS 
and the Secretary of Defense. (U.S. Department of Defense [2013]: p. 2.) 
Based on these two key documents, the most important guiding principles for the role of 
nuclear weapons are: 1) the fundamental role of nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear 
attack on the U.S. and its allies and partners; 2) align U.S. defense guidance with the 
policies of the NPR (reaffirming that the use of nuclear weapons is only considered in 
extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the U.S. and its allies and 
partners; 3) maintain a credible deterrent; 4) credible deterrent is to be maintained with 
the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons. (U.S. Department of Defense [2013]: p. 
4.) 
Regarding the security environment, the new guidance repeated the conclusions of the 
2010 NPR that the most extreme danger of the current international security 
environment remains nuclear terrorism, and the threat of nuclear proliferation (in 
particular Iran and North Korea). But besides these dangers, the U.S. will “continue to 
address the more familiar challenge of ensuring strategic stability with Russia and 
China.” (U.S. Department of Defense [2013]: p. 3.)  
In terms of nuclear employment planning, the guidance stated that although the U.S. 
will maintain a strong and credible deterrent, it will also continue to prepare for the 
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possibility that deterrence will fail therefore DoD was directed to develop nuclear 
employment plans. For these cases, PPD-24 pledged to maintain “significant 
counterforce capabilities against potential adversaries,” and it also stated that “the new 
guidance does not rely on a ‘counter-value’ or ‘minimum deterrence’ strategy.” (U.S. 
Department of Defense [2013]: p. 4.) In order to reduce the role of nuclear weapons, 
PPD-24 reaffirmed the 2010 NPR’s pledge that the U.S. would continue to work 
towards a “sole purpose” posture, and the DoD was directed “to conduct deliberate 
planning for non-nuclear strike options to assess what objectives and effects could be 
achieved through integrated non-nuclear strike options.” Although the guidance stated 
that these non-nuclear options are “not a substitute for nuclear weapons,” planning for 
these options “is a central part of reducing the role of nuclear weapons.” (U.S. 
Department of Defense [2013]: p. 5.) In recognition of “the significantly diminished 
possibility of a disarming surprise nuclear attack,” the guidance directed the DoD to 
examine options to reduce reliance on Launch Under Attack, while “retaining the 
ability to Launch Under Attack if directed.” (U.S. Department of Defense [2013]: p. 5.) 
And finally, the guidance also stated that the hedging approach was also reexamined, 
and the DoD and the DoE “developed a more efficient strategy that allows the United 
States to maintain a robust hedge against technical or geopolitical risk with fewer 
nuclear weapons.” (U.S. Department of Defense [2013]: p. 5.) 
The implications of the new guidance for the stockpile are: a continued reliance on all 
three legs of the triad (as it “will best maintain strategic stability at reasonable cost”), 
operated on a day-to-day basis that maintains strategic stability vis-à-vis Russia and 
China, while also deters potential regional adversaries; a continued practice of open-
ocean targeting; a maintenance of the capability to forward-deploy nuclear weapons 
with heavy bombers and dual-capable aircrafts to support extended deterrence and 
assurance of allies and partners; a maintenance of a forward-based posture in Europe; 
and finally a pledge to seek a one-third reduction from the New START levels in the 
number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons. (U.S. Department of Defense [2013]: 
pp. 5-6.) 
The additional implications of the new guidance include three major areas: 1) resilience 
and flexibility; 2) nuclear deterrence, extended deterrence, assurance, and defense; and 
3) increased reliance on conventional or non-nuclear strike capabilities or missile 
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defenses. Regarding resilience and flexibility, the DoD was directed to maintain a 
sufficient, diversified, and survivable capability for deterrence, and the flexibility “to 
respond with a wide range of options to meet the President’s stated objective” – this 
latter objective is guaranteed by the nuclear triad, the ability to upload strategic delivery 
platforms, the ability to forward deploy nuclear weapons, and the additional options of 
non-nuclear strikes. (U.S. Department of Defense [2013]: pp. 7-8.) 
In terms of nuclear deterrence, extended deterrence, assurance, and defense, the most 
important objective was to provide the “capability to threaten credibly a wide range of 
nuclear responses” which will persuade any potential adversary that the perceived 
benefits of attacking the U.S. or its allies and partners can never outweigh the costs of 
the U.S. response on them. These capabilities will assure allies and partners and clearly 
reflect that their defense is “non-negotiable.” (U.S. Department of Defense [2013]: pp. 
8-9.) 
The last implication was increased reliance on conventional or non-nuclear strike 
capabilities or missile defenses, which means that the DoD will conduct deliberate 
planning for and integration of non-nuclear strike options; and Washington will 
continue to strengthen the regional security architectures through “forward U.S. 
conventional presence and effective theater ballistic missile defenses,” which “will take 
on a greater share of the deterrence burden.” (U.S. Department of Defense [2013]: p. 
9.) 
Looking at this Pentagon summary on the presidential employment guidance, it is 
significantly different from the declassified Cold War employment guidance documents, 
both in terms of focus and in terms of content. As Clark Murdock from the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies argues, the Pentagon report, in essence, does not say 
a lot about employment guidance, it basically repeats the goals of the 2010 NPR, 
describes how the NPR should be implemented, and how the role and number of nuclear 
weapons should be reduced. (Murdock [2013]) During the Cold War, White House 
employment directives included concrete guidance for the targeting categories, they 
contained concrete requests for the type of strike options which were needed to hold 
these targets at risk, and they aligned force requirements to these demands. The 
unclassified summary of the Obama administration’s directive, on the other hand, fails 
to give any targeting guidance on how to maintain strategic stability vis-à-vis Russia 
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and China, and on what type of targets need to be held at risk in order to deter rogue 
states. 
Despite its lack of providing a real targeting guidance, PPD-24 does contain concrete 
achievements in terms of force structure requirements. The guidance made the case for 
further nuclear reductions, regardless of Russian reciprocity (although President Obama 
announced in Berlin that the U.S. would seek “negotiated cuts” with Moscow, he did 
not say that the implementation of the reductions can only happen if Russia agrees to 
reciprocal measures). As the guidance said, “the President has determined that we can 
ensure the security of the United States and our Allies and partners and maintain a 
strong and credible strategic deterrent while safely pursuing up to a one-third reduction 
in deployed nuclear weapons from the level established in the New START Treaty.”  
(U.S. Department of Defense [2013]: p. 6.) This was an important step as it 
acknowledged that the U.S had more nuclear weapons than necessary, and Russia was 
not given an explicit veto power over the fate of these reductions. (Wolfsthal [2013]) 
Although the guidance reaffirmed the President’s commitment to reducing the role of 
nuclear weapons, and paved the way for further nuclear reductions, it still failed to 
implement dramatic changes regarding the operational aspects of nuclear weapons 
employment. The fact that the guidance did not move forward with the issue of a “sole 
purpose” posture, and maintained the wording of the 2010 NPR on the “fundamental 
role” of nuclear weapons implies that there is still “a narrow range of contingencies in 
which U.S. nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring a conventional or CBW 
[chemical or biological weapons] attack against the United States or its allies and 
partners.” (NPR [2010a]: p. viii.)  
Another way to limit the role of nuclear weapons, outlined by the guidance, was an 
increased reliance on non-nuclear capabilities and a deliberate planning for non-nuclear 
strike options. Advanced non-nuclear capabilities definitely have the potential to take 
over several missions from nuclear weapons and they can play an important role in 
reducing reliance on nuclear weapons, but the guidance also stated that “they are not a 
substitute for nuclear weapons,” which means that there are serious limits to their 
capability to take over nuclear missions.  
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The next issue where the guidance had the promise to reduce the role of nuclear 
weapons but it eventually failed to fulfill this promise is the launch under attack (LUA) 
policy. Under the LUA policy, a country launches a nuclear response once it has 
confirmed that it is under nuclear attack. Relying on this prompt response posture is 
incredibly dangerous as it reduces the decision time of the National Command 
Authority and it risks initiating an all-out nuclear war. In this regard, the new guidance 
acknowledged that with the end of the Cold War, and the fall of the Soviet Union, “the 
potential for a surprise, disarming nuclear attack is exceedingly remote” and the U.S. 
can finally afford to reduce the role of this strategy, at the same time, the DoD was also 
directed to maintain the capability to launch under attack if necessary. This mixed 
message to change the policy but do not change the capability will probably have only 
limited effects on nuclear planning. According to Hans M. Kristensen, “the strategy 
seems to have little relevance in any but the most extreme war-fighting scenarios; nor 
does it matter much for deterrence as long as the United States maintains a sufficient, 
secure retaliatory capability. The key potential benefit of reducing reliance on the 
strategy appears to be extending the decision time for the commander-in-chief during a 
crisis.” (Kristensen [2013a])  
In this regard, maintaining the capability seems to be a missed opportunity for reducing 
alert levels as well. While de-alerting was high on the 2007-2008 campaign agenda, the 
2010 NPR stated that “the current alert posture of U.S. strategic forces – with heavy 
bombers off full-time alert, nearly all ICBMs on alert, and a significant number of 
SSBNs at sea at any given time – should be maintained for the present.” (NPR [2010a]: 
p. x.) This means that none of the bombers are kept on alert at the moment, but almost 
all 450 ICBMs and 100-120 SLBMs are on alert with about 800 nuclear warheads. 
Upon receiving the launch order, these weapons are ready to launch within fifteen 
minutes. In a 2011 Congressional hearing, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 
for Policy James N. Miller explained that “the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) 
considered the possibility of reducing alert response requirements for ICBMs and at-
sea response requirements of SSBNs, and concluded that such steps could reduce crisis 
stability by giving an adversary the incentive to attack before “re-alerting” was 
complete. At the same time, the NPR concluded that returning heavy bombers to full-
time nuclear alert was not necessary, assuming the other two Triad legs retain an 
adequate alert posture. The current alert posture supports strategic stability through an 
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assured second-strike capability. It ensures that, in the calculations of any potential 
opponent, the perceived gains of attacking the United States or its Allies and partners 
would be far outweighed by the unacceptable costs of the response.” (Congressional 
Hearing [2011]) 
In the framework of the targeting review, giving up the capability to launch under attack 
could have paved the way for reducing alert levels, but retaining the capability and 
“only” reducing the reliance on LUA does not seem to have any effect on the current 
alert posture. In a July, 2013 Huessy Breakfast Series seminar, Miller repeated that the 
guidance review “did examine postures that involved some additional de-alerting […] 
we found that additional steps in this regard would be difficult to verify on the other 
side, and more importantly could be destabilizing in a crisis as alert levels were raised 
back up.” (Miller [2013]) In addition to these challenges, Admiral Richard Mies, former 
head of STRATCOM noted that “our forces are postured such that we have the 
capability to respond promptly to any attack, without relying upon ‘launch on warning’ 
or ‘launch under attack’” which explains why a reduced reliance on LUA did not have 
any direct effect on the current alert posture of the U.S. (Mies [2001]) (It is important to 
note that Admiral Mies is right to say that a country can give up the reliance on LUA 
and LOW and still have a prompt response capability due to high alert levels, but giving 
up high alert levels would mean the end of a day-to-day LUA or LOW capability. In 
this case, the U.S. could still have a LUA or LOW policy but it is more problematic, as 
it would also require the adversaries to be on a de-alerted posture – if the adversaries 
have also de-alerted their nuclear forces, then in a crisis situation, the U.S. could regain 
its LUA or LOW capability by a quick re-alerting process.) 
The new guidance also reaffirmed that the U.S. will “maintain significant counterforce 
capabilities against potential adversaries [and] does not rely on a ‘counter-value’ or 
‘minimum deterrence’ strategy.” (U.S. Department of Defense [2013]: p. 4.) According 
to the JCS, counterforce strategy means “The employment of strategic air and missile 
forces in an effort to destroy, or render impotent, selected military capabilities of an 
enemy force under any of the circumstances by which hostilities may be initiated.” (The 
definition was quoted from the JCS in Arkin; Handler; Morrissey; Walsh [1990]: p. 
184.) As mentioned before, this strategy has a much stronger requirement in terms of 
nuclear weapons capabilities than the counter-value strategies – counterforce requires 
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more nuclear weapons to hold at risk the most difficult targets of the adversaries, and 
these weapons have to be more advanced and more accurate in order to fulfill this 
mission. As STRATCOM concluded in its 2002 Counterproliferation Operational 
Architecture, counterforce “is preemptive, or offensively reactive” – it is preemptive, as 
it aims to destroy the adversary’s military capabilities before they could be used; and it 
is offensively reactive, as it requires the other side to intercept, absorb, or mitigate the 
attack. (USSTRATCOM [2002]: p. 6.) Therefore, maintaining the counterforce strategy 
definitely sets limits to how deep the U.S. is able to cut its own nuclear forces, and it 
also links these reductions to the military capabilities of its potential adversaries. In the 
future, if the U.S. wants to dramatically reduce its nuclear stockpile, it will require a 
dramatic change in the military capabilities of its adversaries, or the U.S. will have to 
give up the counterforce strategy and shift to a more relaxed, deterrence-based posture. 
Despite this distinction in the guidance, it is important to repeat that the dividing line 
between counterforce and counter-value strategies is artificial, and U.S. targeting policy 
has never been one or the other, it has always been a mix of the two. The main rule is to 
hold at risk what the enemy values the most. This explains why the composition of 
targets is different from state to state. In the case of Russia, U.S. targeting policy is 
overwhelmingly counterforce, with a primary focus on its nuclear weapons capabilities. 
But as a result of its considerably smaller nuclear arsenal, China for example is a more 
equal mix of counterforce and counter-value elements, with a greater emphasis on war-
supporting industry targets. In the meanwhile, rogue states are mainly targeted for their 
WMD capabilities (although it is decreasing as a result of the implementation of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention). 
Despite these different priorities, leadership targets, in general, are believed to be at the 
end of the escalation ladder, based on the assumption that they are essential to keep the 
conflict under control. (Interview with Bruce G. Blair [2014]) 
Altogether, the new guidance does not seem to be a transformational document, it just 
catches up with reality like many previous guidance documents. It definitely deserves 
credit for setting the stage for further reductions, reaffirming the rhetoric of the 2010 
NPR, and setting additional constraints to the use of nuclear weapons; but regarding the 
operational aspects of nuclear weapons employment, it does not seem to implement any 
dramatic changes, instead it maintains several key elements of Cold War employment 
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policy. The new guidance considered moving towards a “sole purpose” posture but it 
concluded that it is not the right time to do that. Similarly, it ordered the DoD to reduce 
reliance on launch under attack, but it retained the capability, which means that it will 
only affect a very few “extreme war-fighting scenarios.” In the meanwhile, the 
maintained capability requires a continued reliance on high alert postures, which was 
also examined during the review but remained untouched in the end. And finally, the 
refusal of counter-value and minimum deterrence strategies clearly signals that there is a 
serious limit to how deep the U.S. is able to cut its nuclear forces, and to a certain 
extent, it is still tied to the nuclear capabilities of its adversaries (mostly to Russia and 
China). 
Now that the new guidance was signed by President Obama in June, 2013, the updates 
will go through the OSD, the JCS and STRATCOM, and they will translate the 
President’s directive into more concrete guidance documents. These documents will 
lead the Joint Functional Component Command Global Strike to update the current 
strategic war plan (OPLAN 8010-12), and the Geographic Combatant Commanders to 
update their regional plans. Based on previous practices, this process takes around 18 
months, which means that the first war plan which is based on the Obama 
administration’s guidance is due by the end of 2014. 
 
5.3 Evaluation  
Regarding the characteristics of Cold War nuclear thinking, the first element was high 
alert levels. In this regard, there were considerable changes since the Cold War, both in 
terms of numbers and in terms of content. With the dramatic decrease of nuclear forces 
in the 1990s, the number of nuclear weapons on high alert has also been significantly 
cut, and in the framework of the Bush administration’s Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, 
thousands of non-strategic nuclear weapons and all strategic bombers were taken off 
day-to-day alert. In addition, the dangers of an accidental or unauthorized launch were 
much higher at the early stages of the Cold War, but many of these dangers have been 
mitigated by the gradual installment of real technical safeguards since the late 1970s. 
Despite these developments, today there are still 800 nuclear warheads on high alert 
(450 on ICBMs and about 350 on 100-120 SLBMs). In the 2008 campaign strategy, 
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presidential candidate Obama declared that “keeping nuclear weapons ready to launch 
on a moment's notice is a dangerous relic of the Cold War,” and he pledged to “work 
with Russia to end such Cold War policies in a mutual and verifiable manner.” (Obama 
[2008a]) Despite these promises, the 2010 NPR and the 2013 employment guidance 
concluded that the current alert levels should be maintained. According Bradley H. 
Roberts, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense 
Policy, the issue of alert levels was debated during the interagency review process but 
the administration came to the conclusion that “additional steps beyond the ones 
already taken would be unwise, especially unilaterally.” It is true that the U.S. would 
love to see the Russian forces operate differently, but it is not likely that Moscow would 
agree to any reciprocal de-alerting measures considering the current tensions with the 
U.S. over the annexation of Crimea, the crisis in Ukraine, and the allegations of 
violating the 1987 INF Treaty. (Interview with Bradley H. Roberts [2014]) In fact, 
Moscow has done the exact opposite, and it has increased the readiness level of its 
ICBMs and SSBNs.  
Taking into consideration all these developments, the Obama administration concluded 
that this was not the right moment to implement de-alerting measures. But despite the 
decision to take concrete de-alerting measures off the agenda, the White House pledged 
to continue its efforts to further mitigate the risks of launches resulting from accidents, 
unauthorized actions, or misperceptions and to maximize the decision time available for 
the President in a crisis. These measures included a continued practice of open-ocean 
targeting, further strengthening the U.S. command and control system, and exploring 
new modes of ICBM basing for enhanced survivability and to reduce incentives for 
prompt launch. (NPR [2010a]: p. x.) 
In close relation to the issue of alert levels, the next characteristic of Cold War nuclear 
thinking is preemption, launch on warning, and launch under attack. While all these 
strategies were operational policies during the Cold War, their significance has been 
considerably reduced since then. During the Bush administration, there was a short 
reemergence of preemptive thinking, with regards to regional WMD proliferators. In the 
framework of the Global Strike mission, STRATCOM was tasked to work out a 
separate war plan (CONPLAN 8022) to provide the President with prompt strike 
options against immediate threats, and to deliver rapid, extended-range attacks in theater 
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missions. Although Global Strike was canceled very soon, some of its missions 
migrated into OPLAN 8044. Under the Obama administration, the reliance on these 
operational policies has been further limited, and the administration directed the DoD to 
reduce the role of launch under attack but maintain the capability.
110
 During the Cold 
War, having a prompt launch capability was claimed to deter a deliberate first strike 
from Moscow. Today, as the 2013 guidance said, this possibility is extremely remote 
but decision makers still thought that the capability has to be maintained.  
There are several reasons why the administration came to this conclusion. On the one 
hand, it is partly a result of bureaucratic resistance from the military – a common 
argument of military advisors is that removing LUA would reduce the flexibility of the 
U.S., it would make the ICBMs vulnerable, while there would be no serious gains with 
it. (Interview with Jon B. Wolfsthal [2014]) On the other hand, there are still many 
operational policies which require a capability to launch under attack. The targeting 
criteria which demand the U.S. to plan to destroy the entire nuclear arsenal of Russia, 
and the still high damage expectancy levels require a Minuteman force on high alert. 
(Interview with Bruce G. Blair [2014]) In this regard, James N. Miller mentioned some 
additional reasons which played a role in the administration’s decision to maintain the 
prompt launch capability. The first and most important reason was to retain a hedge 
against any future survivability challenges to the submarine leg of the triad. If U.S. 
strategic submarines became vulnerable to attack (as unlikely as that may seem today), 
and U.S. bombers were off nuclear alert as they have been for many years, the ability to 
launch ICBMs under attack would provide the main U.S. strategic nuclear response 
capability until the survivability of submarines and/or bombers was established. 
Another and significantly less important reason was the deterrence value of LUA – 
today, it is not exclusively directed against Moscow, but it is more about deterrence vis-
à-vis North Korea, as a surprise first strike is more likely to come from the DPRK than 
from Russia. (Interview with James N. Miller [2014]) 
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 Maintaining a capability to launch under attack means that there is a capability for launch on warning 
and preemption as well but the role of these operational policies has been significantly reduced. 
Reliance on the LOW strategy has already been limited by the 1980 PD-59, and despite the maintained 
capability, the chances of its implementation are incredibly remote.  
Regarding preemption, the U.S. still has not declared a no-first-use policy, and there is no hard evidence 
that preemption would be ruled out, but it is not likely that nuclear weapons would be used preemptively 
other than in the case of a small regional scenario, with an immediate WMD threat. (Interview with 
Madelyn R. Creedon [2014]) 
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Even though the Obama administration decided to maintain the capability for launch 
under attack, John R. Harvey argues that there are several ways to reduce its role in 
strategic planning. The first way is to make the ICBMs more survivable to a first strike, 
which would reduce the pressure “to launch them or lose them.” The second way is to 
make them less “lucrative” targets for a potential attack. While during the Cold War 
some ICBM designs were capable to carry up to ten warheads and they were really 
attractive targets for a potential first strike, the recently completed “de-MIRV”-ing 
process of the ICBM force served exactly this purpose to eliminate the incentives to 
take them out in a first strike. And finally, a third way to reduce the role of LUA in 
operational planning is to strengthen the command and control system and to guarantee 
the survivability of the National Command Authority, which would reduce pressure on 
the President to launch an immediate counterstrike in a crisis. (Interview with John R. 
Harvey [2014]) 
The third element of Cold War nuclear thinking is pre-delegation of control. As already 
mentioned before, this practice was mostly dominant in the late 1950s and 1960s, but it 
was entirely rolled back during the 1980s when the DoD retired most of the air defense 
weapons which were pre-delegated before. 
The fourth issue is counterforce targeting and conservative targeting criteria. Although 
the current targeting criteria is still characterized as conservative, but the standards of 
damage have declined – during the Cold War, the main driver was damage limitation 
under which the U.S. was planning to disrupt a potential Soviet attack in progress by 
initiating a massive attack against its military capabilities – especially the nuclear 
forces. (Interview with Bruce G. Blair [2014]) Damage expectancy levels were 
extremely high, and there was a lot of cross targeting (sometimes 5-6-7 nuclear 
warheads were aimed at one target).
111
 Franklin C. Miller, however, noted that this level 
of redundancy was not the result of seeking ever-higher levels of damage but the result 
of poor-planning, which has been significantly improved since the mid-1980s. 
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 According to Bruce G. Blair and Chen Yali, during the Cold War, U.S. commanders were instructed to 
“destroy no less than 70 to 90 percent of the Soviet targets in each of four categories – nuclear forces, 
conventional forces, war-supporting industry, and leadership” which meant that military planners were 
aiming to meet an average of 80 percent damage expectancy. In order to meet these goals, some high 
value targets were covered with an extremely high number of nuclear weapons – Blair and Yali 
specifically mentions the Pushkino battle management radar (tasked to control the anti-ballistic missile 
interceptors protecting Moscow) which in 1991 was still targeted by as many as 69 U.S. nuclear weapons. 
(Blair; Yali [2006]: p. 55.)  
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(Interview with Franklin C. Miller [2014]) Addressing some of these problems means 
that today the damage expectancy levels are probably lower, and it is likely that the 
requirements for cross targeting and redundancy have also been relaxed as a result of 
significant developments in planning capabilities, and a much stronger confidence in the 
accuracy and success of the potential strikes. (Interview with Amy F. Woolf [2014]) 
Looking at the targeting strategy, the main logic has not changed since the Cold War. 
U.S. targeting policy still derives from what the adversaries value the most, which leads 
to a continued focus on counterforce targets – the new employment guidance also 
reaffirmed that the U.S. still relies on a counterforce strategy and does not follow a 
counter-value policy. This is clearly reflected in the current targeting categories as well: 
based on the 2002 NPR, OPLAN 8010 holds at risk military forces, WMD 
infrastructure, military and national leadership, and war-supporting infrastructure. If 
these categories are forced into the (somewhat sterile and artificial) definitions of 
counterforce vs. counter-value, then most of these target categories seem to fit the 
model of the JCS’s counterforce definition – only certain portions of the national 
leadership targets and the war-supporting infrastructure might rather be described as 
counter-value elements. In the case of Russia, the primary focus on the nuclear weapons 
capabilities and its supporting infrastructure guarantees that U.S. targeting policy is 
overwhelmingly counterforce, reflecting a similar damage limitation logic, which was 
characteristic during the Cold War. In the case of China, the picture is more mixed, as a 
result of its limited nuclear weapons capabilities, there is a bigger emphasis on softer 
(industry) targets, which might rather be described as counter-value. Looking at the 
remaining 3+1 contingencies (North Korea, Iran, Syria and “9/11-type scenarios”), 
these countries are probably covered with very limited attack options, against their 
crucial WMD capabilities, which are clearly counterforce targets. 
The next element of Cold War nuclear thinking is the dominance of massive attack 
options in contrast to a very few real limited attack option. The history of Cold War 
operational planning was a constant struggle for real limited options, which could serve 
the policy makers’ concepts like for example limited nuclear war, or intrawar 
bargaining. But despite the policy guidance of the White House, nuclear war plans 
contained overwhelmingly massive attack options, which were based on the 
employment of hundreds or even thousands of nuclear warheads in one single “Sunday 
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punch.” Since the end of the Cold War, the number of nuclear weapons has been 
dramatically reduced, which had an effect on the strike options as well. Although it has 
never been clearly defined what is a massive attack option, and what is a limited attack 
option,
112
 the nominal category of massive attack options has been abandoned, and 
today’s strike options do not contain it anymore. Based on a 2010 STRATCOM 
presentation, there are four main attack options at the moment: Emergency Response 
Options, Selective Attack Options, Basic Attack Options, and Directed/Adaptive 
Planning Capability options. These attack options still contain larger attacks involving 
the use of hundreds of nuclear weapons if the President decides, but the emphasis has 
probably shifted towards very limited attacks, with the employment of only a few 
nuclear warheads in primarily regional scenarios. In addition to these changes, another 
new element was the integration of conventional strike options. According to Bruce 
Blair, the first conventional option was introduced in the strategic war plan in 1983. 
(Interview with Bruce G. Blair [2014]) Although there has always been a certain level 
of integration between conventional and nuclear capabilities, but after the Cold War, 
this integration has become increasingly strong. With a revolutionary development in 
conventional technologies, these capabilities have become able to take over certain 
missions from nuclear weapons – although OPLAN 8010 is still predominantly nuclear. 
While during the Bush administration the lines between conventional and nuclear 
weapons have been significantly blurred, the Obama administration seems to apply a 
greater integration in execution but not in planning. 
The next characteristic of Cold War nuclear thinking refers to the war plans, which were 
preplanned and not flexible at all. In this regard, today’s planning capabilities are a 
result of a long development process, which started already during the second half of 
the 1980s. With the dramatic changes in the Eastern Bloc, SIOP was restructured and 
SAC (replaced by STRATCOM) introduced more flexible targeting capabilities in order 
to reduce the necessary time to adjust the strategic war plans. With the establishment of 
the Strategic Planning Study Group, and the development of the Strategic War Planning 
System, adaptive targeting was introduced. It provided the military planners with rapid 
and flexible retargeting capabilities, which were more appropriate to adjust the war 
plans according to the unforeseen challenges of the post-Cold War security 
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 There is no “magic number” or dividing line between the concepts of massive attack options and 
limited attack options. However, it has never only been about the numbers, but about the objectives as 
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environment. As a result of these developments, changes in the targets and forces were 
immediately channeled in the war plans, and the overall time to update and develop the 
next SIOP was dramatically reduced. On the planning level, these changes had further 
requirements: an increased reliance on accurate intelligence information, and a dramatic 
development in computing technologies which made the day-to-day calculations and 
adjustments possible. The new SIOP concept was called the “living SIOP,” which was 
significantly different from the Cold War times as it was almost a real-time war plan 
with many adaptive options, and a rapid replanning capability to adjust the preplanned 
options. While, the old SIOP gave the President the option to use almost everything 
very quickly, the new war plans recognized that it was nearly impossible to foresee all 
circumstances therefore adaptive and flexible scenarios were included besides the 
preplanned scenarios, which were prepared according to the presidential guidance. In 
this regard, Russia and China are definitely covered with (larger) preplanned scenarios, 
while in the case of North Korea, Iran, and Syria adaptive planning is more likely to be 
used – however, probably there are (smaller) preplanned options against the key WMD 
capabilities of these countries as well.  
NATO also introduced the necessary capabilities for adaptive planning, and it is 
believed that it has no standing war plans, instead it relies on adaptive contingency 
plans, which can be brought up to full status within a very short amount of time. 
(Kristensen [2012]: p. 31.)  
Regarding the next characteristic, planning for a protracted global war was typical for 
the entire Cold War, and as the George H. W. Bush administration did not issue its own 
presidential employment guidance, President Reagan’s 1981 NSDD-13 remained in 
force until President Clinton issued his PDD-60 guidance in 1997. PDD-60 removed all 
previous references to prevailing in a nuclear war, and planning for a global nuclear 
exchange. Instead, the new guidance reduced contingency planning against Russia and 
put a greater emphasis on very limited regional scenarios. This focus remained during 
the Bush and the Obama administrations as well – in reference to the reduced role of 
Russia, the new guidance specifically noted that the chances of a nuclear exchange with 
Moscow are extremely remote.  
Similarly, the issue of civilian oversight has also significantly changed since the Cold 
War. Until the 1980s, there were no clear procedures for civilian oversight, which gave 
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the planners and targeteers a big maneuvering capability in the interpretation and 
implementation of the presidential guidance. Thanks to the efforts of Franklin C. Miller 
during the 1980s and early 1990s, today there are clear procedures for the civilians to 
make sure that the war plans actually reflect the guidance of the policy level. Regarding 
the process itself, the first step is when the President and the NSC define the 
fundamental role of nuclear weapons, the most important directions of the deterrence 
strategy, and lay out the basic employment strategy. Then the Secretary of Defense 
translates the presidential guidance for the DoD, describing how the guidance should be 
implemented. Afterwards, the Chairman of the JCS adds specific directions to the 
military planners and STRATCOM prepares the Nuclear Force Employment Plan, 
which includes several different options for the employment of nuclear weapons. As 
mentioned before, the process is not as linear as it may seem, there are overlaps between 
the different phases, there is interagency cooperation on every step of the process, and 
both civilians and military personnel have the authority to review the different guidance 
documents and provide feedback. Once the war plan update is complete, the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy has the authority to review the plan, and the President 
and the Secretary of Defense approves it. As Franklin C. Miller said, a lot depends on 
the willingness of the policy level to engage in the process, but it is a fundamental 
change compared to the Cold War that today the OSD, the JCS and STRATCOM 
operate in a kind of partnership. (Interview with Franklin C. Miller [2014]) In the 
meanwhile, Congress has no Constitutional role in forming or challenging the process, 
and it has no access to the operational planning documents (however, they might get a 
very general briefing on the war plan if they require). 
Regarding the calculations on the secondary effects of a nuclear blast, there were some 
developments since the Cold War but war plans still do not take account of the entire 
damage a nuclear strike might cause. As mentioned before, blaming the difficulty to 
calculate the secondary effects of a nuclear blast, war plans during the Cold War only 
included the blast effect in their damage assessments, and mostly excluded everything 
else. The issue itself was not ignored, there were several attempts to calculate these 
effects, and complete models were worked out, but based on the weather conditions and 
several other factors, many of the effects were very unpredictable, thus difficult to 
incorporate in the war plans. In this regard, Lynn Eden’s research on the effect of 
firestorms concluded that the reality was not so much about the difficulty to include 
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these factors, but also about how organizations, in this case the DoD, framed the issue – 
the focus on the elimination of certain targets seemed to enjoy a priority above the 
potential death and destruction caused by the employment of nuclear weapons. As a 
result, during the entire Cold War, the U.S. dramatically underestimated the potential 
damage of its strategic war plans, and developed significantly more nuclear weapons 
than actually needed. (Eden [2004]) According to Bruce Blair, today’s war plans pay a 
bigger attention on the secondary effects, and a large number of them are taken into 
account during the process of strategic planning. Present strategic thinking calculations 
and force calculations consider the electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects, radiation 
patterns and fallout as well. Although not all of these effects are formally included in 
the war planning models but firestorms and radiation, in general, are considered to a 
much greater extent than during the Cold War. Besides, the practice of withholding 
attacks based on the secondary effects also appeared in the war plans – a good example 
for that is the missile base to the West of Moscow. (Interview with Bruce G. Blair 
[2014]) 
The last characteristic of Cold War nuclear thinking was the low profile of humanitarian 
aspects in operational planning. During the Cold War, massive attack options did not 
spare the targeting of cities and civilians in general. Some SAC officials were talking 
about major civilian losses as a bonus effect of urban-industrial targeting. Although the 
focus on counterforce targeting did not allow the direct targeting of civilians per se, but 
crucial military and economic targets have not been excluded from the target lists for 
their proximity to civilians either. The present target categories are very similar to the 
Cold War, but the situation is somewhat different today – with the decrease in the 
number of nuclear weapons, the abandonment of massive attack options, and the new 
focus on limited regional scenarios, the execution of the OPLAN would probably result 
in less civilian casualties, and – as it was just mentioned – some of the crucial military 
and industrial targets are withhold, based on the potential secondary effects of the blast 
on the civilian population. The Obama administration, in addition, specifically included 
in its 2013 employment guidance that “all plans must also be consistent with the 
fundamental principles of the Law of Armed Conflict. Accordingly, plans will, for 
example, apply the principles of distinction and proportionality and seek to minimize 
collateral damage to civilian populations and civilian objects. The United States will 
not intentionally target civilian populations or civilian objects.” (U.S. Department of 
DOI: 10.14267/phd.2015009
206 
 
Defense [2013]: pp. 4-5.) This means that major cities cannot be targeted, unless they 
host crucial military targets. Thus, Moscow and Beijing are probably still in the war 
plans, but even if such cities are targeted, STRATCOM has to minimize collateral 
damage. 
Altogether, the end of the Cold War brought significant changes both in terms of 
guidance and in terms of planning capabilities. The introduction of flexible and adaptive 
planning made it possible to adjust the strategic war plans to real 21
st
 century threats, 
and to cover a wider range of contingencies and a wider range of adversaries. But many 
of the guiding principles still seem to reflect the same thinking, which was characteristic 
of the bipolar system.  
The Obama administration took office with a pledge to put an end to Cold War thinking 
but the second hypothesis of this dissertation claims that it failed to meet this promise 
on the operational level, and “it still retains key elements of Cold War nuclear thinking.” 
In this regard, the 2013 employment guidance outlined a vision to reduce the role of 
nuclear weapons and to abandon the legacies of the Cold War, but at the same time, it 
also reaffirmed several elements of Cold War operational planning. Counter-value and 
minimum deterrence postures were rejected, while the counterforce strategy was 
reaffirmed; the triad and a significant upload capability was pledged to be maintained; 
the role of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states was retained; DoD was directed 
to maintain the capability to launch under attack; and the current alert postures were 
also retained. These elements have significant requirements regarding the nuclear force 
structure, and they put serious constraints on the future of deep reductions.  
 
Table 14. Operational Level: Cold War vs. Obama 
Cold War Nuclear Thinking Change Obama Posture 
 high alert levels ≈ 
 bombers have been taken off  
alert but there are still 800 ICBM 
and SLBM warheads on high  
alert 
 preemption, LOW and LUA ≈ 
 reduced reliance but maintained 
capability 
 pre-delegation of control YES  abandoned in the 1980s 
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 (mostly) counterforce targeting 
+ very conservative targeting 
criteria 
≈ 
 still (mostly) counterforce targeting 
but thanks to the developments in 
planning capabilities and weapons 
systems, targeting criteria is less 
conservative today 
 massive attack options + a very 
few real limited attack option ≈ 
 there are no more massive attack 
options and there is a bigger 
emphasis on limited attacks but 
there are still major attack options 
with hundreds of NWs 
 target plans are preplanned and 
not flexible ≈ 
 there are still preplanned target 
plans but flexible and adaptive 
planning also appeared 
 duration of war: protracted, 
global war 
YES  there is no more planning for a 
protracted global war 
 lack of clear procedures for 
civilian oversight 
YES  since the 1980s there are clear 
procedures for civilian oversight 
 lack of calculations on the 
secondary effects of a nuclear 
blast in operational plans 
(serious underestimation of the 
potential damages) 
≈ 
 there are several secondary effects 
which are still not calculated but 
some of them have been included  
 low profile of humanitarian 
aspects in operational planning ≈ 
 the Obama guidance specifically 
mentions humanitarian aspects in it 
employment guidance, although 
counter-value elements are still 
present in the war plans 
 
6. Reductions and Nuclear Strategy  
6.1 Deployed Nuclear Weapons 
In terms of deployed strategic nuclear weapons, the 2009 Prague address primarily 
focused on the conclusion of the New START Treaty, but after the ratification of the 
agreement, the attention of the administration immediately shifted towards the 
implementation of deeper force reductions. The first indicator of the Obama 
administration’s intention to cut deeper was the January, 2012 ‘Sustaining U.S. Global 
Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense’ Pentagon strategy, which concluded 
that “it is possible that our deterrence goals can be achieved with a smaller nuclear 
force.” (Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership [2012]: p. 5.) More than a year later, in his 
February, 2013 State of the Union Address President Obama reenergized his nuclear 
policy and stated that the U.S. would engage with Russia to seek further reductions in 
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their nuclear arsenals – although specific details of the second Obama administration’s 
nuclear agenda were only announced later. (Obama [2013a]) In the June, 2013 Berlin 
address the President declared that the overall review of U.S. nuclear guidance was 
completed, which allowed his administration to seek further negotiated cuts with Russia 
in the deployed strategic nuclear arsenals by up to one-third. As already mentioned, this 
would mean a reduction from the 1,550 New START ceilings to between 1,000 and 
1,100 deployed strategic nuclear weapons. (Obama [2013b]) 
Regarding the implementation of these numbers, going down from 1,550 to 1,000-1,100 
deployed strategic nuclear weapons will probably affect the ballistic missile force, most 
likely the SLBMs (mainly because bombers are counted as one, regardless of the 
assigned warheads, and ICBMs no longer carry multiple warheads, therefore reducing 
MIRVed SLBMs is the “most economic” way to implement the cuts). As the number of 
submarines will go down from 14 to 12, STRATCOM is probably already planning for 
these lower numbers.
113
 According to a 2011 Congressional hearing, STRATCOM 
proposed to equip the 12 new submarines with 16 missile tubes each (a reduction by 
four, compared to the force structure under the New START agreement), which would 
mean 192 SLBMs. (Congressional Hearing [2011]) Although all 12 next generation 
SSBNX submarines will be deployable, not all of them will necessarily be deployed. 
Some of them will probably undergo repairs and other maintenance therefore the actual 
number of deployed SSBNX will most likely be up to 10. (Interview with Hans M. 
Kristensen [2014]) To meet the proposed reduction to 1,000-1,100, this would mean 
that each deployed SLBM should be loaded with an average of around four warheads. 
This would add up to 1,100 (treaty accountable) strategic warheads,
114
 without changing 
the number of the ICBMs or the bomber force. In 2011, Commander of STRATCOM 
General Kehler, in addition, stated that these proposals “did not assume any specific 
changes to targeting or employment guidance. Analyses considered a range of potential 
security environments, strategy requirements, and submarine force structures. […] 
While there is uncertainty about the future strategic environment and policy 
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 An alternative explanation for the one-third reduction is that it is a “self amplifying feedback” on the 
projected number of Russian forces, which are expected to decline significantly in the coming years, as a 
result of retiring the aging nuclear weapons systems of the Cold War. (Interview with Bruce G. Blair 
[2014])  
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 400 single-warhead ICBMs, 60 bombers, and 640 SLBM warheads, deployed on 10 submarines and 
160 SLBMs (the remaining two submarines with altogether 32 SLBMs being in overhaul). 
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requirements, I am confident that a plan to procure 12 Ohio Replacement SSBNs with 
16 missile tubes will meet deterrence requirements.” (Congressional Hearing [2011]) 
From a political perspective, there are many ways to implement these reductions, 
depending on the legal framework and the administration’s willingness to move on with 
or without Russian reciprocity. First, the administration could decide to pursue a 
completely new agreement with Moscow; second, a bilateral amendment could be 
attached to the New START, lowering the ceilings of the treaty; third, informal 
reciprocal reductions could be concluded, based on presidential directives; and fourth, 
the U.S. could also implement the reductions unilaterally, regardless of the actions of 
the Russian counterpart. At the moment, the White House seems to prefer a legally 
binding new treaty with Moscow, but the political circumstances are not really 
favorable for the initiation of a new round of arms control talks. (Interview with 
Madelyn R. Creedon [2014]) 
Whatever option the administration (or the next one) decides to pursue, STRATCOM 
and the JCS already concluded that they are comfortable with these cuts, and they are 
planning with these lower numbers. In terms of operational strategies, the big question 
is how to go even lower. In this regard, the most important factors are targeting criteria 
and targeting strategy – these requirements put tremendous pressure on the force 
structure (especially on the deployed strategic nuclear arsenal), and they clearly define 
how many nuclear weapons are needed for the execution of the war plans. 
The intellectual debate over targeting strategies (comparing the advantages and dangers 
of counterforce and counter-value policies) go back to the early years of the Cold War. 
In this regard, the first big illusion is that the U.S. cannot maintain a counterforce 
strategy under significantly lower numbers. Opponents of deep reductions argue that 
after a certain point, the U.S. would be forced to shift to a counter-value strategy which 
would mean the targeting of the civilian population, which is immoral.
115
 First of all, a 
lot depends on the military capabilities of the potential adversaries. Maintaining a 
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 As already mentioned before, the author of this dissertation does not agree with the so called “city 
busting” characterization of counter-value strategies, which aims the deliberate destruction of civilian 
populations. Counter-value targets are generally softer economic targets, closer to highly populated areas, 
therefore aiming at these targets would inevitably result in a higher loss of civilians. Launching hundreds 
of nuclear weapons on counter-value targets would definitely be immoral but it would also be immoral to 
launch them against counterforce targets. Therefore, rejecting one of these strategies on moral grounds is 
ambiguous at best, as the current counterforce strategy already “accepts” a significant level of civilian 
casualties. 
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counterforce strategy under lower numbers could actually be more attractive than under 
larger numbers, if the potential opponents also reduced their nuclear forces. As James 
N. Miller noted, in a bilateral situation where each side had only one nuclear weapon, 
both sides would have extremely strong incentives to target the other’s nuclear 
capability. If reductions happen in a multilateral form, the lower you go, the more 
attractive counterforce becomes; therefore having survivable forces is increasingly 
important for stability as numbers are reduced. (Interview with James N. Miller [2014])  
The alternative scenario is that the U.S. reduces its nuclear forces significantly, but its 
adversaries would remain on the current levels, or even increase their arsenals. In this 
case, the existing targeting categories – 1) military forces; 2) WMD infrastructure; 3) 
military and national leadership; and 4) war-supporting infrastructure – are obviously 
unsustainable and there is a strong pressure to abandon certain categories. Having for 
example 200 nuclear weapons altogether, and using them against the nuclear forces of 
an adversary with 2,000 nuclear weapons does not make any sense, and it does not 
constitute a real deterrence value. Under both scenarios, stability will depend on 
effective deterrence, and an assured second strike capability.  
Although this second scenario will definitely require a reevaluation of the current 
targeting policies, it still does not mean that the U.S. is forced to shift to a city-busting 
counter-value strategy. For the transitional period with extremely low numbers (which 
will eventually lead to global zero), experts of the Federation of American Scientists 
and the Natural Resources Defense Council suggested a so called ‘minimal deterrence’ 
posture, which “will make retaliation after nuclear attack the sole mission for nuclear 
weapons.” (Kristensen; Norris; Oelrich [2009]: p. 2.) This strategy is based on a new 
targeting policy, which explicitly avoids targeting cities and focuses on industrial 
infrastructure facilities, like for example power plants, or oil and metal refineries. A 
central concept of this strategy is a secured nuclear retaliatory capability, instead of the 
current Cold War-style ready-to-launch damage limitation policies – as the authors 
argue, nuclear deterrence must be separated from war fighting. The main characteristics 
of this posture would include: reduced missions for nuclear weapons, the removal of 
planning for a first strike, a constrained second-use policy, no nuclear forces on alert, 
and the clear separation of nuclear and conventional forces. Kristensen, Norris, and 
Oelrich claim that minimal deterrence would turn off Cold War dynamics, and permit a 
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significant relaxation of warhead requirements (with the eliminated need to take off 
underground targets and hardened silos, the current “legacy warheads” would be more 
than enough to fulfill the mission of nuclear weapons). This would pave the way for 
further deep reductions, and it would create a stable equilibrium before the last step is 
taken towards total nuclear elimination. (Kristensen; Norris; Oelrich [2009])  
An additional challenge of abandoning hard counterforce targeting and moving towards 
lower numbers is the reassurance of allies. Allies do not seem to understand these 
concepts, and they seem to worry about “what is left for their reassurance if the U.S. 
goes down to a few hundred nuclear weapons.” (Interview with Jon B. Wolfsthal 
[2014]) In this regard, Kristensen, Norris, and Oelrich argue that “Knowing that the 
attack on infrastructure would follow if any nation were unwise enough to attack the 
United States or its allies with nuclear weapons should be enough of a deterrent – to the 
extent anything is – to prevent an attack in the first place.” (Kristensen; Norris; Oelrich 
[2009]: p. 51.) Besides, the reduced reliance on nuclear weapons could be 
counterbalanced with an increased reliance on forward deployed non-nuclear 
assurances, which are more appropriate to address the challenges these states are facing 
today, and which can more credibly deter a potential aggression against their sovereign 
territory. 
Altogether, the current Cold War-style counterforce targeting sets a serious limit to how 
deep the U.S. can reduce its nuclear forces, and ties the future of reductions to the 
capabilities of the potential adversaries. But, if further deep reductions are to be 
pursued, some elements of the present (hard) counterforce targeting might have to be 
abandoned (depending on the adversaries’ military capabilities). Whether the existing 
targeting categories can be maintained or need to be reevaluated, the U.S. will not be 
forced to pursue a city-busting counter-value strategy, and it can still avoid the 
deliberate targeting of civilians. Whatever the future numbers and strategy will look 
like, the main driving factors should be effective deterrence, stability and survivability.  
Regarding the reassurance of allies, tactical nuclear weapons play a crucial role, 
especially vis-à-vis NATO allies. Both in the 2010 NPR, and in the 2013 employment 
guidance Washington reaffirmed its commitment to “maintain the capability to 
forward-deploy nuclear weapons with heavy bombers and dual-capable aircraft in 
support of extended deterrence and assurance of U.S. Allies and partners. In Europe, a 
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forward-based posture should be maintained, consistent with the 2012 North Atlantic 
treaty Organization (NATO) Deterrence and Defence Posture Review, and until such 
time as NATO has agreed the conditions are appropriate to change the Alliance’s 
nuclear posture.” (U.S. Department of Defense [2013]: p. 6.) In the framework of the 
B61 life extension program, the U.S. is planning to build 500 new B61-12 tactical 
nuclear weapons, of which probably 200 will replace the old versions, and remain 
deployed in Europe. From an operational perspective, reducing the reliance on tactical 
nuclear weapons, and facilitating a withdrawal from Europe would require an increased 
reliance on forward-deployed conventional forces and regional missile defense systems 
(which the U.S. already pledged to strengthen in order to limit the role of nuclear 
weapons in general). And even if tactical nuclear weapons would be withdrawn from 
Europe, the nuclear deterrence of the Alliance could still be maintained by the tactical 
nuclear forces, currently kept in storage in the continental U.S., and also by the strategic 
nuclear forces of the U.S., as well as “the independent strategic nuclear forces of the 
United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own” (as stated by the 
2012 Deterrence and Defence Posture Review – DDPR). (DDPR [2012]) 
 
6.2 Non-Deployed Nuclear Weapons
116
 
Regarding the strategic aspects of nuclear reductions, the prospects to cut the non-
deployed nuclear arsenal depend both on operational factors, and on developments in 
the nuclear modernization programs. The technical requirements to hedge against the 
failure of a warhead type or a leg of the triad, and the need to have a constant reserve 
force against unforeseen geopolitical challenges both influence the number and type of 
non-deployed nuclear weapons. In this regard, the administration claimed that the new 
“3+2” warhead modernization strategy could bring significant changes, and facilitate 
cutting the hedge force in half. 
During the Cold War, the role of non-deployed nuclear forces was very limited as both 
superpowers tried to deploy the majority of their nuclear weapons inventories. Reserve 
nuclear forces were small as a result of the continuous development and production of 
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new nuclear weapons, which guaranteed the rapid exchange of the entire stockpile in 
every few years. The United States only started to create a permanent reserve or hedge 
force in the early 1990s. The role of the hedge was twofold: first, to guarantee an up-
build capability in case of a reemerging confrontation with Russia, and second, a 
technical insurance to secure against the potential failure of a warhead type or a delivery 
system. Despite the dissolution of the Soviet Union, during the first years of the 1990s, 
the United States was skeptical about the democratic transition of the previous Eastern 
Block and the commitment of the Russian Federation to arms control measures in 
general. Therefore, the Clinton administration’s 1994 NPR officially codified – for the 
first time – the concept of a hedge force against the uncertainties and the potential risks 
of the security environment. (NPR [1994]) This concept gradually lost importance as 
the number of deployed strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons kept shrinking on 
both sides and relations improved between Washington and Moscow. By the end of the 
1990s, the main rationale for upholding the hedge force shifted towards the necessity of 
maintaining a back-up against technical failures. Although the nuclear arsenal was 
aging, a moratorium was declared on nuclear weapons testing, and several production 
facilities were closed. Therefore, it seemed imperative to retain fully functional nuclear 
warheads in reserve as an insurance policy. (Ritchie [2009]: pp. 96-97.) 
While the Clinton administration’s NPR was not too explicit about what the hedge 
really was, both the Bush and the Obama administrations made the specific role of the 
hedge clearer. Although technical considerations remained important, the Bush 
administration’s 2001 NPR refocused U.S. hedging policy on safeguarding against 
geopolitical surprises, originating from a wider range of adversaries. (NPR [2001]) This 
shift in planning meant that the force structure was designed for a post-Cold War 
environment with a more cooperative Russia. Therefore, the primary goal of the hedge 
was to provide guarantees in case this environment changed and U.S.-Russian relations 
significantly deteriorated. 
Regardless of the main focus of the acting administration, the hedge has always served 
two different roles which belong to two separate institutions: the military considers the 
hedge a responsive force against the uncertainties of the international geopolitical 
environment, while the National Nuclear Security Administration views the hedge as a 
repository to safeguard the aging U.S. nuclear arsenal. These two institutions advise the 
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administration on the required size of the hedge.
117
 Since the end of the Cold War, both 
the United States and Russia considerably reduced their deployed nuclear warheads, but 
Washington retained many of these weapons in the hedge. By now there are more non-
deployed nuclear weapons than deployed nuclear weapons in its military stockpile. 
According to FAS estimates (Kristensen; Norris [2014b]), the United States has a 
military stockpile of 4,650 nuclear weapons, of which roughly 1,900 strategic and 200 
tactical nuclear weapons are deployed. Altogether this leaves around 2,500 non-
deployed nuclear weapons in reserve – approximately 2,200 strategic and 300 non-
strategic.
118
 This hedge force
119
 provides the United States with a capability to increase 
its deployed nuclear arsenal to more than 4,000 nuclear weapons within three years.
120
 
In the long run, this capability might feed into Russian paranoia as it has the potential to 
undermine strategic parity and it could become a serious roadblock on the way towards 
further reductions in deployed strategic as well as non-strategic nuclear arsenals.  
The Obama administration has already indicated in the 2010 NPR that it is considering 
reductions in the nuclear hedge. According to the document, the “non-deployed 
stockpile currently includes more warheads than required” and the “implementation of 
the Stockpile Stewardship Program and the nuclear infrastructure investments” could 
set the ground for “major reductions” in the stockpile. (NPR [2010]: p. 38.) However, 
in parallel to these significant reductions, the United States “will retain the ability to 
‘upload’ some nuclear warheads as a technical hedge against any future problems with 
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 Regarding the size of the hedge, there are concrete calculations based on technical considerations to 
determine the size of the technical hedge, which is needed to safeguard against the potential failure of a 
warhead type or a delivery system. In general terms, the hedge contains one back-up warhead for each 
deployed warhead (and some additional warheads for example to support LEPs). Sizing the geopolitical 
hedge, on the other hand, is more difficult to calculate. According to Bradley H. Roberts, the general rule 
has been to have enough warheads in the hedge to get the deployed forces back to the level of the 
previous arms control agreement – for example, in the case of the George W. Bush administration this 
meant getting back to the levels of the START I agreement. (Interview with Bradley H. Roberts [2014]) 
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 Some warheads in the hedge are active (they are maintained in an operational status but non-deployed, 
mostly stored at a depot or at an operational base) and some of them are inactive (they are maintained in a 
non-operational status, they have their tritium components removed and other limited life components are 
not replaced until the warheads are reactivated). (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, 
Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs [2011]) 
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 In general, the hedge force does not necessarily cover a 100 percent of the non-deployed arsenal – 
there are some “grey areas.” According to certain accounts, bomber weapons on bomber bases are not 
part of the deployed arsenal but they are definitely not part of the hedge either. Another example is the 
category of the so called “legacy warheads” which are not being refurbished but kept to support an 
undergoing Life Extension Program and kept only until there is confidence in the LEP. 
120
 Reserve warheads can be added to bombers within days or weeks, additional warheads can be 
uploaded to SSBNs within months but uploading again three warheads on each ICBM takes more time. 
At each ICBM base, approximately one week is needed for the reconfiguration of a missile, therefore 
uploading all 450 ICBMs would require more than two years. 
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U.S. delivery systems or warheads, or as a result of a fundamental deterioration of the 
security environment.” (NPR [2010]: p. 22.) In line with the 2010 NPR, the 2013 
Presidential Employment Guidance also envisioned reductions in the deployed strategic 
nuclear arsenal and reaffirmed the intention to reduce the hedge as well. The Pentagon 
report discussed an “alternative approach to hedging” which would allow the United 
States to provide the necessary back-up capabilities “with fewer nuclear weapons.” This 
alternative approach puts the main emphasis on the technical role of the hedge, claiming 
that “a non-deployed hedge that is sized and ready to address these technical risks will 
also provide the United States the capability to upload additional weapons in response 
to geopolitical developments.” (U.S. Department of Defense [2013]: pp. 6-7.) 
According to Hans M. Kristensen, this might imply that the hedge will no longer 
contain “two categories” of warheads – the number of reserve warheads that is enough 
to protect against technical failures will be enough against potential geopolitical 
challenges as well. (Kristensen [2013a]) However, at this point it is still unclear if (and 
when) this new approach will lead to actual force reductions in the non-deployed 
nuclear arsenal. 
U.S. government documents (for example the employment guidance or the FY 2014 
SSMP) have been setting up a number of preconditions for reducing the size of the 
hedge. Beyond “geopolitical stability,” the two most important preconditions are the 
establishment of a responsive infrastructure by constructing new warhead production 
facilities and the successful completion of the warhead modernization programs. The 
DoE’s FY 2014 SSMP, which proposed the so-called “3+2” warhead plan, claimed that 
the development of interoperable warheads could permit a considerable reduction in the 
number of hedge warheads. However, in light of the current budget constraints, it is still 
unclear if the program will start as planned and even if completed according to 
schedule, the gradual reduction of the technical hedge would not begin until the mid-
2030s. Similar challenges will arise if the administration wishes to link the reduction of 
the hedge to the construction of new warhead production facilities – some of which 
have already been delayed due to budget considerations, and the exact dates and 
technical details of their future completion are still unclear. 
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The preconditions would mean that significant reductions in the hedge
121
 are unlikely to 
materialize for at least another 15 years. In the meanwhile, the deployed arsenal faces 
two scenarios in the coming decades: 1) the number of warheads and delivery platforms 
could keep shrinking, or 2) arms control negotiations might fail to produce further 
reductions as a result of strategic disparities (partly caused by the huge U.S. non-
deployed arsenal). Under the first scenario, keeping the hedge in its current size would 
be illogical because a smaller deployed arsenal would require fewer replacement 
warheads for the case of technical failures, and because fewer delivery platforms would 
require fewer up-load warheads in case of geopolitical surprises. Maintaining the 
current non-deployed arsenal would not make any more sense under the second scenario 
either. If future arms control negotiations get stuck based on arguments over strategic 
parity, maintaining a large hedge force will be part of the problem, not the solution. 
Therefore, insisting on the “modernization precondition” and keeping the current hedge 
for another 15 years would not bring any benefits for the United States. 
Moreover, this might also send a bad signal to Russia, where U.S. missile defense 
developments and its alleged impact on strategic stability are already a primary source 
of concern to the Kremlin. As a result of aging technologies and necessary retirements, 
Russian nuclear forces have been constantly decreasing, and despite all modernization 
efforts,
122
 it is expected that by the early 2020s the ICBM arsenal will shrink to 220 
missiles. (Kristensen; Norris [2013b]) Russia already deploys 40 percent less strategic 
delivery systems than the United States and tries to keep the balance of deployed 
weapons by higher warhead loadings. This does not give Russia the ability to 
significantly increase the deployed number of warheads – not just because of the lower 
number of delivery platforms but also because of the lack of reserve warheads 
comparable in number to the United States hedge force. In this regard there is an 
important asymmetry between Russia and the United States – while Washington keeps a 
hedge for technical and geopolitical challenges, Moscow maintains an active production 
infrastructure, which – if necessary – enables the production of hundreds of new 
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 Regardless of the status of nuclear modernization programs, some moderate reductions will eventually 
occur in the hedge force. In the framework of the New START Treaty, the number of deployed strategic 
nuclear weapons will shrink and it will facilitate some reductions in the technical hedge, as well. 
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 Russian has an ongoing modernization program, in the framework of which it has already begun to 
build a new heavy ICBM and a multiple-warhead Bulava SLBM. 
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weapons every year.
123
 In the meantime, the United States loads only 4-5 warheads on 
its SLBMs (instead of their maximum capacity of 8 warheads) and finished 
downloading all of its ICBMs to a single warhead configuration (with a maintained 
capability to re-MIRV). Taken into account the upload potential on these delivery 
vehicles and the number of warheads in the hedge force, in case of a dramatic 
deterioration of the international security environment the United States could increase 
its strategic nuclear arsenal to above 4,000 deployed warheads in about three years. 
These dynamics work against strategic stability (which, according to Russia, is partly 
identified by strategic parity), and might have a negative effect on the chances of cutting 
the deployed arsenals as well. The intentions of the Obama administration to cut the 
hedge in half if the “3+2” is completed are good, but it would take too much time, and it 
seems to be more urgent to start implementing gradual reductions as it could indicate 
good faith and contribute to the establishment of a more favorable geopolitical 
environment. It could signal President Obama’s serious commitment to further 
disarmament, send a positive message to Russian military planners and ease some of 
their paranoia about U.S. force structure trends. 
 
6.2 The Future of the Triad 
Although the 2010 NPR examined the status of the strategic triad and the possibility of 
slicing it down to a dyad, it finally endorsed keeping all three legs. According to the 
2010 NPR, the three legs have a complementary role to each other: SSBNs provide 
survivability, ICBMs provide prompt launch capability, and bombers provide flexibility 
and the capability to signal in a crisis. Besides, proponents of the triad argue that it 
provides the President with a wider range of options; it is more appropriate to credibly 
deter opponents, and reassure allies; it serves strategic stability as it reduces the 
incentives for an attack in a crisis situation; and a variety in delivery vehicles provides a 
hedge against the failure of an entire leg. As James N. Miller argued, the lower you go, 
the more important it is to hedge and reduce vulnerabilities, and as long as nuclear 
weapons exist, this logic supports maintaining the triad. (Interview with James N. Miller 
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 This asymmetry definitely has its implications for the long term (10-15 years) status of strategic parity, 
but certainly less impact on short term relations. 
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[2014]) Morton Halperin, in addition, reminded that a pledge to maintain all three legs 
of the triad can advance the administration’s goals to implement significant reductions 
in the number of warheads. As all three legs have a powerful lobby in Congress, they 
have the power to undermine any further cuts in the arsenal. But, if the different 
services do not have to worry about the future of their programs, they might be less 
interested in preventing any kind of force reductions, and might support some cuts to 
the overall number of the stockpile. (Interview with Morton H. Halperin [2014]) 
Although there are several advantages to keeping all three legs of the triad, the 
economic problems and the budget cuts put this issue back on the table, and they might 
force the administration to reconsider its position. The main reason is that these delivery 
vehicles are the most expensive elements of the modernization programs. As General 
James Cartwright, former Commander of STRATCOM and former Vice Chairman of 
the JCS highlighted, the delivery vehicles are aging, “the challenge here is that we have 
to recapitalize all three [triad] legs, and we don’t have the money to do it”. General 
Robert Kehler, also former Commander of STRATCOM expressed similar thoughts: 
“we’re not going to be able to go forward with weapon systems that cost what weapon 
systems cost today”. (Quoted in Woolf [2012]) While, Admiral Mike Mullen, former 
Chairman of the JCS, predicted that in the future the U.S. might be forced to reduce its 
capabilities to a dyad: “At some point in time, that triad becomes very, very expensive. 
[...] At some point in time, in the future, certainly I think a decision will have to be made 
in terms of whether we keep the triad or drop it down to a dyad.” (Mullen [2011]: p. 
14.) 
Regarding the SSBN submarines, they have the strongest place among the delivery 
vehicles, and most likely they will be the last leg to fall from the strategic triad. But 
maintaining the current fleet of 14 submarines is costly, and building 12 new 
submarines is projected to cost an additional $347 billion for their entire lifecycle. 
(Collina [2014]) Therefore, a 2013 CBO report proposed that the U.S. should reduce the 
current size of its fleet to eight SSBNs, and it should only build eight new SSBNX 
submarines. (CBO [2013a]) There are two major arguments against maintaining such a 
robust SSBN arsenal, the first one is the potential to save billions of dollars in a tight 
budget environment (according to the CBO, reducing the fleet to eight submarines could 
save $11 billion between 2015 and 2023, and another $30 billion during the 2030s); and 
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the second argument is the fact that submarines do not run on full capacity. Even now, 
submarines only carry around 4-5 nuclear warheads, and by the time the first SSBNX 
enters into service in 2031, the strategic nuclear arsenal will probably be even smaller. 
Implementing these changes, however, will definitely require several revisions on the 
operational level as well. Constantly holding at risk a certain number of targets in 
Russia, China, North Korea, and the Middle East requires that eight or nine of the 
operational submarines are at sea at any given time, of which four or five (two-three at 
the Pacific, and one-two at the Atlantic) are at “hard alert” within the range of their 
targets, while the other three or four are in transit to, or from their patrols, on a so called 
“modified alert.” This means that the first step to reduce these numbers is the limitation 
of operational strategies, such as target categories, and alert level requirements.  
Looking at the other two legs of the triad, bombers seem to be at a safe place for now. 
While the service life of the B-2s is expected to last until 2058, the Air Force already 
reported that it had secretly started the development of a new Long Range Strike 
Bomber, which will replace the ageing B-52s in the 2020s. Besides, the Air Force lays a 
huge emphasis on developing dual-capable aircrafts, which can also be used for 
conventional missions. ICBMs, on the other hand, are endangered for three reasons: 
first, the service life of the Minuteman III ICBMs can be extended to 2030, which 
means that their replacement is not the most urgent issue and they might fall victim to 
reductions because of the cost overruns of other modernization programs. The second 
issue is the projected decrease of the Russian ICBM forces. As already mentioned, 
Moscow’s ICBM arsenal is expected to shrink to 220 missiles by the early 2020s, which 
could set the ground for significant reductions in the U.S. ICBM force as well. The third 
issue, which might influence the future of the ICBMs is a change in the operational 
policies that could directly affect their strategic role. In this regard, alert levels and the 
launch under attack policy are the most important factors. 
Although the Obama administration seems determined to maintain the current alert 
levels, a future change in this policy might trigger reductions in the ICBM force as well. 
Advocates of de-alerting, in general, argue that the potential consequences of an 
inadvertent launch would outweigh by far the benefits that may come from keeping 
nuclear weapons on high alert in the current security environment. They claim that this 
is an outdated Cold War practice which is dangerous and totally inappropriate to 
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address the challenges of the 21
st
 century. (Kristensen; McKinzie [2012]: p. 17.) These 
people believe that the fears of a re-alerting race are “overblown because today’s highly 
alerted nuclear postures involve visibly deploying, or ‘generating,’ nuclear forces and 
increasing alert levels in a crisis.” They also claim that reducing alert levels is possible 
in a gradual and verifiable manner, which would eliminate the risks, and also discourage 
smaller nuclear weapon states from increasing their own readiness levels. The current 
excessive alert postures of the U.S. and Russia lock nuclear planning into Cold War-
style scenarios, while a gradual reduction in their alert postures could “reduce readiness 
levels, lengthen decision times, and develop the experience and means to verify the 
process.” (Kristensen; McKinzie [2013]) 
Opponents of de-alerting, in contrast, argue that the risks of an inadvertent launch are 
exaggerated and highly unlikely,
124
 while the risks of de-alerting are more imminent, as 
reducing the operational readiness of nuclear forces would harm crisis stability, and 
make the idea of a preemptive strike more attractive. In case of a crisis, they claim, a re-
alerting race would intensify tensions, and it would make the use of nuclear weapons 
more likely. (Kristensen; McKinzie [2012]: p. 17.) Opponents, in addition, argue that 
there is no support in the military for de-alerting as there are technical difficulties to 
implement de-alerting measures in the strategic nuclear forces (Interview with Gary 
Samore [2014]) – these physical problems, however, could be overcome by the next 
generation designs. (Interview with James E. Cartwright [2014]) On top of these 
concerns, Franklin C. Miller, adds that “no verification scheme has yet been devised to 
provide confidence that a missile, land- or sea-based, either has been taken off alert or 
returned to alert status.” And finally, opponents also worry about the morale 
consequences of de-alerting, “once crews stop believing their mission is real they cease 
to pay attention to their responsibilities and lose competency; de-alerting would create 
such attitudes.” (Miller [2009]: pp. 289-290.) 
After serious discussions in the framework of the interagency review process, the White 
House came to the conclusion that the dangers of de-alerting outlined above outweigh 
the potential benefits of it therefore the administration pledged to keep the current alert 
levels. Despite this decision, President Obama also directed the DoD to reduce reliance 
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 Those, who question the benefits of de-alerting, emphasize that the alert postures of both the U.S. and 
Russia are “highly stable and subject to multiple layers of controls,” ensuring clear civilian (i.e. 
presidential) decision-making. (Miller [2009]) 
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on, but maintain the capability of launch under attack, which is a closely related policy 
to alert levels. 
In theory, in case of a first strike from the adversaries, a prompt launch capability can 
guarantee the survivability of fixed and vulnerable forces (i.e. ICBMs), and provide the 
President with a range of immediate options. Although the current security environment 
does not seem to justify planning for such a scenario, no President can allow an 
adversary to believe with confidence that the entire U.S. ICBM force can be taken out 
with hundreds of nuclear warheads deployed on them – giving up the option of prompt 
launch would create an asymmetric vulnerability, and it would be an invitation for a 
first strike. (Interview with Bradley H. Roberts [2014])  
ICBMs, in general, complicate an adversary’s targeting policy, as they absorb hundreds 
of nuclear weapons, and there is a strong deterrent value to them.
125
 (Interview with 
Madelyn R. Creedon [2014]) Besides, ICBMS on high alert provide a prompt launch 
capability, which might still be necessary in case of a regional crisis, when the vital 
interests of an ally are at stake, and further escalation could be prevented by a limited 
nuclear strike. (Interview with Amy R. Woolf [2014]) But if the administration decides 
to take ICBMs off alert, and give up the capability to prompt launch, then some people 
would argue that the U.S. would diminish their most important strategic value, and it 
would eventually make them vulnerable and lead to their complete withdrawal of the 
nuclear triad. Therefore, any future initiative to reduce the alert status of ICBMs, and 
diminish the capability to launch under attack could probably have significant 
consequences to the future of the land-based leg of the nuclear triad. 
 
6.4 The Strategic Requirements of Lower Numbers 
When President Obama announced his plans to reduce the number of deployed strategic 
nuclear weapons to between 1,000 and 1,100 nuclear warheads, conservative circles 
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 In relation to this point, Franklin C. Miller argued that without ICBMs, an adversary could easily 
calculate how to cripple U.S. nuclear forces with only a few nuclear weapons (by targeting air bases and 
SSBN bases, significant damages could be caused). But launching a very few nuclear weapons could still 
be explained by the adversary as an accidental or unauthorized launch, despite the devastating damage it 
might cause to the overall U.S. nuclear arsenal. Having 400 ICBMs, on the other hand, would require 
launching at least 800 nuclear warheads if an adversary really wants to take out U.S. nuclear forces – in 
this case, there would be no questions about the intentions of the given adversary, and there would be no 
ambiguity about the nature of the attack. (Interview with Franklin C. Miller [2014]) 
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attacked him for going too deep, while arms control advocates claimed that these 
numbers were too moderate. By 2013, a number of reports have already been published 
on how to implement really deep force reductions in the U.S.-Russian nuclear arsenals. 
In a 2005 Arms Control Association report,
126
 ‘What Are Nuclear Weapons For’ 
physics Professor Sidney D. Drell and Ambassador James E. Goodby argued that 
“Based on an analysis of the present and prospective threats that define missions for 
U.S. nuclear weapons we conclude that the strategic arsenal required by the United 
States can be reduced to considerably lower numbers. We recommend a U.S. force 
structure of 500 operationally deployed nuclear warheads, plus 500 in a responsive 
force.” (Drell; Goodby [2007]: p. v.) The document called for an operationally deployed 
force of three Trident submarines on station at sea, carrying 24 missiles and 96 
warheads each (a mix of low-yield W76s and high-yield W88s). In addition to that, the 
deployed force structure would include 100 single-warhead (W87) Minuteman III 
ICBMs, placed in hardened silos, and 20–25 B2 and B52H bombers. The responsive 
force would consist of three Trident submarines (similarly loaded with 96 warheads), in 
transit or in port, plus two or three unarmed boats in overhaul. It would also include 50–
100 Minuteman III ICBMs off alert and without warheads, and 20–25 unarmed 
bombers. Altogether, the Drell-Goodby report recommended a force structure, which 
included already existing warhead designs, maintained the current diversity, and the 
potential to hedge against the uncertainties of the security environment and the technical 
failures of a warhead type or a delivery system.  
Even more dramatic numbers were outlined by Global Zero in a 2012 U.S. Nuclear 
Policy Commission report, ‘Modernizing U.S. Nuclear Strategy, Force Structure and 
Posture.’127 (Global Zero [2012]). The report called for steps on five main areas: 1) a 
dramatically reduced force structure to 450 deployed strategic nuclear weapons, and an 
additional 450 in reserve; 2) a de-alerted posture, which would require “24-72 hours to 
generate the capacity for offensive nuclear strikes;” 3) a “more secure, consolidated 
and ‘locked down’ nuclear weapons stockpile,” which would reduce the threats of theft 
or unintended use; 4) “a stood-up alert missile defense and conventional force 
capability that is prompt and global,” which in a crisis situation could function 
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 The original report was revised in 2007. 
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 The project was chaired by General (ret.) James Cartwright, and the commission included Ambassador 
Richard Burt, Senator Chuck Hagel (now Secretary of Defense), Ambassador Thomas Pickering, General 
(ret.) Jack Sheehan, and Dr. Bruce Blair, co-founder of Global Zero. 
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effectively in the 24-72 hours timeframe, while the nuclear forces are generated; and 5) 
a reliable and effective command, control, communications and early warning system, 
which can manage the transition from negative to positive control over nuclear forces. 
(Global Zero [2012]: p. 6.) The force structure would include ten SSBNs (seven 
assigned to the Pacific and three to the Atlantic), carrying 720 strategic nuclear 
warheads (half of it deployed, half non-deployed), and 18 B-2s with 180 gravity bombs 
(half of it deployed, half non-deployed). ICBMs and tactical nuclear weapons, on the 
other hand, would be phased out. The report argued that ICBMs are dangerous and they 
can only support nuclear wartime operations against Russia, as their minimum energy 
trajectories would cross Russian territory, whether the missile is directed against China, 
North Korea, Syria, or Iran. It would be ambiguous and it has the potential to trigger a 
nuclear retaliation. Moreover, ICBMs were argued to be “inherently targetable and 
depend heavily upon launch on warning for survival under some scenarios of enemy 
attack.” (Global Zero [2012]: p. 8.) Regarding tactical nuclear weapons, the report 
recommends their elimination, as “Their military utility is practically nil. They do not 
have assigned missions as part of any war plan and remained deployed today only for 
political reasons within the NATO alliance.” (Global Zero [2012]: pp. 8-9.) In terms of 
implementation, the report proposed a ten year timeframe by 2022, either with Russian 
reciprocity (by reciprocal presidential directives or a new arms control treaty), or 
unilaterally.  
One of the most ambitious proposals was outlined by James Wood Forsyth Jr., Colonel 
B. Chance Saltzman, and Gary Schaub Jr. who argued that “In fact, the United States 
could address military utility concerns with only 311 nuclear weapons in its nuclear 
force structure while maintaining a stable deterrence.” (Forsyth; Saltzman; Schaub 
[2010]: p. 82.) This would mean 192 de-MIRVed Trident D5 SLBMs on twelve Ohio 
class submarines, a hundred single-warhead Minuteman III ICBMs, and 19 B-2s with 
air-launched cruise missiles for continued standoff capability and flexibility. (Forsyth; 
Saltzman; Schaub [2010]: pp. 82-83.) 
The most important reason why it is worth comparing these proposals is that it clearly 
shows that there is not just one right way to implement deep cuts. While the Global 
Zero report advocated for a dyad, the other two studies planned to maintain the triad, the 
question of de-alerting was also not crucial in two of the three proposals, and tactical 
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nuclear weapons were also not crossed out by all of them. Altogether, it shows that a lot 
depends on the operational requirements, the targets that need to be held at risk, and the 
deterrence strategy a state decides to pursue. Despite this flexibility in certain aspects of 
the implementation, it is clear that in order to reach these numbers, some of the current 
operational elements definitely need to be limited (or abandoned). 
In this regard, the following areas have the potential to facilitate significant force 
reductions, and pave the way towards a more relaxed posture and a more limited future 
arsenal:  
1) Reduce the mission of nuclear weapons: 
 Introduce a “sole purpose” posture: declare that the sole purpose of nuclear 
weapons is to deter a nuclear attack against the U.S., its allies and partners. And 
apply an unconditional negative security assurance: declare that the U.S. will not 
use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states. 
o First, these changes would reduce the number of potential adversaries 
from the current six to three (Russia, China, and North Korea), as only 
those states would remain targetable by the U.S. nuclear arsenal, which 
possess nuclear weapons.  
o Second, these changes would also limit the target categories and the 
target lists, as they would eliminate the requirement to plan against 
chemical and biological weapons, which do not have the potential to 
threaten the survival of the U.S. or its allies, and could be credibly 
deterred with conventional weapons.
128
 
Altogether, this would require planning for a smaller range of contingencies, 
against a smaller number of states, which could definitely eliminate the need for 
certain types and number of nuclear weapons. (Besides, it would also result a 
more relaxed posture, with an implicit no-first-use declaration, as the U.S. would 
only use its nuclear arsenal in response to a nuclear attack.) 
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 Paradoxically, reducing the planning against non-nuclear weapon states, and contingencies involving 
chemical and biological weapons would not be a shift from Cold War to post-Cold War policies but it 
would be abandoning a post-Cold War phenomenon which was essentially raised to operational policy 
during the Clinton and the Bush administrations, and it would mean returning to a kind of Cold War 
logic, which puts a huge emphasis on deterring nuclear attacks.  
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2) Change targeting principles: 
 Limit damage criteria: reduce the requirements for damage expectancy in strike 
options. 
o As long as damage requirements are high, high-priority targets need to be 
covered with multiple warheads, or with more accurate, higher yield 
weapons. But if these requirements are lowered, it could significantly 
reduce the number and type of warheads required to meet the target plans 
and destroy a target. 
 Reduce flexibility requirements: plan for fewer scenarios and provide the 
President with fewer (but more realistic) strike options. 
o Once the number of adversaries is reduced, and the target categories are 
limited, there is a reduced requirement to plan against certain scenarios, 
and there is an opportunity to reduce the diversity of strike options as 
well. Taken into consideration the dramatic developments is adaptive 
planning, the number of preplanned scenarios can be reduced, and 
adaptive plans can take over further responsibilities. The reductions in 
the strike options, and the reduced reliance on preplanned war plans 
would also have a positive effect on the prospects of further reductions. 
 End (hard) counterforce targeting:129 The Cold War-style counterforce targeting 
policy meant a force-on-force strategy, which required a robust and advanced 
nuclear arsenal. 
o Reducing the counterforce mission, and shifting the focus to softer 
targets (by implementing, for example, the already mentioned counter-
infrastructure strategy) could eliminate the requirement for hundreds (or 
thousands) of nuclear weapons. U.S. nuclear forces would still remain 
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 As mentioned before, the reduced number of nuclear weapons does not necessarily have to come with 
an alternative targeting policy – if the adversaries keep reducing their capabilities in a reciprocal manner, 
then the current categories can be maintained. (Essentially this is the reason why the current target 
categories are so similar to the Cold War categories, whereas the number of nuclear weapons has been 
significantly cut since then.) But the dynamics of the past few years suggest that major force reductions 
are less and less likely, therefore waiting for reciprocal measures (from Russia and eventually from China 
as well) might not pay off. The advantage of ending Cold War-style counterforce targeting is that it can 
significantly fasten the process of reductions, and it does not make these cuts dependent on any adversary.  
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capable to destroy critical war-making and industrial targets, but it would 
be under significantly lower numbers. 
3) Focus on retaliation instead of war fighting: 
 Reduce planning for damage limitation: during the Cold War, U.S. targeting 
policy reflected an increased planning for damage limitation, which meant that 
the U.S. was planning to destroy the adversaries’ forces before they could be 
used. This required a high level of readiness, and a robust arsenal, aimed at the 
most valuable counterforce targets. Today, there is already a reduced reliance on 
damage limitation as a huge portion of the nuclear forces is in reserve and needs 
to be generated before use, while alert levels have also been significantly 
reduced. These changes allowed significant reductions during the two Bush 
administrations, and further limiting these policies could probably facilitate even 
more significant cuts.   
o Reduce alert levels and eliminate LUA capability: a reduced planning for 
damage limitation, and an increased reliance on retaliation would reduce 
the necessity for prompt launch capability, and it could reduce the 
necessity for high alert levels as well. Changing these two policies could 
trigger changes in the nuclear delivery systems, and pave the way to a 
transition from the strategic triad to a dyad. 
This list of operational policies does not mean that all of these elements need to be 
changed in order to implement dramatic reductions in the force structure. It only showed 
a variety of factors which have a strong requirement with regards to force levels. Future 
administrations will need to pick their own preferences and implement some of these 
changes in their nuclear posture, if they want to implement significant reductions. 
President Obama’s employment guidance, which reaffirmed the Cold War-style 
counterforce targeting policy, the high alert levels, the capability to launch under attack, 
and the mission of nuclear weapons against biological and chemical weapons, as well as 
against a few non-nuclear weapon states, reflects that it will not pursue dramatic force 
reductions below the levels it already announced. The current operational principles 
would not even allow much deeper cuts, because of the above mentioned force 
requirements. As the third hypothesis of this dissertation framed it, “Retaining key 
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elements of Cold War nuclear thinking on the operational level has a negative effect on 
the prospects of further reductions.” In this regard, the most important factors are the 
mission of nuclear weapons, which designates the potential adversaries and target 
categories; the targeting policy with the damage expectancy levels, and the diversity in 
strike options; the reliance on counterforce strategy; and the requirements for a prompt 
launch capability with high alert levels and a launch under attack capability. If the 
current or future administrations decide to pursue further deep reductions, some (or all) 
of these elements need to be limited (or abandoned). 
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Conclusions 
In the 2009 Prague address, the Obama administration set for itself the standard of 
shifting away from Cold War nuclear thinking, which is the main reason why this 
dissertation approached this question from a historical perspective. The 45 years of the 
Cold War have been a dynamic period with several major innovations in nuclear 
weapons policy. Every administration tried to put its own stamp on U.S. nuclear 
doctrine and introduced new concepts and principles to guide military planners in the 
preparation of strategic war plans. But despite the shifting priorities of these 
administrations, there were several elements in U.S. nuclear strategy, which were 
characteristic during the entire period of the Cold War. Based on these elements, the 
dissertation clearly identified Cold War nuclear thinking on three main levels: the 
declaratory policy, the force structure, and the operational level. This analytical 
framework was used to evaluate the Obama administration’s achievements in nuclear 
weapons policy, and to define the current nature of U.S. nuclear strategy. 
Considering the developments in the institutional framework and the changes of the 
security environment, the analytical framework was based on the 1961-1989 period, 
from the Kennedy to the Reagan administrations. After a careful examination of these 
three decades, six main characteristics were identified in the declaratory policy. The 
first element was the worldview, which was based on a clearly identified enemy image, 
where the Soviet Union was the peer opponent of the U.S., and it was believed to 
constantly prepare for a surprise first strike against the Western Block; the role of the 
U.S. was seen as the global leader of the free world, tasked to ensure the victory of the 
good cause; and ready to use its nuclear weapons in the defense of its most important 
allies. The main doctrine was flexible response, which meant that the President was 
offered a number of options, starting from the use of conventional weapons, to an all-
out nuclear war. Preventive strikes, as a matter of policy, were ruled out, but the U.S. 
reserved the options to act preemptively if the enemy was seen to prepare for an attack. 
In order to preserve this option, Presidents rejected (with the exception of Kennedy) the 
policy of no-first-use, and they also retained their flexibility in terms of potential enemy 
targets, which required a rejection of a universal negative security assurance to all non-
nuclear weapon states. This meant that nuclear weapons occupied a prominent day-to-
day role in strategic planning, and they had to cover a great variety of contingencies. 
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Cold War nuclear thinking in the force structure meant an extremely robust nuclear 
arsenal with high number of nuclear weapons and delivery platforms, as well as a 
preference to deploy MIRVed ballistic missiles, which were able to hit several different 
targets in the same target group. The delivery vehicles included all three legs of the 
strategic triad, land-based ICBMs, sea-based SLBMs, and airborne strategic bombers. In 
order to minimize vulnerability to technical failures, and ensure a high level of 
credibility, there was a great diversity of nuclear warheads and nuclear weapons were 
regularly tested. This was guaranteed by an active infrastructure, which kept replacing 
portions of the arsenal in every few years, and eliminated the need to develop a constant 
hedging policy. Nuclear weapons, in addition, were forward deployed to the territory of 
allied states in order to more effectively protect them, and also to reflect U.S. 
commitments to their defense. 
On the operational level, Cold War nuclear thinking required a high readiness of forces, 
and nuclear weapons were kept on “hair-trigger” alert levels, some of them ready to be 
launched on a few minute notice. This high level of readiness served to provide prompt 
launch operational policies, like for example preemptive strike options, launch on 
warning, or launch under attack. For a few decades during the Cold War, the control of 
nuclear weapons was pre-delegated in order to mitigate the risks of a decapitating first 
strike, and also to raise mission effectiveness in regional scenarios. U.S. targeting policy 
was based on a counterforce strategy, which meant a primary focus on Soviet nuclear 
weapons capabilities, leadership and command and control targets, as well as war-
supporting and war-initiating infrastructure. Some administrations included softer 
categories, like for example after-war recovery infrastructure, but the primacy of 
counterforce targeting was never questioned. The focus on these hardened military 
targets required very conservative targeting criteria, which was based on high damage 
expectancy levels, and a lot of cross targeting and redundancy. War plans were mostly 
dominated by massive attack options, and only a very few real limited options were 
offered to the President. Target plans were preplanned and not flexible at all, which 
meant that it took a lot of time to adjust them and develop new options. Planning for a 
nuclear war meant that the U.S. was preparing to fight a prolonged nuclear exchange, 
potentially extended to a global scale. Although the policy level tried to reflect to the 
developments of the security environment and implement changes accordingly, but the 
lack of clear procedures for civilian oversight meant that military planners had a lot of 
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maneuvering capability to interpret the policy guidance documents and implement them 
according to their own judgment. War plans, in addition, seriously underestimated the 
potential damages of a nuclear strike, neglecting most of the secondary effects in their 
damage calculations. Humanitarian aspects, in general, also had a low profile in 
operational planning. Although civilians were not targeted per se and the emphasis was 
on military capabilities, targeting war-supporting, and after-war recovery infrastructure 
still held at risk massive civilian populations, and there was no guidance in place to hold 
these targets back, only because of their proximity to densely populated areas. 
These elements altogether add up to a comprehensive definition of Cold War nuclear 
thinking. A big advantage of this framework is to show that there are many different 
aspects of Cold War nuclear thinking, and – unlike many academic papers simplistically 
suggest – not all of these elements are outdated or inappropriate today. The idea of 
flexible response, for example, is still logical in the current security environment, 
although the focus seems to shift from a variety of nuclear options to a narrowed 
spectrum in nuclear, and a widened spectrum in conventional options. Or another 
example is providing positive security assurances to the closest allies, which is still an 
important bond between the U.S. and its allies, and some would argue that it still keeps 
some of these states from building their own nuclear weapons capabilities. Besides, the 
examination of these elements one-by-one revealed that some of these strategic policies 
have been developed for significantly different reasons than the ones they serve today. 
This means that ‘Cold War nuclear thinking’ as a concept might still be present in the 
current U.S. nuclear strategy, but it might no longer be Cold War thinking behind it.   
Regarding the main research questions of this dissertation, the author intended to show 
how President Obama’s Prague agenda affected U.S. nuclear weapons policy, and what 
practical changes did it trigger in nuclear strategy. The main goal was to objectively 
examine through the lens of the historical framework if the Obama White House really 
shifted U.S. nuclear strategy away from the Cold War. The basic assumption was that 
the administration’s declaratory policy showed significant changes but the operational 
level still maintained key elements of Cold War nuclear strategies, which sets serious 
limits on the minimum level of force requirements, and acts against future deep 
reductions. The comparative analysis of the Obama administration was always twofold, 
first the author showed how the Obama administration’s nuclear policy was different 
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from the previous post-Cold War administrations; and second, it also showed how the 
administration’s policy related to the Cold War traditions. 
In this regard, analyzing the Obama administration’s declaratory policy revealed that the 
2010 Nuclear Posture Review was indeed a significantly different document than the 
Clinton or the Bush administrations’ nuclear strategy. Building on the 2007-2008 
presidential campaign, and the 2009 Prague address, the Obama NPR meant a 
significant shift in five main areas. First, the framework of the NPR was extended, and 
besides the traditional focus on arms control, it also included nuclear security in its 
scope. Second, the administration implemented significant rhetorical changes in the role 
of nuclear weapons: it included, for the first time, the long term objective of global zero; 
it pledged to refrain from developing new nuclear weapons and from supporting new 
nuclear missions; it committed to ratify the CTBT; and it took steps towards a “sole 
purpose” posture, where nuclear weapons would only have a role in deterring a nuclear 
attack. The third area was the rhetoric towards Russia and China, which laid a huge 
emphasis on a cooperative relationship to promote strategic stability. China has never 
been handled in the same context as Russia – previous NPR documents rather put 
Beijing in the same group as rogue states. Similarly, the rhetoric towards other 
adversaries has also changed a lot. The U.S. extended its negative security assurance, 
and the only criteria remained the NPT membership, and the compliance with its 
obligations. This meant that only a few non-nuclear states remained, which were still 
threatened by U.S. nuclear weapons. But even for these states, the U.S. offered a way 
out, and the negative security assurance meant to provide them with a positive path. (In 
this regard, however, the U.S. maintained the right to unilaterally assess compliance, 
and despite the favorable rhetoric it did not change anything in operational terms, as 
none of the previously targeted countries was excluded by the new formulation of the 
negative security assurance.) The last issue was the relationship of the U.S. and its 
allies. The reception of the NPR was generally positive, as most of the allies could read 
their preferences into the NPR. The U.S., in addition, paid a bigger attention to their 
priorities, involved them in the drafting of the NPR, and reaffirmed that it will maintain 
its standing positive security assurances towards them. 
Despite these results, the U.S. still failed to clarify some ambiguities about the role of 
allies in strengthening reliance on regional conventional capabilities, the role of 
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prevention and preemption, and the policy towards biological weapons. Critics, in 
addition, question why the U.S. hesitated to declare a “sole purpose” posture; why the 
negative security assurance was not universal, why it retained the right to reevaluate the 
assurance in case biological weapons became more alarming; why a no-first-use 
declaration was not included; and if the new posture had any effect on the actual 
targeting policy. The author found that there were two main reasons for not 
implementing a more dramatic posture. The first one is the reassurance of allies which 
explains, for example, the wording of the negative security assurance, and the hesitation 
towards the “sole purpose” posture. The second reason is the Obama administration’s 
desire to build a bipartisan support behind its nuclear strategy, which explains most of 
the cautious linkages between issues like for example global zero and the maintenance 
of a safe, secure, and reliable arsenal; admitting to have more nuclear weapons than 
necessary but rejecting unilateral disarmament measures; expressing the desire to cut 
the arsenal but maintaining the triad, and transferring the decision on the withdrawal of 
tactical nuclear weapons to NATO.  
Examining these results along the Cold War framework showed that the security 
environment has significantly changed. While the chances of a U.S.-Russian nuclear 
exchange have dramatically reduced, Washington now faces a much wider range of 
potential opponents, and preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism have 
become the number one security challenge. As mentioned before, there are no changes 
in terms of a continued assurance of the allies with positive security guarantees, and in 
terms of a continued reliance on the concept of flexible response. The Obama 
administration, however, lessened the role of preemption in its rhetoric; reduced the 
mission of nuclear weapons; shifted towards a “sole purpose” posture, which would be 
an implicit no-first-use declaration; declared a more comprehensive negative security 
assurance than any U.S. President before; and declared that the fundamental role of 
nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear attack, and the use of nuclear weapons would only 
be considered in extreme circumstances. Compared to the prominent day-to-day role of 
nuclear weapons during the Cold War, these changes clearly show that the first 
hypothesis of the dissertation, which claims that “in the declaratory policy, the Obama 
administration has lessened the reliance on Cold War nuclear thinking” is true. 
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Looking at the force structure, the end of the Cold War brought significant reductions in 
the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Both Bush administrations cut the nuclear arsenal in half. In 
addition, the George W. H. Bush administration dramatically transformed U.S. nuclear 
forces in the framework of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, it declared a testing 
moratorium, and it concluded the START I and START II agreements. The Clinton 
administration introduced the concept of a permanent hedge force, it initiated the 
Stockpile Stewardship Program, and it was deeply engaged in the drafting of the CTBT. 
The George W. Bush administration continued the efforts of its predecessors, it 
concluded the SORT Treaty and it introduced several innovations in U.S. nuclear forces 
– these initiatives included the concept of a responsive force, the capabilities-based 
approach, or the idea of a “new triad.”  
In contrast to the two Bush administrations, the Obama administration only 
implemented moderate force reductions. Between 2009 and 2014, the military stockpile 
of the U.S. was only reduced by 309 nuclear warheads. The administration, however, 
concluded the New START agreement, which was the first verifiable arms control 
agreement since the START I. Although the treaty did not implement significant force 
reductions (the actual number of nuclear weapons allowed under the counting rules was 
well in the range of the SORT agreement), but New START put the U.S.-Russian arms 
control process back on track – it guaranteed transparency and confidence about the 
other side’s strategic nuclear capabilities, and it brought back serious verification 
mechanisms in the process. In addition to the New START agreement, the 
administration implemented two important structural changes in the U.S. nuclear 
arsenal. Under President Obama, the process of “de-MIRV”-ing the ICBMs was 
finished, and after 25 years, the Navy completely got out of the business of non-
strategic nuclear weapons. Looking at the future, the Obama administration committed 
to further reductions in the deployed strategic nuclear arsenals, and it also expressed its 
desire to seek reductions in the non-deployed, and non-strategic nuclear arsenals as 
well.  
Altogether, the force structure of the Obama administration showed significant 
continuities with the previous administrations, both in terms of numbers, and in terms of 
content (besides the moderate reductions of the New START Treaty, which reflected 
the Bush administration’s employment guidance, the Obama administration also 
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pledged to maintain all three legs of the strategic triad), but unlike the Bush 
administration, President Obama prefers seeking reductions in a bilateral treaty 
framework, and he is committed to ratify the CTBT. The main drivers of the Obama 
administration’s force structure are: maintaining strategic stability vis-à-vis Russia and 
China; strengthening the deterrence of potential regional adversaries; continued 
assurance of the allies; the implementation of the Stockpile Stewardship Program with 
continued investments in the nuclear weapons infrastructure; and finally, the level of 
Russian nuclear forces, which is still considered as the only peer in nuclear weapons 
capabilities.  
In addition to these elements, budget realities might become a new factor in the future 
of the stockpile. The United States is facing a “perfect storm” where the nuclear 
warheads, the delivery platforms and the nuclear weapons infrastructure are all in 
desperate need of significant investments to refurbish the ageing systems, develop the 
next generation of nuclear weapons, and build the necessary infrastructure to support 
these programs. The only problem is that the U.S. does not have the money to do that. 
In light of the sequestration and the shrinking defense budget, some crucial elements of 
the nuclear modernization programs are seriously endangered by the strict budget 
environment. The “3+2” warhead modernization strategy has already been postponed by 
five years (which directly affects the future of the non-deployed stockpile), and the 
CMRR-NF project has essentially been killed, while the UPF is running on a reduced 
budget. Therefore, cost overruns and further reductions in the available funds might 
slice some elements of the robust modernization programs, which will have a direct 
effect on the size and shape of the future nuclear arsenal of the U.S. 
Regarding the concept of Cold War nuclear thinking, strictly speaking only the 
continued commitment to the nuclear triad (at least under the New START agreement) 
remained the same. As opposed to that, the number and diversity of nuclear weapons 
have been significantly reduced, although the current number of U.S. nuclear forces was 
still identified as high, based on the comparison of U.S.-Russian nuclear arsenals with 
the nuclear weapons capabilities of any other state. The diversity of nuclear weapons 
has not disappeared either, as there are still multiple warhead types for all three legs of 
the triad. In the meanwhile, nuclear weapons testing was replaced by the Stockpile 
Stewardship Program, and a hedging policy was introduced in the early 1990s to 
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address the unforeseen geopolitical challenges of the security environment, and the 
potential technical failures of a warhead type or a delivery vehicle. The last element of 
Cold War nuclear thinking was forward deployment of nuclear weapons, which was 
reaffirmed by the Obama administration as well, although the number of these weapons 
has been significantly cut since the Cold War, and all forward deployed nuclear 
weapons have been withdrawn with the exception of 180-200 tactical nuclear weapons 
in the territory of five NATO allies.  
Examining the main reasons behind these policies showed that there were significant 
shifts in the case of many of these elements. The high number of nuclear weapons no 
longer seems to address the Russia-threat in itself: the U.S. admitted that the chances of 
a nuclear exchange with Russia are extremely remote, and today these nuclear forces 
serve a much wider range of contingencies. The current nuclear arsenal has to maintain 
strategic stability with Moscow and Beijing, but it also has a new role in deterring 
regional WMD proliferator states. In the case of the delivery platforms, the triad 
traditionally served to guarantee survivability by the SSBNs, prompt launch capability 
by the ICBMs, and flexibility by the strategic bombers. These three legs provided 
Presidents with a wide range of options, they were considered the most effective way to 
deter opponents and reassure allies, they served strategic stability by reducing the 
incentives for a first strike, and they erased vulnerabilities by providing inter-leg 
hedging capabilities for the potential technical failures of an entire platform. These 
arguments still seem to be present in the debate, but in addition to them the political 
aspect of maintaining the triad seems to gain a bigger and bigger emphasis. As Morton 
Halperin highlighted, maintaining the triad can also be used as a political bargaining 
chip to enhance further reductions in the number of warheads.  
Similarly, the diversity of nuclear weapons, and the forward deployment of tactical 
nuclear weapons also have some alternative justifications today, in comparison to the 
bipolar system. During the Cold War, the diversity of nuclear weapons was a result of 
an active infrastructure, and it was rather a sign of constant technological developments, 
which provided the U.S. military with newer and more capable weapons systems year-
by-year. In the meanwhile, maintaining the diversity today is mostly important for 
technical reasons. As the U.S. declared a testing moratorium, and switched to the 
Stockpile Stewardship Program and the Life Extension Programs, it became imperative 
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to provide a constant technical back-up to the deployed nuclear weapons. Having a 
diverse stockpile with multiple options for each delivery platform is increasingly 
important to erase potential technical failures and to maintain the credibility of the 
arsenal.  
Regarding the last element, the forward deployment of tactical nuclear weapons used to 
have many justifications, including reassurance, deterrence, burden-sharing and 
signaling. But from this list, the most important mission was to deter the Warsaw Pact 
from attacking NATO and, in case deterrence would fail, to support a theater nuclear 
war between the two alliances. Today, on the other hand, this focus has shifted towards 
the reassurance of allies (especially the new members of NATO), who still seem to 
attach a significant political value to these nuclear weapons. Altogether, these shifts 
show again that Cold War nuclear thinking might still be there as a concept, but the 
thinking behind does not necessarily reflect Cold War logic, or at least not necessarily 
with the same emphasis as before. 
On the operational level, President Obama inherited from the Clinton and the two Bush 
administrations flexible and adaptive planning capabilities, which on the one hand 
significantly reduced the time to adjust the war plans, and the development of new 
strike options; and on the other hand, these capabilities also allowed the U.S. to cover a 
much wider range of scenarios with significantly less nuclear weapons than before. This 
latter capability was especially important, as the post-Cold War targeting policy 
significantly extended the scope of potential contingencies, which the U.S. had to cover 
with nuclear weapons. This shift in focus meant that Russia was no longer considered 
an immediate contingency, and strike plans increased their attention on China and 
WMD proliferator states. Although the rhetoric of these administrations reflected an 
essentially post-Cold War thinking, the operational level did not limit the role of nuclear 
weapons, in fact it expanded the mission of nuclear weapons to cover regional WMD 
scenarios, where under the Bush administration, the preemptive use of nuclear weapons 
was an explicit operational policy. A new war plan (CONPLAN 8022) was developed to 
cover these contingencies, which seemed to lower the threshold to use nuclear weapons; 
increased the role of strategic nuclear weapons in theater missions; and significantly 
blurred the lines between conventional and nuclear weapons. This on the one hand 
seemed to increase the likelihood of nuclear use, and on the other hand raised some 
DOI: 10.14267/phd.2015009
237 
 
serious concerns about the different lines of command, and the reactions of adversaries 
and allies as well. Moscow and Beijing repeatedly expressed their worries about the 
new Global Strike mission and used it as a justification to their own modernization 
programs. Although the employment component of Global Strike was withdrawn and 
the entire program was canceled, some of its missions were believed to migrate into the 
other plans. 
Under the Obama administration, there were two major updates to the war plan, the first 
one probably as a result of the retirement of the nuclear capable Tomahawk cruise 
missiles, and the retirement of 80 Russian ICBMs. In the meanwhile, the second one is 
believed to be underway at the moment, in reflection to the new presidential guidance of 
the administration, issued in June, 2013. Regarding the potential adversaries, Iraq and 
Libya have fallen off the list since the Bush administration, and the Obama 
administration is believed to have added a new category, a “9/11-type” terrorist 
organization, which initiates a WMD attack on the U.S. or its allies and partners. 
Besides these changes, Russia, China, North Korea, Iran and Syria probably remained 
on the list, which adds up to six adversaries – half of which is non-nuclear. In Russia, 
the number of targets is estimated at around 1,000 with a primary focus on Russian 
nuclear weapons capabilities, while in China this number is estimated at 500, with a 
bigger emphasis on war-supporting industry targets. The strike options range in size 
from very limited regional employments to the use of hundreds of nuclear weapons in a 
more robust preplanned strike option. The target categories surprisingly reflect a very 
similar system to the Cold War: in addition to the traditional focus on military forces, 
leadership and command and control targets, and war-supporting infrastructure, the only 
new element is WMD infrastructure, which gradually gained a bigger significance after 
the fall of the Soviet Union. 
A key document of the Obama administration’s operational policy is the 2013 
presidential employment guidance (PPD-24), which was only initiated after the NPR 
was issued, and the New START negotiations were completed. This was the third major 
targeting review since end of the Cold War, and the first one since the Bush 
administration’s review in 2002. The first big problem of this document (or at least in 
the case of the unclassified Pentagon summary of PPD-24) was that it did not seem to 
provide any real guidance on targeting categories and strike options – it basically 
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repeated the main goals of the 2010 NPR, and explained how these elements should be 
implemented. The most genuine effect of the guidance was that it made the case for 
further reductions in the number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons by up-to one 
third, and it included some constraints with regards to the use of nuclear weapons. But 
besides these declarations, the new guidance did not implement any major changes, and 
it seemed to provide only half-solutions – the wording of the document implied 
discussions about implementing really progressive policies but it seemed that there was 
always some kind of push-back in the next sentence. President Obama, for example, 
pledged to reduce the role of nuclear weapons, but his guidance failed to declare a “sole 
purpose” posture, which implied that there is still a narrow range of contingencies 
where the U.S. would consider the use of nuclear weapons in response to conventional, 
or chemical and biological attacks. Although the guidance stated that the President 
directed the DoD to deliberately plan for non-nuclear strike options, it also stated that 
these capabilities cannot substitute nuclear weapons. Another example is the case of 
launch under attack policy – the White House directed the DoD to reduce reliance on 
this policy, but in the meanwhile it also directed to maintain the capability. While the 
issue of reducing alert levels was high on the campaign agenda, it suddenly disappeared 
from the list of priorities, and both the 2010 NPR and the 2013 employment guidance 
pledged to maintain the current levels. The guidance in addition reinforced counterforce 
targeting, and rejected the counter-value strategy and the minimum deterrence posture. 
But as STRATCOM said itself, counterforce “is preemptive, or offensively reactive” 
and it also has strong requirements on the force structure.    
Looking at these policies through the lens of the Cold War, every element of Cold War 
nuclear thinking changed in a way but only the policies of pre-delegation of control, and 
the planning for a protracted global war disappeared entirely. In addition to these 
policies, the lack of clear civilian oversight was also addressed, and it was dramatically 
improved as a result of a much closer cooperation between the different players of 
strategic planning. Despite these changes, all the other elements of Cold War nuclear 
thinking were somehow transformed or limited but not abandoned, which means that 
they still define the operational level of U.S. nuclear strategy. The first one of these 
elements is high alert levels. In this regard, there were significant reductions, bombers 
have been taken off day-to-day alert, as well as thousands of tactical nuclear weapons. 
But the U.S. still has 800 SLBM and ICBM warheads on high alert, ready to launch in 
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fifteen minutes. In close relation to this element, the reliance on prompt strike 
operational policies like preemption, launch on warning and launch under attack has 
also been significantly reduced but the capability to execute these policies remained. 
Although the current employment guidance does not discuss preemption or launch on 
warning, the capability to maintain LUA means that the other two policies are also 
executable (only there is probably even less thinking about them – in the case of the 
launch on warning policy, the 1980 PD-59 has already used a similar wording to the 
current employment guidance: it reduced the reliance on LOW, while it also directed the 
DoD to maintain the capability). Regarding the targeting policy of the U.S., it remained 
mostly counterforce, which shows slight differences from adversary to adversary – 
China for example is a mix of hard counterforce elements and softer targets, while 
Russia and the WMD proliferators are predominantly counterforce. The targeting 
criteria has also changed somewhat since the Cold War: it is still conservative but 
damage expectancy levels have been lowered, and there is significantly less cross 
targeting and redundancy in the system. In the case of attack options, massive attack 
options disappeared, and the current options include Emergency Response Options, 
Selective Attack Options, Basic Attack Options, and Directed/Adaptive Planning 
Capability options. Although the U.S. still has huge preplanned attack options with the 
employment of hundreds of nuclear weapons, today there is probably bigger emphasis 
on very limited attacks in primarily regional scenarios, and conventional integration is 
becoming stronger and stronger. Since the Cold War, the strategic war plans have been 
restructured, the SIOP was renamed to OPLAN, and the U.S. developed adaptive 
targeting capabilities, which allow real-time targeting adjustments, and a very quick 
development of new attack options. In terms of considering calculations on the 
secondary effects of a nuclear blast, there have been some developments – even if not 
all of the factors are included in the war planning models, strategic thinkers consider 
EMP effects, radiation patterns and fallout, and they probably include to a greater extent 
firestorms and radiation in general. Besides, withholding targets based on these effects 
has also appeared. In close relation to these issues, President Obama included in his 
2013 employment guidance that the humanitarian aspects should be included in the 
strategic war plans, and planners should minimize collateral damage to civilians – this 
might not mean avoiding the targeting of Moscow or Beijing, but it is still an important 
constraint for targeteers. 
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The second hypothesis of this dissertation claims that President Obama failed to 
implement his own promises on the operational level, and “it still retains key elements 
of Cold War nuclear thinking.” Summarizing this long list above, the most important 
Cold War legacies, which still seem to guide U.S. operational policy are: the rejection 
of counter-value and minimum deterrence postures, while counterforce targeting was 
reaffirmed; the maintenance of the triad and a significant upload capability; the 
continued role of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states; the maintained capability 
to launch under attack; and the still high alert levels. These elements put a huge pressure 
on the force structure and they seem to stand in the way of future deep reductions. 
In comparison to the declaratory policy level, where mainly political reasons (seeking a 
bipartisan support and reassuring allies) seemed to be the most important reasons for not 
implementing even more progressive measures in the strategy, the case of the 
operational level shows a more significant reliance on “parochial” interests. 
Bureaucratic resistance and greater strategic considerations seem to feature strongly in 
these debates. In the case of alert levels, opponents of de-alerting claimed that it would 
be risky to reduce the readiness of forces for crisis stability considerations, as a re-
alerting race in a conflict situation could actually make the use of nuclear weapons more 
likely. Besides, there was a strong resistance in the military against de-alerting 
measures, because of technical difficulties in the implementation, fears of the morale 
consequences on the ballistic missile crews, and also because they do not see any 
reliable verification mechanism to provide confidence that the adversary has 
implemented the same measures. This latter issue has some political relevance as well – 
the administration also held it against reducing alert levels that the current relations with 
Moscow do not imply any willingness in the Russians to engage in an agreement over 
alert levels, and unilateral measures were not a preferred option for the administration.  
Similarly to the issue of alert levels, bureaucratic resistance was important in the case of 
launch under attack policy as well. Military planners claim that LUA provides 
survivability to the ICBMs, and in a crisis situation it gives the President a wider range 
of options, while abandoning this policy would not bring any real world gains for the 
U.S. They argued that abandoning the capability to launch under attack would reduce 
the flexibility of the President, and it would leave the ICBMs vulnerable. From a 
strategic perspective, this was claimed to be dangerous, as letting an adversary 
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confidently believe that it can take out a significant portion of U.S. nuclear forces would 
be an invitation for a first strike, which no President can allow. In addition, the current 
operational policies (like for example counterforce targeting against Russia, and high 
damage expectancy criteria) still require U.S. forces to be on a high readiness level, and 
to be able to launch immediately. Besides, it provides a hedge against any future 
survivability challenges to the submarine leg of the triad, and an additional strategic 
value of this policy is that it has a strong deterrence effect, which is not necessarily 
directed against Russia anymore, but much rather against North Korea.  
All these considerations guaranteed that instead of abandoning these two (Cold War) 
operational policies, the U.S. would retain them, and only implement supplementary 
measures to mitigate the most important risks of their maintenance. In the case of alert 
levels, the administration pledged to continue the practice of open ocean targeting, take 
measures to increase presidential decision time, and explore new modes for ICBM 
basing to make them more survivable. In the case of LUA, there are continuing efforts 
to make ICBMs more survivable, make them less lucrative targets for a first strike (i.e. 
de-MIRV them), and also to strengthen the command and control systems, and increase 
presidential decision time. 
By examining the requirements of these operational policies on the force structure, the 
following measures were identified as potential steps to pave the way for further 
significant reductions: introduce a “sole purpose” posture, and apply an unconditional 
negative security assurance to limit the number of contingencies and adversaries against 
which nuclear weapons play a role; limit damage criteria to reduce the reliance on more 
capable, higher yield nuclear weapons; reduce flexibility requirements for strike 
options, which could reduce the number of scenarios that nuclear weapons have to 
cover; end (hard) counterforce targeting, which would reduce reliance on a robust and 
advanced nuclear arsenal, and could also significantly reduce the amount of weapons, 
which are needed to hold at risk the designated targets; and finally reduce planning for 
damage limitation, which would mean a reduced reliance on alert levels and LUA 
capability, potentially triggering significant changes in the delivery platforms. 
Based on the third hypothesis of this dissertation, as long as these elements are 
maintained, there is a tremendous pressure on the force structure, and the administration 
cannot implement any major reductions. In the meanwhile, all the above mentioned 
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elements have the potential to reduce force requirements, and facilitate further 
disarmament measures. Although changing these operational policies is only the first 
step of the implementation, it cannot be avoided. The future of reductions will still 
depend on the security environment, the U.S.-Russian, U.S.-Chinese strategic relations, 
or the composition of Congress, but without reducing these operational requirements, 
even the most favorable political conditions would fail to trigger any dramatic reduction 
in the U.S. nuclear arsenal. This is the main reason why the Obama administration’s 
2013 employment guidance seems to miss a huge opportunity to pave the way for even 
more significant reductions, and if any future U.S. administration wants to continue 
these efforts, it has to be more effective in leaving the legacies of the Cold War behind. 
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Glossary 
 
3+2 warhead modernization strategy: The “3+2” strategic vision aims “to transition 
the composition of the stockpile to a total of five unique systems: Three 
ballistic missile‐type warheads, each deployable on both Air Force and 
Navy delivery systems, employing three interoperable nuclear explosive 
packages with adaptable non‐nuclear components [and] two types of 
air‐delivered nuclear weapons, both deployable in a cruise missile and a 
bomb weapon system, employing interoperable nuclear explosive packages 
with adaptable non‐nuclear components.” (FY 2014 SSMP [2013]: p. 1-2.) 
 
Alert level: The operational readiness of nuclear weapon systems. “There are 
differences in levels of alert across time and across nuclear geography.” 
Based on these differences, one can differentiate between the following 
categories: high alert (ready to fire within minutes); medium alert (ready to 
fire within hours); low alert (ready to fire on several days notice); and de-
alerted (cannot be fired for a long period, for example, weeks). (EWI 
[2009]: p. 3.) 
 
Arms race stability: “Arms race stability involves the effect of planned deployments on 
the scope and pace of the arms race.” (U.S. Congress, Office of Technology 
Assessment [1985]: p. 119.) 
 
Command and control: “The exercise of authority and direction by the president, as 
commander in chief through established command lines over nuclear 
weapon operations of military forces, as chief executive over all government 
activities that support those operations, and as head of state over required 
multinational actions that support those operations.” (Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological 
Defense Programs [2011]: p. 312.) 
 
Command and control system: “The facilities, equipment, communications, 
procedures, and personnel that enable presidential nuclear direction to be 
carried out.” (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, 
Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs [2011]: p. 312.) 
 
Counterforce targeting: “The employment of strategic air and missile forces in an 
effort to destroy, or render impotent, selected military capabilities of an 
enemy force under any of the circumstances by which hostilities may be 
initiated.” (The definition was quoted from the JCS in Arkin; Handler; 
Morrissey; Walsh [1990]: p. 184.) “Typical counter-force targets include: 
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bomber bases, ballistic missile submarine bases, intercontinental ballistic 
missile (ICBM) silos, antiballistic and air defense installations, command 
and control centers, and weapons of mass destruction storage facilities.” 
(Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and 
Biological Defense Programs [2011]: p. 240.) 
 
Countervailing strategy: It was announced by President Carter's PD-59 employment 
guidance in 1980. It means that “in an era of strategic nuclear equivalence, 
it is necessary to have nuclear (as well as conventional) forces such that in 
considering aggression against our interests any adversary would recognize 
that no plausible outcome would represent a victory on any plausible 
definition of victory [...] if deterrence fails initially, we must be capable of 
fighting successfully so that the adversary would not achieve his war aims 
and would suffer costs that are unacceptable, or in any event greater than 
his gains, from having initiated an attack.” (PD-59 [1980]) 
 
Counter-value targeting: “Strategies or attacks against an opponent’s civilian 
population and general economic centers that constitute the social fabric of 
the nation.” (Arkin; Handler; Morrissey; Walsh [1990]: p. 185.) 
 
Crisis stability: “Crisis stability is the degree to which strategic force characteristics 
might, in a crisis situation, reduce incentives to initiate the use of nuclear 
weapons.” (U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment [1985]: p. 
119.) 
 
Damage expectancy: “The probability that a weapon will arrive, detonate, and achieve 
at least a specified level of damage (severe or moderate) against a given 
target. Damage expectancy is a function of both probability of arrival and 
probability of damage of a weapon.” (U.S. Department of Defense [2001]: 
p. 141.)  
 
Declaratory policy: It basically refers to a broad set of public statements and written 
documents made by the President, the Secretary of Defense and other high-
ranking officials on the requirements of deterrence, the strategic doctrine 
and the most important guidelines for nuclear weapons policy. 
 
De-alerting: “Implementing some reversible physical changes in a weapon system that 
would significantly increase time between decision to use the weapon and 
the actual moment of its launch.” (EWI [2009]: p. 2.) 
 
De-targeting: “Removing the targeting information, or substituting ocean-area target 
coordinates, from a ballistic missile so that an accidental or unintentional 
launch will not result in a nuclear catastrophe (USIA).” (NATO [2007]: p. 
1-17.) 
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Disarmament: “The reduction of a military establishment to some level set by 
international agreement” or by a unilateral declaration. (U.S. Department of 
Defense [2001]: p. 164.) 
 
Dismantlement: “The process of taking apart a nuclear warhead and removing all 
subassemblies, components, and individual parts for the purpose of physical 
elimination of the nuclear warhead. Dismantled subassemblies, components 
and parts, including nuclear materials, may be put into a disposal process, 
may be used again in another warhead, or may be held in strategic 
reserve.” (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, 
Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs [2011]: pp. 307-308.) 
 
Downloading: Removing some warheads from a multiple independently targetable re-
entry vehicle (MIRV). 
 
Dual-capable aircraft: “Allied and US fighter aircraft tasked and configured to 
perform either conventional or theatre nuclear missions. Also called DCA.” 
(NATO [2007]: p. 1-17.) 
 
First strike stability: “A condition that exists when neither superpower perceives the 
other as motivated by the posture of strategic forces to launch the first 
nuclear strike in a crisis.” (Kent; Thaler [1989]: p. iii.) 
 
Flexible response: “The capability of military forces for effective reaction to any enemy 
threat or attack with actions appropriate and adaptable to the 
circumstances existing.” (U.S. Department of Defense [2001]: p. 206.) 
 
Force structure: The necessary type and number of nuclear weapons and delivery 
vehicles needed to meet the requirements of the operational level and to 
fulfill the role and mission set by the declaratory policy. 
 
Heavy ICBM: “The term ‘heavy ICBM’ means an ICBM of a type, any one of which 
has a launch weight greater than 106,000 kilograms or a throw-weight 
greater than 4350 kilograms.” (START I [1991c]: Annex p. 5.) 
 
Hedge: The hedge force was officially codified by the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review of 
the Clinton administration. It is a permanent reserve force to provide an up-
build capability against a dramatic deterioration of the security environment, 
and a technical insurance to secure against the potential failure of a warhead 
type or a delivery system. In general, it is smaller than the operational non-
deployed arsenal (there are some “grey areas” between the hedge and the 
non-deployed arsenal), and it contains both active and inactive warheads. 
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Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS): “The joint staff of the air force, navy, 
army, marine corps, and representatives of NATO allies that plans strategic 
nuclear force allocations to enemy targets listed in the SIOP [and 
OPLAN].” (Pringle; Arkin [1983]: p. 255.) 
 
Launch on warning (LOW): “A condition under which bombers and missiles would be 
launched on receipt of early warning that an opponent has launched his 
missiles.” (Pringle; Arkin [1983]: p. 255.) 
 
Launch under attack (LUA): “A condition where the early-warning information 
received on the launch of an opponent's missiles is confirmed and bombers 
and missiles are launched to survive an attack.” (Pringle; Arkin [1983]: p. 
255.) 
 
Life Extension Program (LEP): “A program to repair/replace components of nuclear 
weapons to ensure the ability to meet military requirements. By extending 
the ‘life,’ or time that a weapon can safely and reliably remain in the 
stockpile without having to be replaced or removed, National Nuclear 
Security Administration (NNSA) is able to maintain a credible nuclear 
deterrent without producing new weapons or conducting new underground 
nuclear tests.” (NNSA [2014a]) 
 
Massive retaliation: A doctrine announced by the 1953 NSC-162/2 guidance and by 
John Foster Dulles in January, 1954. “A strong military posture, with 
emphasis on the capability of inflicting massive retaliatory damage by 
offensive striking power; U.S. and allied forces in readiness to move rapidly 
initially to counter aggression by Soviet bloc forces and to hold vital areas 
and lines of communication; and a mobilization base, and its protection 
against crippling damage, adequate to insure victory in the event of general 
war.” (NSC-162/2 [1953]: pp. 5-6) 
 
Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD): “A doctrine of reciprocal deterrence that rests 
on the ability of two opponents to inflict unacceptable damage on one 
another after surviving a nuclear first strike.” (Pringle; Arkin [1983]: p. 
256.) It was announced by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in 1964.  
 
Military stockpile: The military stockpile of the U.S. nuclear arsenal (also called as 
“active stockpile”) consists of the operational warheads. 
 
Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV): “A reentry vehicle 
carried by a delivery system that can place one or more reentry vehicles 
over each of several separate targets.” (U.S. Department of Defense [2001]: 
p. 359.) 
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National Command Authority: “The president and the secretary of defense or their 
duly deputized stand-ins or successors. The chain of command runs from the 
president to the secretary of defense and through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to 
the commanders of the regional and specified commands.” (Pringle; Arkin 
[1983]: p. 256.) 
 
Negative security assurance: It is a guarantee by a state that possesses nuclear 
weapons that it will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-
nuclear weapon states. 
 
No cities doctrine: A strategy which aims to totally avoid hitting major cities by 
nuclear strikes. It was announced by Secretary of Defense Robert 
McNamara in 1962. 
 
No first use declaration: A pledge by a state that possesses nuclear weapons that it will 
not use nuclear weapons as a means of warfare unless an adversary attacks it 
first by nuclear weapons. 
 
Non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS): According to the 1967 Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, all states which did not manufacture and explode a nuclear weapon 
or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967 were considered a 
non-nuclear weapon state. (NPT [1967]: Article IX) 
 
Nuclear parity: “A condition at a given point in time when opposing forces possess 
nuclear offensive and defensive systems approximately equal in overall 
combat effectiveness (USDoD).” (NATO [2007]: p. 1-21.) 
 
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR): “The Nuclear Posture Review is a legislatively-
mandated review that establishes U.S. nuclear policy, strategy, capabilities 
and force posture for the next five to ten years.” (U.S. Department of 
Defense [2010a]) 
 
Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy (NUWEP): The Office of the Secretary of 
Defense prepares the so called Guidance for the Employment of the Force, 
and the NUWEP is an appendix to the GEF which “provides general and 
country-specific planning scenarios and objectives” as well as “policy 
guidance for target selection and for the development of different types of 
attack options.” (GAO [2012]: p. 6.) 
 
Nuclear weapon state (NWS): According to the 1967 Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, “a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and 
exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 
January 1967.” This means the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, 
France, and China. (NPT [1967]: Article IX) 
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Nuclear yields: “The energy released in the detonation of a nuclear weapon, measured 
in terms of the kilotons or megatons of trinitrotoluene required to produce 
the same energy release.” (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs [2011]: pp. 313.) 
 
Operational level: This is the level where the “declaratory policy” should be 
implemented into concrete military strategies and war plans (while the 
principles of the declaratory policy are defined by politicians, the making of 
operational level strategies mostly falls under the control of the military – 
although since the mid-1980s civilians are having an increased role in the 
oversight of these strategies). 
 
Positive security assurance: It is a guarantee by a state that possesses nuclear weapons 
that it will come to the aid of a non-nuclear weapon state if it is attacked or 
threatened by another state with nuclear weapons. 
 
Pre-delegation of control: Predesignated officers are empowered by the commander 
“to act under stipulated emergency conditions in the accomplishment of 
previously defined functions.” (U.S. Department of Defense [2001]: p. 31.) 
 
Preemptive attack: “An attack initiated on the basis of incontrovertible evidence that 
an enemy attack is imminent.” (U.S. Department of Defense [2001]: p. 424.) 
 
Presidential employment guidance: It describes the administration’s priorities on what 
the DoD’s nuclear weapons employment policy (NUWEP) should look like. 
In general, this directive identifies potential adversaries, target categories, 
and scenarios for which preplanned nuclear options should be developed. 
(GAO [2012]: p. 5.) 
 
Prevailing strategy: As the 1981 NSDD-13 document stated, “the most fundamental 
national security objective is to deter direct attack – particularly nuclear 
attack – on the United States and its Allies. Should nuclear attack 
nonetheless occur, the United States and its Allies must prevail. Our nuclear 
forces are of crucial importance both in the prevention of nuclear attack 
and in protecting our national interests at any level of nuclear conflict. […] 
This requires that we be convincingly capable of responding in such a way 
that the Soviets or other adversary would be denied their political and 
military objectives.” (NSDD-13 [1981]: p. 1.) 
 
Preventive war: “A war initiated in the belief that military conflict, while not imminent, 
is inevitable, and that to delay would involve greater risk.” (U.S. 
Department of Defense [2001]: p. 428.) 
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Reliability replacement warheads: “Warheads retained in the inactive stockpile that 
provide the assets to replace Active Stockpile Warheads should reliability or 
safety problems develop.” (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs [2011]: pp. 314.) 
 
Refurbishment: “All nuclear weapons alterations and modifications including life 
extensions, modernizations, and revised military requirements.” (Office of 
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological 
Defense Programs [2011]: pp. 314.) 
 
Ride out policy: Forces are postured so that they will strike only after absorbing a first 
strike from the enemy. 
 
Sole purpose posture: A declaration by a state in possession of nuclear weapons that 
the sole purpose of its nuclear arsenal is to deter a nuclear attack against 
itself, and its allies and partners. 
 
Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP): “A management program which is able to 
maintain the “safety, security and effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent. 
[…] Within the Nuclear Security Enterprise, the central mission which 
includes maintaining the active stockpile, Life Extension Programs (LEPs) 
and Weapons Dismantlement, is referred to as the Stockpile Stewardship 
and Management Program.” (NNSA [2014b]) 
 
Strategic nuclear weapon: “Strategic nuclear weapons are designed to engage objects 
in geographically remote strategic regions (over 5500 km) to accomplish 
strategic missions. In exceptional situations, strategic nuclear weapons may 
be used to accomplish operational missions. Strategic nuclear weapons are 
in service with the strategic nuclear forces.” (NATO [2007]: p. 1-26.) 
 
Strategic stability: “A situation is stable when “nations would only use nuclear 
weapons to vindicate their vital interests in extreme circumstances” – in 
effect, a situation in which nuclear arms would only be employed for 
essentially “political” and basically defensive purposes, capturing the 
benefits of the nuclear revolution while minimizing its unnecessarily 
perilous aspects.” (Colby [2014]: p. 7.) 
 
Strategic triad: Strategic delivery vehicles which can deliver a nuclear attack by land, 
sea, or air: with land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, sea-based 
submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and airborne strategic bombers. 
 
Strategic war plan: The general plan for nuclear weapons employment. Between 1961 
and 2003 it was called SIOP, and since 2003 it is called OPLAN. The 
strategic war plan is not a single plan, but a family of plan, which is 
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overwhelmingly nuclear but it also contains conventional options. It 
provides the President with a range of targeting and strike options, and it 
describes the launch procedures and the target sets against which nuclear 
weapons would be launched. (Freedman [2003]: p. 395.) 
 
Tactical nuclear weapon/non-strategic nuclear weapon: “Those nuclear-capable 
forces located in an operational area with a capability to employ nuclear 
weapons by land, sea, or air forces against opposing forces, supporting 
installations, or facilities. Such forces may be employed, when authorized by 
competent authority, to support operations that contribute to the 
accomplishment of the commander’s mission within the theater of 
operations.” (U.S. Department of Defense [2001]: p. 379.) “While there are 
several ways to distinguish between strategic and nonstrategic nuclear 
weapons, most analysts consider nonstrategic weapons to be shorter-range 
delivery systems with lower yield warheads that might be used to attack 
troops or facilities on the battlefield.” (Woolf [2014a]: Summary) Or more 
simplistically, everything that is not covered by the START agreements.  
 
Target base: The intelligence community develops a list of worldwide military targets, 
called the Modified Integrated Database (MIDB), and based on the 
employment guidance documents STRATCOM selects the potential targets 
for nuclear weapons use, which is a subset of the MIDB and called the 
National Target Base (NTB). (McKinzie; Cochran; Norris; Arkin [2001]: 
pp. 9-10.) 
 
Weapons of mass destruction (WMD): “Atomic explosive weapons, radio active 
material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any 
weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in 
destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned 
above.” (UN [1948]) 
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